Between empiricism and intellectualism : Charles Taylor's answer to the 'media wars'. by Caldwell, Marc Anthony.
BETWEEN EMPIRICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM:
CHARLES TAYLOR'S ANSWER TO THE 'MEDIA WARS'
Marc Anthony Caldwell
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, in the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, at the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
Durban, November 2008
Declaration
I declare this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Science, in the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. It has not been submitted before for any other









Science Wars, Post-Marxism, Taylor 18
Chapter Two:
Journalism and the Media Wars...................................... 48
Chapter Three:
Taylor's philosophical anthropology.................................. 78
Chapter Four:
Taylor and the New Left
Chapter Five:












My thanks go to my 'thesis-widowed' wife, Adi, who patiently read through the final
drafts. Thanks too, to my supervisor, Professor Keyan Tomaselli, for remaining confident
that despite its multiple versions, a final version of this thesis would eventually emerge.
IV
Abstract
When the Media Wars broke out in Australian universities in the mid-1990s,
journalism educator Keith Winschuttle accused cultural studies of teaching theory that
contradicted the realist and empirical worldview ofjournalism practice. He labeled cultural
studies as a form of linguistic idealism. His own worldview is decidedly empiricist.
The thesis brings to Windschuttle's empiricist-idealist dualism a type oftranscendental
argument that uses Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor's understanding of modernity as a
paradox between the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions. Taylor was an instrumental
member of the New Left movement (beginning in 1956) while he was a student at Oxford.
Together with Stuart Hall, he edited ajournal that became a precursor to New Left Review.
While at Oxford, Taylor went to Paris to study with Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Upon his
return he brought back a copy ofMarx's 1844 Manuscripts, which he translated into English
for his colleagues. Taylor was instrumental in introducing Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology
there. Hall mentions in recent interviews his debt to Taylor for their discussions on Marx and
Hege1.
Taylor's approach to post-Marxism and his critique ofpositivist social science derives
significantly from his reading ofMerleau-Ponty, whose Phenomenology ofPerception (1962)
rejects both empiricism and intellectualism (idealism) for their sharing a Cartesian model of
subjectivity. British Cultural Studies began (Hall says in 1956) with a rejection ofthe
economism ofclassical Marxism, and sought a more plausible theory ofagency than what
Marxism offered at that time. The correspondence between the debates in early cultural
studies and Taylor's extensive writing on this matter, together with his overall critique of
modernity, appear too close to be coincidental. Furthermore, these debates were driven by
an attempt to steer between the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions, thus embracing in
their own intellectual practices Marx's (and Hegel's) dialectical method.
Drawing upon the correspondences between Taylor's and cultural studies' attempts to
resolve the paradoxes ofmodernity, it becomes clear that Windschuttle's dualism can be absorbed
within the problematic ofcultural studies. Furthermore, drawing on Taylor's use of the humanist
Marx, Hegel and Merleau-Ponty, Windschuttle's empiricist paradigm can be shown to fail
to provide a plausible (and therefore ethical) model ofagency. A study ofTayIor's philosophical
anthropology provides the basis by which this failure can be addressed. Taylor's philosophy
is equally useful in addressing this lacuna in postmodern cultural studies.
v
Introduction
When Australian historian Keith Windschuttle l (1997a; 1998a; 1998b) accused
cultural studies scholars in journalism education of misrepresenting the subject and
corrupting aspirant student journalists, those same scholars responded that their critic
had misrepresented their field (see Hartley 1999; Bacon 1999; Turner 2000).
Windschuttlefirst put his case in a paper, Poverty ofMedia Theory, delivered at the
Journalism Education Association's annual conference held in Aukland, New
Zealand, in December 1995. The paper was republished in various forms
(Windschuttle 1997a; 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998d; 1999; 2000), and as the content of
these articles is very similar, reading anyone of them provides the gist of them all.
Each version argues that a journalism education programme should uphold three
principles: (I) a realist outlook and an empirical methodology committed to reporting
the truth; (2) an ethical attitude towards one's audiences; and (3) good writing in the
plain style. Each paper holds that 'media theory' (in cultural studies) has no place in
professional education on grounds that it contradicts each of these principles and is
intellectually incoherent.
When describing the events 'down under', one is easily given to hyperbole and
satire. Mandy Oakham (2002) sets the scene, in "the dark galaxy of Australian
education," where at the dawn of a new era symbolized by the 'modem, corporate
university' there was an "evil Empire run by government intent on slashing university
funding," causing a ripple effect of interdisciplinary struggles and "Vive Chancellors
fighting for funding, student load, research points and ultimately for survival"
(Oakham 2002: 265). In the corporate university students became customers wanting
certificates that could be 'cashed in' on the job market. Education had to become
vocationaJly relevant. Graduates had to be able to do something with their degrees.
I David Row (2004), who teaches journalism and media studies at the University of Newcastle,
Australia, introduces Windschuttle thus: "erstwhile left-wing university lecturer in Media Studies and
Social History turned private media educator and, later, right-wing provocateur" (Rowe 2004: 43).
Journalism education and cultural studies made the vocational versus the liberal arts
distinction palpably concrete. It was not long before there was trouble.
The opening shots of the Media Wars, as they were dubbed in Australia, were fired in
1995. As always in every great battle there were the conscripts forced into
confrontation by virtue of their location within the perceived journalistic ranks. Some
conscripts found themselves in "no-mans land" and this was a battle fought out in
mostly masculine territory with the loudest wails coming from pierced egos.
The great battle down under was fought out between the forces of the Republic, the
Jedi Knights of Journalism flashing their lasers of factual empiricism against the
massing dark forces of the Federation, some disguised as media studies exponents, but
most were wearing their eclectic uniforms of cultural studies flashing their own light
[sabers] of radical contextualism and other sinister linguistic devices. These dark
forces were led by the biggest Darth Vader of them all ... John Hartley (Oakham
2002: 266).
Evidently, Hartley (1995) fired the first shot that 'rang around the world' of
journalism education. But he should have 'checked his facts', as Windschuttle points
out (2000: 152-153).2 "It should have been enough to point out the inaccuracies and
move on," says Oakham, but "Windschuttle, who owns and operates his own
journalism training centre, Macleay College in Sydney, declared all-out war"
(Oakham 2002: 267). At the Aukland conference that same year, WIndschuttle
"thundered that there should be 'no more theory' in the teaching ofjournalism"
(Oakham 2002: 267). The matter did not stop there, and Hartley (1999) and others
(Tomaselli and Shepperson 1999) committed further fuel to the flames. From
Hartley's description of "young [newsroom] cadets [who] have the crap kicked out of
them by overbearing and unsympathetic supervisors whose job is to prepare them for
the factory system of new production," Oakham adds:
It is alleged that Hartley in an earlier, pre-academic life, spent a short time as a cadet
on a newspaper. Clearly he did not find it a pleasurable experience (Oakham 2002:
269).
A conference was held by cultural studies scholars in 1998, to which they
invited Windschuttle and a representative number ofjournaJism educators were
2 Windschuttle (2000) calls into question Hartley's (1995: 26) description ofjournalists as "petty-
bourgeois, self-employed white collar workers." The description, Windschuttle shows, derives directly
from Nicos Poulantzas's repeating Louis Althusser's earlier "claim that the press, radio and television
are ideological apparatuses of the capitalist state and that those who work for the media are therefore
members of the class that supports this state .... Of course, this was all theorized nonsense when
Poulantzas wrote it in the 1970s and, in the hands of Hartley in the 1990s, it has not improved with
age" (Windschuttle 2000: 154).
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invited in a bed to settle the matter.3 Windschuttle, they complained, had reduced
cultural studies to the linguistic idealism that characterized postmodern literary
criticism, and not taken into account the materialist and more overtly Marxist aspects
of scholarship that defined the field. But the debate congealed into stagnant and
immovable positions of theory (cultural studies) and practice Uournalism training).
And from the proceedings, to paraphrase Emmanuel Kant's oft quoted dictum, it is
hard for an observer not to conclude that practice without theory is blind, and theory
without practice is empty.
Dead-ends, false starts, and some luck
This thesis began as an attempt to make sense of the apparently irresolvable
differences between the two sides in the debate. Some abortive theoretical ventures-
not worthy of mentioning - were attempted, but each fell successively on one or the
other side of the debate. A more illuminating discourse analysis was then undertaken,
studying propositions in a sample of papers delivered at two conferences in Durban,
KwaZulu-Natal, on the matter ofjournalism and press freedom. One conference was a
training symposium of Commonwealth editors hosted by the Commonwealth Press
Union in 1999,4 and the other was an academic conference on similar matters hosted
at the former University of Natal in 2000.
Using insights drawn from Barbie Zelizer's essay, Journalists as Interpretive
Communities (1993), and starting with tools of discourse analysis drawn from
previous research,S it became clear that the qualitative differences in talk at the two
conferences - both talking about journalism - could be accounted for by virtue of the
different communities a/practice to which the participants of each conference
belonged (see Wenger 2000). With a Foucaultian theory of discourse drawn from
J A special issue of Media International Australia, incorporating Cullure and Policy (No. 90, February,
1999) collects a range of responses to Windschuttle's position from the conference itself and includes
contributions from cultural studies writers such as John Hartley and Catharine Lumby.
4 I reported the event in the Daily News (15 September 1999). Delegates generally agreed that
democracy was a sham where governments remained hostile to a free press. The message these editors
took to the Commonwealth heads of state summit being held at the time reiterated the stance, in line
with the Windhoek Declaration, that journalism had to act as a bridle against the abuse of political and
economic power by providing for the public record an account of public life and government
performance. To this end, they asserted, journalism's proper stance towards government and big
business was an adversarial one.
S I had completed a Masters dissertation on a discourse analysis of a left-wing newspaper, The
International, which had been published by the International Socialist League in South Africa from
1915 to 1919.
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Norman Fairclough's (1995) poststructuralist discourse analysis, among other sources
(Billig 1999; Hammersley 1997; 2003; Tannen 2002) there seemed to be little or no
way to contemplate a bridge between these two camps; and by extension, between the
camps in the Media Wars.
A successive pilot project, conducting an ethnomethodological conversation
analysis (Schegloff 1992; 1997; 1999) on conversations between senior journaJists,6
brought me no closer to a solution.7 Zelizer's (1997) views on the unhappy adoption
ofjournal ism in cultural studies, reinforced by Larry Grossberg's (1993: 89) not
dissimilar thoughts about "the discipline of communication," made the prospect of
finding that 'common ground' between journalism and cultural studies even more
remote. But giving more thought to the constitutive function of conversation did open
up a promising space.
Putting aside agendas of institutional politics, at issue in Media Wars was not
insignificantly the discursive condition of what Zelizer (2004a) describes as the "God-
terms" ofjournalism's methodology and self-description - facts, truth and reality - at
odds with cultural theory's terms of "construction, subjectivity, and relativity"
(Zelizer 2004a: 112). But the fact that the "uneven interest in journalism among
cultural studies scholars seems to have ... derived from a critique ofenlightenment
and a lack of confidence in the emancipatory power of reason" (Zelizer 2004a: 110.
Emphasis added) caused me to step back and view the event against a bigger
6 After my first attempts at finding a way forward in the 'media wars' debate died out, I started an
ethnomethodoJogicaJ study of what journalists accomplish when they engage in mundane conversations
with each other about their experiences in journalism. The study was motivated by a comment Mylse
Breen (1998) makes:
In Australia there are still some within the journalistic culture who decry any notion that there is
a 'theory ofjournalism' even though they might theorise interminably over the bar about the
vagaries of their profession. When they indulge in 'shop talk', they enter the domain of theory. In
fact, by merely saying there is no theory, they are propounding a theoretical stance. Journalism
teachers, however, cannot afford to waste time on that argument. They typically carry large loads
and need to demonstrate to their administrative superiors that there is, indeed, a body of theory
behind what they teach. If not, then what are they teaching? (Breen 1998: 3).
The pilot study - as it unintentionaHy became - involved detailed conversation analyses of nine thirty-
minute conversations between pairs of senior reporters with more than fifteen years experience in the
field, and who all worked in the same newsroom. The intention was to study how they made sense of
their practice, understanding talk-at-work to be constitutive of practice (Drew and Heritage 1992), and
their Uournalism) practices to be "doings and sayings" (Schatzki 2002: 73). Conversation is understood
as a form of social action (see Holtgraves 2001), and as an integral component ofpractice.
7 Without having spent the more than a year it took to complete the initial conversation analysis, it is
doubtful that I would have come to see the 'bigger picture' I am referring to. The ethnomethodological
paradigm introduced me to a literature on practice that eventually led me first to Alasdair Maclntyre's
virtue ethics, and then to Charles Taylor's critique of modernity. The rest is history.
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phi losophical picture of the debate; which Zelizer impl ies in the second half of the
following quote (but the first part is also important):
For much of cultural studies ... mainstream journalism was examined through the
near-sighted eyes of the academy. In many of its forms,journalism became codified
as an extension of the sciences and the scientific model of knowledge production,
oppositionally positioned to cultural studies' dominant stance of criticism and
sometimes parody. Cultural studies reduced the impact of positivistic knowledge
about journalism to a whisper (Zelizer 2004a: 112).
In short, it was the politics of the academy that made journalism - that "sense-
making practice of modernity," as John Hartley (1995: 20) calls it, and therefore "the
most important textual system in the world" (see also Montgomery et al. 2002: 228) -
a research problem because, within the academy, it was a problem of epistemology.
But if journalism was represented as a practice embedded in positivist and empiricist
logics, Windschuttle's description of the practice's methodology only confirmed that
impression. He clearly positioned journalism as a binary opposite to cultural studies,
and made good his efforts by reducing that field to "linguistic idealism"
(Windschuttle 1998c: 6, 22). But the question of whether the 'problem ofjournalism'
started with the subject's adoption by cultural studies, or whether Windschuttle
himself adopted journalism as an unwitting ally in his prior campaign against
postmodern historiography - a campaign pursued in his book, The Killing ofHistory
(l997b) - is probably irrelevant. The epistemological challenges that journalism
education experiences in the academy are nothing new, but began when it ventured
into the academy more than a century ago.
Those challenges comprise a multifaceted thing that hinges around the signifier
of modernity. That journalism education is seen (quite correctly) to belong to
'vocational training' - not too differently to law, medicine, management studies,
education, accountancy, architecture, and a range of other curricula that clearly point
to a profession - its own practice orientation has remained suspect perhaps for lack of
any suitable professional accreditation body (which law, education, medicine and so
on have). But the modern aspects of instrumental reason - and the equally
instrumental relations between theory and practice those aspects entail - are not the
facet of modernity that concerns me. Instead, and without dismissing the theory-
practice moniker (1 shall return to a detailed discussion of the articulation of these
terms, in Chapter Two), when one compares the "God-terms" ofjournalism with
those of cultural theory (Zelizer 2004a: 112), and consider them as indexed in two
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competing sources of modernity - what are conventionally understood as modernity
and postmodernity - one begins to see that journalism's modern common sense
suffers from a dislocation - a crucial point of difference - between what Raymond
Williams (1977: 122, 125-126) defines as the residual and the emergent. My claim is
that journalism's 'God-terms' belong to a residual 'culture' of modernity, whereas the
oppositional concepts are (or were) decidedly emergent.
To illustrate the 'creative' dislocation between residual and emergent sources of
modernity, and to see where (British) cultural studies becomes an agent in that
dislocation, there is probably no clearer description than Stuart Hall's essay, The
rediscovery of 'ideology ': return ofthe repressed in media studies (1982). Hall pulls
together a number of threads that define the field, showing how the Birmingham
Centre critiqued the definitive sociological assumptions of communication science in
the 1950s and 1960s. But it is easy to overlook the phi losophical significance of those
first few pages of the essay. In those pages Hall describes the combined positivist,
empiricist and behaviourist paradigm of 'mainstream' mass communications research.
Empiricism was the paradigmatic common sense of sociology, psychology, political
science and other fields in the social sciences at that time; though having adopted
these paradigms probably did more to save mass communication research from
academic extinction than the record seems prepared to admit.
Nonetheless, cultural studies emerged (falteringly, of course) as a critical
reaction to that common sense. The field emerged also as a rejection of the
mechanistic economism of classical Marxism (Hall 1982: 83-84). Hall's essay
indirectly portrays an antinomy between Enlightenment (modernity) and its Romantic
'other' articulated in the figure of Marx; or what Canadian political philosopher
Charles Taylor identifies as "multiple modernities" (Taylor 2000b).8 Taylor's
conceptualization of "modem social imaginaries" expands the descriptor of' a
modernity' to the potency of a "hermeneutic of legitimation," by which "our
contemporaries imagine the societies they inhabit and sustain" (Taylor 2002a: 6, 7).
The paradigms of empiricism and constructivism that animated the Media Wars (as an
extension of the broader Science Wars) remain no less contending hermeneutic clues
to understanding modernity, and the real.
8 Charles Taylor was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford in the late 1950s a founding member of the New Left,
and a founding editor ofthe Universities & Left Review - the forerunner of the New Left Review.
Taylor shares these distinctions with Stuart Hall.
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If one recasts Windschuttle's localized realist-relativist binary into the broader
Enlightenment-Romantic (roughly coterminous with differences between analytic and
continental philosophy) contentions of Western modern philosophy, and then situate
the recast problematic into the combined anti-positivist, anti-behaviourist and anti-
empiricist picture that Hall (1982) presents as the stimulus of British Cultural Studies,
we are presented both with a way to render the 'media wars' debate as occurring
beyond the limitations of contending 'disciplinary' interests, but as occurring as a
regional skirmish within a much wider field of contentions that began with the advent
of modernity itself. That advent was the seventeenth century scientific revolution that
exploded the holistic Aristotelian corpus, and thrust into the historical stream the
paradigmatic logics that made mechanistic science possible. Empiricism was one
viable effect: shaped by Rene Descalies's rational 'inward turn' that informed his
philosophy of mind, followed by John Locke's empiricist subject, and Immanuel
Kant's attempt to restore a compromise between Cartesian doubt and the experience-
centric epistemology of empiricism. A term that encapsulates the modern force of the
Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian moment is "Enlightenment fundamentalism" - a term
Nicholas Smith (1997) adopts from Ernest Gellner (1992) and refines - which
"maintains that the becoming modem of a society and its characteristic ways of
understanding the world involves an irreversible process of disenchantment" (Smith
1997: 10).
From the Weberian perspective, the transition to modernity appears as an evolution
from traditional modes of thought and action like religion, revelation and myth, to
rational enlightened modes like science and technology. Enlightenment
fundamentalism then imports philosophical significance to the phenomenon of
disenchantment by construing it as definitive of the maturation of human rational
capacities. According to the Enlightenment fundamentalist, science and technology
are not merely the prevailing form of reason in modern times; they do not just
chronologically succeed religious and mythic ways of seeing the world. Rather, they
give the lie to those orders of significance which, as supposedly revealed through
myth, dogmatic metaphysics and religion, ground human identity in its pre-mature
phases of cognitive development. In other words, Enlightenment fundamentalism
construes disenchantment as conceptually as well as historically compelling. Denuded
of natural and traditional orders of meaning by genuine cognition, says the
Enlightenment fundamentalist, we are bound by reason, and not just by historical
circumstance, to acknowledge the truth of the contingent basis of human existence.
Though the yearning for ontological significance lingers, human beings are doomed
de facto and de jure, in Gellner's words, 'to suffer a tension between cognition and
identity' (Smith 1997: 10-11).
Identity for Taylor is not a historical constant in human experience, but a
specifically modern notion that would have been anachronistic in pre-modern
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cultures. This does not mean that identity was absent before modernity, but that the
problem of identity was not related to the individual as it is for modern subjects
(Taylor 1989a: 65). The point is made more strongly at the start of Alain de Benoist's
(2004) paper, On Identity, where he quotes Zygmunt Bauman's contention that
"[i]dentity never 'became' a problem, it has always been a problem, it started as a
problem" (de Benoist 2004: 9). Taylor would add that this problem is a moral one.
Given Zelizer's (2004a: 110) understanding of cultural studies as framed in a
critique ofenlightenment, it is understandable that its force should centre upon
questions of modern identity. Following Jennifer Slack and Laurie Whitt (1992),
David Scott's (2005) and Mark Freed's (2001) work on the ethical dimension of
cultural studies' and Stuart Hall's conjoined responses to the alienation of modern
subjects, we can add to a critique of Enlightenment a political and ethical urgency that
has in its sights a truly emancipatory purpose. Windschuttle's objections to cultural
studies miss the point of the field in so far as he appears to expect it to serve (media)
industrial ends. But, as John Hartley (1995; 1999) makes clear, journalism is a
specifically modern textual system, and is thus implicated in the constitution and
reproduction of modern identity.
Journalism was founded as a modern project - it cannot be explained without
reference to modernity, including the growth of democratic politics, popular
sovereignty, mass citizenship, market economies, corporate and consumer culture. For
most of its 200 to 400-year history, journalism has been partisan in these
developments, not just in the sense of being for or against a specific modernizing
party or idea, but a partisan for modernity as such. It has been committed to the
principles of the Enlightenment, preferring observation over authority, reason over
obedience, the eyewitness over the catechism, and campaigning actively for science,
technology, truth and progress as commanding powers. Journalism represents (may is)
the turn away from divine and royal 'warrants' for legitimacy towards rational and
popular ones (Hart1ey 1999: 25).
For that reason at least, journalism ought to be taken seriously. Cultural studies
does so, not to serve the industry, but to serve journalism's publics (or consumers) in
ways rather more emancipatory than the industry might desire. Windschuttle's
criticism of cultural studies, however, ought not to be dismissed, even if his
reductionist image of cultural studies as "linguistic idealism" neglects the side that
appears above. His objections concern postmodernism, which "[fJor cultural studies,"
in the view of Slack and Whitt (1992), "it is the recent engagement with
postmodemism that has brought questions of ethics to the surface and prompted
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debates over the constitution ofthe subject and the problems and possibilities ofa
politics" (Slack and Whitt 1992: 571. Emphasis added).
The impression I am attempting to make both problematizes Windschuttle's
understanding of cultural studies, and situates the realist-idealist binary by which he
counterpoises journalism practice to (postmodern) cultural theory along a series of
corresponding indices that situate the localized Media Wars debate in the wider
Science Wars; and further still, in the constitutive condition of modernity whose most
radical effect (apart from enabling mechanistic science) has been the impoverishment
of the human subject. Far from residing within an 'idealist-relativist-postmodern'
problematic, cultural studies embraces the tensions that constitute modernity itself (as
the diagram below illustrates). The field is, therefore, a site of contestations given to
problems of social, political and personal implications and effects of contemporary
culture(s) imbricated with "multiple modernities" (Taylor 2000b).
This thesis brings Taylor's philosophy to an analysis of the dualism between
empiricism and relativism upon which the Media Wars debate rests. The argument
contends that the foundation ofTaylor's philosophy in the phenomenology of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) offers a way of both dissolving the dualism and
offering a way forward. The thesis argues that Taylor's rejection of the empiricist
logic behind contemporary Cartesian models of the human person - which he first
explored in attacks on behavioural psychology in the late 1950s and early 1960s-
stems from the same post-Marxist debates to which he contributed, and which
fostered the founding principles and practice of cultural studies. Tay/or's rejection of
empiricist conceptions of subjectivities and identities during that period continues to
inform his anti-epistemological philosophical anthropology (Dreyfus 2004; Taylor
1971a; 1987a) - a term generally defined as comprising irreducible categories we
believe apply definitively to human reality (Buber 1945; Honneth and loas 1988;
Schacht 1990; Zaner 1966), and which "raises and provides answers to questions
concerning the kind of being human beings are" (Smith 1997: 36). Taylor's
philosophical anthropology provides the hermeneutic rationale for his diverse writings
on the structure of the human and social sciences (Smith 1997,2002,2004).
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The thesis
The thesis statement is thus: Charles Taylor's transcendental9 critique of
empiricist social science rests upon a rejection of the Cartesian picture of the self, and
aims to restore a plausible conception of human agency. From Taylor's use of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment and perception, both
empiricism (realism) and intellectualism (idealism) rest on Cartesian assumptions, and
thus generate a representationalist model of the self that affirms objects in the world
as absolutely external to mind. Empiricism and intellectualism are therefore not true
opposites,IO and Keith Windschuttle's empiricist assumptions therefore fail to secure
the very thing he accuses intellectualist (postmodern) cultural studies of erasing: an
adequate account of human agency.
Taylor aims his argument at modernity's disengaged conception of reason, both
theoretical and practical, and seeks to rule them out as impossible points of departure
- for examp.le, positivistic theoretical reasoning as well as Kantian and utilitarian
practical reasoning. What these projects share is an effacement of the good and proper
ontological understanding of the subject's relation to institutions of meaning (Steele
2005: 77).
Modernity for Taylor is not a uniform condition of instrumental reason and
other 'malaises' (Taylor 1991 a) brought down from Enlightenment, but is instead
found as a tension between contending strains and sources which include those from
Romanticism. Sources ofthe Se!f(Taylor 1989a) is a historical account of transitions,
gains and losses that have a bearing on modern subjectivity and self-understanding. In
the preface of the book, Taylor describes it as "an attempt to articulate and write a
history of the modern identity" and to "show how the ideals and interdicts of this
identity ... shape our philosophical thought, our epistemo'logy and our philosophy of
9 Like Hegel's Phenomenology, Taylor's Sources of the Self( 1989a) begins with a transcendental
argument against an atomistic conception of the subject tantamount to the modern liberal view, and
then moves to reconstruct a historical bachground to this transcendental argument. A transcendental
argument "starts from some feature of our experience which we claim to be indubitable and beyond
cavil. They then move to a stronger conclusion, one concerning the nature of the subject or the
subject's position in the world. They make this move by regressive arguments, to the effect that the
stronger conclusion must be so if the indubitable fact about experience is possible" (Taylor 1995a: 20).
Taylor's transcendental argumentation depends on the historical vindication, and affirms the position
that transcendental conditions are not formal but descriptive and historical. Otherwise, we would need
to affirm a 'view from nowhere', and that we can think without evaluative frameworks, which Taylor
clearly rejects (Taylor 1989a: 27,40).
10 The empiricist-realist paradigm takes the world to exist of itself, and imagines perception to mediate
our contact with the world. The intellectualist-idealist alternative takes the world to exist by virtue of
thought, and depicts perception as merely retrieving what has already been put there by the intellect.
Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception holds, instead, that the world that is primordially presupposed is
the perceivied world. Empiricism and intellectualism "dissolve the perceive world into a universe
which is nothing but this very world cut off from its constitutive origins" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 41).
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language without our awareness" (Taylor 1989a: ix). Without seeing the richness and
complexity of our (modern) identities, Taylor warns that we become susceptible to
impoverished life as individuals a,nd liable to see a fragmentation of the social and
political sphere. As "self-interpreting animals" necessarily positioned in "webs of
interlocution," or "horizons of significance," our being is coterminous with the
interpretations of our being (Taylor 1989a: 39,48). It is possible, particularly on
Taylor's (1989a; 2002b) account of modernity, to group these (moral) sources under
Enlightenment ('reason') and Romantic ('imagination') traditions. Keith Negus and
Michael Pickering (2004) provide an apt description of this condition:
It is commonly recognized that the twin traditions of the Enlightenment and
Romanticism have guided us ,in quite contrary directions. What is not so commonly
recognized is that their profound influence over the past two centuries lies also in
attempts somehow to reconcile them, to draw on the powers of both disengaged
reason and the creative imagination. So much of modern culture swings back and
forth between them, but moving towards ways of resolving the tensions between them
is also characteristically modern, even if the impetus towards such reconciliation
comes originally from Romanticism (Negus and Pickering 2004: 8).
Similarly, it is plausible enough to describe the formation of British Cultural
Studies as a reaction to empiricism in both social science and classical Marxism, and
to see their own responses and debates as making use of existing critiques of
Enlightenment. But without opting for one side of the tension, cultural studies sought
to emulate Marx's (and Hegel's) dialectical approach to these tensions. "Marx's ideal
of the all-round person embodied the central values of Romantic humanism .... It
certainly informed Adorno's critique of the negative consequences of Enlightenment
thought" (Negus and Pickering 2004: 8). Cultural studies follows in this tradition, but
attempts to embrace the tension itself; thus providing the first (modern) condition by
which the field became ideally a site of tensions - a veritable 'hothouse' of modernity
- embracing the tensions found between Windschuttle's empiricist-idealist dualism. 11
From the above I want to submit that cultural studies actually embraces
Windschuttle's entire dualism. Cultural studies is not about empirical practices or
about idealist constructions; though it certainly pays attention to these. It is principally
about modern culture(s) at base; though it starts with popular experiences of its ill-
11 The entire empiricist-idealist index may be taken as an indicator of the modern condition,
corresponding to a more extensive binary between the competing frames of Enlightenment and
Romanticism that constitutes modernity. In this way I draw away from views, evident in John Hartley's
(1999) description ofjournalism as modern, that modernity is characterized by Enlightenment,
empiricism, rationalism and any of the family of paradigms that belong there.
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effects on class, race and other social fractions and their resultant manifold
resistances. Therefore, this thesis can be said to focus entirely upon the empiricist
basis ofKeith Windschuttle's allegations that cultural studies is a form oflinguistic
idealism, that it espouses moral relativism, and that it contradicts journalism's realist
and empirical worldview. In other words, the thesis extracts Windschuttle's model of
the two fields occupying opposite ends of an empiricist-idealist index, and studies the
significance ofthat model.
The thesis takes no direct interest in matters to do with journalism education,
though it does pay closer attention to the theory-practice dichotomy that is a part of
that field, as well as to Windschuttle's reduction of cultural studies to the idealist end
of his model. At the same time the thesis attempts as far as possible to steer clear of
discussion of particular themes or sets of concepts at large in cultural studies. The
attempt is to extract discussion ofthe historical constitution of (British) cultural
studies from the diverse range of discourses that make up its scholarship and activism.
This type of separation is very difficult indeed, and no less so than treating
Windschuttle's empiricism separately from his intentions. To rephrase what I am
attempting, in a structuralist register, I am focusing on the underlying Signified of
Windschuttle's assumptions; and the underlying signified of the problematic that
spurred cultural studies into existence.
I shalli argue that Taylor's anti-Cartesian rejection of epistemology shows that
Windschuttle, in his empiricist objections to the alleged moral relativism of cultural
studies, falls on his own Enlightenment sword by allowing an implausible Cartesian
model of human subjectivity and agency that belies much of what an effective
journalist has to be in order to function not only in a human world, but also in a world
that journalism partly constitutes as a sphere of meaning. As Taylor writes in Hegel
(1 979c):
[T]he Enlightenment analytic science of man was not only a travesty of human self-
understanding, but one of the most grievous modes of self-distortion. To see a human
being as in some way compounded of different elements: faculties of reason and
sensibility, or soul and body, or reason and feeling, was to lose sight of the living,
expressive unity; and in so far as men tried to live according to these dichtomies, they
must suppress, mutilate or severely distort that unified expression which they have it
in them to realize (Taylor 1979c: 2).
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At the same time, the thesis questions whether models of identity and
subjectivity in much of cultural studies scholarship would be better served by
engaging with key tenets ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology. The thesis provides
reasons pertinent to the genealogy of cultural studies to take this option seriously.
Considering arguments that Taylor had first developed from humanist Marxism,
French existentialism, and analytic philosophy since the late 1950s, one can see this
opposition between empiricism and idealism as a dualism representing abstractions
from the Aristotelian corpus. That is, drawing on Taylor's philosophical
anthropology, this thesis argues that both the Enlightenmentfundamentalism (and
empiricism) that Windschuttle argues is journalism's methodology, and the
relativistic idealism he sees cultural studies to espouse, are epistemological reductions
that promote implausibly naturalistic (Cartesian) conceptions of human subjectivity.
Taylor draws this insight from Merleau-Ponty, but employs it in an approach that
indexes both analytic philosophy and sources in the continental tradition.
While the issue around which criticisms of cultural studies are made concerns
journalism education, this is subordinated to the central argument of this thesis -the
relevance ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology to questions of subjectivity in
cultural studies - and is returned to in a more substantive way in the concluding
chapter. To this end, 1 argue that the particular ethical inflection of Taylor's past-
Marxist scholarship, imbedded in his anti-Cartesian and anti-empiricist critique of
naturalism in social science, draws very close to the ethical imperatives of Stuart
Hall's own project. Both aspire to a model of the human subject emancipated from the
negative effects of modernity. While emancipation-in-modernity can be considered a
portmanteau of cultural studies, it is no less that ofTaylor's philosophical
anthropology. The historical proximities ofTaylor's and Hall's intellectual activism
suggest their connections far more than their differences. Both were at Oxford
together; both were in the New Left; both partook in debates that fashioned the initial
debates of cultural studies. Scholars in its service would do well, therefore, to
consider Taylor more seriously.
Outline of chapters
This section provides a schematic outline of the transcendental argument ofthe
thesis: bringing Taylor to the 'media wars' envisaged as a contention between
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empiricism and intellectualism. These terms refer to a method, used by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, that Taylor adopts in order to critique empiricist and neo-Kantian
doctrines of perception that retain in common a disengaged and mentalistic Cartesian
subject, and so to build a phenomenological description of embodied subjectivity. His
philosophical anthropology thus critiques modernity and at the same time seeks to
recover an adequate account of the subjectivity that is true to experience. The
argument builds on a version of transcendental argumentation that Taylor uses. 12
Proposall: Windschuttle contends that the linguistic idealism he sees as central
to postmodern cultural studies contradicts the realist and empiricist self-understanding
that journalism education should adopt to accurately represent the profession and
practice. Windschuttle thereby places journalism and cultural studies at opposite ends
of an empiricist-intellectualist continuum.
Proposal 2: Cultural studies was founded as a post-Marxist (Marxist humanist)
critique of (empiricist) classical Marxism mainly on grounds that it did not offer an
adequate account of human experience. Taylor was an integral part ofthe debates that
informed that critique.
Proposal 3: The ethical import ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology derives
significantly from his post-Marxist scholarship, and his rejection of empiricism in
social science derived from that scholarship. Their combined import is the recovery of
an adequate model of human subjectivity.
In so far as Proposall is true - Windschuttle does not deny that his
assumptions are empiricist, but provides convincing evidence that they are - he
purports journalism practice (and theory) to be appropriately pursued on those
12 The literature on transcendental argumentation is complex and riddled with contestation (Cassam
1987; Gram 1971; 1975; Rosenberg 1975; Sacks 2005). The method stems from Kant (who does not
take it far enough), and is developed by Hegel, whom Taylor criticises as having taken it too far
(Taylor I995a: 20ff; Smith 2002: 249, n.7). Nicholas Smith (2002: 59-64) makes no secret of the
complexity of debate to do with transcendental argumentation, even in connection with Taylor's usage.
A structure of transcendental argument (I am using Smith faithfully here) follows the form of opening
with an experience or truism; something that is beyond dispute. The second move is to state the truth of
p as a conceptually necessary condition of the possibility of that truism. The third move is to conclude
'therefore p'. Applied to this thesis, the opening move is to state what Windschuttle says as an accurate
statement of belief. There are no good reasons to believe that he misrepresented his beliefs - after all,
he published and republished them. The second move states the truth of Winschuttle's empiricism in
relation to subjectivity, and claims this to be an integral part of debate from which cultural studies
formed. Taylor is instrumental in those debates. The third move extends those claims and opens the
way for rendering Windschuttle's empiricist arguments for journalism education and practice untenable
- at least in so far as human subjectivity is concerned.
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grounds. Accepting Taylor's view (Proposal 2) that empiricism and intellectualism
(including Windschuttle's category of 'linguistic idealism') provides a Cartesian
model of the self, those same criticisms must apply to Windschuttle's model of how
journalists, in their practice, represent newsworthy events. Furthennore, if Taylor was
party to debates in the New Left, and was instrumental in debates the led to the
formation of cultural studies, its own avowed anti-empiricism and anti-positivism
must at least tacitly acknowledge Taylor's (material) contribution. IfTaylor's
scholarship can be accepted as materially part of early debates that constituted cultural
studies, then Proposal 3 applies. That being so, Taylor's philosophical anthropology
offers the field a firmer basis upon which to reject Windschuttle's claim that cultural
studies is fundamentally unethical- accepting that the field cannot be reduced to its
poststructuralist and postmodern components that have done all that is possible to
make ethics an impossibility (see Slack and Whitt 1992).13
In general, Taylor's philosophical anthropology rejects the epistemological
construal at the centre of Cartesian ism that has wrought an implausibly intellectualist
model of human agency. Taylor provides an Aristotelian argument that seeks to
articulate these movements in a way that critiques representationalism, resists
foundationalism, and opposes the epistemological construal of the human subject.
While he has rejected behaviourist and empiricist conceptions of human action since
the late 1950s, he has also sought to promote an embodied and engaged understanding
of the self developed mainly from Merleau-Ponty.
Chapter One discusses the problem of the gap between theory and practice in
relation to the "media wars" debate. The chapter focuses on the empiricist
assumptions of Windschuttle's claims for journalism, as well as his accusations of
cultural studies being idealist and relativist. Windschuttle, who has much to say about
"French philosophy", finds his philosophical basis in Australian empiricist
philosopher of science David Stove. The chapter concludes with an introduction of
13 Debate in the 1990s over the suitability of cultural studies for journalism education and training
occurred at a time when cultural studies was in the throes of its deepest crisis since its inception in the
1960s. But by revisiting Taylor's critique of epistemology published during that inception period, and
by using it as a principal basis for a critique of that debate, offers both a way to collapse the Cartesian-
inspired dual isms upon which the debate rests, and to restore to cultural studies a rationale by which it
may be seen to remain relevant to an enquiry ofjournalism in so far as it is imagined as a social and
cultural practice.
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Taylor's rejection of the Cartesian epistemology behind empiricism, behaviourism
and positivistic thought that supports naturalistic social science.
Chapter Two introduces the three propositions given in this introduction. The
first is explored in terms of the Science Wars, which I argue was (or is) the
background to the debate and provided its fundamental backing. The second
proposition is discussed in terms of post-Marxism; explaining some of the issues and
contentions that led to and sustain that concept. The third proposition is discussed in
terms of two concepts by which Taylor is better known: communitarianism and
authenticity. The first concept links Taylor to debates around civic and public
journalism (see Christians et al 1993), whereas authenticity appears to express his
anthropology more powerfully than any other concept.
Chapter Three forms a bridge leading to the body of the thesis, and provides
an overview ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology, setting it in the context of its
critique of Cartesian conceptions of the 'naturalistic self and the 'reification of mind'
found in current scholarship that Taylor critiques.
Chapter Four discusses the question ofTaylor's post-Marxism and his
involvement in the beginning of British Cultural Studies. As a survey of Taylor's
activism in the New Left movement from 1956 to about 1961, the chapter explores
how he came to discover in French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty his 'big
idea' that I am using in this thesis to critique the basis upon which Windschuttle
opposes constructivist thought from an empiricist perspective. But the chapter also
aims to impress upon the reader the importance ofTaylor to Stuart Hall's post-
Marxism, leading to the question of a return to Hegel as a post-Marxist outlook, thus
calling for a consideration ofTaylor's thought in current cultural studies scholarship.
Chapter Five builds on the thrust ofthe previous chapter by exploring more
deeply Taylor's subscription of Merleau-Ponty. The main purpose of this chapter is to
consider how Taylor's Merleau-Pontian outlook may have influenced the structuralist
turn in British Cultural Studies. This aspect of the argument remains speculative, but
is used nonetheless to explore the humanist Marxist - and specifically post-Marxist -
basis by which Taylor developed his critique of the Enlightenment subject. These
roots are principally in Hegel and Feuerbach.
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Chapter Six reaches the question ofTaylor's rejection of epistemology and the
Cartesian philosophy of mind. The argument examines the beginnings of this rejection
from his first book, The Explanation ofBehaviour (Taylor 1964), which came out of
his studies with Merleau-Ponty together with his reading of analytical philosophy at
Oxford. One historical significance of this work is that it emerged out of his New Left
period and, as I argue in preceding chapters, should be considered in relation to his
post-Marxist thinking which, on the surface, seems to be extraneous to the book. The
chapter leads into Taylor's more recent work, where arguments begun in Explanation
and extended into a thorough rejection of epistemology grounded in a Hegelian
philosophy of mind through which he provides a conception of practice that both
collapses the Cartesian bifurcation oftheory and practice, and promotes a more
plausible model of subjectivity than the mechanistic and rationalist conceptions
currently promoted by empiricist factions not only in the Science Wars, but in the
related Media Wars also.
The Conclusion begins with a discussion on cultural studies and philosophy,
where I suggest that the field should observe its 'natural' boundaries, not because of
what it cannot do well, but because of what it ought to do. There are implications here
for the study ofjoumalism. This leads to a discussion ofTaylor's and Stuart Hall's
ethics. I discuss, among other papers, the only one I am aware of that actually applies
Taylor to the context of (postmodern) cultural studies (Freed 2001), but, I show where
the author - applying Taylor ahistorically and ignoring his post-Marxist scholarship -
misses the significance of Taylor to cultural studies.
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Chapter One
Journalism and the Media Wars
The study ofjournalism faces a peculiar set of challenges in the academy where,
from the day it was included in any university calendar, I it has had to contend with
the contradictory imperatives of theory and practice. On the one hand, journalism is
obviously a practical occupation, and that identity powerfully steers notions that to
study journalism means to come to grips with its industrial practice. Theory becomes
the tail of a very practical dog, and any theory that fails to illuminate practice, or to
describe it plausibly, becomes difficult to justify in ajournalism programme. For
example, normative media theory 'makes sense' more readily than critical theory,
even where it usefully explores the culpability of news media in manipulative
ideological practices. It is normative theory and the' how to' material that gets
included in journalism manuals long before critical theory gets considered. Even
journalism ethics is generally considered an afterthought; an oxymoron to bear in
mind if you get the time - a final 'why' once you've already leant 'how to' (see
Mirando 1998).2
To speak of 'journalism ethics' outside the safety of academic' laboratory
conditions' generally gets the reception of an invective uttered in polite company.
Otherwise, as veteran journalist David Randall (2001: 132) writes: "Even to put the
two words in the same sentence is to risk reducing the listener to helpless laughter."
British moral philosopher Matthew Kieran (1997) elaborates on this phenomenon:
I Journalism was first included in a university calendar in the United States of America immediately
after the civil war there. Defeated Confederate General Robert E. Lee proposed the programme in 1868
(Sloan 1990: 3).
1 A recent study (Mirando 1998) of more than 300 journalism text books published between 1967 and
1997 found that substantial discussion of ethics did not appear until about the mid-I 920s. Surprisingly,
the topic virtually disappeared from journalism books for the next 40 years, only to return in the 1970s
(Mirando 1998: 26). One would also expect that by this time an overwhelming number ofjournalism
schools had included ethics into their curricula by this time. But another survey (Christians et al. 1993)
found that out of237 schools surveyed, only about 25 percent actually taught the subject. By the 1990s
th is figure had risen to 85 percent.
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The point is that the very notion of media ethics appears paradoxical: the very phrase
itself seems to constitute an oxymoron. Many professional journalists in Britain, for
example, often greet the suggestion that they ought to be ethically sensitive with
sneers of disdain (Kieran 1997: I).
Newsroom veteran-turned-scholar Richard Keeble (1994: 24) explains that
journalists, despite their low rank in the corporate hierarchy, are too easily blamed for
lapses of ethical sensitivity. Their practice is nested in an institutional structure that
for the most part embodies values and a concomitant pursuit of goods that differ from
those that journalism pursues.
[T]he dominant attitude prioritises "getting the story" and the demands ofthe deadline
above all else. Ethical and political concerns are secondary, if they are ever
considered at all (Keeble 1994: 24).
Journalists are traditionally prone to shifting during the course of their careers
from healthy skepticism to outright cynicism (Ettema and Glasser 1998: 64, 88-89),
but they also often seem to wear that attitude proudly to indicate their senior status.
But cynicism is also an option of the powerless; of lapsed believers rendered so by
frustrated effort of having tried to make a difference. Like priests who have lost their
faith but kept their jobs, they endure only for so long as the reward of goods external
to the practice makes being there bearable.
One of the problems with media ethics is that while readers and critics expect
the news production process to be carried out with all the standardization of a
mechanised production line, they remain unaware of the pressures under which
journalists usually work. As former newspaper editor-turned-academic Jim Willis
writes: "[w]hat sincere journalist has not wanted to take some time and research why
things work as they do in the media and what impact the media really has on the
public" (Willis and Willis 1990: 6). Otherwise, in an occupation dogged by deadlines,
time spent on esoteric musings is truly time wasted.
As a Newsweek correspondent once said on a special edition of ABC-TV's
"Nightline": "You just don't have time to consider why you do something as a
journalist. You just do it." Anthony Lewis of the New York Times echoed that thought
in a Columbia University program on journalistic ethics, when he stated, "We can sit
here all day and debate the ethics of how we get information, but the point is we must
get it. Every working journalist knows how hard it is to get at the truth out there"
(Willis and Willis 1990: 6)
These are the' he Iter skelter' conditions under which journal ists work, "but
many would like to have the luxury of stopping awhile and thinking about what they
are doing" (Willis and Willis 1990: 6). And after the weariness sets in from years
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working at that pace, answering to those demands, and receiving the same meager
returns for their efforts, "some journalists begin daydreaming about the more laid-
back life of those journalism professors in their ivy-covered building, passing on the
benefits of their experience to future journalists" (Willis and Willis 1990: 6).
The platypus among the purebreds
Disciplinarity, understood as a tradition of thinking, writing and research to do
with questions of a particular field, poses a related challenge to journalism. "By
disciplinarity we mean an essentialist tendency in the production of academic
knowledge that produces a set of theoretical and methodological axioms, and then
formalizes them as dogma" (Kavoori and Gurevitch 1993: 174). But such conditions,
suggest Anandam Kavoori and Michael Gurevitch (1993), sets journalism like a
"platypus" among the "purebreds." This condition, however, is not unique to
journalism. Robert Craig (1999) argues that communication is similarly of mixed
parentage, and having to continually refer to these 'diverse' disciplines for its tenuous
identity. But diversity, as Arjun Appadurai (1996: 26-36) argues, is not a quality that
disciplinarity fosters, particularly as "many colleges and universities have
increasingly become factories for specialized research, applied interests, and
professional credentializing" (Appadurai 1996: 27). The humanities remain "the
critical site for the idea that the University is also about thought and reflection,
cultivation and conscience, disinterest and abstraction, literacy and cosmopolitan ism"
(Appadurai 1996: 27). Journalism in the academy would appear to hover between the
poles of theory and practice.
The ongoing ferment over the past, the present, and the future of mass communication
research is tied to an ongoing urge for the imposition of order - a tendency that we
have labeled disciplinarity (Kavoori and Gurevitch 1993: 173-174).
Journalism remained a practical occupation and enterprise. It was integrally
wedded to media institutions. But for all its vocational and 'trade school' status,
journalism is no less practical than law, education, medicine, accountancy and many
others fields that claim disciplinary stature. Notions oftrans-disciplinarity,
interdisciplinarity, post-disciplinarity and even 'anti-disciplinarity' provides little
comfort, if any at all, for journalism which appears barely to have found a voice of its
own. Historians construct its memory; accountants and political economists deliberate
on which economic, structural and ownership patterns should be its ideal form;
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political scientists (and politicians themselves) determine the parameters of its
(democratic) role in society (see Carey 1993).
Barbie Zelizer (2004b) depicts journalism, under these conditions, as a
"territory at war with itself," where different aspects of inquiry proceed without
reference to each other; and "with each new visitor to the territory encountering a
prompt and definitive attempt at colonization by those already there" (Zelizer 2004:
3). Journalism's natural home was never in a university; and whatever purported to be
its subject matter there was always far more an epiphenomenon of academic
pretensions than a reflection of the self-knowledge ofjournalists in industry. Yet,
there it stayed, where its aspirants would earn credentials alongside trainee lawyers
(reading law), trainee teachers (reading education), trainee doctors, dentists,
pharmacists, agriculturalists (farmers), accountants, managers, marketers and all who
would measure their theory learned there against whatever yardstick the practice in
the working world presented to them.
The bifurcation between theory and practice has been a feature ofjournalism
education and training since its inception, and the recent debate (referred to in the
previous chapter) between journalism educators and cultural studies scholars in
Australian universities drew particular attention to that relationship. The empiricist
historian Keith Windschuttle - who is better known for his passionate defense of
history as a true science rather than as a branch of literary theory - emerged to
champion the cause ofjournalism educators against their cultural studies colleagues.
His name quickly became emblematic of what became, for cultural studies, a brief
and unwanted crisis added to its own 'identity crisis' (see Ferguson and Golding
1997).
The Media Wars debate, as it was coined, has been largely forgotten, but the
issues at its centre remain as relevant now as they were a decade ago. From the side of
cultural studies, its scholars responded mainly with defences of their field, and
critiques of the limited scope of the instrumentalist perspective ofjournalism
education and training. Quite rightly, the counter charge, that cultural studies scholars
do not 'understand' journalism, is probably largely correct given Windscuttle's own
description of its empirical basis. But it is the empiricist assumptions behind his
claims that have received little, if any, sustained attention. Similarly, the connections
of the debate to the 'science wars' have not been given sufficient attention.
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The chapter ends with an introduction of philosopher Charles TayJor's rejection
of the Cartesian epistemology behind empiricism, behaviourism and positivistic
thought that remains in perspectives that retain natural scientific models as a basis for
social science. TayJor finds the foundation of his philosophy in French
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Windschuttle, who has much to say about
"French philosophy", finds his philosophical basis in Australian philosopher of
science David Stove. I am not setting up a 'wizard's dual' between Taylor and Stove;
for TayJor has no objection to scientific ontologies so long as they remain in the
domain of science. It is when these ontologies are extended to anthropology that they
become problematic, as they do in naturalistic social science. And as journalism is
principally a practice about human significance and the social world, the methods of
natural science do seem strangely out of place. That ought to be the basis upon which
to challenge Windschuttle. This chapter sets the basis for that critique.
The problem of journalism in the academy
The elevation ofjournalism studies from its inception in newsroom training
manuals to a discourse intent on academic respectability is an ugly duckling story
driven in part by crises in the established disciplines implicated in the wider changes
that have reconfigured the fit between the academy and the industrial and social world
beyond its immediate domain. In academia, journalism could call itself 'journalism
studies', and find a space in the library. But whether journalism should be a discipline
in its own right, or remain a disputed territory of history, politics, languages,
sociology and any others that lay claim to it, remains an issue that is not easily settled
on grounds of interdisciplinarity.
Until quite recently, journalism's subject matter was not considered 'academic
enough' for degree purposes unless it was addressed within a more robust discipline
like English, philosophy, politics (Carey 2000: 16); and latterly, cultural studies
(Windschuttle 1997b: 5-6; 1998a: 72-73). Even so, within these frameworks
journalism has not always been treated "as a textual system in its own right," but as a
"terra nullius of epistemology, deemed by anyone who wanders by to be an
uninhabited territory of knowledge, fit to be colonized by anyone who's interested"
(Hartley 1996: 39).
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A cursory review of the literature on journalism education (Dickson 2000; Sloan
1990) shows that this condition is not so much an outcome of emergent tensions in the
field, but is a condition instilled from the moment journalism entered into the
academy. William Sloan (1990) finds that any differences in those tensions, between
then and now, may be grouped in three overlapping phases. The first phase, beginning
in 1868, immediately after the American Civil War, was motivated by a concern for
the prospects of democratic public life, and it can be characterized as a bid to 'save
democracy'. The second phase, beginning at around 1920, was motivated out of
concern for the professional standing ofjournalism itself (' saving journalism '). The
third phase appears to be connected with the declining prospects of the human and
social sciences ('saving the humanities').
The first phase, in Sloan's (1990) schema, began when defeated Confederate
General Robert E. Lee, having "received a number ofjob offers at the end of the Civil
War, accepted one to become president of Washington College" (Sloan 1990: 3).
Frederick Rudolph (1962) points out that "Lee's experiment" formed part of a general
drive "to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the
several pursuits and professions of life" (Rudolph 1962: 249). The general,
"[b]elieving an intelligent press played an instrumental role in contributing to an
informed, responsible citizenry," proposed in 1868 that a scholarship be set up for
students wanting to make a career in journalism (Sloan 1990: 3). The programme
lasted for a decade, but was discontinued on the grounds that it was unpopular with
both students and industry leaders.3 Newspaper editors thought the course was
"inherently absurd ... [for] practical journalists, who had worked their own way
upward by diligent application, knew the impossibility of learning the lessons of
journalism within the walls of a collegiate institution" (Sloan 1990: 3).
This phase ended with the 1947 Hutchinson Commission on Freedom ofthe
Press, coinciding with the second phase which began in about 1920. Up until this
interval it was commonly believed that reporters needed no special education. In the
absence of raw talent, a basic liberal arts degree was enough.4 Anything more
3 Lee died on 12 October 1870.
4 The first systematic study of American journalists in 1936 found that only haifhad undergraduate
degrees. By 1961 this figure had risen to 81 per cent in the upper echelons of the journalistic fraternity,
and crept up to 95 per cent by 1992. Those with majors in journalism and mass communication made
up at halfofall reporters with degrees in 1982, and rose to only 60 per cent a decade later (Weaver
1999).
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specialised was strictly imagined as the preserve ofthe 'trade school', but the
Commission thought this view to be short-sighted. The Commission is usually
identified with having instituted the social responsibility theory of the press (Siebert et
al. 1956),5 but less attention is given to one of its recommendations to implement the
idea through journalism education. It found that most journalism schools
devote themselves to vocational training, and even here they are not so effective as
they should be. The kind of training a journalist needs most today is not training in the
tricks and machinery of the trade. Ifhe is to be a competent judge of public affairs, he
needs the broadest and most liberal education. The schools ofjournalism as a whole
have not yet successfully worked out the method by which their students may acquire
this education.6
This is not to say that until this time there were no initiatives in journalism
education. Immediately after World War One - signaling the second phase - basic
journalism courses were becoming established in a number of North American
tertiary colleges. The added push in the 1920s was for recovery, to restore the
professionalism ofjournalism, "to regain some of the lost prestige suffered during the
era of yellow journalism" (Steiner 1994: 56). In this respect the Commission's advice
came as a confirmation of a growing trend.
The first 4-year programs in the early years of the 20th century emphasized
journalism education in conjunction with the liberal arts, particularly the social
sciences, a curriculum intended to prepare students to help journalism achieve its full
potentia'l in serving society and democracy. By the I920s, and with increasing force in
the 1930s, training in occupational skills had become the heart of the program(me). In
most schools, it still occupies that spot. Beginning in the 1940s, theoretical research
was added to the traditional research in such areas as law and history. It took on
growing importance in graduate study, even though it still accounts for only a small
part of the undergraduate curriculum. Each stage in journalism education brought new
approaches and combined them with what had gone before. Today, virtually all
journalism curricula emphasize professional training, and many combine them with
the concepts of liberal arts, social sciences, and theory (Sloan 1990: 4).
These initiatives faltered, and did so in no small part due to a lack of support
and skepticism emanating from both industry and education reformers. One reformer
5 Daniel Hallin (1994) points out several factors that sparked the commission and the social
responsibility theory: "By the end of the Second World War the inadequacies of the libertarian model
were evident. It was clear, first of all, that the owners of the news media were not representative of the
public at large, and that democracy and, more narrowly, the credibility and morale of news
organizations themselves - was at risk if the owners had the power to use the media at will as
instruments of class or personal interests. Second, it was clear that what worked to sell cultural
commodities didn't necessarily coincide with the interest of society in substantial and accurate
reporting on public affairs. And third, it had become clear that propaganda - in Habermas' terms, the
use of communication as an instrument of power and profit rather than as a medium of dialogue - had
become pervasive in the private sphere as well as in political life, and also threatened to undermine the
market-place in ideas" (Hallin 1994: 3-4).
6 Commission on Freedom of the Press (1974). A Free and Responsible Press. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, p.78
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in American education, Abraham Flexner, said journalism education as he found it
was "on a par with university faculties of cookery and clothing" (Dressel 1960: 21-
22).7 Edd Applegate (1996) quotes criticisms ofjournalism education and training
from various other sources too, qualifying these as "fortunate" on the grounds that the
enterprise "needs criticism, whether positive or negative, in order to change"
(Applegate 1996: 94). One critic, the writer and historian of publishing, John Tebbel,
in articles published in 1963 and 1964 "caused practitioners to applaud and educators
to squirm" (Applegate 1996: 94). Applegate lists among Tebbel's objections to
journalism training in universities that
I. Certain professors have stopped reading newspapers.
2. Certain professors have forgotten their purpose: to train individuals to
interpret thoughtfully today's complicated information and to communicate
information effectively.
3. Research has replaced teaching in graduate programs in the largest schools.
4. Emphasis on research has caused a de-emphasis of the professional
curriculum. Indeed, certain research faculty do not have any professional media
experience
Criticism ofjournalism education is a publishing industry on its own.
Nevertheless, one can detect that by around the time of the Hutchinson Commission
the objectives ofjournalism education and training had probably shifted from 'saving
journalism' from the stigma it had earned in the 1910s, to one of saving the news
media industry itself, given a perceived disconnect between it and democratic public
life (Picard 1985). Signs of this phase are evident in both North America and Western
Europe before World War Two, but take off during and immediately after the war.
Carleton University in Ottawa, which was founded in 1942 as a nondenominational
liberal arts, science, commerce and engineering college, started the first journalism
program in Canada in September of 1945 and granted its first degrees in journalism a
year later. The University of Western Ontario in London followed suit in 1945-46 and
awarded its first degrees in 1948. Ryerson Polytechnical Institute in Toronto also
began to offer courses shortly thereafter and, thanks to extensive equipment for the
teaching of typography, printing, engraving, radio and television, soon achieved large
enrollments (Gaunt 1992: 35).
In the Netherlands, at this time, journalism education was introduced at both the
university of Amsterdam and the Catholic University ofNijmegan, where they "were
strongly supported by the newspaper industry and provided a mix of professional
7 Abraham Flexner was the same reformer who in The American College. A Criticism (1908) criticized
the American university lecture method of instruction on the grounds that it enabled colleges to "handle
cheaply by wholesale a large body of students that would be otherwise unmanageable and thus give the
lecturer time for research" (Flexner 1908: ).
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training and communication studies" (Gaunt 1992: 67). Formal journalism education
in Belgium started in 1922, but as an offering in university in 1945 - first at the Free
University of Brussels, then in 1946 at the Catholic University of Louvain (Gaunt
1992: 72-73). Ireland, with its flourishing media industry and "one of the highest
reading rates in Europe," saw its first university-level journalism course as late as
1982, at Dublin City University (Gaunt 1992: 73).
The first full-time journalism course, established at the Rathmines College of
Commerce in 1969, was adapted from training schemes run by the National Council
for the Training of Journalists in the United Kingdom. The one-year course, which
emphasized reporting and sub-editing, was extended to two years in 1974 and leads to
a Certificate of Journalism. The College, now part of the Dublin Institute of
Technology, takes 25 to 30 students each year (Gaunt 1992: 73).
No digest ofjournalism education history is complete without mentioning
Joseph Pulitzer, who ironically was a major player in the yellow journalism era.
During this time, however, it was in 1892 that he first set his sights on Columbia
University to make good the need to improve the qualifications ofjournalists. But the
school only opened in 1912, despite the university having accepted Pulitzer's two
million dollar endowment some years before that. As James Carey (1978: 848) puts it:
"Journalism education begins, for all practical purposes, when Joseph Pulitzer pressed
many dollars into the somewhat reluctant hands of Columbia University." Money
talks but it seldom buys respect. Carey describes the field's standing in Columbia in
1957 as an illegitimate waif clutching a thin and impoverished subject matter, and
living a cap-in-hand existence of one not having been properly introduced.
Such a program of study was held, self-righteously and without much justification, in
low regard on the campus. Those rare occasions when one gathered with colleagues
from the rest of the campus, particularly with those from English and other
humanities, were encounters of withering, palpable contempt (Carey 2000: 13).
What was taught unti I about the mid-1960s was an unsystematic transmission of
the accumulated folk wisdom of a rough-hewn craft clinging to Siebert et al. (1956)
and a humble clutch of other literature - barely more than news writing manuals - to
give the subject a presence in the library. Journalism's literary paucity may have
contributed to the field's discomfort "in the overstuffed chairs of the faculty commons
upholstered for professors of the liberal arts and the traditional disciplines of
theology, law and medicine" (Carey 2000: 16). It may be comforting to note from
Edward Shils's (1961) review ofe. Wright Mills's book, The Sociological
Imagination (1959), that journalism's begrudging reception into the academy was not
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unique. Sociology's entrance was similarly harrowed, and its right to exist there
remained suspect until it became respectable in the 1930s. In his review Shils writes:
When American sociology, unregarded and undemanding, was pleased to be allowed
an academic existence, it suffered from lack of self-confidence. The other academic
disciplines thought little of it and it was unknown to the outside world. Its rustic
na"ivete and its simple enthusiasm aroused no antipathies within its own parochial
confines (Shils 1961: 600).
It is perhaps not surprising that journalism was nourished by humanities
disciplines to which it may have appealed for succour; although it is almost
inconceivable that any of these might have given in to any maternal instincts they
might have felt towards journalism. The fact that journalism recognized its home in
the liberal arts may have been motivated by its practitioners having had a dominantly
liberal arts education. Journalism thus entered the academy as a throwback of the arts.
Had the journalistic collective been composed predominantly of commerce or science
graduates (which is hard to imagine), the subject may have sought a home in
commerce or science. Nonetheless, the collective contribution journalists made to
their profession was made with tools derived from English, history, politics,
sociology, and other undergraduate fare that each generation ofjournalists had been
exposed to - all committed to the process of moulding the craft as it was learned 'on
the job'. Journalism is therefore a hybrid of the multidisciplinary heritage of its
collective practitioners. Carey implies as much when he says that journalism
naturally belongs with political theory which nurtures an understanding of democratic
life and institutions; with literature from which it derives a heightened awareness of
language and expression and an understanding of narrative form; with philosophy
from which it can clarify its own moral foundations; from history which forms the
underlying stratum of its consciousness; and from art which enriches its capacity to
imagine the unity of the visual and verbal world (Adam 1993: v. Emphasis added).
Canadian journalism scholar Stuart Adam shares this view, with the added
complaint that journalism training in North America has been dominated by the social
sciences, and should find its 'true home' in the humanities. Agreeing with Carey, he
says that
Uournalism] professors should teach something called reporting, that students should
receive an education in something called the liberal arts, and that it is in the interests
of students to study a field, which is taught in the schools by scholars rather than
practitioners, called mass communication or media studies (Adam 1993: 6).
Even if the inaugural literature ofjournalism studies consisted ofa rough-hewn
folklore of editors' memoirs and training manuals, as Carey (2000: 13) describes
journalism's entry into Columbia UniversitY,joumalism practice itself was, by virtue
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of its practitioners, not innocent of theory. Journalists have always brought to the
newsroom the intellectual resources of language studies, history, politics - together
with streetwise grit - and committed these to the' melting pot' of a self-reflexive field
fashioned as mundane procedures chasing self-evident facts. Iflater generations of
journalists are found adding cultural studies to that mix, they are doing only as their
forebears had done. But all the same, the material conditions of news production
moulds these latest resources to its own ends. Anything does not go.
Perhaps in that respect, the validation ofjournalism studies would always be the
centripetal pull from the industrial centre, moderating any offering tempted by the
centrifugal pull of becom ing a purely theoretical enterprise, as critical media theory
tends towards. Instituted at each extreme of the centrifugal-centripetal axis appear two
incommensurable practices, one academic, the other industrial (or 'practical'). From
each vantage point the other appears as lacking. As media historian Mitchell Stephens
points out,
Academics have long whispered that journalism programmes are too professional: just
trade school. Journalists have long grumbled that some of them are too academic-
filled with useless 'theory' (Stephens 2000: 63).
The thought often goes that if theory and practice are estranged, then simply
introduce them properly and the rest will follow. But the results are usually
unsatisfactory. David Skinner et al. (200 11) argue that journalism "programmes which
compromise between vocational training and a broader programme of study based in
the liberal arts remain unsatisfactory because they put too much onus on students
themselves to bridge the gap between theory and practice" (Skinner et al. 2001: 341;
emphasis added). One difficulty that bedevils discourse on theory and practice is the
metaphor of head and hand. As a working template, it is easy to translate this binary
into others such as doing/thinking, vocational/academic, and industry/academy. One
translation that is offered as a solution to this dichotomy is Skinner's et al (2001: 344-
45) distinction between why and how. Not far behind the distinction between why and
how lies another: between the vocational and the academic; together with an
assumption that each belongs to a different educational domain.
In Australian arts faculties, as Wendy Bacon (1999) points out, the trend has
been an upsurge in "communication studies students who want more production
courses, and production students who expect their universities to deliver on the
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promise of future jobs" (Bacon 1999: 80).8 This pattern coincided with the emergence
of cultural studies - of a more literary bent than of the original field - as a dominant
paradigm in the human sciences. The extent to which this transmogrified field has
attained hegemony in the humanities is evident in the impression that 'everyone is
now doing cultural studies'. Some seasoned cultural studies scholars have noted, not
without alarm, that even in "previously conceptually conservative communication
departments" in South Africa, cultural studies has taken root and spread (Tomaselli
and Shepperson 1998: 89-90; Tomaselli and Shepperson 2000: 237). By the mid-
1990s cultural studies had become the premier paradigm in the human sciences,
where communication had risen to (albeit temporary) saviour status at a time when
students wanted more 'vocational' subjects. During this apparentfin de siecle of the
'old humanities' ,journalism (as an extension of media studies) acquired
unprecedented appeal. In the introduction to a book on cultural studies' own current
bout of soul-searching, Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding (1997: xx) note this
phenomenon in British universities:
The recent expansion of cultural studies in the UK has been part of the deliberate
force-fed increase in the number of full-time university students from 563 000 to
930000 between 1988 and 1994. At the same time the atrophy of some traditional
disciplines in the humanities and social sciences has left a space for newer, and
superficially glamorous fields to mop up student demand. The expansion of these
popular areas of study has not been without its opponents, and the subject continues to
struggle for legitimacy in a political culture which is now almost obsessively
utilitarian in its approach to education. One Minister for Education proclaimed 'I have
ordered an inquiry ... to try to find out why some young people are turned off by the
laboratory, yet flock to the seminar room for a fix of one of those contemporary
pseudo-religions like media studies ... For the weaker minded, going into a cultural
Disneyland has an obvious appeal' (Patten 1993: 14). In 1995 and 1996 a flurry of
articles in the national press attacked media and cultural studies when it was revealed
that university applications to study in these areas continued to rise (Ferguson and
Golding 1997: xx).
8 The Australian case is evident in South Africa where, under a market-driven dispensation, universities
have had to 'examine themselves' against criteria set by government White Papers which, since 1996,
have ordered universities to offer more industry- and career-focused programmes, produce more
science, technology and business-oriented graduates, and to downplay knowledge that has no obvious
capacity to make money (Dowling 1998: 2-5). Supporting this drive is an assumption that such
graduates would slot into 'socially useful jobs' measured against an instrumentalist index that commits
education to the purpose offulfilling quotas in the service of national economic ends. And if the 'old'
humanities "do not lead to hard material market gains, they must be 'down-sized' or closed down"
(Dowling 1998: 3). Arts faculties responded by bringing on board 'technical' and career outcomes such
as journalism, public relations, advertising, Internet skills - anything to do with communication - in a
bid to stave off redundancy.
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Of theory and practice: 'Media Wars'
The gap between journal,ism' s theory and practice seems a lot narrower in
theory than it does in practice. This sense is illustrated by two examples where theory
and practice were seen to colNde. The first concerns a passage in Barbie Zelizer's
book, Taking Journalism Seriously (2004), where she recounted in its opening pages
her experience of studying journalism after having been in the practice.
When I arrived at the university - "freshly expert" from the world ofjournalism - I
felt like I'd entered a parallel universe. Nothing I read as a graduate student reflected
the working world I had just left ... these views failed to capture the life I knew
(Zelizer 2004: 2).
However, if one considers that Zelizer's experience in the academy was 'as a
journalist', with a newly hybridized identity resembling something like Homi
Bhabha's concept of "double time" (Bhabha 1990: 297, in Zelizer 1993: 224), then
her experience was more likely to have seen theory and practice as incommensurable.
Theorists might find cause to think, perhaps, that Zelizer Ilad entered the academy a
little na"ively, having been even uncritical ofjournallism pract1ice. But this appears not
to be the case. As in the biographical preface to her book on the J.F. Kennedy
assassination, Zelizer (1992) writes:
As a reporter, I had often wondered about the ways in which half-jumbled wisps of
conversation became full-blown news stories that were told with a knowing and
certain voice. As I made my way out ofjournalism and into academic, I carried that
curiosity with me, making it the topic of my doctoral dissertation and, in turn, the
focus of this book (Zelizer 1992: vii).
Zelizer goes on to depict journalism scholarship as a "territory at war with
itself' where different aspects of inquiry proceed without reference to each other; and
"with each new visitor to the territory encountering a prompt and definitive attempt at
colonization by those already there" (Zelizer 2004b: 3). Stuart Adam notes similarly
that "the academic and professional) elements ofjournalism curriculum are like 'two
nations warring within the bosom of a single state'" (Adam 1988: 9).
The differences between 'know tllat' ('theory') and 'know how' ('practice')
took a particularly hostile turn in Australian universities in the late 1990s. The
complaint was that a disproportionate number of senior academic posts in journalism
training went to cultural studies scholars despite few having any actual journalism
experience (Windschuttle I 997a: 3-4; 1998a: 9-10; 1998b: 72-73). John Hartley is not
unsympathetic. He notes earlier that "(m)edia production itself is still downplayed as
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it always has been, on the wrong side ofthe ... divide between 'academic' and
'practical' subjects, suited to vocational students and unpublished tutors" (Hartley
1992: 24). But therein lay the gist of the matter. Most who were specifically
journalism educators had migrated from industrial practice to academic practice,
where they competed against staff that had 'stayed at school'. Accordingly, these
scholars were more senior, amply published, and being about the same age,
effectively established a glass ceiling for the migrants beneath them. Resentment
grew, and when it found a champion in Australian journalism scholar Keith
Windschuttle, it boiled up to a point when, in November 1998, a conference was
called to allow each side to hear the other out.9
The daylong 'Media Wars' event was prompted largely by a charge from
Windschuttle that, in his view, the idealist ontology and relativist epistemology of
cultural studies made it an inappropriate foundation for the study ofjournalism. He
claimed that the empirical methods and realist values ofjournalism "are undermined,
contradicted and frequently regarded as naive by the proponents of media theory ...
the body of theory that accompanies the academic domain called 'cultural studies'"
(Windschuttle I997a: 5).
It is important to understand that the popularity of media studies 10 with students owes
nothing to cultural studies.... a largely incomprehensible and odious gauntlet they
must run in order to be allowed to do what they really came to the institution for, to
study media practice (Windschuttle 1997a: 15-16).
Windschuttle reiterated his claim that journalism training should be severed
from cultural studies, and to "return to what is believed to be the 'Holy Trinity' of
journalism education: an empirical method and 'realist' worldview; an ethical
orientation to audiences and the 'public interest'; and a commitment to clear writing"
(Flew and Sternberg 1999: 9). He describes the fundamental differences between the
two fields this way:
(i) [J]ournalism has an empirical methodology and has a realist view of the world,
whereas cultural studies is a form of linguistic idealism whose principal methodology
is textual analysis; (ii) journalists respect their audiences, whereas cultural studies is
contemptuous of media audiences; and (iii) journalism is committed to clear writing
and concrete prose style, whereas cultural studies is notable for its arcane abstractions
and willful obscurantism (Windschuttle 1999: 12).
9 Organised by the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy, and held at the Queensland
University ofTechnology on 27 November 1998.
10 Windschuttle seems here to be referring to the study ofjoumalism, public relations, advertising and
the like, and not to 'media studies' as it is articulated within cultural studies.
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While Windschuttle's main broadside is against the influence British cultural
studies ofthe Birmingham tradition has had on journalism education in Australia
since the mid-1970s, he casts his net wider to include all shades of neo-Marxist
thought, postmodernism, poststructuralism, theories of ideology and the 'fictional
audience' - in other words, the entire dialogue between contending paradigms within
cultural studies. And if Australian cultural studies has, as an interdisciplinary project,
"developed primarily from the dialogues between European, American and Australian
scholars" (Strelitz and Steenveld 1998: 10 I), Windschuttle's invective points mainly
at the influences of postmodern literary criticism emanating from North America than
it does to the earlier neo-Marxist Birmingham tradition that has been largely
displaced."
Windschuttle excludes fromjoumalism's 'Other' in media theory those earlier
"pol itical and sociological studies ofjournalists" (Windschuttle 1997a: 5) that
embodied behaviourist, positivist, liberal-pluralist and structural-functionalist
epistemologies typical of post-war North American social science. Therefore he
appears only to reject critical media studies, and to find the "fairly wide range of
empirical studies that have long been done on the economics and ownership of the
media" quite acceptable (Windschuttle 1997a: 5). He leaves uncertain if he rejects
those Marxist strains in political economy that have usefully engaged the field of
cultural studies. In view of his general antipathy towards Marxism (Windschuttle
I997a: 6, 10), it is fair to assume that he would separate from political economy the
same Marxist strains he finds at fault in cultural studies. A pillar of Windschuttle's
argument is his claim that journalism is committed to a realist worldview by
"reporting the truth about what occurs in the world" (Windschuttle 1997a: 4; 1998a:
61 ).
11 With a tradition of being influenced by British intellectual movements since the mid-I 070s,
Australian universities were quick to absorb this intellectual movement - particularly into faculties of
film and media, the critical and literary humanities, and the developing mUltidisciplinary fields of
Australian studies and postcolonialist critique. It centres chiefly around concepts of identity,
nationhood and the external and internal other, and has focused among other things on the film
renaissance, impacts of American popular culture. Without a longstanding leftist intellectual tradition,
American cultural studies quickly became divorced from its Marxist roots. This has been further
compounded by the influence of postmodernist literary critiques that dismiss the grand narratives
central to modernist approaches, and for whom reality is seen as little more than a social construction.
It appears, however, that if relativist positions Windschuttle objects to in cultural studies are
postmodern literary theorists quite different from realists in the field, and in dialogue with them; there
may also be more agreement between himself and many researchers in the field of cultural studies than
he admits - a likelihood that Tomaselli & Shepperson propose (1999).
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Journalists go out into society, make observations about what is done and what is said,
and report them as accurately as they can. They have to provide evidence to verify and
corroborate their claims and they have to attribute their sources. Journalism, in other
words, upholds a realist view of the world and an empirical methodology"
(Windschuttle 1997a: 5; 1998a: 61).
By realism, Windschuttle means the ontological grounding for the empirical
methods by which journalism depicts reality as objectively as possible, leaving the
least possible trace of the journalist's 'fingerprints', though not necessarily evidence
of the news production process. Interviewed for the Media Report radio programme
(10 December 1998),12 he explained:
[T]here's an external world, you have to find out what's going on, and you have to do
empirical investigation and then try and report that as truthfully and objectively as you
can, that's all laughed at by cultural studies theorists, who say that anything we talk
about in the real world is going to be a construction of our own, it's our own culture
looking back at us.
Windschuttle argued that journalism's empirical methodology contradicted what
he claimed to be the 'linguistic idealism' of Althussarian structuralism, which
contends, he says, "that we cannot have access to an objective understanding of any
real world" (Windschuttle 1997a: 7). That is, the legacy of the linguistic turn in the
human sciences is such that the realist ontology ofjournalism practice is negated, and
all we are said to have access to are other texts (Windschuttle 1997a: 7).
We create the world we inhabit by employing our own linguistic and cultural
categories that structuralists insist cannot, by their own nature, refer to any real world,
only to their relations with other signs and categories. We thus cannot know things in
themselves because we are locked within a closed circuit of 'signs' or 'texts'
(Windschuttle 1997a: 7).
Windschuttle also objects to structuralism's negation of human agency
(Windschuttle 1999: 14). "Media students were then taught that capitalist ideology
was generated in the form ofa system oflinguistic rules by the agents of the ruling
class who worked for the media" (Windschuttle 1997a: 8). The news media were
mere 'ideological state apparatuses' to reproduce capitalism's ideological 'deep
structures' (Windschuttle 1997a: 7). But then, structuralism all but vanished from the
cultural studies curriculum, leaving one wondering whether the relativism it espoused
said something about its own worth. 13
12 http://www.abc.neLau/rn/talks/8.30/mediarpt/mstories/mr981210.htm [accessed 20/3/05].
13 For a time, Althussarian structuralism was useful in explaining how capitalism was reproduced. But
the closed circle of ideologically-induced audience passivity in Althusser also left resistance to cultural
and political domination untheorised. A way out of this loop was found in Stuart Hall's (1980)
encoding/decoding theory, derived from a Gramscian correction to the deterministic traps in
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Who, for instance, now talks about Althusser's 'ideological state apparatuses'? Who
now uses the 'encoding/decoding' thesis of Hall and the Birmingham School? Who
now thinks it important to spend time in lectures distinguishing between the 'signifier'
and the 'signified' or between 'denotation' and 'connotation or 'dialogic',
'diachronic' and 'synchronic'? All these concepts are now museum pieces
(Windschuttle 1997a: 16).
The seminar resolved nothing. In an interview on Australia's ABC National
Radio's The Media Report (10 December 1998),14 Cratis Hippocratis of Queensland
University of Technology said: "Towards the end of the day we had people declaring
themselves with passion, Windschuttlians; others calling themselves Hartitlians, and
putting their hands on their chests and advocating each side." Nothing of significance
changed in the years that followed; and, by and large, the emotions that the event
stirred up and the 'crises' it seemed to signify have dissipated. Even so, the wider
issues remain in place. I shall disti I those that are pertinent for my purposes.
One place where Windschuttle en's is where his polemic is predicated on a naive
opposition between theory and practice. This bifurcation would cause difficulties
under normal circumstances. Skinner et al (2001: 341; italics added) argue that
journalism "programmes which compromise between vocational training and a
broader programme of study based in the liberal arts remain unsatisfactory because
they put too much onus on students themselves to bridge the gap between theory and
practice." Where the 'theory' bears little or no resemblance to the practice,
Windschuttle contends, journalism programmes taught under the aegis of cultural
studies (or more specifically, media studies) would lead to "a form of intellectual
schizophrenia among staff and students alike" (Windschuttle: 1997a: 5; 1998a: 61).
It is postmodernism's fixation on the relativity of truth that he finds anathema to
journalism (Windschuttle 1998a: 14). Windschuttle similarly links postmodernism
and obfuscation in his book, The Killing ofHistory (1997b). He devotes a chapter to
Michel Foucault who, evidently like students of media stUdies, he claims, cannot
Althussarian structuralism. But while the turn to Gramsci in cultural studies effected a turn away from
the shadow of economism in Marxist theory, it also radically displaced the entire Marxist problematic
(Hall 1996: 281). From then on, Althusser's theory was abandoned, but not linguistic idealism. The
optimism in cultural studies following this 'turn from theory' is also evident in Graeme Turner's (1990)
view of the progress made since the replacement of Althusser's more rigid and deterministic
problematic with Gramsci's more flexible and subtle one. But he is also mildly critical of the way this
"pendulum swing from containment to resistance" of the creative power of the popular in postmodern
thinking has led "to a retreat from the category and effectivity of ideology altogether" (1990: 224).
14 http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lalks/8.30/mediarpt/mslories/mr98 J2 JO.hlm [accessed 20/3/05].
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write. ls Foucault "makes it difficult for the reader to understand what is going on ...
by insisting on his own 'private' version of words in ways that are often at variance
with their 'public' uses" (Windschuttle 1997b: 125). But Foucault and other French
theorists are quite peripheral to the discipline of history, as they are to mainstream
cultural studies, particularly of the Birmingham tradition (Strelitz and Steenveld 1998:
102). The more conventional object of cultural studies is not a discrete practice or
text, but a network of practices and texts produced as an event in context (Tomasell i
and Shepperson 2000). Wendy Bacon agrees that in cultural studies "there are few
absolute cultural relativists among those involved in media research and scholarship"
(Bacon 1998: 79).
I agree with him that a position of absolute relativism which says that it is not possible
to distinguish some texts and views as being closer to what is actually happening in
the world than others, is inconsistent with critical journalism which sets out to tell
stories about what is happening in the world (Bacon 1998: 79).
Windschuttle has received a modicum of sympathy from some quarters he
would least have expected it. Martin Hirst (1998) sympathetically acknowledges that
some media theory is good for journalism students, but questions "the usefulness and
validity of much that the postmodernists believe in" (Hirst 1998: 84). Keyan
Tomaselli and Arnold Shepperson (1 998a) hold a similar view, finding some common
ground with Windschuttle that certain approaches in cultural studies "have indeed
relativised the issue of ethics right out of the discourse ofjournal ism" (Tomaselli and
Shepperson 1998a: 90). Furthermore, even media studies - a post-Hoggart and post-
Hall phenomenon - is a recent development in cultural studies (Tomaselli and
Shepperson 1998a: 91). Within cultural studies
there are schools of cultural studies which similarly take exception to certain
postmodernist approaches on the basis that postmodernist theories (whether literary-
criticism or media studies) exclude the need to hear people as people and not merely
as 'texts'" (Tomaselli and Shepperson 1998a: 90).
While there is little reason to assume that Windschuttle wishes to isolate
journalism studies from other disciplines, journalism educators do also indicate a
"deep-seated resentment of, and anxiety over, the shifting boundaries of knowledge
and practice" (Lumby 1999: 37. See also Meadows 1999: 43). His response, "echoing
a number ofjournalism educators, suggests an attempt to limit discussion rather than
15 Barring a view mea culpas, reaction has been mute to Windschuttle's charge that in cultural studies
incomprehensibility is a sign of intellectual greatness (1997a: 16-17; 1999: 15). This silence may have
to do with embarrassment over the 'Sokal hoax' (See Hodge 1999).
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to encourage a wider consideration of the nature ofjournalism and its place in the
world" (Meadows 1999: 47). It is hard to see how the exclusion of critical theory from
journalism training, can do any more than "reduce journalism to an unthinking set of
'technical operations'" (Davies 1999: 53; See also Bacon 1999: 39, Ravel! 1998: 93).
Employers are more concerned about the ability ofjournalism students to be able to
apply a wide range of knowledges to their craft, rather than bringing from their
tertiary experience little more than a competence in writing a story in inverted
pyramid style (Meadows 1999: 49).
University of Leeds philosopher Matthew Kieran argues that for journalism the
ideology concept is "corruptive because it undermines our recognition of the ability
and importance of critical rationality in enabling us to judge whether news reports and
practices are appropriate, fair and true" (Keiran }997: 79). He advises that "if no
coherent argument can be found to show that the media are inherently ideological,
then the strand of news analysis that is predicated upon the ideological presumption is
itself flawed" (Kieran 1997: 81). On the other hand, however, Tomaselli and
Shepperson (1998a: 93) pose to Windschuttle the question of how so many journalists
in South Africa could have acquiesced to apartheid ideology if they had indeed
followed objective, empirical methods?'6 Of course, no one suggests that these
reporters were hypnotised by apartheid legislation (Strelitz and Steenveld 1998: 104).
John Hartley (1996) describes journalism, in the words of Terry Flew and Jason
Sternberg (1999: 9), as the "sense-making practice of modernity," and argues that this
orientation cannot "be understood from within journalism education, with its focus on
how to be a better producer, but instead requires an orientation towards its readership
and audiences, which come from media and cultural studies" (Flew and Sternberg
1999: 9). That does not mean that cultural studies is opposed to journalism. Hartley
agrees that cultural and media studies since the 1970s has certainly had the habit of
criticising media power in news coverage particularly, but not to criticise journalists
16 Windschuttle spends much effort in his Media Wars seminar paper addressing this issue. He takes to
task the views put forward by Tomaselli and Shepperson (1998) and Strelitz and Steenveld (1998) that
"new insights" provided by cultural studies should prevent journalists of the future from falling into the
ideological complicity committed by apartheid-era journalists who 'confessed' at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. The fact that Windschuttle 'understood' the hidden issues from the critical
distance of his Australian vantage point is not surprising. He was 'outside' of the discourses of
apartheid - a privilege that local journalists did not have. The way he dismisses the argument of these
writers is therefore, in my view, superficial at best. It is also somehow contradicted by his second
point: "The claim that journalism is a pursuit of truth and an attempt to report what really happens is
not refuted by the fact that many journalists often fail to achieve these goals" (Windschuttle 1999: 12).
He is right in pointing out as a fallacy any view that all reporting is false if some reporting is false.
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or journalism. Hartley writes elsewhere that "[t]he original Birmingham approach was
a defence of the importance ofjournalism, because their aim was to understand how
political communication actually works" (Hartley 1999: 23).
But the growing anxiety among some commentators is less about separations
than a growing proximity in both the academy and industry between theory and
practice, and the shifting of boundaries between conventional institutional and
discursive arenas (Lumby 1999: 35, 38). This blurring between the academy and
industry seems to contradict the liberal journalism taught to students, which derides
'theory' as "irrelevant to practice and to see themselves as transparent mediators of
unambiguous signs allowing information and ideology which passes itself off as
knowledge" (Ravell 1998: 94). Libertarian certainties about what counts as journalism
can no longer be taken for granted. Ifjournalism builds a social picture in the public
imagination, it does so beyond news pages and bulletins (Hartley 1999: 20). In this
respect the question of 'what is journalism' remains a perplexing one (Bacon 1999:
83).
There is a wealth of historical evidence ... demonstrating that the values and methods
which are unproblematically associated with 'quality' journalism are, in fact,
embedded in the dense discursive and institutional history which maps the rise of the
media industry (Lumby 1999: 53).
For one, journalism may be conceptualised as a Kantian partisan for modernity,
committed to the principles of the Enlightenment (Hartley 1999: 25; Osborne 1998:
29-32). Any critique of the Enlightenment would challenge journalism's historic place
as a conveyor of reason. Positions in cultural studies opposed to Enlightenment
philosophy have come to hold that it is "no longer confident about the emancipatory
power of reason, or the educative possibilities of knowledge in an information age"
(Hartley 1999: 27). Hartley proposes as a type of ,mediasphere' the possibility that a
postmodern ('popular') journalism has always been present from the days of the
pauper press, serving suburban vernaculars, doing the job for which journalism was
first invented (HartJey 1996: 72. See critique by Hirst 1998).
While Windschuttle may have found some support within cultural studies ranks
over postmodern excesses, his assertion that "[journalists] report not to please their
employers or advertisers ... but in order to inform their audience (Windschuttle 1998b:
11) remains a poor foundation for journalism training. The implications of realist
notions such as 'objectivity' remain topics of debate (Hirst 1998: 84). Martin Hirst
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acknowledges thatjoumaJism students should have at least some media theory, but
questions "the usefulness and validity of much that the postmodernists believe in"
(Hirst 1998: 84); but parceling out theory and practice into separate packages offers
no way forward (see Bacon 1998: 81-82; Meadows 1997). However, Wendy Bacon
feels quite strongly that "[t]here can be a dialogue between media studies and
journalism, even at the coalface ofjournalism practice" (Bacon 1999: 82).
When as ajournalist I first encountered the (then commonplace) view that a sense of
news was instinctive, it helped to have an understanding of how commonsense
understandings about the world are the product of social relations .... [T]his
understanding helped to give me confidence in my own sense of what was a story, and
to see where this sense might fit or be in conflict with organizational news agendas"
(Bacon 1999: 82).
Windschuttle's naturalist bias
For so long as the dispute between Windschuttle and representative voices in
cultural studies remained at the level of 'defending the trenches', it remained unlikely
that any significant incursion would have occurred. The debate would remain a tit-for-
tat exchange of accusations and denials. The most basic positions were that cultural
studies contradicts the realist ontology and methodology of established journalism
practice, and standard journalism training is unable to critique its own ideological and
social reproductive conditions of practice. That exchange was not dissimilar to
debates over the relative worth of qualitative and quantitative methods in social
science; or whether the study ofjournalism ought to follow Verstehen (interpretive
understanding) approaches to social inquiry that tend to use quantitative methods, and
by so doing to eschew naturalistic, empiricist (though not necessarily empirical) and
any of a range of approaches that retain Cartesian anthropological assumptions found
in Erklaren (causal explanation) approaches. The remedies each proposed were for
empiricist journalism to adopt constructivist and critical perspectives, and for cultural
studies to adopt an outlook followed in Anglo-American analytical philosophy.
It would be incorrect to leap to the conclusion that Windschuttle advocates
quantitative methods (as opposed to methodology)l? against the more interpretive
17 Even where it remains an effective default practice among researchers who see themselves as
positioned necessarily on either side of that imagined divide. One good reason for this default is due
not to incorrigibility, but as Thomas Lindlof(\991) explains, due quite simply to a lack ofa suitable
synonym. With reference to audience studies, he says that although the term qualitative "is not used
universally by those who engage in non-quantitative" research, "qualitative inquiry is probably the best
single descriptor for what the great majority of them do" (Lindlof \99\: 25). But that 'doing' may be
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qualitative methods common in cultural studies. One should reject this conclusion for
reasons that go beyond those well-rehearsed arguments that reject the "incompatibility
thesis" (Howe 1988; 1992; 1998). As Kenneth Howe states in the context of
educational research: "Far from being incompatible ... qualitative and qualitative
methods are inextricably intertwined" (Howe 1988: 12).18
Windschuttle's opposition to the institutional relations between cultural studies
and journalism training do not stand or fall on the relative veracity of anything
presented in the above section. Instead, these point to the underlying logics that seem
to separate his position from that (or those) taken by scholars in cultural studies. That
is, Windschuttle subscribes to a naturalistic ontology. Put simply, while he castigates
the subordination ofjournalism education under the rubric of cultural studies, he
advocates that the field should be constituted according to logics and models more
attuned to the natural sciences. This sense can be hidden in sniping over competing
claims as to whether journalism is 'objective' or 'subjective'; being terms that are
often used to qualify naturalistic from interpretive modes ofenquiry. Windschuttle
shows his hand most blatantly when he takes a number of scholars to task, and singles
out Ann Cllrthoys (1991) in particular, for claiming an "epistemological gap between
many academics and many journalists" (Curthoys in Windschuttle 1998c: 7).
Curthoys claims that "[m]ost academics ... in the physical and natural sciences ...
now reject positivist concepts of knowledge, the notion that one can objectively know
the facts" (Curthoys in Windschllttle 1998c: 7). Windschuttle understandably attacks
her for
the pretentious claim to speak for the whole of twentieth century philosophy, a claim
which completely ignores the mainstream of Anglo-American analytic philosophy this
century, which has long regarded the view about truth expressed by Professor
Curthoys [that truth cannot be known] as a simple fallacy, indeed an obvious self-
contradiction. If there are no truths, then the statement "There are no truths" cannot
itself be true. Moreover, the claim that journalists cannot report the truth is patently
absurd. In political reporting, for instance, there is plainly a great deal of opinionated
comment and rhetoric that often supp0l1s various ideological ends, but there is also a
great deal of reporting of facts, that is, of objective truths which no one in his or her
right mind would question (Windschuttle 1998c: 7-8).
part of the problem; and I do not wish to impute that Lindlof does not recognize this, for there certainly
exists a range of research technologies that appear to be 'all about meaning', and another that is 'all
about numbers'. What I am calling 'technologies' (e.g., focus groups, questionnaires, factor analysis)
belong under the category of methods and not that of methodology.
18 I shall return to this matter in the next and final chapters.
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In much of Charles Taylor's earlier work in politics and anthropology (Taylor
1964), specifically in his essay Social Theory as Practice (Taylor 1985b), he
questions whether the natural sciences provide a suitable paradigm for methods of the
human and social sciences. I want to use Taylor's position to argue that while
Windschuttle's dependence on Australian philosopher of science David Stove's
(1982) thinking may have something to say concerning the activities ofjournalism
(like newswriting, observation, interviewing, and so on), it is unable to make sense of
journalism as a practice. This seems not to advance any position already taken in
criticisms of Windschuttle's instrumentalist approach to journalism - that is, for being
unable to explain how wider social forces impinge on news production processes.
Where Taylor's position does present an advance - or what he calls an "epistemic
gain" - is where his Hegelian critique of Cartesian epistemology enables an
articulation between what has been accreted as empiricism, on the one hand, and
idealism (and similar modes, such as constructivism) on the other.
In an important respect, Taylor effectively collapses a separation that is an
essential cause of the entire 'Windschuttle debate' - empiricism versus constructivism
- but also manages to collapse that between theory and practice. His paper, Hegel's
Philosophy ofMind (Taylor 1985a), on the main source by which he achieves this
end; though his use of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology serves equally as well. Not
that anxieties over separations are anything new to journalism. Peter Rosan (1994:
364-65) has argued in another context that the problem with mainstream journalism -
as opposed to 'public journalism' - is that it is all about separations. It separates facts
from opinions, news from editorial, and so on. In many ways this schizophrenia
extends the separation of theory from practice that characterizes much thinking about
journalism itself. However, as I have pointed out, Windschuttle has no objections to
certain (suitable) theories being brought in as journalism's itinerant explanada. But
what role do these theories play? Theory within the naturalistic mode aims to explain
and to predict; and in so far as a normative dimension is allowed, prescribes what
ought to happen from the desired pattern of all similar events (what is).
The above view affords theory a dominantly descriptive function from which
any normative element is extracted as its own' best practice'. But Taylor (1964;
1983a) questions the behaviourist assumptions behind this understanding of theory,
and argues that the naturalistic picture it presents does not attend to specifically
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human actions. "[T]he big disanalogy with natural science lies in the nature of the
common-sense understanding that theory challenges, replaces or extends" (Taylor
1985a: 92-93). The classical theorists such as Descartes and John Locke, upon whom
empiricism depends, go wrong in their epistemology, which advocates "an
impoverished phenomenology of perceptual experience" (Smith 2004: 34). This
"ontologizing of rational procedure" (Taylor 1995a: 61) transposes "reflective
procedures for generating objective knowledge onto the very nature of the perceiving
subject" (Smith 2004: 34).
The method of analysing a complex phenomenon into simple components, treating
them as neutral bits of information, and rationally reprocessing them, is written into
'the mind' itself .... A picture of what it is to know obscures our understanding of
what it is like to be a perceiver (Smith 2004: 34).
Ifjournalism was a practice of representing the natural world - even a world
where humans are reduced to objects wondering across a landscape - then perhaps
natural scientific methods would serve the practice more than adequately. But
journalism is primarily about the human world - an intersubjective space in which
man is "condemned to meaning" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xii). In Taylor's language,
people are "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor 1985a: 10), which entails that there are
always pre-theoretical understandings of what is going on among the members of a
society. These pre-understandings are formulated in self-descriptions which are
involved in the institutions and practices of society. "A society is among other things
a set of institutions and practices, and these cannot exist and be carried on without
certain self-understandings" (Taylor 1985a:93). In this respect at least, Windschuttle's
understanding ofjournalism practice provides a very blunt set of tools with which to
work in an inherently interpretive and meaningful world.
Natural science gives us a model which is tolerably clear. Theory, say physical theory,
gives us a picture of the underlying mechanisms or processes which explain the causal
properties and powers of the things we are familiar with. In many cases, this picture,
this picture of the underlying reality turns out to be surprising, or strange or
paradoxical, in light of our ordinary commonsense pre-understandings of things ....
But part of what is involved in having a better theory is being able more effectively to
cope with the world. We are able to intervene successfully to effect our purposes in a
way that we were not able before. Just as our commonsense pre-understanding was in
part a knowing how to cope with the thjngs around us; so the explanatory theory
which partly replaces and extends it must give us some of what we need to cope better
(Taylor 1983a: 61).
We can see from the above that Windschuttle and his like-minded journalism
trainers were not concerned that theory should hinge onto practice. Their charge was
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that cultural studies, which had become the premier paradigm within the human and
social sciences, contradicted the methodsjournalists applied in their practice.
Certainly, journalists "go out into society, make observations about what is done and
what is said, and report them as accurately as they can" (Windschuttle 1998a: 61), but
there is a difference between that world as objects moved by natural forces (for which
natural science is ably equipped to explain), and that world as made up of subjects
possessed of intentional behaviour (for which interpretive social science is better
equipped to understand).
In Social Theory as Practice (1985b) Taylor argues that the natural sciences do
not provide suitable methods and procedures of the social sciences (1985b: 91; Geertz
1994: 83-84). In the natural sciences it is common to see theory "as affirming an
account of underlying processes and mechanisms of society" (Taylor 1985b: 92).
While the natural sciences certainly transform practice (as an application of theory)
the practice it transforms is external to its theory. In the social world, "theory ...
transforms its own object" (Taylor 1985b: 101). Taylor argues accordingly that social
theory is a different kind of activity from the natural sciences. The "disanalogy with
natural sciences lies in the nature of common sense understandings that science
challenges, replaces or extends (Taylor 1985b: 92-93).
To add also that this view is typical of natural science method could rightfully
invite objections that this is indeed a caricature, or an allusion to 'reductive
naturalism' as might obtain in objectivism, and not science per se. This is a criticism
Clifford Geertz (1994: 83ft) makes mildly of Charles Taylor's contention that the
naturalistic world-view is "wildly implausible" as a model in the human sciences
(Taylor 1985a: 1; 1985b: 21). Taylor takes aim at, say, Skinnerian behaviourism,
computer modeled notions of human behaviour, and so on. Instead, he favours
hermeneutic or 'interpretivist' approaches to explanation.
As I've indicated, Geertz criticism ofTaylor's concern that the natural sciences
have led to a false conception of what it is to explain human behaviour is far less with
his arguments than with their effect (Geertz 1994: 83): "The creation of a fixed and
uncrossable gulf between the natural and human sciences is obstructive of either's
progress" (Geertz 1994: 84).
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The issue is whether so radically phrased a distinction is any longer a good idea, now
that the point has been made ... that the human sciences, being about humans, pose
particular problems and demand particular solutions (Geertz 1994: 85).
In the heyday of positivism this distinction may have served the human
sciences, but after Thomas Kuhn's The Structure ofSCientific Revolutions (1962) and
Peter Winch's The Idea ofa Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (1958) it
has become far harder to accept universal standards of rationality in science. But with
the gulf narrowed, or even merged as Geertz suggests, what applies to science must
also apply to social phenomena (including morality). There are no ahistorical and
acultural standards by which to objectively determine the good. These standards are
Iinked to the incommensurability of parad igms. And in this respect, ethical theory
cannot necessarily reflect right or wrong in specific forms of human behaviour, taken
as an independent object. The lack of universal standards seems to render the idea of
rational justification of scientific paradigms and of moral precepts impossible. Thus,
our options seem to be either a moral subjectivism allowing for a relativist 'anything
goes' view in science, or a conservative defence of whatever views and standards
happen to be fashionable.
Taylor takes a different route. He accepts that ethical theory fashions what is
right or wrong in that behaviour. But if theory does transform its own object, it does
not follow that anything goes, leading to a charge to relativism. Taylor is undaunted
here, preferring a soft relativism, and arguing that even here social theory is
validating. "[C]ertain kinds of changes wrought by theory are validating, and others
show it to be mistaken" (Taylor 1985b: 102). Indeed, both Taylor and MacIntyre
(1984; 1991) claim to have gone beyond moral subjectivism by taking a historicist
and comparative account of rationality. They both claim that an analogy between
rationality in science and in morality should be taken seriously.
David Stove
If one were to name the prime object in all of Windschuttle's objections, it
would probably go under the name of constructivism; and when considering that he
follows Australian philosopher of science David Stove (Windschuttle 1997b: 199-
201), it is more than likely that it is this key ingredient that makes cultural studies so
objectionable in his sight. Originally proposed within the sociology of science,
constructivism holds in line with thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper and
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Paul Feyerabend that scientific knowledge is made'9 by scientists and is not
determined by the (objective) research methods they apply to phenomena. On the face
of it, this makes constructivists antirealists, relativists and 'anti-rationalists', whose
ideas of reality may herald a turn to George Berkley's idealism; although the
Berkleyan project was very different, and had its own concerns?O
In his book, Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists (1982), Stove attacks
as irrational and relativist those postmodern social constructivist views which -
typically of Popper, Khun and Feyerabend - he says, claim that in modern science
there is no reason to think one theory more true than another (Stove 1982: 18-19).
Our philosophy of science ... lost contact long ago, at least as early as Popper, with
the refreshing realities of scientific discovery and invention: with the actual objects of
science. But with Khun even the intentional objects of science, the propositions of
science, have vanished into thin air, and with their disappearance, of course, the
cognrtive aspect of science vanishes too. Science, it turns out, whatever may be
believed to the contrary by the vulgar and by whig historians, is really as intransitive
as sleep (Stove 1982: 18).
Stove launches his book with a hilarious and devastating analysis of how
various linguistic devices are used to make these views seem plausible. One of the
simplest is to place words like "fact," "objective," and "truth" in scare quotes, thus
neutralising success-words and turning them into failure-words - a tendency often
found in current writing in and around cultural and media studies. The implication is
that there can be no cognitive achievement in any statement (Stove 1982: 9-19). In a
Foucauldian sense, statements exist as elements of discourses, or not at all. Or as
analytical philosopher 1. L. Austin wrote: "There's the bit where you say it and the bit
where you take it back" (Austin 1962: 2). Popper's philosophy entai Is that we do not
know - and cannot possibly know - any such thing as afaet. Stove points out,
however, that once the implications of Popper's and Kuhn's views are presented
straightforwardly, no one would take them seriously (Stove 1982: 14-15).
19 Constructivists are accused of believing that scientists literally 'make the world', in the way that
houses are made. But this strong thesis is not the best way to understand constructivism. There are
philosophers of science who follow the weaker thesis, and who note that relativism can be useful in the
interpretation of science. That is, scientific knowledge is 'produced' primarily by scientists and only to
a lesser extent determined by fixed structures in the world.
20 Berk'ley argued, in A Treatise concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge (1701) that there is no
external material world, and that 'things' we can see and/or touch are merely collections of ideas, and
that it was God who produced these ideas. It may be interesting to note that Berkley was writing at a
time when science was offering a contending, competing materialist way of understanding the world.
At the same time there existed in the philosophical agenda a skepticism about the very existence of the
material world. Berkley tried to offer an alternative to both these views (See Oxford Companion to
Philosophy 1995: 89-92).
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Another adherent to Stove's work is Roger Kimball, whose book, Tenured
Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted our Higher Education (1990), attacks the
postmodern deconstructionist movement in mainly American universities. In the same
vein as Kimball is Allan Bloom's The Closing ofthe American Mind (1987), which,
Windschuttle says, argues that
radical theory had captured the entire agenda about how we in the West study human
society and how we understand human beings as individuals. The results were that
humanities and social science departments within universities had abandoned
objectivity and truth and become hopelessly politicized. Most young people today
were taught to scorn the traditional values of Western culture - equality, freedom,
democracy, human rights - as hollow rhetoric used to mask the self-interest of the
wealthy and the powerful. This teaching, Bloom argued, had bred a cynical. Amoral,
self-centred younger generation who lacked any sense of inherited wisdom from the
past (Windschuttle 1997b: J0).
Under such a zeitgeist, "[w]hen the proponents of cultural studies write about
the past they now have few reservations about calling their practice 'history' ," says
Windshuttle. Armed with the critiques of Stove and a significant number of followers,
Windschuttle takes aim at cultural studies, which, as he says, is "one of the more
prominent of the fields to emerge from the French-indebted literary theory and media
studies of the 1970s" (Windschuttle 1997b: 14).
I do not wish to contest this particular claim that Windschuttle's makes, but I do
want to challenge his reduction of 'French theory' to the handful of thinkers whom he
cites. So-called' French-theory' cannot be represented by this one of its strands, which
in the estimation of experts on French philosophy, does not feature very prominently.
Furthermore, Charles Taylor, as a scholar inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as an
analytical philosopher, and as a critic of naturalism in the human and social sciences,
presents a most able armoury of thought by which to counter at least the key claims
Windschuttle makes in defence ofjournalism in the empiricist tradition. Taylor's
thought also offers a way of rethinking practice that restores theory to an expressive
rather than to the representative role naturalism has it. In addition to these few points,
when British Cultural Studies was in its earliest formation, he was already playing an
important part in framing the problematics that would become its key definers.
Conclusion
This chapter sets out the two problems in the study ofjournalism this thesis
attends to - the disparity between theory and practice, and the prevalence of
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naturalistic enquiry in the field. The 'Windschuttle debate' encapsulates both of these
problems. Both a critique of Windschuttle's rejection of cultural studies and a basis
for an alternative to the naturalistic assumptions of his rejection can be found by way
of key features of Charles Taylor's philosophical anthropology. These features can be
articulated in a theory of practice that restores at least the element of agency that
Windschuttle's voices concerns about, and returns theory to a relation that is more
autochthonous to the practices they inform.
Certainly to call Taylor a 'cultural studies scholar' sounds strange, and even
outrageous. But I do suggest that Taylor's thought offers a way to reconsider key
elements in cultural studies' genealogy, and in light of Taylor's recent work, to
consider whether a connection can be made between it and current thinking as to the
field's 'lost arcadia' in Birmingham. Taylor and Stuart Hall were, after all,
contemporaries in the New Left movement; and while their paths diverted from the
early 1960s onward, there are significant indictors that they remained 'of a mind'
even as their academic and political careers became explorations of different contexts.
Not that even British cultural studies remained the practice Hall had imagined it
to be. He criticized the 'postmodern turn' in cultural studies as having led to a form of
'theoreticism' by way of which the field changed from being a political practice to an
academic discipline (Hall 1990: 18). For a field founded on a project of straddling
contradictions, modeling itself on a dialectic, it was perhaps inevitable that once "the
locus of much of its work [became] the university - a bankrupt site for intellectuals
addressing the most pressing questions of our age" (Giroux 2000: 29) - cultural
studies fossilized as thesis or antithesis without transforming itselfin synthesis (see
Agger 1992: Ch 1).21
In Graeme Turner's view the field, comfortably gentrified in the academy,
requires urgent recovery. Turner stresses that he has made this point a number of
times before, that "I want to retrieve the sense of cultural studies as a political project,
as a practice which has maintained a sustained engagement with the world in which it
operates" (Turner 2002: 196. Italics added). It is the sense of cultural studies 'as a
21 Henri Giroux's (2000) criticism of the university as a site of practice unfit to 'do cultural studies'
might not be as easily dismissed as many who have invested their lives in the institutions which claim
the name might think. And this is not necessarily a matter of 'anti-intellectualism' either. A sober look
at current cultural studies as a purely academic and theoretical enterprise shows not a resolution but an
abandonment of the tension between theoretical clarification and political engagement by which the
field "tries to make a difference in the institutional world in which it is located" (Hall 1992: 284).
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practice' that seems critical here. On this point he is at one with Stuart Hall (1992)
who warns, in Cultural Studies and its Legacies, of an "overwhelming textualization
of cultural studies' own discourses" that turns power into "an easy floating signifier"
and the field into "every damn thing" (Hall 1992: 286, 292; see Turner 2002: 58;
Wood 1998: 400). The problem of 'theoretical practice' is (or has been) central to
debates in British Marxism at least. In an attack on E.P. Thompson's historicism, and
his confusing theory with theoreticism, Dennis Dworkin (1997: 236-237) quotes Hall
as saymg:
There is a poverty oftheoreticism, but for socialists and Marxists there cannot be a
poverty of theory. There is, of course, never theory without practice, but there is never
adequate practice that is not informed by theory. What Marx teaches us is that there
are by necessity different kinds of work with different levels ofabstraction.22
To the best of my knowledge, Hall's earliest complaints about theoreticism in
cultural studies are contained in his review of work in the Centre (Hall 1980a). "We
are aware of the many turning-points where we have fallen into an imitative
dependency, or where we have allowed theoretical debates to obscure the absolutely
necessary test of concrete work and exemplification" (Hall 1980a: 42). The challenge,
he continues, lay in "getting the theoretical and concrete aspects of our work into a
better and more productive balance" (Hall 1980: 43).
This struggle-for the best kind of theoretically informed concrete practice-continues: it
is one of our highest, most self-conscious priorities. We have attempted to monitor
and to transform our organization of intellectual work in the light of it. We believe our
future work will show the positive effects of struggling with ourselves in this way for
a 'best practice'. It is the only way we know of developing a real intellectual practice
which does not merely reproduce The Obvious (Hall 1980a: 43).
22 Hall's comments were made during a conference in Oxford. Dworkin (1997: 294, n. 41) refers to his
source as Martin Kettle (1979: 542-543).
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Chapter Two
Science wars, post-Marxism, Taylor
The previous chapter concerns three interlocking themes. The first - resting
largely upon a theory-practice dualism - concerns the apparent gap between
postmodern cultural theory and the empirical methodology that Keith Windschuttle
(1998a, 1999) argues a journalism education and training should promote. The second
theme concerns the empiricist foundation in which Windschuttle (1997b: 185ft)
invests his criticism of the linguistic idealism to which he reduces cultural studies (see
Windschuttle 1997b: 12-19). The third theme concerns political philosopher Charles
Taylor, whom, I began to argue in that chapter, offers a non-foundational (yet
interpretive) basis by which to nullify the empiricist stance that Windschuttle takes in
his objections to cultural studies.
These three themes remain connected as the matrix upon which the argument of
this thesis is pursued. This thesis 'joins the dots' between three propositions given in
the introductory chapter, according to the transcendental argument already explained
there. The thesis argues that Keith Windshuttle's contention that the differences
between journal ism (education and training) and (postmodern) cultural studies are
represented by a dualism between, on one end, realism and empiricism ('modern'),
and on the other end, a postmodern body of thought that is constructionist, ideal ist and
relativist reveals more than he possibly suspects. 1 shall contend that the dualism he
sets up resembles the same problematic that gave impetus to the New Left and
eventually to British Cultural Studies.
Charles Taylor was an integral part of that movement opposed both to
empiricism in social science and to economism in classical Marxism. In both
instances, Taylor based his rejection on Maurice Merleau-Ponty similar method that
illustrated that both empiricism and intellectualism depicted the human agent as a
disengaged subject invented in Cartesian epistemology. Poststructuralist and
postmodem theory is not considered to have produced a subject any more robust than
the Cartesian one. Through its anti-humanist outlook postmodern thinkers have
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confidently announced the "death of the subject itself- the end of the autonomous
bourgeois monad or ego .... [T]he end of individuality, the eclipse of subjectivity in a
new anonymity that is not puritanical extinction or repression but probably not often
either that schizophrenic flux and nomadic release it has often been celebrated as"
(Jameson 1991: 15, 174).
Reaction to a 'death' as violent as Jameson depicts it has been mixed, and even
to deny it while holding onto other postmodern features such as the ubiquity of mass
communication and the power of the image (Hebdige 1988). Christopher Norris
(1990) has argued that postmodernity - marking an absolute and irreparable break
with the unified subject - stands at the end of a line of inquiry that started with
Ferdinand de Saussure, worked its way through poststructuralism and ended with Jean
Baudrillard (Norris 1990: 143-166), whom, with Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, in Stuart
Hall's (1986b: 45) opinion, went "right through the sound barrier."
Periodizing postmodernity is problematic. Noel Carroll (1997) notes that while
the term is used as a moniker of globalism, it "first appears to gain currency in the
1950s and 1960s as the name of various art movements in literature, architecture"
(Carroll 1987: 143). As the name of an "expressive totality" correlating with
developments in philosophy and science, this became evident in the early 1980s
(Carroll 1987: 144). Hall puts the beginning much earlier as "the current name we
give to how those old certainties began to run into trouble from the 1990s onwards"
(Hall 1986b: 47). But in the end, he rejects any notion of postmodernism representing
a total rupture, and he doubts there is any such unified thing as the postmodern
condition, but something "plural, disunified, multiple and contradictory" (Chen 1986:
311 ).
I want to agree with Kuan-Hsing Chen that cultural studies resembles this
condition, and may even be termed "postmodern". But in line with other difficulties
of the concept, perhaps Taylor's depiction of there being not one modernity, followed
by a 'postmodernity', but "multiple modernities" both gets past the impasse of
deciding what postmodernism is, and represents the period as uncertain, plural,
multicultural, contingent, and so on (Taylor 2000b). It is in this sense that I want to
proceed with the view that Windschuttle's dualism represents the entirety of cultural
studies' founding problematic; both realist and idealist, empirical and relative,
Enlightenment and Romantic.
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The most important (third) proposition is that the key features ofTaylor's
philosophical anthropology are intertwined with the founding debates that led to the
formation of British Cultural Studies. Furthermore, his phi losophy offers resources
that connect the field's post-Marxist roots with an emancipatory conception of the
subject that is rooted in the humanist Marx. In short, the thesis aligns Taylor's ethics
with a similarly ethical stance inherent in Stuart Hall's activism.
The second proposition concerns the post-Marxist foundation of cultural
studies, and presents a picture of that foundation emerging in tensions between rival
sources of modernity. This tension resembles Raymond Williams's definitions of
'residual' and the 'emergent' cultures. "The residual. .. has been effectively formed in
the past, but is still active in the cultural process ... as an effective element of the
present" (Williams ]977: ]22. The more complicated emergent can be distinguished,
in Williams's terms, between "alternative" or "oppositional" cultures (Williams 1977:
235); the first resembling "someone who simply finds a different way to live and
wishes to be left alone with it, and [the oppositional] someone who wants to find a
different way to live and wants to change society in its light" (Williams ]980: 42).
The point that I shall be making is one that could as well take into account
Ernesto Laclau's (1990) concept of "dislocation", by which he criticises Williams's
emergent/residual distinction as failing to account for the indeterminacy that, he
argues, constitutes the very condition of political possibility, and hence retaining a
measure 'fatalistic certainty' that was a part of classical Marxism's historical
teleology (Laclau 1990: 51 ).1 Post-Marxism rejects that quietism and seeks to restore
a measure of agency, displacing some of Marxism's key terms, resulting "in a
prioritization of politics as the process by which social identities and interests are not
just contested but produced" (Gilbert 200 I: 192).
I do not intend to engage in matters raised in Laclau's post-Marxist (and
poststructuralist) critique of Williams, but will give this only cursory attention in this
chapter. Here I merely want to indicate that Taylor's distinction between 'multiple
modernities' can be articulated with Williams's terms; where the sources that
I Laclau writes: "For classical Marxism, the possibility of transcending capitalist society depended on
the simplification of social structure and the emergence of a privileged agent of social change, while
for us, the possibility of a democratic transformation of society depends on a proliferation of new
subjects of change. This is only possible if there is something in contemporary capitalism which really
tends to multiply dislocations and thus create a plurality of new antagonisms" (Laclau 1990: 41).
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constitute the residual and the emergent can be seen as grouped into a 'family' of the
Enlightenment tradition (residual), whereas other resources derive from a range of
positions that emerge from the Romantic tradition (emergent) of modernity. Whether
these sources correspond to a 'modern' and a 'postmodern' oeuvre is not necessarily
excluded in Taylor's work, but his conception of 'multiple modernities' does attempt
to recover historical goods that he considers as a condition vital to the dialogical
constitution of modern (contingent) identities. Poststructural ism tends to erase that
possibility, and hence the ethical dimension of persons.
The third proposition concerns one aspect extracted from the range of issues
that the Media Wars debate brought to the surface: the underlying empiricist
framework that Keith Windschuttle assumes to be the preferred outlook ofjournalism
theory and practice. This assumption, even by John Hartley's reckoning, is not
inaccurate in so far as journalism is the sense-making practice (and institution) of
modernity. Hartley even entertains the prospect that journalism has a relation
modernity is rather more coterminous than instrumental. Hartley's journalism-
modernity couplet holds true in so far as he insists on journalism's inherent function
as serving Enlightenment.
Journalism, however, is also democratic, and as Taylor sees not one but
alternative or 'multiple modernities' (Taylor 2002b), we begin to see that Hartley's
couplet has a capacity for 'self-critique' no less limited than Windschuttle's realist-
idealist dualism has for invigorating journalism theory and practice. Both fall shy of
Edward Thompson's (1968) and Stanley HalTison's (1974) descriptions of a working
class press that played no small part in Thompson's and Raymond Williams's
conceptualizing of cultural materialism (see Higgins 1999). The Romantic tradition is
no less a source of modernity; and in this respect, Windschuttle's realist-idealist
dualism also shields an instrumentalist understanding ofjournalism's relation to
modernity that, were the journalism educators he defends to see it, might very well
send them reaching out for the 'fresh air' of civic, public and 'communitarian'
journalism.
This chapter addresses a theme drawn from each proposition in turn. The first
section situated the 'media wars' debate within the wider contestation of the 'science
wars'. I shall begin with Slavoj Zizek's (2002) impassioned plea made on behalf of
the more embattled party in those wars, cultural studies. The successive section
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considers post-Marxism as the philosophical background to debates that led to the
formation of British Cultural' Studies. Finally, Taylor's philosophical anthropology is
introduced by way of concepts by which he is better known, and which media
scholars focus on (perhaps) exclusively: communitarianism. The other concept is
authenticity. But the discussion aims to extract from these concepts a sense of what
Taylor's philosophy is really about.
'Science Wars' and the hidden Cartesian picture
[T]he politically correct cultural studies theorists often pay for their arrogance and
lack of a serious approach by confusing truth (the engaged subjective position) and
knowledge - that is, by disavowing the gap that separates them, by directly
subordinating knowledge to truth (say, a quick sociocritical dismissal of a specific
science such as quantum physics or biology without proper acquaintance with the
inherent conceptual structure of this field). The problem of cultural studies effectively
is often the lack of specific disciplinary skills. A literary theorist without proper
knowledge of philosophy can write disparaging remarks about Hegel's
phallocentrism. We are dealing with a kind of false universal critical capacity to pass
judgment on everything, without proper knowledge. With all its criticism of
traditional philosophical universalism, cultural studies effectively functions as an
ersatz philosophy (Zizek 2002: 29).
Strong language indeed; but it would be mistaken to take Slavoj Zizek as
adopting a stance contra to cultural studies. Instead, his is an impassioned plea in a
struggle "between the advocates of postmodern-deconstructonist cu Itural studies and
the cognitivist popularizers of 'hard' sciences" (Zizek 2002: 19); a struggle for the
high ground of the "public intellectual" being lost by the Left not only due to science
wars debacles such as the 1994 Sokal hoax2 (Turner 2000: 356), but also due to a
reluctance or inability of cultural theorists to deal with certain epistemological claims
and assumptions that help maintain the ideological hegemony held by the 'Third
Culture' popularisers of science despite the interventions of critical science studies
(Franklin 1995).
The contestation is not between natural and social scientists; instead "we are
dealing not with scientists themselves but ... with authors who address a large
segment of the public in a way whose success outdoes by far the public appeal of
cultural studies" (Zizek 2002: 20). Their success in convincing a public as to the
2 In 1994, New York University theoretical physicist Alan Sokal submitted an essay to Social Text,
entitled Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics ofQuantum Gravity.
The essay purported to be a postmodern look on the political implications of twentieth century physical
theories. After five members ofSocial Text's editorial board accepted the essay for publication in 1996,
Sokal revealed in the journal Lingua Franca that it was an ensemble of deliberately concocted howlers
and non-sequiturs, stitched together to flatter the ideological preconceptions of the editors.
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greater plausibility oftheir truth claims derives less from their having "reveal[ed] the
keys to the great secrets that concern us all" (Zizek 2002: 21) than it does from the
background social imaginaries from which their claims derive their authority (see
Taylor 2002; 2004). The sources of those imaginaries derive from Enlightenment
naturalism, exemplified in the kinds of empiricist and instrumentalist thinking by
which human life has come to be imagined in mechanistic ways (Taylor 1989a: 234).
But social imaginaries are not all-powerfully determinate. "It is simply the idea that
the imagined location of identity has to be something negotiated in the present by the
citizens themselves, rather than something received or inherited from the past" (Smith
2002: 168. Italics added). Therefore, the success of 'Third Culturalists' such as Daniel
Dennett, Fritjof Capra, and Oliver Sacks is an accomplishment of their being public
intellectuals in a way that their cultural theorist adversaries are not.3
In the I940s and 1950s the idea of a public intellectual was identified with an
academic versed in "soft" human (or social) sciences who addressed issues of
common interest, taking a stance toward the great issues of the day and thus triggering
or participating in large and passionate public debates. What then occurred, with the
onslaught of ,'French" postmodern deconstructionist theory, was the passing of the
generation of public thinkers and their replacement by "bloodless academicians," by
cultural scientists whose pseudoradical stance against "power" or "hegemonic
discourse" effectively involves the growing disappearance of direct and actual
pOllitical engagements outside the narrow confines of academia, as well as the growing
self-enclosure in an elitist jargon that precludes the very possibility of functioning as
an intellectual engaged in public debates (Zizek 2002: 20-21).
Zizek draws a crucial distinction between "science itself and its inherent
ideologization" (Zizek 2002: 21), arguing a further distinction between the
'naturalization of culture' (as when social institutions are imagined as natural entities)
and the 'culturalization of nature' (as when the natural world is imagined
mechanistically) (Zizek 2002: 22). Where Zizek's provocative argument(s) becomes
worrying is in his advocacy of a reified Cartesian philosophy of mind; even as he
appears to draw away from similarly rationalist models ofthe self. Other thinkers
such as Charles Taylor are less ambiguous; Taylor, who since the late 1950s has taken
a fundamental stance against the Cartesian epistemological construal of human
agency.
Furthermore, Taylor's work pre-dates seemingly innovative solutions such as
Bent Flyvberg's (2001) argument for an Aristotelian way out of the science wars:
3 Daniel Dennett represents the fields of cognitive science and evolutionary theory, Oliver Sacks
represents the field of neurology, and Fritjof Capra represents those physicists who deal with quantum
physics and cosmology.
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social science (generally) proceeds from phronesis, whereas science is generally
about epistemology.4 Flyvberg (200 I) recognizes the hinge between phronesis
(practical wisdom, or practical reason, though the concept has no strict counterpart in
English) and episteme (pure knowledge) - terms separated by the seventeenth century
scientific revolution, though Taylor would see this achievement of an absolute
conception of objectivity linked to the priority of mechanistic explanation as a
subsumption of teleological explanations under absolute mechanistic ones (Taylor
1964: 11,98; 1989a: 457). The "requirement of absoluteness," in Taylor's words, is
that "the task of science is to give an account of the world as it is independently of the
meanings it might have for human subjects, or how it figures in their experience"
(Taylor 1980a: 31). This stringently atomistic standard of evidence was tied to an
exacting new ideal of objectivity. "After Galileo, Taylor is saying, theories proposing
mechanistic explanations of nature, couched in absolute terms, tended to be more
successful than teleological explanations, until they eventually became the norm in
science" (Smith 2002: 40).
In Taylor's so-called 'realist' view of science, scientific theories emerge by a sphere
of practical concerns. But they succeed as theories by identifying the real causal
powers inherent in different kinds of substance. Incidentally, this realist view leaves it
an open question whether causal powers are teleological or mechanistic. It is not up to
the phi !osophy of science to decide what causal powers there are in the world.
However, Taylor is convinced that a certain kind of teleology, one that ascribes
subject-related properties to physical substance, is no longer credible. Taylor's
philosophical realism leaves open the possibility ofa teleological science of nature
that neither regresses to the old Aristotelian 'enchanted' view nor intrudes into the
human sciences in a destructive way. Having said that, it is not a possibility Taylor
himself explores (Smith 2002: 40-41).
It is widely agreed that the substitution of mechanistic explanations for
teleological ones was a decisive step in the evolution of modern science (Kymlicka
1988; Mansueto 1997; Ringen 1976; Smith 2002: 41). That belief rests on empiricist
epistemology, which in the mid-twentieth century grounded the mechanistic
explanations of behavioural psychology. But while behaviourism is long dead, "the
belief that the laws governing human behaviour must be mechanistic in form is still
very much alive" (Smith 2002: 43), as is evident in much of the 'Third Culture'
4 The simple phronesis-episleme distinction is not held universally as a model separating the social
from the natural sciences; if it was, the science wars would have been senseless, or never have
occurred. The terms resemble though do not equate the terms of the Ihe01y-praclice dichotomy that
emerges in certain fields such as journalism studies. In phronesis, thought and action are
hermeneutically related as when the thought is derived through action; with the two combined in
praclice.
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positions defended in the 'science wars'. That is, empiricist epistemology underpins
the (behaviourist) conviction that behaviour must be explicable in mechanistic terms.
A recent skirmish of the 'science wars' was seen with the outbreak in the late
1990s of the 'media wars' in mainly Australian universities engaged in journalism
education. The contestation involved journalism educators (mostly former journalists
who had migrated to the academy) objecting to the academic standing afforded to
cultural studies scholars who held leadership positions in journalism programmes (see
Windschuttle 1997a; 1998a; 1998b; 1999). The main objection was that cultural
studies was an inappropriate basis for the training of would-be journalists. The
journalistic flashpoint across which this 'sciences wars' skirmish was waged found
entrenched on either side the antinomies of realism and relativism, practice and
theory, and empiricism and constructivism. While the principal target of the
journalism educators - commanded by Australian positivist historian Keith
Windschuttle - was postmodernism and/or deconstructionism (or just 'Theory'), left-
leaning neo-Marxist practitioners of cultural studies who mayor may not have
embraced Theory were drawn into the fray.
Unhappy memories of the Sokal hoax (Sokal 1996; Sokal and Bricmont 1998)
seemed to unnerve the side of cultural studies as much as it emboldened
Windschuttle. But after the matter died down at the turn of the millennium, neither
side appeared to have scored any lasting gains. The result might have been different
had cultural studies scholars looked more widely afield- without rather than within -
to resources that could have properly located the negative implications that
empiricism and a Cartesian philosophy of mind hold for the philosophical
anthropological dimensions of human agency. Windschuttle's concerns were, after all,
about journalists themselves; were therefore ethical rather than instrumental. The
problem, as it appears, is that postmodern cultural studies had rendered an ethical
subject an impossibility (Slack and Whitt 1992). While theories of the 'active
audience' and similar acknowledgements of 'agency' reduced to resistance to cultural
determinations do ground the ethnographic movement within cultural studies (see
Morley 1993), the underlying imaginaries - derived from a Cartesian philosophy of
mind - that underlie empiricism are seldom if ever recognized.s The case of the field
5 David Morley (1993) reviews the contesting positions that have made up the concept of the 'active
audience, and notes the strongest stance as "see[ing] that macro structures can be reproduced only
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of communication is another case in point. Lawrence Grossberg (1993; 1997), in
considering the difficult articulations between communication and cultural studies,
notes how despite work in the 1960s that fed into the 'discipline' having been
intimately tied to issues of culture and community, to the social nature of human
reality, and to the political possibil ities of utopian aspirations. However, under the
pressures of the growing status of "science" and logical positivism, the emergence of
psycholinguistics and information theory, the demands of propaganda research and
the recurring public fears over new forms and technologies of communication, that
legacy was largely submerged. The field of (mass) communications, into the 1970s,
was largely quantitative and scientistic, seeking to find the statistically or
experimentally verifiable effects determined by particular media and message
variables. Its theoretical foundations were almost entirely located in neobehaviourist
psychology and structural-functional sociology. The normative, theoretical, and
populist impulses implicit in the study of communication were, to say the least,
rendered suspect and invisible (Grossberg 1997: 280).
Both the variously-contending conceptions of the active audience and the
interpretive conceptions ofthe selfthat underlie "communication" (see Peters J.
1999), tend to rest upon a bid to recover the primacy of human behaviour rather than
human action (see Taylor 1964). The difference is as significant as that between
consciousness (which all animals have) and perception (possessed by language
animals only; and hop live in a moral universe). The former advocates a model of
representation to the neglect of (though not necessarily as opposed to) models of
constitutive agency. The Cartesian core of empiricism is retained in representational
and mediational thinking, whereas the alternative conception critiques that core in a
way that recovers a Hegelian philosophy of mind to which Enlightenment rationality
that underwrites the 'Third Culture,6 movement (Zizek 2002) remains adamantly
opposed.
At stake is a conception of the self that is at once ethical and emancipatory.
Without adequately eradicating the epistemological construal that has derived from
through microprocesses .... The whole point of that shift was to attempt to find better ways to articulate
the micro and macro levels of analysis, not to abandon either pole in favor of the other" (Morley 1993:
17).
6 On the surface the science wars can appear to be between culturalists and scientists; but, instead, it
concerns the former and an emergent fusion of science and literature that has formed into a discourse of
popular scientism. Elinor Shaffer (1997) describes 'third culture' as a form of social history, or as an
interface between science and other disciplines - given to publishing books for an intelligent, reading
public open to the hegemony of science in public life. "The interface of science with other disciplines
has become a matter of urgency in our time, because science is the dominant intellectual discipline,
whose authority, influence and, through its practical applications, financial and political power are
unequalled .. Even on 'ultimate' questions science today has taken the place of both theology and
philosophy, and books offering scientific answers to age-old questions of the formation and end of the
universe, the essential character of human nature and consciousness, and the parameters of decision-
making about matters of life and death have attained a remarkable popularity" (Shaffer 1997: 2-3).
56
the Cartesian core rooted in empiricist and scientistic thinking, it seems that cultural
studies can do little better than championing one kind of ideological effect against
another kind of interpellation. This constraint remains in place even as cultural studies
scholarship chooses its contestations as antinomies of "meaning versus effects;
interpretation versus quantification; consciousness versus behaviour" (Grossberg
1997: 281).
Charles Taylor's philosophical anthropology - by seeking to recover a plausible
model of human agency and identity - offers a way of restoring what I maintain here
to be a missing dimension that may make cultural studies a more potent contender in
the 'science wars', and that could have provided a more effective way of meeting the
challenge of the 'media wars' by understanding the empiricist assumptions of populist
scientistic apologetics. But there is more: as a post-Marxist scholar and founder
member of the British New Left movement, Taylor played a formative 'public
intellectual' role in the formation of British Cultural Studies in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. The implications of studying particularly Taylor's (emergent) philosophy
during this per1iod forms the foundation of this thesis.
Post-Marxism and cultural studies
Cultural Studies is arguably the quintessential post-Marxist field located in the
human and social sciences given, at least, that "it came into existence as a critique of
Marxist economism" (Gilbert 200 I: 189). The field of post-Marxism is a long-
contested terrain that displays a quite different problematic in the post-Soviet era to its
questions in the post-Stalin era, and so I want to distinguish, following Stuart Sim
(1998), between post-Marxism and post-Marxism without necessarily suggesting that
they represent a movement from the cradle of cultural studies to its grave.
British Cultural Studies began in response to Marxism's crisis in the late 1950s
and early 1960s; spurred by the weakening of orthodox Marxism that followed in the
post-Stalin era and which was powerfully symbolised by the Soviet invasion of
Hungary in 1956. But the post-Marxist thought that responded to these conditions -
particularly outside the Soviet bloc - did not occur suddenly. Its ground was prepared
by thinkers such as Georg Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci who tried, with limited
success, to escape the reductionist problematic of Second International Marxism (see
Sim 1998). Successive thinkers used their work to explore 'Marx without Marxism' -
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a direction with gave the New Left its initial impetus, and which it helped to sustain in
and through its activism.?
Stuart Hall, in his ground-breaking essay, The problem o/ideology - Marxism
without guarantees,8 called post-Marxism one of the "largest and most flourishing"
schools in cultural studies (Hall 1986: 28). With its altered accent, the term post-
Marxism has a meaning incurred in the 1989 collapse ofthe Soviet Union. Together
with the term's 'post-Soviet' and 'post-Cold War' inflections, the term signifies the
1990s period as a time when Marxism had declined to the point where it hadfinally
lost its power as a political imaginary. The period saw scholars and intellectuals either
abandon the ideology and project altogether, or like Ernesto Laclau and Chantalle
Mouffe to take up defensive positions to fight a rear-guard action to argue its case.
Either way, the period ruled out 'business as usual'. Not insignificantly, this period
also saw cultural studies enter a stage of deep uncertainty (see Barrett 1991; Ferguson
and Golding 1997), represented partly by a literature that indicates the field had
reached a 'mature' phase centred upon themes of recollection and reinvention (e.g.,
Grossberg 1997; Peters 1999).
The simple correspondence I am drawing between two phases of cultural studies
and the post-Marxist and post-Marxist periods is a generalization challenged by both
Marxist scholarship and cultural studies being, respectively, sites of contestation. To
venture another generalization, however, one issue of contestation within the post-
Marxist period was to shift the classical Marxist dictate ofthe class fraction as the
basis for revolutionary praxis onto other fractions such as race, gender, religions, and
so on. The post-Marxist period has seen a reverse of that challenge, where scholars
seek to shore up the ground lost to the dictate of class. LacLau and Mouffe's work
(1985; 1987) to this effect are one example ofthis defense at a general level. Stuart
Hall's (1996; 1997) papers defending his continued conviction in Louis Althusser
represents a situated defense in cultural studies.
Paul Bowman's book, Post-Marxism versus Cultural Studies: Theory, Politics
and Intervention (2005), represents a position between these two examples. Bowman
7 Stuart Hall explains to Kuan-Hsing Chen that he abandoned his dissertation on Henry lames "literally
because of 1956" (Hall 1986a: 497).
8 "Without guarantees" will probably be Stuart Hall's epitaph; but if not, the editors of a recent
collection of essays in honour of him thought it a suitable title to their book (Gilroy, Grossberg and
McRobbie 2000). Charles Taylor is among the global community of cultural studies to contribute
essays to the book.
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opposes a tendency in cultural studies to evacuate the Marxist problematic in its
postmodern moment of 'scandal'. However, Bowman's argument is not a
conservative gesture, but in line with Angela McRobbie's (1992: 720) earlier
argument, suggests that post-Marxism is a suitable 'replacement' of Marxism for
providing a politico-theoretical ground for cultural studies. Post-Marxism effects a
"deconstructive displacement of some of Marxism's key terms, which results in an
ontological prioritization of politics as the process by which social identities and
interests are not just contested but produced" (Gilbe,rt 2001: 192). Where Bowman
(2005) does go further than McRobbie (1992) is to pose the challenge of restoring the
integrity of the selfin the face of the "morality without [an] ethical code" conditions
of postmodern ethics (Bowman 2005: 31).
While Bowman's post-Marxist emphasis finds a sympathetic stance in the
argument of this thesis, it is the earlier part of the preceding post-Marxist period and
philosophy that concerns me here; that is, the period and problematic that corresponds
to the formation of British Cultural Studies. That is, questions of subjectivity and
human agency were integral to early post-Marx,ist critiques of economism. A
continuity between these and other aspects ofpost-Marxism and the shifts from class
to alternate social fractions that occupy and constitute post-Marxist debate may be
found in Charles Taylor's work. In this respect I am drawing closer to Stuart Sim's
embrace of both inflections in Post-Marxism: An Intellectual History (1998), where
he draws a continuity between the work of George Lukacs, Louis Althusser and the
Frankfurt School as examples of"a post-Marxism at work within classical Marxism,"
and the "growing disenchantment being expressed towards Marxism from the
postmodern and feminist camps from the 1960s onwards" (Sim 1998: 2). It is this
continuity that is evident in Taylor's work, and which appears to have been made
feasible by his de-emphasis ofthe class concept in the interests of allowing greater
space for pluralistic notions of agency, and no less its ethical dimensions.
Kuan-Hsing Chen (1996) calls for a post-Marxist cultural studies as a way of
negotiating between 'traditional' Gramscian modes and what he calls
'postmodernism,.9 Chen's use of the terms 'cultural studies,' 'Marxism' and 'cultural
studies' is confusing; though understandably so given the difficulties of posing the
9 I put the term 'postmodernism' in scare-quotes to indicate Chen 's (1986) questioning whether such a
thing as postmodernism actually exists; or whether it is more accurate to indicate different modernities.
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prospect of 'post-Marxist cultural studies' as a response to its previous forms. Chen
defines a post-Marxist cultural studies in the following way:
[P]ost-Marxism can be understood as (I) the movement "beyond orthodox Marxism,"
(2) as the attempt "beyond the notion of Marxism guaranteed by the laws of history,"
and (3) as the persistent usage of Marxism "as one's reference point" .... Perhaps the
"name" Marxism" does not make a difference as (to the extent that holding onto it
claims and authorizes one's patri-lineage, affiliations and right to write and speak)
(Chen 1996: 320).
Certainly post-Marxism has always been a contested terrain, and its fortunes
resemble those of cultural studies: seen equally as an "open-ended and ongoing
theoretical struggle to understand and intervene into the existing organizations of
active domination and subordination within the formations of culture" (Grossberg
1997: 196). That is, the histories and formations of the two fields are implicitly
implicated; and for this reason, the postmodern direction that cultural studies took
ought to be seen more as a 'genetic' structure (however latent) than as a recent literary
deviation from any purported founding principles.
Thus, cultural studies, born into a family in decline, inherited the recriminations
against the "discursive effects of 'modernist' theoriZing" in Marxism - reductionism,
functionalism, essentialism and universal ism (McLennan 1996: 54). It was inevitable
that the field would embrace postmodern critique of the metaphysical and reductionist
character of Marxist economics; though what exactly constituted a 'reductionist'
explanatory programme "is the subject of a protracted and complex debate in the
meta-theory of the natural and social sciences" (McLennan 1996: 57). The field
would remain embroiled there also.
Questions of theoretical consistency aside, the substantive case for the inadequacy and
outdatedness of Marxism's reductionist ambience remain to be addressed, and the big
points ... are that class-explanatory propositions are less powerful nowadays, that
there are now very significant nonclass determinations, and that the whole cultural
realm has become considerably more important (McLennan 1996: 56).
In a different key, Gregor McLennan's (1996) discussion mirrors the 'two
paradigm' motif that has typified the theoretical development of (British) cultural
studies' as a tension between the home-grown socialist humanism of Raymond
Williams and Edward Thompson and "the economic reduction ism of the Marxists,
arguing for the importance of the creative human actor, of human experience, and the
determining power of cultural production itself' (Grossberg 1997: 200-20 I).
But cultural studies emerges as a disciplinary formation and intellectual position in the
confrontation ... between this humanist Marxism (which Hall calls "cultural ism") and
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the antihumanism of Althusser's structural Marxism. The latter pointed to the
former's reductionist asswnption of a necessary correspondence between cultural
forms, experience, and class formation .... It is out of this debate that the position
many people identify with Birminghan cultural studies arises. It is a moment in which,
to put it emblematically. Williams is "saved" by rereading him through Althussarian
structuralism (Grossberg 1997: 20:1).
However, the cultural studies centre, as it were, did not hold. The swing was
made to a poststructuralist reading of Althusser, where the very resistances that had
sustained cultural studies beyond adequate theorizing devolved into an "infinite
plurality of meaning and the endless fragmentation of the subject" (Grossberg 1997:
202). Michele Barrett's (1991) book depicts this movement as one from the
'modernist economics of untruth' (ideology) through to a postmodern politics of truth
(discourse). Barrett holds that "in recent years, the whole paradigm within which the
debate has occurred has been extensively and tellingly criticized" to the point where
we must accept that "the materialist (in practice economic reductionist) premises of
Marxism are inadequate as a basis for thinking about political, cultural and social life
in a late twentieth-century whose 'determinations' are so different from those of mid
nineteenth-century manufacturing capitalism" (Barrett 1991: 16, 139).
Barrett is referring to a realization that became evident within post-Marxism,
accepting as equally true a regime of truth that had prevailed during the height of
classical Marxism. It becomes possible, therefore, to see a progression starting with
classical Marxism, moving through a period ofpost-Marxism, and reaching post-
Marxism. Upon that timeline we can easily place British Cultural Studies as a
movement beginning at (and as) a moment of fracture in post-Marxism in which it is
deeply invested, and traveling fatalistically towards the final fracture in which post-
Marxism was revealed with inexorable affect and effect of that moment being the
logical outcome of its own historical' disposition'. That is, the fortunes of cultural
studies were always tied to those of Marxism; and it is possible in this way at least to
see cultural studies as a post-Marxist problematic - even given dual meaning of the
term as I have been using it. That is, the field has been an expression of that
problematic, not only embracing post-Marxist debates within its own debates and
discourses, but performing also as an index or barometer of the movement from post-
Marxism to post-Marxism.
To the extent that such an image holds true, cultural studies may appear rather
more to represent the historical shifts and cultural formations it tries to understand
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than to be a constituent element as a political agent within those formations. Yet
again, a hyper-representative depiction of cultural studies as an effect of history
overly emphasises determinations. An ameliorating measure of agency must certainly
obtain, thus making cultural studies complicit in the movement from classical
Marxism, through post-Marxism, to post-Marxism. It would seem that cultural
studies, as an indicator of the post-Marxist prob~ematic in its continuity, has been a
hermeneutic activity - as a participating actor in history, being both representative
and constitutive (and transformative) of that problematic - rather than a dialectical
representation of it.
Certainly cultural studies has not engineered itself into a cul-de-sac; as if having
played itself out in a fatalistic end game. It can (and does) take a lead from post-
Marxist theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1987), who defend
their poststructuralist approach (in discourse theory) to 'radical democracy' on
grounds that new social movements are mobilized 'beyond class' fractions; that is,
around "new oppositional counter-discursive forms of consciousness and action" such
as gender, race, religion and other cultural criteria (Ingalsbee 1996: 265). Post-
Marxism remains a response to crises of Marxism, but instead of these being
identified as theoretical matters posed by economism, they are posed by the
revolutionary agency of social movements that flouted the class dictate of classical
Marxism. Occluded from the post-Marxist analytic is a preoccupation with class as an
Enlightenment-inspired scientific truth-claim inherent in a mechanistic deployment of
structuralism (Poster 1975: 357). Post-Marxism's anti-foundational rejection of fixed
identities thus avai Is it to include the postmodem to imagine counter-d iscursive praxis
as a movement of shifting identities that "decentres the state as the predominant site
of political struggle" (Hartmann 1998: 348).
I mentioned Paul Bowman's (2005) book a few pages back, and suggested that
he addresses the question of cultural studies within a post-Marxist problematic, with
the assumption that this focus corresponds with 'postmodern cultural studies'. But
whatever correspondences apply, they are not chronological. I do not wish to engage
with Bowman in any detail here, but simply to refer to the broadest scope of his book
in order to indicate two points about the periodisation of post-Marxism that I am
briefly exploring here.
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Bowman subscribes to the Lacanian scholar Slavoj Zizek, who contests the
contemporary abandonment of radical politics and the postmodern retreat from
Enlightenment. In opposition to postmodern relativism, Zizek positions Lacan not as a
postmodem theorist, but as an Enlightenment thinker. Furthermore, Zizek, in The
Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre ofPolitical Ontology (2000), advocates a
reinvigorated Cartesian ism while at the same t,ime pursuing a defense of the critique
of ideology issued from within "a systematic Marxist position in and against the
conditions of contemporary Capital" (Sharpe 2004: 127). Matthew Sharpe voices a
commonly voiced query as to how Zizek's open defense of Cartesian ism connects
with his reading of Lacan and Marx (see Badminton 2003: 16-19).
[H]ow does Zizek's defence of the Cartesian subject relate to his wider [Marxist]
position? What does he think that Lacan, and his attempt to regenerate the critique of
ideology, could possibly have to do with Descartes? .... [T]he work that Zizek's
'retrieval' of the Cartesian subject is intended to carry out in the contemporary
theoretical climate needs to be elaborated .... [I]t is necessary to read Zizek's work as
a response to the 'post-structuralists' who attained such a theoretical hegemony in the
1980s in much of Anglo-American 'cultural studies or 'theory', as well as our courses
on 'continental philosophy' (Sharpe 2004: 127).
There is no need here to explain where and how (postmodern) cultural studies
scholarship has grasped decentredness with unbridled enthusiasm; though considering
the tone of Zizek's essay, Cultural Studies and the "Third Culture" (2003), one is left
to wonder to what extent he identifies with the cognitivists whose aim, he says, is "to
liberate the Left from the irrationalist-relativist-elitist postmodern fake" (Zizek 2003:
27). However, precisely where expressions of this kind leave cultural studies in
relation to the ethics of postmodemism - thus referring to the salience and thrust of
Bowman's (2005) book - may call into question the ethics of doing cultural studies.
But the prospect of a suitably vigorous ethical dimension being found within a
Cartesian frame, as Zizek advocates, would seem unlikely given the rejection of the
'ghost in the machine' image of the human subject that Cartesianism has inspired
(Ryle 1947). I mention this much here (and no more) not to dismiss Bowman's
sources, or his use of them, but to draw attention to certain problematic aspects of
them.
I am not claiming or assuming (by association) that cultural studies is 'anti-
ethical', ethically neutral (if that is at all possible), or lacks an adequate philosophical
anthropology. However, the absence of discussion and debate on this topic is worth
noting. Apart from Jennifer Slack and Laurie Whitt's paper in Cultural Studies
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(1992), edited by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler, there has
been little work investigating the relationship between cultural studies and ethics; or
the ethical dimension(s) of cultural studies. This ought not to suggest that a great gulf
exists between them, for as an emancipatory practice in the interests of the voices of
alterity, cultural studies has always had ethical underpinnings (see Zylinska 2005).
Perhaps the issue at heart concerns the legacy of (the classical) Marxism's
understanding of subjectivity which, as Barrett says, is either non-existent, or
"lamentable" (Barrett 1991: vii, 155).
The question immediately arises as to whether Barrett's charge applies as much
to the humanist Marx as it appears to do to the ethical implications of a view that sees
all theory as practice (Taylor 1985b: 91 ft). At least two points arise here: the first has
to do with the 'scientific' and 'positivistic' myth of the neutrality of theory, and the
second has to do, volte-face, with the ethical power of normative descriptions. I shall
briefly discuss the notion of communication as a case in point, and go on to consider
the suitability of communication as an imaginary ofjournalism. Sociolinguist
Deborah Cameron (2000) argues that the importance of talk and communication is
generally a common-place assumption of (post)modern culture.
[W]e live in what might be called a "communication culture" ... a culture that is
particularly self-conscious and reflexive abut communication, and that generates large
quantities of metadiscourse about it. For the members of such a culture it is
axiomatically "good to talk" - but at the same time it is natural to make judgments
about which kind of talk are good and which are less good. People aspire, or think
they ought to aspire, to communicate "better"; and they are highly receptive to expert
advice (Cameron 2000: viii).
Like communication, the salience of the concept of conversation in imagining
journalism practice is motivated in no small part by Jtirgen Habermas's concept of the
public sphere, and related attention given to the work of John Dewey, for both of
whom talk is a constitutive feature of democracy. When Habermas (1991) writes that
the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals
assemble to form a public body, he grants conversation a significant political role. So
too is Dewey, for whom the revitalization of public life depends on "the improvement
of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the
problem of the public" (Dewey 1927: 208).
The concept of conversation lies at the centre of discussions on public and civic
journalism, for instance, and even there tends to have more normative value than
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powers of description. Perhaps this tendency has derived, even partly, from theorists
taking face-to-face conversation as a metaphor of democratic life, whereas
consumption and rule-following may remain more accurate descriptors instead.
Certainly the idealized, if not romanticized, sense of Habermas's schema has attracted
its fair share of critics.
Michael Schudson (1992: 146) questions the extent to which "political
participation [was] carried out through rational and critical discourse." Elsewhere
Schudson (1997) disputes the extent to which writers use it as a descriptor of public
life. He adamantly disagrees that conversation is aptly applied to thinking about
journalism, and draws into question a swathe of thought that has been inspired to
adopt the Habermasian public sphere as an apogee ofjournalism practice at its
innocent democratic best.
One does not have to search far today to find views that place conversation at the
center of democratic life .... There is a veritable obsession with the term. It can be
found all over the academic landscape - in postmodernist philosophy, in
communitarian social criticism, in the public journalism movement, and elsewhere. It
is to be found in liberal critics of the mass media and in philosophers of discursive
democracy. It is central to Richard Rorty's critique of scientific and philosophical
certainty .... Rorty, Michael Oakeshott, and Hans-Georg Gadamer all turn to
"conversation" as a model of knowing.... James Carey has been especially eloquent in
placing conversation at the center of public life and the restoration of a public at the
heart of the contemporary task of democratic society (Schudson 1997: 297-298).
Schudson's critique points at the metaphoric use of the concept of conversation
as a type of what happens in journal ism. But he is also leveling his critique at an
absence that political economists have been on about for some time - the turn from
'conversation' to 'consumption' in the ostensibly democratic culture evident in
Western modernity. He notes also, in phrases excised from the above quote, 10 that
ours is a culture of conversation, where the 'talking cure' is paraded as the way we
conduct our sociability. Lawrence Grossberg (1997) draws attention to this 'more hair
of the dog' confusion by referring to lames Carey's (1975: 20) point that "the wide-
spread social interest in communication derives from a derangement in our models of
communication and community [which are] ... less an analysis than a contribution to
the chaos of modern culture" (in Grossberg 1997: 47).
10 Schudson refers to literary critic David Simpson's (1997) references to a current "cult of
'conversation'" epitomized in 'talk radio' and the glut of cheap 'talk shows' on television where
everyone's right to an opinion is glamorised.
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[T]he study of communication seems to have obvious ethical dimensions as soon as
the researchers face questions of policy and normative concerns. But it is often
difficult to draw the ethical implications of theoretical positions directly out of the
more descriptive writings. The notion of cultural crisis, however, allows us to look at
the ethical dimensions of the notion of culture at the heart of communication theory;
and the concept of culture includes a moral dimension at its very core .... The notion
of a cultural crisis implies some image of an ideal culture, or at least a culture not in
crisis. And since culture is, broadly speaking, the framework within which an
individual lives, the notion of a cultural crisis must have a conception of an ideal form
of human existence underlying its judgment (Grossberg 1997: 47).
This leads us back directly to a central tenet of the post-Marxist problematic-
the recovery of the humanist Marx of the Paris Manuscripts, and to at least one post-
Marxist intellectual - Charles Taylor - who was closely connected to the early
formation of British Cultural Studies (though he remains curiously absent in its
debates and histories), and whose work and thinking in the 1960s and 1970s engaged
with many of the themes that became the bread and butter of the field at that time. As
I mentioned earlier, Taylor founded and co-edited the Universities and Left Review
with fellow Rhodes Scholar Stuart Hall. Taylor taught Hall about Hegel and the
humanist side of Marx (Inglis 1993: 154), and was active in the New Left movement
until his return to Canada in the mid-1960s. Taylor has participated in review
conferences of that period (Archer et al. 1989; Eagleton and Wicker 1968), and
contributes a chapter to a book published in honour of Hall (Gilroy et at. 2000).
Taylor's thought is better known in terms of his philosophical anthropology, but
this began as an interrogation and critique of classical Marxism in the 1950s, thus
placing him in the tradition ofpost-Marxism. Taylor's work draws strongly on French
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), who in turn drew on Edmund
Husserl and Lukacs - configuring his phenomenology from the former, and his post-
Marxism from the latter. But Taylor also draws from the later Ludwig Wittgenstein in
the analytic tradition. Taylor's thought is therefore characterized as variously
philosophical hermeneutic, phenomenological and analytic, committed to a project of
restoring to philosophy an anti-essentialist, anti-Cartesian model of human
subjectivity. In this respect his philosophical anthropology is deeply ethical at least in
so far as it seeks to recover a plausible model of human agency.
On the 'communitarian' Taylor
I want to now address the question of what Taylor's philosophy is about, and to
do so against the tendency to situate any intellectual's work under a paradigm instead
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of within a body of questions. TayJor is too often telescoped within the focus of
communitarianism (see Christians et al. 1993; Eagleton 1996: 81-83), thus rendering
more opaque the richness of his thinking as a critic of modernity. Applying the
communitarian epithet to Taylor as a 'master theme' is understandable given the
difficulty of applying a defining label to his work. This does not mean that a
definition is beyond reach; at least not given his having identified with his former
Oxford professor Isaiah Berlin's (1953) notion of his being a hedgehog (Taylor
1985a: I, 3) - that is, being a thinker driven by a single 'big idea', "by which he
means his intellectual agenda has centred around one idea or highly related set of
ideas" (Bowers 2002: 35).
Thefact, however, of this tendency to 'pigeon-hole' an intellectual is not
altogether un instructive as the relevance of any thinker's project can be measured by
the extent to which it is expressed in, or inspires, programmes of social and pol itical
activism. Communitarianism stands out as one of these programmes, and in itself
translates the powerful imaginaries that Taylor musters, turning them to the purpose
of re-imagining journal ism as a modern project. That is, against the strictly libertarian
(informational) functions that journalism is said to perform, communitarianism brings
to light the conversational aspects by which communities and identities are
dialogically constituted - not least through the practice of "storytelling" (Schudson
1995; 1982; Woodstock 2002). Public and civic journalism (Lambeth 1992: 48-51),11
therefore, can be seen as expressions ofTaylor's thinking, but it is obvious that his
thinking is not about either of these.
Nonetheless, communitarianism remains an illuminating sign under which to
understand Taylor. But I want to draw some distance from that label, while
simultaneously retaining a tension between it and the actual project that best depicts
the questions that Taylor addresses. As a critic of modernity, Taylor's philosophy is
about modern subjectivity; and so, his philosophical anthropology forms the centre
piece of his entire philosophy. That is, taking phenomenology's sensitivity to the
structural forms of parts and wholes (SokoJowski 2000: 22-27), Taylor's critique of
the Cartesian epistemological construal- that is, his critique of the Cartesian
11 I mention Edmund Lambeth (1992) in particular for how he frames the Hutchins Commission
recommendations within the Aristotelian thinking of Alasdair Maclntyre's virtue ethics. This way he
develops a programme for 'communitarian' journalism. Again, Maclntyre rejects the label of
communitarianism.
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extension of the inner/outer (mind-body) sorting to the level of human person - can be
considered as the whole, or 'master theme', that integrates all the parts of his work.
Alternatively, it is the lens through which to view the Hegelian Marx he extracts with
the aid ofMaurice Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology, together with his
Hegelian theory of practice. 12 Of course, the 'master theme', as I have identified it-
being Taylor's 'anti-epistemology' (see Dreyfus 2004) - does not square with the
'core' ofTaylor's philosophy as Nicholas Smith (2002) identifies it:
At the core ofTaylor's project is the conviction that human reality is structured, and
in some sense constituted, by layers of meaning. This is the first principle of his
philosophical anthropology (Smith 2002: 18).
Smith is not wrong, but there are grounds to argue that the "first principle" he
identifies is an application ofTaylor's more fundamental stance. That is, Taylor's
philosophical anthropology rests on a deeper epistemological problematic.
Nonetheless, this does show the difficulty of imposing upon Taylor's work a template
that is up to the task of pulling together the many threads of his project; and short of
accepting that variously aberrant interpretations ofTaylor may at least be 'more or
less true', it is possible to introduce Taylor's thought by way of any application to
which his work is intended.
Michael Shapiro (1986: 312) lists among these intentions Taylor's criticism of
empiricism, his "advocating communitarianism over social atom ism and the integrity
of the human subject" (see Taylor 1985b: 187ff; I 992c; 1995a: 189ft). Atomism is the
Lockean doctrine that makes "the priority of the individual and his rights over
society" (Taylor 1979b: 29) possible by positing a certain view of human nature and
the human condition without which the priority of rights could not be asserted.
Atomism thus "affirms the self sufficiency of man alone or ... of the individual"
(Taylor 1979b: 32). The modern doctrine of atom ism is what Shapiro refers to as the
epistemological conceit effected by empiricists and idealists alike (Shapiro 1986:
311 ).
It is at this point where Taylor's method becomes particularly sharp; and where
his application to this thesis becomes pertinent. That is, within both empiricist and
idealist frames one finds a very similar anthropology, or 'picture of man', sharing a
12 The same applies to other themes that I do not consider explicitly in this study, such as his theory of
identity grounded in the narrative self. For a discussion on this aspect ofTay!or's thinking, Linda
Woodhead's (J 999) theological essay, Theology and the Fragmentalion ofthe Self, usefully draws the
connections between Tay)or's philosophical anthropology and his conception of modern identity.
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common epistemological construal rooted in Descartes and Enlightenment
fundamentalism (Taylor 2002a). But for all its 'conceit', the picture we get ofTaylor
is not one who rejects the modernity that empiricism depicts (as does Alasdair
MacIntyre (1984)) with whom he is sometimes compared (see Tate 1998). Nor does
Taylor reject those aspects favoured by idealist thought. Like David Scort says of
Stuart Hall's "ethical voice responsive to the violations that grow out of complacent
satisfactions, secure doctrines, congealed orders, sedimented identities" (Scort 2005:
1), Taylor refuses paradigmatic encirclement. Instead, he sees not a single modernity,
but - Taylor (2000b) writes in an essay honouring Hall- "multiple modernities"
invested in contending imaginaries. "A viable theory of alternative modernities has to
be able to relate both the pull to sameness and the forces making for difference"
(Taylor 2000b: 367).
The picture we gain ofTaylor, therefore, is one of a philosopher situated
between contending paradigms and refusing any for reasons that include, among
others, that both empiricist (naturalist) and constructivist (relativist) thinking were
rendered from a disarticulation of the holistic Aristotelian corpus - resulting, in
empiricist science, in "the subsumption of teleological explanations under mechanistic
ones" (Smith 2002: 37). But Shapiro tempts Taylor's objections to being named a
communitarianism - being a broad philosophical approach whose general concern is
with the bonds of community. Taylor is uncomfortable with the epithet for its usual
denotation derived from a diametrical opposition to libertarianism tout court, whereas
his project seeks to retain the best of both; not the rejection of one for the other
(Taylor 1994b: 250; 1995a: 182-183; 1996).
The point I am driving at is a matter of parts and wholes; of the difference
between injecting Taylor (or any thinker) into a useful conceptual application and
letting this term work metonymically, and taking the more difficult route of beginning
with his philosophy (the whole) and leading to each signifier (a part) that it invests.
This is what I attempted to do with Taylor; unlike certain communication scholars
who have tended to define him under the rubric of communitarianism mainly in their
interest in applying his thought on practical reason to questions ofjournal ism ethics,
but possibly also to 'authenticate' pre-existing conceptions (Christians et aI. 1993;
Wilkins and Christians 2001). One dire effect has been to lock Taylor too readily into
existing discourses of public and civic journalism without considering how the
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broader philosophical implications of his thought may actually problematise the
understandings of those practices. James Ettema's and Theodor Glasser's (1998) sole
reference to Taylor is an example of 'getting him right', recognising in Taylor's
theory the dialogic dimension essential to conversation:
Solidarity, as Habermas conceived it, emerges from - and subsequently strengthens -
the kind of genuinely dialogic conversation Charles Taylor had in mind when he
wrote about how communication can take liS over a certain threshold and into a
universe of discourse where commonality is not simply shared but established. Such
conversation promotes a sense of "ours" that is something greater than a mere
aggregation of "yours" and "mine" (Ettema and Glasser 1989: 201).
I do not wish to examine this or other instances of misplaced attempts to align
Taylor squarely with anyone school of thought - though there is little reason to
contest Thomas Schwandt's (2003: 304) view that Taylor can be contained within
philosophical hermeneutics. "The goal of philosophical hermeneutics is philosophical
- that is, to understand what is involved in the process of understanding itself'
(Schwandt 2003: 304). On the other hand, a too-ready inclusion ofTaylor in a general
interpretive paradigm is sure to be problematic. For instance, Taylor rejects the
interpretivist view "that hermeneutics is an art or technique of understanding, the
purpose of which is to construct a methodological foundation for the human sciences"
(Grondin 1994: 109), thus distancing himself from the nineteenth century
hermeneutics ofWilhelm Dilthey.13 Taylor's focus instead on (hermeneutic)
understanding as a kind of moral-political knowledge that is at once embodied,
engaged, and concerned with practical choice is a central element in the hermeneutic
philosophies that draw on Gadamer and Heidegger. 14
The end to which Taylor's outlook is given is not so theoretical as it is
practical. A central focus of his philosophical anthropology is the concept of
engagement, directed principally at a Cartesian "anthropology of disengagement" that
continues to drive a libertarian ideal of self-transparency and instrumental freedom
(Smith 2004: 41), and which underwrites notions of human beings as potentially
having the freedom to do as they will. But the fact that humans are 'languaged
animals' contradicts this notion.
I J See Smith, John K. (1984). The problem of criteria for judging interpretive inquiry. Educational
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 6(4).
14 From Gadamer's position, "Hermeneutics ... is not ... a methodology of the human sciences, but an
attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-
consciousness" (Gadamer 1975: xiii).
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[T]he fact that human beings are language animals means that they can never achieve
full self-possession. The thinking and acting subject is always already situated in the
semantic dimension, and so is subject to norms that are in some sense "given". The
semantic dimension is, in principle, independent of the will and must escape
objectification by the will. The constitutive power of language also militates against
the ideal ofahsolute cognitive self-possession. For if there are experiences, feelings,
and social relations that are constituted by the way we express or interpret them, and
these things help define who we are, our self-understanding can never be complete.
These features of human existence are not objects waiting to be represented by the
right kind of designative language. There is no final, "self-authenticating" vocabulary
for them; and relatedly, there is always more "meaning" to them than is expressed in
any particular self-interpretation. The meaning of human existence insofar as it
inhabits the semantic dimension or is constituted by language qua expressive power
can never be final ised. In addition, the language of self-interpretation is beyond the
individual's control because language has an inherently intersubjective character
(Smith 2004: 41-42).
As Taylor puts it in The Importance ofHerder: "The language I speak, the web
I can never fully dominate and oversee, can never be my language; it is always our
language" (Taylor 1995a: 99). This brings us back to the question of
communitarianism, and possibly indicates common cause that Taylor might find with
pragmatists - as his debate with Richard Rorty (1980) indicates, though far from
suggesting that he might be a card carrying pragmatist. Nevertheless, much of
Taylor's political thought on the social preconditions for modem identity do suggest
an alignment with communitarianism; and certainly he can be counted among those
Anglo-American philosophers ls who can be considered to have contributed to the
communitarian tradition (Taylor 1995a: 181-203). Alasdair MacIntyre has also been
(erroneously) identified among communitarians (Caney 1992; Thigpen and Downing
1987). "In spite of rumours to the contrary," MacIntyre writes,
I am not and never have been a communitarian. For my judgement is that the political,
economic and moral structures of advanced modernity ... exclude the possibility of
realizing any of the worthwhile types of political community what at various times in
the past have been achieved, even if a'l ways in imperfect forms. And I also believe
that attempts to remake modern societies in systematically communitarian ways will
always be either ineffective or disastrous (Maclntyre in Bell 2005, n.2).
Perhaps the primary reason why both MacIntyre and Taylor reject the
communitarian label lies in the very framework in which it is understood: the
15 Anglo-American communitarianism has developed most visibly as a reaction to John Rawls's
landmark book, A Theory ofJus/ice (1971). Drawing primarily upon the insights of Aristotle and
Hegel, political philosophers such as Alasdair Maclntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael
Walzer dispute Rawls's assumption that the principal task of government is to secure and distribute
fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need to lead freely chosen lives.
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'liberalism-communitarian debate'. 16 That is, the debate runs together "ontological
and advocacy issues" (Taylor 1995a: 181), and Taylor sets about to disentangle them
- 'atomists from holists' - in a manner which delves deeply into political theories of
western liberalism. I shall not venture there, save to say that Taylor defends the view
that "democratic society needs some commonly recognized definition of the good
life," and that he rejects models of society premised upon notions of 'unencumbered
identities' (Taylor 1995a: 182). "The target ofTaylor's argument is not the capacity
for individual self-determination as such, but rather a failure to appreciate the
ontology required to make sense of this capacity" (Smith 2002: 146).
A secondary reason for the appeal of communitarianism may be identified (at
least emotionally) with wistful memories of a golden age of Marxism; and in a way
that ignores Marx's own sensitivity to the complex relations of identity that
individuals have to the modern societies to which they belong. 17 But given even these
parameters, it is fairly obvious that both Taylor and MacIntyre would have been
identified as communitarians at least for having provided "excellent accounts" in the
"literature on the historical development of modern liberalism" (Theobald and
Dinkelman 1995: 6). But upon closer inspection, both Taylor's and MacIntyre's
accounts start not from a communitarian assumption, but share a critique of the
Augustinian 'inward turn' that made Descartes's philosophy possible.
Descartes represents a crucial juncture in terms of liberal conceptions of selfhood. His
separation of mind and body is often targeted for blame by thinkers representing
diverse intellectual and philosophical orientations; among them ... communitarians ....
According to these critics, Descartes ... is responsible for "unleashing" instrumental
reason. Bolstered by instrumental reason, mankind was to make its boldest, and
largely unprecedented, declaration of dominion over the world .... A modern
anthropocentrism began to replace a feudal theocentrism as a central feature of the
European world view, just as heliocentric scholarship began to replace geocentrism.
From the perspective of communitarians, most important about the Cartesian moment
in the evolution of liberalism is that the door was widely opened for culturally
defining fulfilment as something that might be found totally within the context of the
self. Stated differently, what was radical about Descartes' magnification of the
Augustinian inward turn was that human fulfillment could be achieved merely
16 Taylor, Charles (1989d). Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate. In N. L. Rosenblum,
(ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
17 Marx rejects the atomistic view of the individual in showing that liberal concepts of individuality are
"expressions of the social alienation offree market conditions" (Sayers 2007: 84). It is Marx's
depiction of what has become known as the 'fragmentation thesis' (see Giddens 1990). In the
Communist Manifesto, Marx describes modernity in terms of "[the] constant revolutionizing of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of relations, everlasting uncertainties and agitation .... All fixed,
fast-frozen relationships, with their venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air."
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through the exercise of reason, rendering outside sources or connections nonessential
(Theobald and Dinkelman 1995: 7-8).
An additional motive for labeling particularly Maclntyre as a communitarian
may be given his insistence on the efficacy of tradition; which is not the motif of a
conservative impulse, but is intended as a direct attack on Enlightenment claims for
reason's unconditional autonomy vested in 'individual radical autonomy' (see Annas
1989; Colby 1995; Schneewind 1982). As Maclntyre puts it in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality?: "[I]t is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground,
some locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for
enquiry independent of all traditions" (MacIntyre 1988: 367).
MacIntyre therefore rejects the Kantian assumption 18 that reason legislates its
own ends (MacIntyre 1984: 222), and thereby stands in general agreement to
Gadamer, who rejects the a priori status of reason and emphasizes instead that
Enlightenment reason is always situated within particular traditions (Gadamer 1975a:
340,345).19 Gadamer also rejects Kant's denigration of tradition as the source of
'irrationality' (Gadamer 1979: 246-247). His rejection defines the hermeneutic
tradition and its central principle, the hermeneutic circle, in that all interpretation
involves a tension between one's own perspective and that of another (Gadamer 1979:
273). It is therefore impossible to escape one's own horizon, leaving interpretation as
always involving a negotiation between one's horizon of significance and the
preconceptions of others within their own horizons (Gadamer 1979: 238, 261). But
unlike Kant's confidence, Gadamer accepts as a point of principle that there can be no
final truth claims.
In this section I have attempted to present the question of communitarianism, by
which many define Taylor's outlook, as lying in tension with the questions of
modernity that his thinking is about. In this way I have tried to neither dismiss nor
thoroughly endorse the term as a label for his philosophy, yet to point out ways in
which it can usefully indicate the core of his concerns about modem identities.
Furthennore, I have sought to indicate some of the sources and concepts that inform
18 In Critique ofPure Reason (Axi-xii), Kant states: "It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most
difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which wi 11 assure to
reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in
accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique ofpure
reason."
19 See also Bernstein (1983: 142).
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his questions. Gadamer's sense of 'horizon' is one of these, but ought to be read
within the field of existential hermeneutics rather than as a self-standing concept. For
instance, when we notice how Gadamer's horizon informs what Taylor calls the "Best
Account" principle (Taylor 1989a: 69), coupled to his notion of"epistemic gain"
(Taylor 1989a: 72), it is necessary to bear in mind the Gadamarian background when,
in The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Taylor 1991a: 37), we read:
Things take on importance against a background of intelligibility. Let us call this a
horizon. It follows that one of the things that we can't do, if we are to define ourselves
significantly, is suppress or deny the horizons against which things take on
significance for us.
That same background informs topics such as Taylor's discussion of the moral
dimension of cultural incommensurability or (as he does) the possibility of
commensurability (see Taylor ]989a: 67-68). A more germane point, however, would
be the question of authenticity,20 which Taylor defines in opposition to 'self-
determination', but in a manner that recognizes even in "facile relativism" an ideal
central to modem culture of our being "true to my own originality" (Taylor 1991a:
23). Even in the notion of our being "self-interpreting animals (Taylor 1985a: 10),
Tay lor' s offers an engaged understanding of a selfthat is eminently social, and not
atomistic (Taylor 1989a: 39). It is a Heideggarian self, for whom its being is open to
question and matters to itself (Taylor ]992: 328). That mattering Taylor explores in
terms of "the selfas a kind of being that can only exist in normative, moral space
(Tay/or 1989a: 49). Thus Taylor demonstrates how the possibility of an authentic
identity is frustrated by a moral relativism which denies the validity of our horizons of
significance and which underlies an instrumental attitude towards human
relationships.
While both Tay/or and MacIntyre remain unwavering critics of modernity,
Maclntyre does not share Taylor's confidence in any social goods being retrievable
from it. "For Maclntyre, the moral philosophy of modernity has lost sight of any
conception of man's essence and hence is not able to make sense of the conceptual
20 Stemming from Kant, and Descartes before him, humanist liberalism has tended to regard the
individual as atomistic, autonomous, and wholly self-determining. Grounded on this model of
subjectivity is the view of freedom as distance or escape from society and its mechanisms of
determination. Liberal negative freedom posits an autonomous self that can :form its own purposes and
act on its own to achieve them. Self-determining freedom - one is only free when that one decides for
him or herself what it is that concerns that one. These concerns and motivations are shaped by the self
and not by external influences. This notion of freedom 'demands that I break the hold of all such
external impositions and decide for myself alone.' Taylor thinks that self-determining freedom is a
deviant form of authenticity.
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scheme it has inherited" (Kitchen 1999: 29). The term MacIntyre uses to describe
modem liberalism's deterioration of moral frameworks necessary to make informed
ethical judgments is "emotivism", which is seen to mirror larger shifts in moral
thinking and practice at a social level. Emotivism "is the doctrine that all evaluative
judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative
in character" (MacIntyre 1984: 11-12).21 But such a view, at best, conceals a
rationalist picture of the self, and at worst, a highly inauthentic being. Taylor's
historical account of modem identity brings to the foreground the historical roots to
contemporary culture's pre-occupation with self-fulfillment, self-realization, in short,
with being 'authentic' - that is, in a manner that occupies Theordor Adomo's book,
The Jargon ofAuthenticity (1973).22
Taylor acknowledges that his understanding of 'engaged human agency' -
meaning that "the world of the agent is shaped by his or her forms oflife, or history,
or bodily existence" (Taylor 1993a: 318) - that lies at the centre of his theory of
authenticity is indebted to Heidegger's key concept of Dasein (being-in-the-world) as
a being who is "embodied in a culture, a form of life, a 'world' of involvements," and
the importance of Heidegger in helping us "emerge painfully and with difficulty, from
the grip of modem rationalism" (Taylor 1993a: 318).
Taylor sees the idea of authenticity arising at the end of the eighteenth century,
building on earlier forms of individualism represented by Descartes's disengaged
understanding of reason and John Locke's unbounded, punctual self (Taylor 1991a:
21 Political correctness would, in these terms, refer synonymously to emotivism. For a note on the
Marxist roots of Maclntyre's concept, see Chapter 3, footnote n.8.
22 A comparison between Adorno and Taylor would require at least a chapter in itself; which is
certainly beyond these bounds. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Adorno's book is a criticism of
German existentialism addressed from within the Frankfurt School's attempt to restore the place of
critical reason. There are a number of convergences between Adorno's book and Taylor's
philosophical anthropology; and one of these is a rejection of the 'inward turn' that came from
Descartes, and which Soren Kierkegaard exemplified in his 'radical Christian inwardness' that lost the
Hegelian achievement of a dialectical mediation of subject and object. In a foreword to Adorno's book,
Trent Schroyer describes an aspect that closely resembles Taylor's approach:
That is, the constitutive presuppositions of human subjectivity must themselves be dialectically
related to the historical context in which determinate subjects are formed. Failure to so relate the
subject and object of historically situated knowledge results in the fallacy of 'objectivism' - or the
reduction of subjectivity to the in-itselfness of facts (e.g., positivism) or the innate principles of
mind (the idealistic philosophy of the identity of reason and mind). Both forms of objectivism are
the loss of critical (dialectical reason. Only the tradition of reflective critique conceived of human
subjectivity in a way that did not reduce it to the determinateness of natural facts or absorb it into
the spiritual principles of absolute idealism. Kierkegaard's radical inwardness becomes an idealistic
objectivism by failing to comprehend subjectivity as a historical category" (Adorno 1973: xi).
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25). The concept was given expression with the rise of Romanticism, and hence what
developed out of that period (assisted by Rousseau) was a strong sense of individual
identity and freedom, and with it its concomitant ideal to be "true to myself and my
own particular way of being" (Taylor 1991a: 27-28). Johann Herder developed the
idea of authenticity such that each of us has a 'way of being a human being', and
hence ought not to live our lives imitatively to the demands of external conformity
(Taylor 1991a: 28-29). Without being 'true to myself and my originality, I therefore
"m iss what being human is for me" (Tay lor 1991 a: 29).
In short, Taylor's notion of authenticity is neither the atomistic liberal 'self in
search of its own ends - of itself, for itself- nor is it a self utterly determined (if the
term could ever mean such a condition). Taylor's view of authenticity expresses the
conviction that terms such as self-fulfillment and self-realization are not justifications
for a narcissistic "liberalism of neutrality" (Taylor 199 la: 17-18). Authenticity is a
moral ideal that ultimately answers questions such as what is it good to be? That is
always a social and good given to a dialogical self. Expressive freedom or
authenticity is, on the one hand, a capacity that all human beings have irrespective of
their social or cultural location. On the other hand, the standards of authentic self-
expression vary enormously, both at the individual and at the collective level (Smith
2002: 154). As with all ofTaylor's work, the question of authenticity is tied up with
those of modernity, identity, freedom, communitarianism, and so on. The very
sketchy connections I have made between these would normally be made within a
much larger work, such as in Yong Huang's (1998) extensive paper, Charles Taylor's
transcendental arguments for liberal communitarianism. Towards the conclusion,
Huang commits himself to the 'reconciliatory' view that "Taylor is better
characterized as a liberal communitarian" (Huang 1998: 97). I believe Huang's
assessment ofTaylor as both a liberal and a communitarian 'within limits' is a correct
one. Huang's sense that his view must remain provisional is also well-considered.
Taylor is fundamentally a communitarian and his attempt to reconcile liberalism and
communitarianism is made within the limits set by communitarianism itself. He does
endorse and in a certain sense radicalize the liberal insight that the right moral-
political principles for a culturally plural society must be neutral to various
understandings of the good. In this sense, he is a Iiberal worthy of the name. Yet he is
a communitarian because he argues that the liberal idea of neutrality he accepts and
radicalizes, contrary to the liberal contention, also depends on an understanding of
human goodness, although a universal and trans-cultural one.
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I trust that this picture of Taylor can remain true even in view of some of his
assertions, apparently different from his straight-forward endorsement of the
communitarian claims to the priority of the good (the constitutive good) to the right
(the life good) (Huang J998: 97).
Conclusion
This chapter expands on each of the three propositions that make up this thesis;
the first proposition on Windschuttle's empiricism, the second on the post-Marxism of
cultural studies, and the third on Taylor's philosophical anthropology. Each
'expansion' is intended to situate its proposition in a context that has a bearing on the
overall argument. The first concerns the matter of the science wars which, I contend,
provide the proper impetus behind the media wars. To the extent that my contention is
correct, the stakes were considerably higher than providing suitably-educated
personnel for the media industry. That does not mean, however, that journalism
training has absolutely no grounds to find (postmodern) cultural studies disruptive;
though it would seem that these objections apply rather more to matters of 'news
production' than they do to 'news consumption'. But both, surely, fall under the title
ofjournalism.
The second proposition concerns the post-Marxist problematic of cultural
studies particularly in its formative years; indicating a dislocation between (residual)
empiricist-leaning orthodox Marxism and the turn to elements of (emergent) Marxist-
humanism. The purpose of this discussion is to suggest how to undermine
Windschuttle's argument by showing that the empiricist-idealist dualism he uses to
compare journalism with 'cultural studies' is in fact representative of the very
problematic that gave rise to British Cultural Studies. Furthermore, and more
significantly here, this was the problematic of modernity that defines Taylor's work;
to which he has given his attention to oppose its empiricist and idealist excesses. The
discussion on communitarianism above provides one site of intervention, where he
mildly rejects the label and at the same time steers clear on its liberal opposite.
The third proposition is the indispensability claim that, in any valid
transcendental argument, is apodictic - that is, it convinces merely by the fact of its





This chapter serves the simple purpose of presenting those aspects ofTaylor's
rejection of epistemology and naturalistic social science considered to be necessary
supportive background for the successive chapters. The chapter begins with the
question of empiricism, leading to an introduction to Maurice MerJeau-Ponty'sl
strategy to eliminate its dualistic pairing with 'intellectualism' or idealism. This
discussion leads to one on Taylor's philosophical anthropology.2 This chapter
attempts the difficult task of summarizing those aspects of TayIor's philosophy that
have a bearing on this thesis, borne out in argument set out in the remaining chapters.
A significant purpose of those chapters is to explore the significance ofTaylor's
involvement in the formation of the New Left movement in Britain, and hence his
contribution to the debates that led to the formation of British Cultural Studies.
The transition in argument in this chapter, from a critique of empiricism,
through Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, to Taylor's anthropology is not an arbitrary
one. Nor is it cut off from argument in the previous chapters. Windschuttle's
empiricism presupposes a Cartesian image of the self disengaged from the world it
experiences, and whose 'perceptions' are limited to representations ofthat world
mediated 'in mind'. Taylor rejects this image. In addition, he rejects John Locke's
empiricist view ofa "punctual self that is an object known through its transparent
presence to a consciousness reflecting on a self abstracted from embodied concerns
(Taylor 1989a: 49). Taylor's view of persons as "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor
J985a: 10) offers an engaged understanding of the self as "enframed in a social
I The French phenomenologist was not read (at least in English) in the empiricist atmosphere of
Oxford, and the fact that Taylor was called upon to defend his phenomenology in a debate with Oxford
linguistic philosopher AJ. Ayer (Taylor and Ayer 1959) indicates something of the novelty that
Merleau-Ponty appeared to be within that analytic domain.
2 Nicholas Smith (1997: 174) provides a 'cautionary' footnote: "As Taylor reminds us, we have to use
the expression 'philosophical anthropology' with special caution. On the one hand, there is hardly any
official recognition of philosophical anthropology as a legitimate academic discipline in the English-
speaking world. And where it does constitute a recognized strand of philosophical knowledge - in
continental Europe - it is often associated with a particular brand of anti-democratic, 'culturalist'
politics."
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understanding of great temporal depth, in fact, in a tradition" (Taylor 1989a: 39), yet
differs in important ways from similar narrative views that limit identity to a
construction of accounts of the self. Jerome Bruner's (2002) 'narrative self' typically
represents this constructivist perspective: "A self is probably the most impressive
work of art we ever produce, surely the most intricate' (Bruner 2002: 14). Taylor's
account, by comparison, explores the self as a kind of being that can only exist in
normative, moral space (Taylor 1989a: 49). His Hegelian conception of practice
incorporates this central aspect of his philosophical anthropology.3 In Taylor's work,
[p]hilosophical anthropology ... is the attempt to elucidate the basic constitution of
human subjectivity, where the human subject is understood as a being whose own
being is a matter of self-interpretation. The fact that the subject is a self-interpreting
being means that it can only be understood through its modes of mediation and
externalization, rather than in an immediate conscious self-presence (Smith 1997: 23).
Representationalism
A brief explanation of empiricist assumptions is bound to fall short on detail,
and require being supported by stilts of footnotes. Nonetheless, empiricism, as part of
that branch of philosophy called epistemology (or theory of knowledge), accounts for
knowledge as arriving from experience and the evidence of sensory perception. As
such, empiricism is the basis of (experimental) scientific method such that what is
accepted as real is derived only through observations of the natural world. All notions
of intuition and a priori reasoning are thus excluded. This view accords with Taylor's
(1964: 92) description of empiricism as the doctrine - starting principally from John
3 One easily gains the impression when reading Taylor, who has "never shown much enthusiasm for
elaborating a technically detailed hermeneutic of interpretative 'methodology'" (Smith 2004: 30), that
one is getting little, if any, guidance towards arriving at a methodology that is analytically useful. It
may be for this reason that one finds in empirical studies references to his work used only in a kind of
'supporting role'. One study breaks with this trend by showing how Taylor's concept of strong
evaluation can usefully inform nursing practice; but argues in a manner that employs Alasdair
Maclntyre's (1984) virtue ethics as an important prop. Beyond this study I am aware of no others - at
least, outside of political science - that applies Taylor's work in empirical research with an ostensibly
'TayJorian' methodology. His work is engaged at mainly a conceptual and theoretical level.
Nicholas Smith (2004) addresses Taylor's work as belong to the tradition ofphilosophical
hermeneutics; and it would be expected that he would turn his hand to hermeneutics as an interpretive
method. "Although it is true that [Taylor] has done important work clarifying and defending the role of
interpretation in social science, his core interests and intellectual commitments barely touch on
hermeneutics in any sense" of textual analysis (Smith 2004: 29). A clue to the way forward appears in
Smith placing the word methodology in scare quotes (Smith 2004: 30). I shaH assume that he has in
mind a distinction between method and methodology. This allows for a way of considering Taylor's
philosophical anthropology as useful in elaborating the axiomatic aspect of the latter, while ascribing to
the former a requirement that it be diligently derived from that axiology. My understanding here is that
axioms and methods are constituent elements of methodologies (Lincoln 1990: 73; Lincoln and Guba
2000: 167,169; Lincoln and Guba 2003: 265-266; Potter 1996: 23-24).
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Locke and fmding its most recent expression in Rudolph Carnap's logical positivism,4
though certainly not ending there - in which data is imagined as being passively received
through mechanism of perception, and thereby producing experience as an effect of
external reality represented in the mind as if impressed upon a tabula rasa.
The Lockean doctrine responds to Descartes's seventeenth century continental
rationalism,s which, while confinning the modern scientific world-view, asserts also
that knowledge is attributable to reason independently of the senses. The term by
which this combination is proposed is called epistemological representationalism,
which opposes Platonic idealism, and which "offers a very simple analysis of
knowledge in terms of the cognitive relation to the subject to a mind-independent
cognitive object" (Rockmore 2007: 30). A representational theory of knowledge holds
that access to the real or mind-independent external world is gained through ideas in
the mind.
For a representationalist, to know is not to know the object directly but rather to
directly know the representation, which, it is held, correctly depicts the cognitive
object. A representationalist approach to knowledge is pervasive in continental
rationalism, English empiricism, in Kant, and in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Representationalism, which was revived as early as Descartes, has been a main
strategy for knowledge throughout the entire modern era. Representationalism is
features in rationalists like Descartes, in empiricists like Locke, and in general
throughout the new way of ideas. It is also in part features in Kant.
Representationalism is as popular now as it has ever been (Rockmore 2007: 30).
In so far as this description of empiricism is correct, it wou Id seem plainly
evident that journalism combines both interpretive and empirical methods. But that is
not in dispute, even as the debate over the linkages between 'theory' and 'practice' in
journalism education assumes the form of whether the practice is better understood
under an empiricist or an idealist rubric. The rubrics themselves are the issue in so far
as both put forward a representationalist viewpoint that refuses an adequate
conception of human subjectivity. One concept by which representationalism is
contested is narrativity, of which Hayden White (1980) writes:
4 Carnap sought to combine empiricism with a version of rationalism that drew heavily on the younger
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Logical positivism's strongest tenet was its
principle of verification such that propositions could be determined true or false in empirical ways that
effectively deemed metaphysical and ethical statements as false. Logical positivism remained
influential in post-war philosophy of science, and among its detractors in the 1960s were Thomas
Kuhn, Peter Winch and Charles Taylor.
5 The term "continental rationalism" refers to a set of epistemological doctrines to do with innate ideas
built into the structure of mind. This school of thought separated the Medieval linkage between faith
and reason, asserting instead an unrelenting 'faith' in human reason by which we can arrive at
knowledge unassisted by revelation.
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To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature
of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So natural is the
impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way
things really happened, that narrat,ivity could appear problematical only in a culture in
which it was absent - absent or, as in some domains of contemporary Western
intellectual and artistic culture, programmatically refused (White 1980: 5).
What is being "programmatically refused" is the human subject. Solely
empiricist conceptions ofjournalism can thereby be seen to violate the essentially
human element at the core of its practice. Questions about the purposes of storytelling
in social life invariably deflect toward the concepts of narrative and the constitution of
identities and social life (Antonio 1991; Boje 1991) that seem more salient to the
practice than simply getting the 'facts right'. One way in which the temporality of
human experience is expressed is through the notion of 'narrative identity' (Bruner
1991,2004; Carr 1986: 126; Polkinghorne 1996; Ricoeur 1980) which is a lynchpin in
Taylor's philosophical anthropology (Taylor 1989a).
Selves, values and traditions
When Wilbur Schramm (1957) published his survey of twenty years of
journalism research, he noted that the period from 1937 to 1956 was marked by a
development "from almost wholly non-quantitative research, to a fairly even balance
between quantitative and non-quantitative; from an almost exclusive preoccupation
with the methods and viewpoints of the humanities, to a concern with methods and
problems of the behavioural sciences as well; from a view of the printed media as the
shadows of the great personalities, to a view of them as part of the social process"
(Schramm 1957: 91). By 1956 more than half the articles in Journalism Quarterly
were "written in the spirit and method of the behavioural sciences" (Schramm 1957:
93). Schramm's article continues to celebrate the hegemony of behaviourist and
positivist research, which at the time was considered to be a beneficial advance of
sCience.
This, then, is the trend: towards quantitative treatments, as opposed to non-
quantitative; toward behavioural science method, as opposed to humanistic method;
towards the study of process and structure, as opposed to the study of "great men";
and toward a world-wide concern with the press and press systems (Schramm 1957:
95-96).
Charles Taylor, as I shall argue, was among the very few scholars in the later
1950s and early 19605 to draw attention to the anthropological implications of
behaviourism. Following Merleau-Ponty, Taylor's first book targeted behavioural
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psychology (Taylor 1964; 1970a; 1971a; 1971b; 1971c). When positivism had been
discredited, he turned his attention to neuropsychology, cognitive science and other
fields for subscribing to mechanistic models of persons (see Taylor 1977 [1985a: 15-
44]; 1980a; 1985c; 1991b). The methodological matter is not between qualitative and
quantitative methods per se, or whether these are incompatible (Howe 1988; 1992;
1998).6 Instead, Taylor questions whether naturalism offers to the social sciences
appropriate models for the study of human experience (Taylor 1980a; 1980c; 1985a:
I; 1985b: 21; 2002a).
It is not coincidental that during the same period that Schramm celebrated as
having 'advanced' journalism research, there appeared a corresponding decline in
discourses on value. Hans loas, in The Genesis o/Values (2001: 124), notes a 'drying
up' of a discourse on value from the 1930s onwards, emerging again in the 1980s with
Charles Taylor's philosophical anthropology. Steven Hitlin and lane Paliavin (2004)
note the paucity of the concept of values in sociology since the 1960's - though Franz
Adler (1956) noted that decline a little earlier. The concept was similarly
marginalized in psychology (Rohan 2000). The 'decline' does not amount to an
absence as such, but to a shift from categorical imperatives to moral relativism.
Although Kant's philosophy has profoundly influenced Western thought, it is obvious
that at least among modern intellectuals his strict and absolutist 'duty ethics' has lost
considerable appeal and force. A kind of relativism or situationism is in ascendency,
an ethics which has a great appeal to those who like to think of themselves as
'rational' (Barney and Merrilll975: 13).
Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) refers to this malaise as emotivism (following G. E.
Moore) - "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral
judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or
feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character" (MacIntyre 1984: 11-
6 One good reason for the imagined divide between quantitative and qualitative 'research' is due not to
any incorrigibility, but as Thomas Lindlof (1991) explains, due quite simply to a lack of a suitable
synonym to define the respective methods used. With reference to audience studies, he says that
although the term qualitative "is not used universally by those who engage in non-quantitative"
research, "qualitative inquiry is probably the best single descriptor for what the great majority of them
do" (1991: 25). But that 'doing' may be part of the problem; and I do not wish to impute that Lindlof
does not recognize this, for there certainly exists a range ofresearch technologies that appear to be 'all
about meaning', and another that is 'all about numbers'. What I am calling 'technologies' (e.g., focus
groups, questionnaires, factor analysis) belong under the category of methods and not that of
methodology. As Kenneth Howe states in the context of educational research: "Far from being
incompatible ... qualitative and qualitative methods are inextricably intertwined" (Howe 1988: 12).
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12).7 MacIntyre sees in modern liberalism a deterioration of the value resources or
moral frameworks necessary to make informed ethical judgments, mirroring larger
shifts in moral thinking and practice at a socialleve1.8 Christopher Smith (1991)
describes MacIntyre's view in more detail:
MacIntyre points out that in the circumstances in which emotivism flourishes a double
deception is being practiced, a self-deception and, at the same time, a deception of
others. Each puts forward his or her views as if they were impersonal, as if they
transcended any particular interest, and were in fact objectively, universally true. And
all who join in the argument with these views act as if they accepted that this is how
they are intended. Yet at the same time no one really takes what is said to be anything
more than advocacy of the self-interest of the one saying it - this even if only a
Nietzsche, it seems, is willing to come right out and say so. Tacitly everyone assumes
that everyone is a sophist, but all are reluctant to admit it, even to themselves (Smith
1991: 9).
There is a close correspondence between MacIntyre's concept of emotivism (as
a 'moral poverty') and Charles Taylor's concept of weak evaluation9: A similarly
close correspondence exists between MacIntyre's conceptions ofgoodness
(MacIntyre 1984: 15) and Taylor's concept of strong evaluation, understood as "the
fact that these ends or goods stand independent of our own desires, inclinations, or
choices, that they represent standards by which these desires and choices are judged"
(Taylor 1989a: 4). But it is in terms ofTaylor's concept of hypergoods, as goods
standing independently of desire, that we can begin to see the implausibility of anyone
(not without conscience) acting without moral frameworks or horizons. Hypergoods
are extant also in identities whether we are aware ofthem or not (Taylor 1989a: 21 ).10
7 That is, modern liberal public morality, in Maclntyre's (1984) view, offers little more than the
criterion of whether a certain action or option 'feels right'; and if that fails the test one can always fall
back on the follow-the-Ieader dictates of political correctness.
8 Eric Louw (2005), citing John Hartley (1982: 21), describes this condition (without naming it as
'emotivism' specifically) as one of growing cynicism and disillusionment with political processes in
Western democracies: "The demonized celebrity serves the purpose of making 'the enemy' tangible (a
'face'), and providing a convenient fulcrum into which 'boo' words can be poured - as opposed to the
'hooray' words attached to heroes and victims" (Louw 2005: 60). This phenomenon is evident in
journalism practice in so far as "Ulournalists instinctively prefer one alternative over the other,
depending on their split-second judgment of the situation" (Van Ginneken 1998: 147-48). On the one
hand, we can assume Van Ginneken is referring to habits and typifications by which people Uournalists
included) negotiate their taken-for-granted world. But journalists do not just 'live in' the world, but
more actively than most must interpret it for an audience.
9 Charles Taylor distinguishes between strong and weak evaluations. Strong evaluations concern the
moral worth of desires, whereas weak evaluations are morally neutral (Taylor 1985a: 16). Tay lor aims
the concept of strong evaluation at utilitarian and emotivist attempts to reduce morality to mere desires.
10 Were this not so, it would be possible for any subject to occupy any identity as an actor taking on a
particular character -lost in delight of trying on one mask after another. Identity would not really
matter, and its' loss' could be simply remedied by selecting a new one. As for the notion of ' multiple
identities', this concept surely refers to 'habituated roles', and does not evince the kinds of responses
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Our identity is what allows us to define what is important to us and what is not ....
The notion of an identity defined by some merely de facto, not strongly valued
preference is incoherent (Taylor 1989a: 30).
Taylor's philosophical anthropology - being a hermeneutic-pragmatist
philosophy - deals with many of these questions, and advocates in particular a
'narrative identity' in which human subjects make temporal sense of who they are;
revising that narrative as new experience comes into play. But Taylor does not
advocate a self as an entity frozen in time; and it follows from the sheer temporality of
life, Taylor thinks, that "the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for us"
(Taylor 1989a: 47).
In Taylor's view, a life without strong value would not be recognizably human. The
self cannot but be oriented to some conception of the good in the sense that human
beings cannot but live with some comprehension of the distinction between mere life
and a properly human life (Smith 2002: 97).
As Taylor puts it, "making sense of one's life as a story is also, like orientation
to the good, not an optional extra" (Taylor 1989a: 47). If one accepts the intimate
connections Taylor makes between moral frameworks and the question of the self, it
becomes more plausible to accept that an ethical theory ofjournalism can only be
elaborated in tandem with questions of goodness and value. Indeed, the idea of a
journalist as a 'moral witness' would make little sense without a corresponding
conception of value (Ettema and Glasser 1998; Plaisance 2002).
Strong evaluation is a core concept in Taylor's philosophical anthropology, in
which he holds as a first principle "the conviction that human reality is structured, and
in some sense constituted, by layers of meaning" (Smith 2002: 18; see Laitinen 2003:
67-71). Taylor's anthropology extensively draws its "engaged view" from Merleau-
Ponty's existential phenomenology; from which Taylor is able to fashion a view such
that, in Arto Laitinen's (2003: 64) description, "one's grasp of the [Iifeworld] is
practical, emotional, and evaluative rather than purely cognitive or descriptive."
The disengaged viewpoint to which Taylor objects entails a reification of mind,
and certain hegemonic claims made on behalf of a spectrum of Cartesian positions in
the philosophy of mind. Tay]or's strategy is therefore partly reminiscent of Gilbert
Ryle's (1947) attack on the Cartesian Cogito, in which the self is understood as an
inner mind separated from an outer world. It is the implications of the Cartesian
that might follow the question of "who am I?" Phrased otherwise, who is the one trying on the different
masks?
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inner/outer sorting and its corresponding epistemology in conceiving mentalist
conceptions of human subjectivity that welds Taylor's attention. He does not object to
the natural science view that has benefited most from this epistemological construal,
but when this disengaged view is then read into the "very constitution ofthe mind"
(Taylor 1995: 64), what ought to be human experience and understanding proper is
reduced to a figment possessing mere consciousness.
[T]his model, Taylor insists, is inconsistent with the phenomena of embodied
subjectivity. We have seen that an embodied subject is essentially a being at grips
with the world. It perceives the world that is non-indifferent to it and acts in the world
on the basis of its desires and purposes (Smith 2002: 55).
This brings us to the matter with which 1 began this section: Wilbur Schramm's
(1957) approval of the advances behaviourism had made in social science in general,
and specifically in journalism research by the late 1950s. The issue had not to do with
the relative powers of research methods - though, no doubt, benefits are plainly
evident in combining methods gerrnaine to both qualitative and quantitative research
procedures. The issue, for Taylor, concerns the implied anthropology in
behaviourism, positivism, and the epistemological construal - that is, extending the
abstract and 'mathematised' 11 Cartesian concept of mind to the level of a generalized
model of perception and the human subject.
Empiricism stands in Taylor's critique as the epitome of the Cartesian and
Lockean extension of the seventeenth century scientific revolution preserved in the
Enlightenment. Analytical philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition, too, stands in
his view as reinforcing that tradition (Taylor 1966a); and in Britain became the main
impediment to Marxism extending any further than it did there. The (Romantic)
phenomenological, hermeneutic and existentialist traditions in continental philosophy
stand as antithetical to empiricism. And as I have contended since the first chapter,
these two broad movements of modem thought - empiricism representing the
analytical tradition, and phenomenology and herrneneutics representing the
continental tradition - are thus the modem matrix upon which Windschuttle's issue
with cultural theory can be mapped.
11 Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico noticed a degree of anthropomorphism in Descartes'
thinking, projecting mind onto the universe, and discovering 'there' the operations of its own
contingency, thus failing to see that the human thinker stands to mathematics as God stands to creation.
For Vico, then, "our mind has a perfect grasp of its objects because it has made them" (Tiles and Tiles
1998: 426).
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These two contending traditions are very much a part of current anthropological
thinking. Separating these traditions, even as I am doing - between empiricist and
hermeneutic monikers - belies the range of scholarship that attempts to use language
and conceptions from contending frameworks to argue an alternative case. The effect
is to appear so as to straddle contending traditions; and certain philosophers of
science, such as Daniel Dennett, seem to achieve this effect better than many of his
hermeneutic opponents. But as a hermeneutic philosopher, Taylor appears to be an
exception, as borne out at least by his recent essay, Foundationalism and the
Inner/Outer Distinction (Taylor 2002a).
Generally situated within the continental tradition, Hans Joas (2000: 2) makes
the claim that the self is "one of the greatest discoveries in the history of the social
sciences." His pragmatic perspective on self and identity follows a premise similar to
one outlined by Andreas Reckwitz (2002: 244-45), that the emergence of values
cannot be explained within the rational action tradition that followed from the
utilitarianism of Scottish moral philosophy. Nor does the normatively oriented
understanding of action in the social sciences which Durkheim and Parsons presented
as the proper perspective of sociology offer a convincing way in which to theorize the
processes in which values emerge (Reckwitz 2002: 245). Michael Oakeshott offers an
alternative, Hegelian, model: "The self appears as activity ... not a 'thing' or a
'substance' capable of being active; it is an activity" primordially so, with "nothing
antecedent to it" (Oakeshott 1962: 496).
Representing analytic philosophy, Daniel Dennett's cognitivist 'self is modeled
on biological tendencies towards self-preservation. A minimal (biological) self is "an
organization which tends to distinguish, control and preserve portions of the world, an
organization that thereby creates and maintains boundaries" (Dennett 1990: 10-11).
Both recognizing and maintaining boundaries appear, in Dennett's (1993: 414-415)
discussion, as more than a metaphor of how we construct, constitute and distinguish
our selves from what, in Oakeshott terms, is the "not-self' (Oakeshott 1962: 496).
"This fundamental biological principle of distinguishing self from world, inside from
outside, produces some remarkable echoes in the highest vaults of our psychology,"
Dennett 1(993: 415) writes, before describing ways in which various species make
their outer boundaries - whether beavers, spiders, or termites, and the relative
cooperations, resources and 'ways of being' (for consciousness and intention ought
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not to be imputed) by which dams, webs or anthills are extruded from the practices of
a being that is capable of constructing each boundary (Dennett 1993: 415-416). An
important point Dennett makes here is that it is these boundaries that partly define the
organisms that construct them. The way in which an organism 'bounds' itself is
significantly part of its being. Human beings, too, have a special tactic of self-
protection, self-control, and self-definition: by telling stories about who we are
(Dennett 1993: 418). "Each normal individual of this species makes a self. Out of its
brain it spins a web of words" (Dennett 1993: 416).
And just as spiders don't have to think, consciously and deliberately, about how to
spin their webs, and just as beavers ... do not consciously and deliberately plan the
structures they build, we do not consciously and deliberately figure out what
narratives to tell and how to tell them. Our tales are spun, but for the most part we
don't spin them; they spin us. Our human consciousness, and our narrative selthood,
is their product, not their source (Dennett 1993: 418).
A third (phenomenological) perspective, to which Dennett appears to allude, is
found in a range of thought that proceeds from the phenomenology ofEdmund
Husserl; 12 but it is often difficult to detect the family resemblances in the divergent
schools that claim a genetic link to Husserl. In Taylor's case, that link is twice
removed through his reading of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Existential
phenomenologists '3 also share the view that philosophy should not be conducted from
a disengaged standpoint, partly because existential phenomena show themselves only
when engaged with the world in a particular way. That way, which is another 'trait'
common to these schools of thought, is the understanding that subjects are involved in
the world inpre-objective ways; a notion that stands at the cusp ofTaylor's
intellectual career (Ayer and Taylor 1959; Kullman and Taylor 1958). I shall explain
this concept briefly.
12 Husserlian phenomenology is one attempt to undo what Cartesian thinking has wrought. But it is not
to this, but to students of Husserl mainly Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty that Taylor turns. The
phenomenological reduction in Husserl sees objective representations as one amongst many ways of
making human experience explicit, rather than as the primary or essential mode of experience. As
Taylor says in ending his essay, The Concept ofa Person (1985): "i[T]he struggle between rival
approaches in the science of man ... is no mere question of the relative efficacy of different
methodologies, but is rather one facet of a clash of moral and spiritual outlooks" (1985: 114).
Questions of method! can therefore be seen to hinge not so much on their veracity and technical
accuracy, but on the picture of human agency found in the philosophical foundations that underpin
them.
13 The existential phenomenologist's aim is "to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of
which knowledge speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and
derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt what a
forest, a prairie or a river is" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: ix).
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For Heidegger, a phenomenon "signifies that which shows itself in itself, the
manifest" (Heidegger 1962: 51). Merleau-Ponty agrees, and would add that our
"primary perception" of entities "is non-thetic,14 pre-objective and pre-conscious
experience" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 242). Unlike the abstractions of objects that
empiricists perform, the contextual whole from which those parts are taken remains
pre-objective for so long as its structure resists reflection. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, it
is a "positive indeterminate which prevents the spatial, temporal and numerical
wholes from becoming articulated into manageable, distinct and identifiable terms"
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 12).
Merleau-Ponty, and all phenomenologists generally, attack the naturalistic
notion that objective thought, whereby the external world is separated from an 'inner'
perception of that world, is primitive to perception (Taylor 2002a; 2004). Instead,
objective thought is derived from the pre-objective consciousness, where there exists
no distinction between subject and object, and where the perceived world remains
essentially indeterminate. But Merleau-Ponty's specific contribution is the
understanding that consciousness is necessarily embodied, and that its bodily
incarnation determines its total nature (Macann 1993; Moran 2000).
Journalists, for example, can be understood as engaged in a practice embedded
in the material contingencies that both prescribe and afford self-constitution. One
concept that expresses this dynamic is Pierre Bourdieu's conception ofa habitus. In
An Outline ofa Theory ofPractice (1977), Bourdieu argues that social members learn
to participate in 'social games' before they consciously choose to participate. That is,
practitioners and participants are always already, and prerejlectively, involved in the
practices. That is, even as they learn, they are already participating. Much of the
power of the socialization process entailed in 'social games' is experienced in bodily
terms, as simply as part of who we are and how we exist in the world (Bourdieu 1977:
72, 78-79). This sense is the habitus, "embodied history, internalized as a second
nature and so forgotten as history ... [it] is the active presence of the whole past of
which it is the product ... [and] what gives practices their relative autonomy with
respect to external determinations of the immediate present" (Bourdieu 1990: 56). In
14 A non-thetic perception of something refers to an occasion when we have no express experience of it
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 258). It is simply happening before us, like travelling on a train and seeing the
countryside passing before one's eyes. Doing a job, as in reporting, would fit the same category in so
far as we are engaged, coping in the practice without being specifically aware that it is journalism that
we are doing and not baking a cake.
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short, the habitus is the meeting point between institutions and bodies. It is the basic
way in which each person as a biological being connects with the socio-cultural order
in such a way that the various 'games of life' keep their meaning, and keep being
played.
Produced by the work of inculcation and appropriation that is needed in order for
objective structures, the products of collective history, to be reproduced in the form of
the durable, adjusted dispositions that are the condition of their functioning, the
habitus, which is constituted in the course through which agents partake of the history
objectified in institutions, is what makes it possible to inhabit institutions, to
appropriate them practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling
them from the state of dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the
same time imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation entails
(Bourdieu 1990: 57).
Central to Bourdieu's thesis is his determination to overcome those dualisms
typical of the Western intellectual tradition. The related dichotomy between theory
from practice is one conceptual framework that confuses by treating these categories
as existing in reality. Injournalism ethics, for instance, it leads to the mistake that
journalists 'apply' ethical principles to actuality instead of 'working out' the problem
using indeterminate resources. Contrasting knowing to doing tends to neglect this kind
of non-theoretical knowledge that is implicit in practical skills - encouraging a value
judgment that mental work is 'better' than physical labour.
I shall not refer to Bourdieu again, even though a large part of the groundwork
for this thesis began with his theory. I shall be using Taylor instead, whose thought is
significantly indexed in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. It is interesting to note
Iordanis Marcoulatos's (2001) observation that "reading Merleau-Ponty is like
reading a philosophical commentary on Bourdieu" (Marcoulatos 2001: 1). The two
thinkers - one a philosopher, and the other a sociologist - complement each other, and
many of their concepts are interchangeable.
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenal body can be seen as equivalent to habitus as presented
in Bourdieu's work; I would argue that the habitus is the overall actuality of a living
human being as immediately experienced - it may not be reduced to a cluster of
dispositions as superficially assumed by certain commentators (Marcoulatos 2001: 2).
One distinction between the two, however, is that while Merleau-Ponty grounds
his thought in Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology,15 Bourdieu's is
15 Husserl proposed that we could suspend our natural attitudes of the world and rely instead on
'categorical intuitions' and presuppositionless understandings to get at the essences of things. Husserl
rejected the claims of Max Scheler and others that the epistemic boundaries between the self and the
other were dissolved in an unmediated empathic encounter. Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty
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grounded more in French structuralism (Hanks 2005: 71, 77-78). Merleau-Ponty,
however, as I shall argue a few chapters forward, entertained structuralism in his
theory; but he is better understood as suspended somewhere between structuralism
and Husserlian phenomenology from which he develops his "concept of the 'pre-
objective' world [being] the key at once to his theory of perception and to his
philosophical anthropology" (Kullman and Taylor 1958: 108). Merleau-Ponty writes:
We make perception out of things perceived. And since perceived things themselves
are obviously accessible only through perception, we end by understanding neither.
We are caught up in the world and we do not succeed in extricating ourselves from it
in order to achieve consciousness of the world. Ifwe did we should see that the
quality is never experienced immediately, and that all consciousness is consciousness
of something (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 4-5).
Taylor readily incorporates Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of perception,
intention and embodiment into his own analytic thinking. The 'pre-objective' points
not primarily to the world within which we move, setting for the phenomenologist the
task of attaining pure description. Instead, it aims "to describe the' original'
experience upon which our universe of descriptive discourse is 'founded'" (Kullman
and Taylor 1958: 110).
This leads back to the question of Keith Windschuttle's empiricist framework,
and whether it accurately imagines journal ism practice. That is, can journalism
practice be understood (even explained) within an imaginary that befits mechanistic
models of natural science rather more than they do the interpretive practices that
ought to be ascribed to journalism within the social sciences? I think not. Again, I
draw attention to the 'ought' in so far as naturalistic thinking holds considerable sway
in and over the social sciences. My contention is that the hermeneutic framework
behind Taylor's philosophical anthropology, which both critiques naturalism in social
science and informs a version of 'practice theory' that is particularly interpretive,
offers a far more plausible imaginary. Theodore Schatzki (2001) contends that
Taylor's conception of practice cannot stand in a dualistic relation to anything
argued that we can perceive the other because our own bodies at times present themselves as something
unfamiliar to us. Any further knowledge of the other is mediated through language and culture. This
position leads to Martin Heidegger, who argued that we do not know the other directly, but through the
world of things which point to a social world populated by others. From Heidegger's focus on how
tradition determines our relations with others by shaping the world of common meanings, it is a short
step to Hans Georg Gadamer's focus on language and the shift from phenomenological
intersubjectivity to hermeneutics and mutual interpretation. At this point we reach Taylor who, in
developing his philosophical anthropology, advances a thin version of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenal
self - that orients us to the physical world - and a narrative self that orients us to the social world.
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resembling 'theory', but stands instead in a constitutive relation to the social orders of
which they are a determinate though self-modifying component.
Taylor ... highlights practices as site and not just as activity: Practices are contexts
where actions are carried out. He suggests, further, that the meanings that are
instantiated in the arrangements established within a given practice are drawn from
the possibilities contained in the practice's semantic space. He thereby links the
establishment of social order to abstract contexts. Taylor also, finally, anchors a
practice's semantic space in the distinctions marked by the language used in it. For
Taylor, as for many contemporary theorists, language is an essential constitutive
dimension of social reality - and also of practices and social orders as a result
(Schatzki 200 J : 46).
The naturalistic self and the reification of mind
Merleau-Ponty's The Phenomenology ofPerception (1945/1962) sets up as its
protagonists, empiricism and intellectualism (or idealism). But unlike intentions (such
as Windschuttle's) to argue for one against the other, Merleau-Ponty's strategy is to
show how each, in destroying its opponent, accomplishes its own self-destruction,
"thereby creating an intellectual vacuum into which Merleau-Ponty is able to move
with his own alternative account of the facts" (Macann 1993: 165). It would be
mistaken to consider empiricism an unassailable and untroubled region of science.
Empiricism has as its starting point the doctrine of sensation as a primitive source of
knowledge; and depicts experience to be derivative of sensation a posteriori (Kitcher
1980). That is, "[a]ccording to Locke, our understanding of the world is composed
just from the simple ideas we receive through sensation and reflection" (Nagel 2000:
346).
To claim to possess more substantive a priori knowledge - say, to know a priori the
principle of the uniformity of nature - would be to risk forgetting ollr clearly rational
promise to respect the deliverances of experience, whatever they might be. So there
seems to be a very short path from the quite uncontroversial admission of experience
as a source of real information to the quite controversial rejection of all nontrivial a
priori knowledge (Nagel 2000: 345-346).
Jennifer Nagel's essay is not an empiricist apologetic, but argues, mainly
through a treatment of empiricist philosopher Bas van Fraassen's work, that "neither
traditional [Lockean] nor contemporary empiricism is as economical as it might at
first have appeared, and that there might be no such thing as a pure empiricism which
succeeds in banishing all a priori knowledge" (Nagel 2000: 346). While van Fraassen
insists on identifying empiricism as "the epistemological thesis that experience is the
sole legitimate source of information about the world" (in Nagel 2000: 357), he
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admits "not to have a full account of experience that is satisfactory from an empiricist
standpoint" (Nagel 2000: 358). The constraints he sets on experience reduces his
"position to a phenomenalism of the present moment" (Nagel 2000: 365), yet at the
same time he has to account for our ability to relate our sensation with the things we
sense on grounds that do not concede a priori knowledge. In Nagel's view, van
Fraassen is caught between empiricism and aspects of experience he cannot explain
without compromising his premises. One can say that his dilemma is that of
empiricism in general.
Merleau-Ponty's (1962) strategy is not about finding a way out of that dilemma,
but to erase it altogether. He sets up 'empiricism' and 'intellectualism' as
protagonists, though doing so in terms too broad to specify its use in any particular
philosophy (see Moran 2000: 391). In line with David Schenck's (1985) essay on the
problem ofperspectivism with respect to embodiment in Merleau-Ponty, 16 Taylor
(1967b) indicates that this seeming imprecision has to do with "go[ing] beyond the
dualism mind-nature by developing a conception of the body which partakes of both
sides" (Taylor 1967b: 113. Emphasis added). The contradiction that Merleau-Ponty
faces is that between the non-perspectival implications of a synthesis of all
perspectives (or a view from anywhere and nowhere), and the necessary
perspectivalism of (embodied) perception.
Caught in a more Kantian dilemma than one might have expected, Merleau-Ponty
wants to sacrifice neither situated and subjectivity nor the truths of philosophy .... The
apparent necessity of choosing must then be shown to be illusory, the two alternatives
shown to be actually two facets of the same reality. Or, more pointedly, the two facets
must be seen as necessary partners in existence - partners whose tension is the
definition of human being-in-the-world (Schenck 1985: 3 J0-3 J 1).
Added to the concept of embod iment is that of horizon, which, intertwined with
subjectivity, indicates that a real world can only be posited in the realm of experience,
rendering objectivity impossible apart from "our unique internal experience"
(Schenck 1985: 312). "Given the logic of our existence, which is also the logic of our
perception, we can focus on the 'boundary' of an horizon and transform it into a
'figure'; but the shift simply engenders another horizon ... the definition of focal
perception" (Schenck 1985: 311). The argument around embodiment can be extended
16 David Schenck (1985) poses the Nietzschean problem that perspectivism must necessarily lead to
relativism. But Schenck argues that Merleau-Ponty's account of perspectivism is still our best account
of why Nietzsche's sketches of topics from various angles in multiple aphorisms yields a compelling
and rich universe, and not simply chaos" (1985: 313).
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to physics and its scientific experiments, which necessarily occur in time and space;
and would be impossible to monitor "in an eternal present a random collection of
atomistic moments" (Schenck 1985: 312).
Given Merleau-Ponty's insistence that "the external world may not be severed
from the experienced one" (Schenck 1985: 312), it appears that he has embraced the
central pillar of empiricism in so far as experience is the sole source of knowledge of
the world. But within empiricism, experience is limited to a 'figment' of sensation as
something absolutely originary - in its purview, sensations as "the building blocks of
experience, to furnish the atoms out of which the composite whole of experience is
constructed" (Macann 1993: 165). It is that doctrine that becomes the starting point of
Merleau-Ponty's critique of empiricism, and rejects the claim that sensations are
original on the basis that its anthropological implications are grounded in scientific
ideology instead of actual empirical evidence. That is, a mechanistic anthropology is
presupposed instead of accounted for.
The traditional notion of sensation was not a concept born of reflection, but a late
product of thought directed towards its objects, the last element in the representation
of the world, the furthest removed from its original source, and therefore the most
unclear. Inevitably science, in its general effort towards objectification, evolved a
picture of the human organism as a physical system undergoing stimuli which were
themselves identified by their physiochemical properties, and tried to reconstitute
actual perception on this basis, and to close the circle of scientific knowledge by
discovering the laws governing the production of knowledge itself, by establishing an
objective science of subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 12).
Sensations are derived, firstly by presupposing qualities in certain objects, and
then by isolating and abstracting those qualities from those objects. Merleau-Ponty
objects to mechanistic explanation of perceptual experience because they leave
present a 'seeing' in which nobody is actually there to see. It is consciousness without
experience; a 'blind sensor' upon which sense data impinge as a causal reaction on a
subject - the Cartesian subject disengaged from the world it merely represents. But
even supposing it were a full-blooded being present in experience, the contingencies
of that present experience may not be adequate to draw atomized and abstracted parts
into a coherent whole. Memory then has to be resorted to in order to support the mind
with the hindsight of past experience, thus combining sensation with recognition.
Thus, as always, the objective world is presupposed.
Thus the appeal to memory presupposes what it is supposed to explain; the patterning
of data, the imposition of meaning on a chaos of sense-data. No sooner is the
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recollection of memories made possible than it becomes superfluous, since the work it
is being asked to do is already done (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 23).
With empiricism defeated in Merleau-Ponty's argument, a rationale is now
provided for idealism, or what he refers to as intellectualism. But this turns out to be
the reverse side of its empiricist opposite by subscribing to the same objectified world
as its empiricist adversary. Both take the objective world for granted. "Whereas
empiricism seeks to arrive at a correct representation of the world without any
advanced knowledge, intellectualism is in possession of the intelligible structure of
the world from the first though, for the most part, only in principle rather than
practice" (Macann 1993: 167). Merleau-Ponty presents empiricism and intellectualism
as nominal adversaries, and then shows their deeper agreement in presupposing the
objective world. Thus he expresses the gist of his strategy to undermine the dualism
that sustains them:
Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we
would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant
of what we are looking for, or equally again we should not be searching. They are in
agreement in that neither can grasp consciousness in the act oflearning, and that
neither attaches due importance to that circumscribed ignorance, that still 'empty' but
already determinate intention which is attention itself (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 33).
In light of Merleau-Ponty's strategy it becomes clearer why Keith
Windschuttle's charge against cultural studies self-destructs. His empiricism entails
an implicit philosophical anthropology that assumes an implausible picture of
journalism practice. Windschuttle (1 997a: 4) obviously understands journalists to be
conscious beings,17 but this minimal condition says little about what makes them
human in any phenomenological sense of experience (see Zahavi 2005: 301-302).
That is, on grounds of his empiricist assumptions, there are good reasons to believe
that the conception of the self and the kind of human 'behaviour' he posits (and
hence, the kind ofjournalism practice) is imagined along lines of a Cartesian subject
disengaged from the world. 18 This subject is not extraneous to the modern condition,
but is intrinsic to its Enlightenment common sense - denoting a shift from a
"substantive conception of rationality when getting it right is a necessary condition of
being rational" (Taylor 1994a: 217; emphasis added), to a procedural conception of
reason.
17 "Journalists go out into society, make observations about what is done and what is said, and report
them as accurately as they can. They have to provide evidence to verifY and corroborate their claims
and they have to attribute their sources" (Windschuttle 1997: 4).
18 See Charles Taylor's essay, Social Theory as Practice (1985b).
94
What we are called to do is not to become contemplators of order, but rather to
construct a picture of things following the canons of rational thinking. These are
differently conceived by Descal1es and Locke, but on this basic notion of reason they
are one. The aim is to get to the way things really are, but these canons offer our best
hope of doing that. Rationality is above all a property ofthe process of thinking, not
of the substantive content of thought (Taylor 1989a: 168).
In the Lockean theory of mind, ideas derive from sense impressions; or what in
the more recent register are referred to as 'sensory data' thematised by disengaged,
philosophical-scientific reflection (Taylor 1989a: 159ft). In the Cartesian
intellectualist theory, mind is furnished with ideas (building blocks of knowledge)
imagined as discrete representations (Smith 2004: 33-34; Taylor 1989a: 143ft). In
both theories, our representations are considered primitive. But both theories-
embracing "the famous historical controversy between the Cartesian variant, stressing
clear and distinct inferences, and the empiricist counterposition, which focuses on
rules of evidence, the methodologies of induction" (Taylor 1994b: 217) - take the
subject on the foundationalist "inward turn of Augustine to the new stance of
disengagement which Descartes inaugurates and Locke intensifies" (Taylor 1989a:
177):
With a proceduralist conception of theoretical reason, we turn towards our own
thinking processes. We turn to reflexive self-examination. This is a key element in the
whole epistemological shift of modern philosophy, and the accompanying ambition of
founding our knowledge claims. Together with the resolutive-composite method, it
produces the typical structures of modern epistemology (Taylor 1994b: 217).
This picture imposes 'what it is to know' onto 'what it is to perceive'. This
inversion rests on an impoverished phenomenology of perceptual experience, and
"fai Is to acknowledge the conditions of possibi Iity of objective knowledge, that is, its
transcendental conditions" (Smith 2004: 34). In Merleau-Ponty, perception is our
primary access to the world. Taylor follows this view, and thus opposes the classical
Cartesian and Lockean doctrines of mind which are paradigmatic of modern 'common
sense' understandings: "We perceive before we reflect, theorise, or judge" (Smith
2004: 33). The point I am driving at here concerns the modern (Enlightenment)
conception of the self as something to which we become effectively disengaged. After
a discussion on Locke's "punctual self' - an objectified, de-natured and reified self
abstracted from its embodiment, a pure ego "diagnosed in empiricist theories of the
'mental'" (Taylor 1989a: 171) - Taylor arrives at a synopsis of the inwardly-turned
modern condition:
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Adopting the stance of disengagement towards oneself - even if one doesn't push it to
the Lockean extreme of punctuality - defines a new understanding of human agency
and its characteristic powers .... To come to live by this definition - as we cannot fail
to do so, since it penetrates and rationalizes so many of the ways and practices of
modern life - is to be transformed: to the point where we see this way of being as
normal, as anchored in perennial human nature in the way our physical organs are. So
we come to think that we 'have' selves as we have heads. But the very idea that we
have or are 'a self, that human agency is essentially defined as 'the self, is a
linguistic reflection of our modern understanding and the radical reflexivity it
involves. Being deeply embedded in this understanding, we cannot but reach for this
language; but it was not always so (Taylor 1989a: 177).19
Taylor's strategy is partly reminiscent of Gilbert Ryle's (1949) attack on
Descarte's concept of mind, but also shows more affinity to Merleau-Ponty's critique
of the classical doctrines of perception. Taylors reservations about the underlying
concept of the 'mental' (found notably in hegemonic forms of cognitive science) is
based on his view that it "misconstrues the nature of human experience" (Smith 2002:
51) - a misconstrual that is most evident in classical Cartesianism and empiricism, the
philosophical precursors not only of cognitive science but a spectrum of positions in
the philosophy of mind. Taylor's views in this regard are largely shared by a wide
range of scholars such as Dan Zahavi (2005), Jeff Coulter (1999) and Alasdair
Macintyre (1984).
Taylor maintains that the Cartesian-Lockean reification of 'ideas' bears little
resemblance to lived experience. He opposes this combined view by mustering
Merleau-Ponty's insistence that we must describe how things appear to the subject
prior to reflection; to the perceptual, pre-objective world, which signifies in a way that
relates to the desires and purposes of the perceiver. Perceptual knowledge is agent's
knowledge (Taylor 1995: 10). Things in the world are partially disclosed, and point to
other things, and serve as points of orientation for the subject's activities. Perception
is inseparable from coping and engagement with things. The content of perception,
which is our "primary mode of access to the world," is not contingently related to the
world in which the knowing subject is embodied. "[T]he predicament of knowing
subjects is never entirely free of its agent structure" (Smith 2004: 33). The classical
theorists go wrong in their epistemology, which advocates "an impoverished
19 The turn inward infects both the Enlightenment and Romantic aspects of modernity, thus indicating
its deep embeddedness in modern thought (Taylor 1989a: 139, 156, 183, 251). "Even those Romantics
who aspired to rediscover Spirit in nature learn the nature of Spirit through an inward turn" (Taylor
1989a: 258).
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phenomenology of perceptual experience" (Smith 2004: 34). This "ontologizing of
rational procedure" (Taylor 1995: 61) transposes
reflective procedures for generating objective knowledge onto the very nature of the
perceiving subject. The method of ana ysing a complex phenomenon into simple
components, treating them as neutral bits of information, and rationally reprocessing
them, is written into 'the mind' itself .... A picture of what it is to know obscures our
understanding of what it is like to be a perceiver (Smith 2004: 34).
The classical doctrine persists in contemporary naturalistic approaches to
knowledge that render background context as "merely a causal antecedent of our
cognitions" thus confusing "a transcendental condition of knowledge with a causal-
empirical one; or rather, it fails to acknowledge that there is an issue about
transcendental conditions for epistemology to address as well as an issue about the
mechanisms of representation" (Smith 2004: 34).
This difference is evident in ethnocentric types of development theory that
stress modernization?O In his essay, Two Theories ofModernity (l995b), Taylor
distinguishes between cultural and acultural theories of modernity. In acultural
theories, modernity is conceived, by virtue of instrumental reason, as a set of
transformations that any culture can go through (Taylor 1995b: 24-25). Cultural
theories of modernity, as Taylor conceives them, attend to the internally generated
pressures that force one particular culture to evolve into another. They attempt to
reconstruct the intrinsic appeal of the values and standards that help constitute modern
culture, as they mutated from the values and standards of a predecessor culture
(Taylor 1995b: 24)?1
The essay continues to draw out implications of the culturallacultural distinction
that Taylor develops in an earlier essay, Inwardness and the Culture ofModernity
(1992), where the connections between 'inwardness' and modern rationality are given
20 Wilbur Schramm (Schramm 1960; Lerner and Schramm 1967; Schramm and Atwood 1981) was a
staunch advocate of modernization theory, which sought to impose Western industrial development as
a template for the managed evolution of 'pre-modern' societies. The perceived role of communication
science was to implement communication technologies for the purposes of' information transfer', the
imagined engine of development. Marxists critiques of modernization are developed in dependency
theory (see Amin 1976).
21 "I'm leaning on a use of the word culture which is analogous to the sense it often has in
anthropology. I am evoking the picture of a plurality of human cultures, each of which has a language
and a set of practices that define specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of
mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like. These languages are often mutually
untranslatable. With this model in mind, a 'cultural' theory of modernity is one that characterizes the
transformations that have issued in the modern West mainly in terms of the rise of a new culture"
(Taylor 1995b: 24).
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particular emphasis. Taylor returns to this question in an essay entitled Modernity and
Difference (2000) - an essay contributed to a volume in honour ofStuart Hall's
cultural criticism22 - where Taylor translates his concepts against the grain, as it were,
into those of "multiple modernities" and "social imaginaries". These tenns he
develops elsewhere also (see Taylor 2002, 2004, 2007). Returning to previous
concepts, Taylor explains that the acultural variety is of the fami Iy of development
theories that describe cultural and historical "transformations in tenns of some
culture-neutral operation" (Taylor 1992: 88).
These ethnocentric theories from explanations of "the growth of scientific
consciousness or the development of a secular outlook or the rise of instrumental
rationality" a template by which to predict (and prescribe) changes any culture can (or
ought to) undergo (Taylor 1992a: 89). Modernization theory is of this type of
exp'lanation and programme. But in Taylor's hands, the acultural explanation is not
used so much as to condemn these, as to show how these theories help us see how a
certain kind of modern identity arose; how a culture's 'strong values', conceptions of
the good, and its self-definitions came to summon the allegiance of modern subjects.
Similarly, the culturalist explanation serves to bring to mind the non-contingent
background of shared pretheoretical interpretations that arise spontaneously within
any lifeworld, including 'scientific' ones?3 Taylor (see Taylor 2002b) draws heavily
on Hans-Georg Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of horizons" to explicate this learning
process.24 And in so doing, Taylor contributes to the clarification of the hermeneutic
claim that the social sciences have an "interpretative logic" that departs in key ways
from the logic of the natural sciences (Smith 2004: 35).
Our primary sense of reality is bound up with our being in the world, and without this
sense representational cognitions of nature would be impossible. Essentially the same
point holds, according to Taylor, for our knowledge of the human world. That is to
say, for Taylor the human sciences as much as the natural sciences are grounded in a
preretlective, practically structured grasp of reality. But whereas the natural sciences
22 Gilroy, Paul, Lawrence Grossberg and Angela McRobbie (eds.) (2000). Without Guarantees. In
Honour o/Stuart Hall. London and New York: Verso.
23 "The background is a transcendental condition of knowledge in the sense that it is required for the
intelligibility of the knowledge claims we make. It cannot be completely objecHfied (or represented),
since any objective knowledge claimed of it, to be intelligible at all, must itself have a "background"
presupposition - precisely what complete objectification would annul. This transcendental level of
reflection, therefore, exposes limits to the objectifiable, representable world. This is how TayJor
interprets the epistemological significance of Heidegger's (and Gadamer's) reclamation of human
finitude" (Smith 2004: 34).
24 See Taylor, Charles (1990c). Comparison, History, Truth. In David Tracy and Frank ReynoJds (eds.),
Myth and Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
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refine the pre-objective sense of reality by depicting nature from a subject-neutral
point of view, this strategy is unsuitable for deepening our knowledge or
understanding of the human world. For meaning-content and subject-relatedness are
integral to the very notion of human activity. Human activity is by its very nature
directed by desires and purposes - without them, we wouldn't have actions to
understand or explain - and interpreting these desires and purposes is an essential palt
of reaching an understanding or explanation of the activity (Smith 2004: 35).
On naturalism and practice in social science
Taylor does not deny "that human beings do have a capacity for generating
objective representations of the world" (Smith 2004: 34; see Taylor 2002), but he
holds that they do so against a background of the transcendental conditions that make
objective knowledge possible?5 Representations can only arise against a background
of concerns - "a background of practically oriented perceptual awareness" (Smith
2004: 35) - which, of itself, cannot be the object of such (abstract) knowledge.
I ought to be accused of misdirection here insofar as I am presenting a view that
assumes the validation of theory is determined by its capacity to describe and explain
the phenomena of a certain domain, and to help predict those phenomena. To add also
that this view is typical of natural scientific method could rightfully inv ite objections
that this is indeed a caricature, or an allusion to 'reductive naturalism' as might obtain
in objectivism, and not science per se. This is a criticism that Clifford Geertz (1994:
83-84) mildly makes ofTaylor's contention that the naturalistic world-view offers an
implausible model in the human sciences (Taylor 1985b: 21).
In Social Theory as Practice (Taylor 1985b) Taylor argues - specifically
naming Skinnerian behaviourism and computer modeled notions of human behaviour
- that the natural sciences do not provide suitable methods and procedures of the
social sciences (Taylor 1985b: 91). In the natural sciences it is common to see theory
"as affirming an account of underlying processes and mechanisms of society" (Taylor
1985b: 92). While these sciences certainly transform practice (as an application of
theory), the practice it transforms is external to its theory. In the social world, "theory
... transforms its own object" (Taylor 1985b: 101). Taylor argues accordingly that
social theory is a different kind of activity from the natural sciences. The "disanalogy
25 As Taylor argues in Understanding in Human Science (1980a), the 'background' articulates of the
conditions of possibility of the knowledge we do in fact have. Taylor does not intend to cast doubt on
scientific knowledge, but instead to bolster a realist theory of science that attributes the success of
scientific theories to their ability to locate the causal powers that really do inhere in objects. "If
anything, it is the positivist and falsification philosophies of science, rather than herrneneutics, that
shortchange [sic] the explanatory competence of scientific theories" (Smith 2004: 36).
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with natural sciences lies in the nature of common sense understandings that science
challenges, replaces or extends (Taylor 1985b: 92-93).
As I have indicated, Geertz's criticism ofTaylor's concern that the natural
sciences have led to a false conception of what it is to understand (rather than to
explain) human behaviour is far less with his arguments than with their effect (Geertz
1994: 83): "The creation of a fixed and uncrossable gulf between the natural and
human sciences is obstructive of either's progress" (Geertz 1994: 84).
The issue is whether so radically phrased a distinction is any longer a good idea, now
that the point has been made ... that the human sciences, being about humans, pose
particular problems and demand particular solutions (Geertz 1994: 85).
During positivism's hegemonic period, this distinction may have served the
human sciences, but after Thomas Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions
(1962) it has become far harder to accept universal standards of scientific rationality.
But with the gulf narrowed, or even merged as Geertz (1994) suggests, what applies
to science must also apply to social phenomena (including morality). There are no
ahistorical, and acultural standards by which to objectively determine the good. These
standards are linked to the incommensurability of paradigms. And in this respect,
ethical theory cannot necessarily reflect right or wrong in specific forms of human
behaviour, taken as an independent object. The lack of universal standards seems to
render the idea of rational justification of scientific paradigms and of moral precepts
impossible. Thus, our options seem to be either a moral subjectivism allowing for a
relativist 'anything goes' view in science, or a conservative defence of whatever
views and standards happen to be fashionable. Maclntyre's (1984) charge of
emotivism thus stands.
But Taylor takes a different tack. He accepts that ethical theory fashions what is
right or wrong in behaviour. But iftheory does transform its own object, it does not
follow that 'anything goes'. Taylor is undaunted here, preferring a soft relativism, and
arguing that even here social theory is validating. "[C]ertain kinds of changes wrought
by theory are validating, and others show it to be mistaken" (Taylor 1985b: 102).
Indeed, both Taylor and MacIntyre (1983, 1991) claim to go beyond moral
subjectivism by taking a historicist and comparative account of rationality. They both
claim that an analogy between rationality in science and in morality should be taken
seriously.
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For the most part, we understand the meaning of actions in a prereflective,
pretheoretical manner. The distinctive aim of the human sciences, according to
Taylor, is to improve on these shared pretheoretical interpretations that arise
spontaneously within a Iifeworld, without ever completely cancelling them out, and
without abandoning their interpretative form. The task of a science like anthropology,
for instance, is to advance the prevailing understandings of the purposes expressed in
a particular culture. Taylor draws heavily on Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of
horizons" to explicate this learning process. 26 And in so doing, he contributes to the
clarification of the hermeneutic claim that the sodal sciences have an "interpretative
logic" that departs in key ways from the logic of the natural sciences (Smith 2004:
35).
To consider a phenomenological alternative to the neo-behaviourist
(naturalistic) view, to refer to a phenomenal selfentails a link between selfhood, self-
experience, and a first-person perspective (Zahavi and Parnas 1998: 687, 689). "When
we study consciousness ... we should take phenomenological considerations27 into
account, since an important and non-negligible feature of consciousness is the way in
which it is experienced by the subject" (Zahavi and Parnas 1998: 688).
In terms closer to Taylor's post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, ifjournalists
merely represent external events in 'internal mind', as the Cartesian and Lockean
frames would prescribe, their (ethical) practices can never extend beyond the limited
naturalistic requirements of discovering and accurately recording those events?8
Naturalism is the belief that human beings are part of nature, and Taylor would not
contest this claim. However, his critique of naturalistic human science draws attention
to what features of human life these sciences accept as being natural phenomena.29
Naturalistic social science typically rejects anything considered 'not real', and would
therefore ignore meanings and values as existing 'in our heads' and not 'out there' in
the world. Taylor, in his critique of naturalism and its claims regarding moral
26 See Taylor's essay, Comparison, History, Truth, in Taylor (1990c [1995a: 146-164]).
27 Dan Zahavi and Josef Parnas (1998) here refer to the continental philosophical tradition rather than,
say, Daniel Dennett's (in Zahavi and Parnas 1998; Zahavi 2005: 316) vague use of the term in
cognitive science, referring to higher-order representation theories. Zahavi (2005) launches a similar
line of argument in his attack on David Chalmers's book, The Conscious Mind (1996).
28 According to naturalism, explanations of phenomena 'in the world' are objective when given in
absolute terms, that is, terms that exclude human experience of those things.
29 In naturalism, thoughts, motivations, emotions, aversions and values are not considered part of
nature, but rather as projections of an ephemeral subjectivity onto a value-free world. Trends in
psychology that reduce psychological phenomena to neurophysiology, computational models, or
observable behaviour, are a case in point (see Taylor 1988a: vii-ix)
Subject-related phenomena are rejected in naturalistic social] science, or are explained in language that
excludes reference to human subjectivity.
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ontology, has consistently rejected this line of thinking; and Sources ofthe Self
(Taylor 1989a) is his most elaborates statement in this regard.3D
The great problem for naturalism, Taylor submits, is that it fails to reconcile
phenomenology and ontology. On the one hand, many naturalists would agree that
imports and values are experienced, and that they may even be necessary for us to get
on with one another; but on the other hand, they insist this is not what the objective
world is really like. According to Taylor, the naturalistic ideal that the world can be
experienced and explained in absolute terms is peculiar, and excludes all that is
critically unique to human life. Human beings simply could not tllink, act and
experience in the ways they do if meanings, interests and values were not accepted as
part of the world. We are part of the world (Sugarman 2005: 795-796).
This limited type of practice that naturalistic conceptions require may be
implied in the term reporting, where apart from objective stresses on observation all
other story elements are limited to mere articulations of discourse. Human agency is
effectively excluded. The world is only ever represented, and not fully perceived.
What is occluded resultantly is the 'human interest' in both the production and
consumption of news, which in addition to representation requires also the originary
and constitutive dimension of knowledge (notably found in speech). That is, as Taylor
elaborates in his essay, The Importance ofHerder (1995a: 79-99), interpretation
entails expression prior to representation.
Taylor subscribes to an expressivist model oflanguage through his adherence to
Johann Gottfried Herder's expressivist theory of language. Herder's theory
"originates a fundamentally different way of thinking about language and meaning"
(Taylor 1995a: 79), and hence opposes the designative approach to language that was
reinforced by John Locke's empiricism following the requirements of the seventeenth
century scientific revolution. That difference, found in linguistic aspects of the
Romantic movement that influenced Hegel's concept of Spirit, puts greater store on
language use in the context of' interpretive communities'. Hence, Herder's critique
concerns both the notion of a disengaged self and representative theories of language
that proceed from Enlightenment rationality. The Enlightenment played a formative
role in creating the instrumental rationality which, no doubt useful in science, has also
had the side effect of constituting the modern notion of selfhood through an
"ontologizing of rational procedure" exemplified in empiricism (Taylor 1995a: 61,
30 Moral meanings are not merely projections of human sentiment onto what naturalists (and
positivists) consider to be a morally neutral and natural world. Rather, Taylor's claim is that moral
meanings are part of what is a distinctively human world and are made manifest in human individual
and collective life.
102
63). This results in human beings thinking and acting as if they are separate from their
larger environment. This image offers a picture of self-centred agents likened to
computer modeling - a picture of disengaged rationality (Taylor 1997: 7) - taking in
bits of information to process as though through a calculus of means and ends (Anton
1999: 26-27; Taylor 1995a: 63), impressed by knowledge and technique, but
incapable of any human experience that intentionality entai Is.
The dominant rationalist view, Taylor writes, screens out engagement and gives
"us a model of ourselves as disengaged thinkers" (Taylor 1995a: 63. Emphasis
added).31 Representationalism exemplifies the aspect of empiricism inherited from
Enlightenment, inscribed in the "symbol model" that underwrites the encoding-
decoding logic prevalent in the Western tradition (Anton 1999: 29). "In speaking of
the 'dominant' view I am not only thinking of the theories which have been pre-
em inent in modern philosophy, but also of an outlook which has to some extent
colonized the common sense of our civilization" (Taylor 1995a: 63).
To conclude this section, I want to draw attention to Corey Anton's (1999)
essay,32 in which he proposes a fusion of the constitutive-representational dichotomy.
His argument has all the hallmarks ofTaylor's theory without mentioning him even
once?3 Anton (1999) draws on some of the phenomeno logical sources in continental
philosophy that Taylor uses - Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty - but
departs from Taylor by drawing on John Dewey's pragmatic theory influenced no less
by Alfred Schutz's similar subscription to Husserl and the phenomenological
tradition. Anton's target is John Stewart's (1995; 1996) emphasis upon the
constitutive at the expense of representationalist models oflanguage. "To counter [the
symbol model] Stewart, drawing from thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer,
[Mikhail] Bakhtin, and [Martin] Buber, argues that language is fundamentally
'constitutive' of the human world and thus, is intricately linked to who and how we
are" (Anton 1999: 27).34 Such a sentence could well find a place in the hermeneutic
31 Taylor, Charles (1995a). Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein. [n
Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
32 Anton, Corey (1999). Beyond tbe constitutive-representational dichotomy: The phenomeno[ogical
notion of intentionality. Communication Theory 9( I).
33 Anton (1999: 27) complains that John Stewart's (1995; 1996) argument was anticipated seventy-five
years earlier by John Dewey, who "does not appear in either of Stewart's two texts" (Anton 1999: 27).
Similarly, Anton's argument was anticipated by Charles Taylor.
34 Like Taylor, Corey Anton (1999) advocates an articulation or fusion of both constitutive and
representational elements. I shall briefly discuss Anton's argument because it does provide a distanced
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repertoire ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology, given Nicholas Smith's (1997)
reference to the field, in relation to Taylor, as being "made up of those irreducible
categories that are held to have, or are presupposed as having, general application to
human reality," and its purpose to provide "answers to questions concerning the kind
of being human beings are" (Smith 1997: 36). Again, the refusal to acknowledge
Taylor is inexplicable.
Taylor's traditions
Taylor's distinctive approach is rooted in his emphases on the constitutive role
of language and the intersubjective nature of agency. Commentators generally agree
that Taylor's thought subsists in philosophical hermeneutics (Abbey 2004: 2-5;
Redhead 2003: 8-10; Smith 1997: 36-39; 2002: 120), which "forms part ofa broad
movemenes away from empiricism and representational accounts of meaning and
knowledge" (Schwandt 2003: 304). He draws on Hans-Georg Gadamer's
hermeneutics, Ludwig Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy, and the strong
ontology of Martin Heidegger's existentialism hermeneutics. He finds his
anthropological bearings in Maurice MerJeau~Ponty,and understands his linguistic
heritage in both Johann Gottlieb Herder and Alexander von Humboldt.
Others would cast Taylor in an interpretive frame (Hiley et al. 1991), and this
would not be incorrect but for one or two not so minor qualifications. For instance,
Taylor rejects the interpretivist view "that hermeneutics is an art or technique of
understanding, the purpose of which is to construct a methodological foundation for
the human sciences" (Grondin 1994: 109. Emphasis added). Instead, philosophical
hermeneutics presents understanding as the very condition of being human, rather
than it being merely a procedure-governed or rule-governed undertaking. In short,
understanding is interpretation; which provides the sense in which Taylor defines
insight into this aspect ofTayJor's thinking, though, ironically, without any reference to Taylor. But
perhaps of more importance, Anton's (1999) argument helps express one aspect of the question I am
trying to explore: the alignment Windschuttle unwittingly establishes despite his opposing an
empiricist conception ofjournalism practice to linguistic idealism that he attributes to cultural studies.
35 The range of this movement extends to Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, the philosophy of
language from Wittgenstein and Austin, Thomas Winch's philosophy of social science, Martin
Heidegger's existential phenomenology, and ethnmethodology's concern for situated actions as
publicly interpreted linguistic forms (e.g., Garfinkel). Some would include as one of the beacons
American pragmatism, such as John Dewey's epistemological behaviourism, though by Taylor's
(1997) own admission, not Mead's theory of the social self and sociality of language. Mikhail Bakhtin
receives more favourable treatment in TayJor's work.
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humans as "self-interpreting animals" who engage in processes of moral and practical
reasoning (Taylor 1985a: 45-76).Taylor's self-interpretive view of human agents
"essentially resists reduction of experience to a merely subjective view on reality, or
an epiphenomenon, or a muddled description" (Taylor 1985a: 47).
On the contrary, the claim is that our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is
constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on
reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon which can be bypassed in our
understanding of real ity (Taylor 1985a: 47).
Taylor's use of the term 'understanding' is not one he usually has in mind, such
as that resembling an earlier conception Dilthey famously articulated when he
distinguished the Verstehen approach trom explanatory methods (Erklaren) of the
natural sciences. Gadamer had convincingly critiqued important aspects ofDilthey's
project (Sullivan and McCarthy 2005: 622-623); and the aspect that attracted both his
and Heidegger's attention was the separation between the researcher and his or her
object of research (Harrington 2000; Schatzki 2003: 302-303, 314).
The researcher, according to Gadamer, approaches the object of study from his or her
own particular historical perspective and not from the perspective of the object. In this
sense there is as much dissimilarity between researcher and participant as similarity
(Sullivan and McCarthy 2005: 622).36
IfDilthey was the founder of the Verstehen approach to social science, it was
modified first by Heidegger, and later by Hans-Georg Gadamer, in a way that refined
and radicalized Dilthey's notion of understanding as a method of interpretation one
reaches. In Truth and Method, Gadamer (1975: 153ft) argues that the nineteenth
century historicist tradition within which Dilthy, Schleiermacher and other
hermeneutic scholars conducted themselves remained under the influence of
Enlightenment ideals of reducing error in the attainment of knowledge (Harrington
2000: 492; Oliver 1983: 522-523). For Gadamer, understanding is not "an isolated
36 In a paper published decades earlier, David Linge (1973) presents and entirely different view of the
differences between Dilthey's and Gadamer's views of historical consciousness and the implications
this has for methodology. One difference is that "Dilthey's philosophy of life stands within the great
tradition of German historical scholarship which has its roots in early nineteenth-century romanticism,"
and argued within that tradition that "historical understanding constituted a kind of heightened self-
possession" (tinge 1973: 540, 545). The essential approach here is the interpreter's transcendence of
history. With Gadamer, however, the historicity of understanding is elevated to the level of a basic
hermeneutic principle. "Quite explicit in Gadamer;s work, therefore, is a thorough-going critique of the
excessive claims made by Dilthey and others that methodological self-consciousness and critical self-
control amount to a vehicle whereby the knower transcends his own historicity. Such claims reflect the
Cartesian and Enlightenment ideal of the autonomous subject who successfully extricates himself from
the immediate entanglements of history and the prejudices that come with that entanglement. For
Dilthey, historical understanding occurs only insofar as the knower breaks the immediate and formative
influence of history upon him and stands over against it. Historical understanding is the action of
subjectivity purged of all prejudices" (Linge 1973: 546).
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activity of human beings but a basic structure of our experience of life. We are always
taking something as something. That is the primordial givenness of our world
orientation, and we cannot reduce it to anything simpler or more immediate"
(Gadamer 1970: 87). In recognition of this advance, it is now common to use an
expression made famous by Gadamer, 'hermeneutics', to denominate a way of
thinking about the social sciences as essentially interpretive (Oliver 1983: 533-535).
But it is also no exaggeration to add that after Gadamer, Taylor "has been the most
eloquent and influential advocate of the hermeneutic model of social science in the
English-speaking world" (Smith 2002: 120).
It is within the framework of Gadamerian hermeneutics that we can at least
tentatively situate Taylor's philosophical anthropology, but at the same time it would
be inaccurate to cast Taylor's work as singularly representing that frame. A wider
scope is required to embrace his work. For that he is better situated (nonetheless
obliquely) within continental philosophy, even as that emerged in Husserl's
breakthrough in phenomenology, but more cogently as it was interpreted through
Heidegger, and later by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Derrida. But even here
the relationship is unequivocal, ifnot contradictory. These four offer no concerted
front for phenomenology, and there are good reasons to argue that Heidegger
contributed less to prolonging than to putting an abrupt end to the phenomenological
movement (Rockmore 1995: 51-52). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty stressed the
basic continuity between Husserl and Heidegger. He maintained quite approvingly
that "Heidegger's own main text can fairly be understood as the 'explication' of
Husserl's idea of the life world" (Rockmore 1995: 12). The philosophies of both
Sartre and Derrida do not figure in Taylor's scheme. His lineage is traced more
directly to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer; and it is particularly the
Heideggarian influence to which Nicholas Smith alludes when he says that, as a
hermeneutic theorist, "Taylor's first principle of philosophical anthropology is that
human beings are the kind of being for whom their own being is open to question"
(Smith 1997: 36).
There is one other tradition that ably identifies Taylor: Catholicism. A study of
Taylor's contributions to each ofthe fields, disciplines and traditions listed provides a
sense of the dimensions of his anthropology, but it is one aspect that Ruth Abbey
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(2000: 2) leaves oue? - the connections between Tay]or's Catholic faith and his
philosophy, that Mark Redhead notes are "increasingly important to his work" and
"informs his political thought and moral theory" (Redhead 2002: 170, 171). Judging
from the introductory chapter to Taylor latest book - the 800-odd page length A
Secular Age (2007) - there are good grounds to agree with Redhead, and to suspect
Abbey of displaying the very politically correct 'moral squeamishness' that Taylor
uncovers in The Ethics ofAuthenticity (1990), and which he rejects.
Taylor is a profoundly Catholic philosopher, and is quite unequivocal about this,
together with having both French and English parentage (his Catholic faith inherited
from his French mother's side), and having political sensibilities from having been
reared on such conversation from an early age (Redhead 2002: 10-17). Taylor's
inclusion of his Catholicism in the various aspects of his thought - going against the
discursive grain to obviate what may be said to be true, and to leave unspoken what is
proscribed - seems to have had a disquieting effect on his critics. Abbey avoids
discussing Taylor's Catholicism at all. Ian Fraser (2003) treats it gingerly with as
much 'objectivity' as he can muster. Michael Morgan's (1994) discussion resembles
one handling a strange object at arm's length. "Belief in God, in Divine Providence,
and such matters is no longer taken for granted by the majority; religious commitment
is more selective, vaguer, and without the old robustness," says Morgan (1994: 49),
without letting on that he sees the irony behind his words. Admittedly, Taylor has
never been one to pander to popular causes. But not all scholars find Taylor's refusal
of academic protocol distasteful. George Wright (2001: 789) notes that Taylor's book,
A Catholic Modernity (1999), from his Marianist Award lecture, is his first concerted
articulation of what the Christian faith means in the modern world; and may be
envisioned "as a sort of belated concluding chapter" to Sources ofthe Self (I 989).
Others entertain Taylor's Catholicism in relation to questions of moral philosophy
(Kitchen 1999: 34; Redhead 200 I: 86; Redhead 2006: 648-651), questions of Judeo-
Christian theism, and to the question of Kantian transcendence (Fraser 2003: 300).
Nonetheless, one difficulty with each author's approach is that it misses an important
point about Taylor's anti-Cartesian conception of a moral horizon: none of us lives in
37 Abbey (2000: 2) lists Taylor's interests as being in "the topics of moral theory, selthood, political
and epistemology."
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a solipsistic universe of the 'mind', whether this be a disembodied spirit or wanderer
divorced from history.
These are Taylor's traditions. But as he fashions his outlook, he refuses what
Fred Dallmayr (2005) calls (borrowing an image from MacIntyre) the "self-images of
our age", and "writes against the grain of prevalent intellectual prejudices" (Dallmayr
2005:225)
At a time when all academic disciplines were increasingly patterned in the model of
the natural sciences, he reminded his colleagues in the humanities and social sciences
of a different standard of inquiry: that of the interpretive understanding of meaning --
a standard depending on participant engagement rather than neutral observation. At a
time when the legacy of Hegel was shunted aside by devotees of logical rigour, he
almost single-handedly rescued from oblivion this philosopher of "spirit" .... Above
aH, at a time when agnosticism and indifference or even hostility to religion are de
rigeur in much of academia, he never stopped to inject into his writings a certain
mode offaithfulness or fidelity -- a faithfulness to something unconditional,
something that cannot be grasped or instrumentally manipulated and which, despite its
oblivion, never stops to call on us (Dallmayr 2005: 225).
One indication of the conviction with which Taylor is prepared to travel against
the paradigmatic traffic of the academic common herd is evident in his exploration of
the concept of authenticity;38 to which he gave his fullest treatment in Ethics (Taylor
1991). In this book, which Taylor extracts from Sources ofthe Self (1989), he
identifies three malaises of modernity. These are individualism, instrumental reason
(referring to the economic application of means to ends) and to a subtle political
power he calls "soft despotism" 39
38 The concept of authenticity is a difficult one to provide definitively an approach in recent academic
discourse. Theodor Adorno's rejection of the concept for its ostensive promotion ofindividuaJity, while
symptomatic of intellectual sentiments of its time, managed to articulate, and possibly promote, an
overall hostility to the concept. It became a 'liberal' concept. Adorno's book, The Jargon of
Authenticity (1964), is therefore a benchmark of its time.
The way in which the meaning of 'authenticity' has been derived has been far from parasitic. Instead,
authenticity has been seen as a hopeless cry of modern angst, and its most authoritative expression has
been consistently located in Nietzsche's pathos of authenticity. Jacob Golomb's book, In Search of
Authenticily: From Kierkegaard to Camus (1995), presents this view of illusive authenticity. Golomb
dismisses Taylor's intervention on the matter, even though having considered in a chapter Heidegger's
subsumption of the concept in his ontological question of being. Heidegger repositions the starting
point of the question of authenticity in the notion of authentic Dasein. Authenticity is a genuine "is-
ness" (Existenz). For Heidegger the very search for authenticity "constitutes its meaning" (Being and
Time 59). Taylor's identification of authenticity in the value of 'ordinary life' seems to acknowledge
Heidegger's conversion of the question to terms of being, and at the same time address the Nietzschean
p:oble~atic. ., . '" .
Alexls de TocquevIlle s term for a socIety In whIch most of ItS members have gIven up an active role
in the ordering of that society only to discover that society and government is run by an 'immense
tutelary power' which endangers political liberty and discourages participation.
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Drawing on his analysis ofthe modern self, Taylor shows how the search for
authentic self-fulfillment can become incoherent and self-defeating when it is tied to
atomistic individualism, the overvaluation of instrumental reason, and an alienation
from public life. At the same time, he argues against pessimism, suggesting that the
other elements of our philosophical and cultural traditions give us resources for
confronting our current challenges. Crucially, he calls for recognizing that our wants
are necessarily qualitatively distinguishable (so that, among other things, we can want
to have better wants), that our individuality is grounded in sociality (so that we can
conceive of freedom in ways other than absence of external constraint), and that
frameworks of strong evaluation are inescapable (so that the attribution of
significance is not simply a matter of immediate subjective choice).
Taylor also demonstrates how the possibility of an authentic identity is
frustrated by a moral relativism that denies the validity of our horizons of significance
and which underlies an instrumental attitude towards human relationships. He
therefore asserts the impossibility of constructing an authentic identity without
accepting a non-instrumental commitment to relationships, and without
acknowledging our "horizons of significance" that generate moral demands from
outside ourselves.
There is an important point made above that is worth exploring further. In
Sources (1989a) Taylor discusses at length the transition of Western culture from an
ethic of glory and heroism to what he calls the "affirmation of ordinary life". The
paradigm shift is one that moves from sources in ancient Greek culture - with its ethic
of honour - to a condition where the "affirmation of ordinary life finds its origin in
Judeo-Christian spirituality" (Taylor 1989a: 215). But the transition was not complete
until the Reformation, which, Taylor argues, premised salvation upon the faith of the
individual believer alone. We begin to sense how Taylor can be considered a
'communitarian', even though he rejects that label (Taylor 1994b: 250; 1995a: 182-
183; 1996). From the Reformation onwards there followed a steady movement away
from mediated salvation.
Taylor argues that in premising salvation upon the faith of the individual believer
alone, and in attacking the idea that one could achieve a closeness to God through the
mediation of those who absented themselves from the profanity of the ordinary (i.e.
monks, celibate clergy, etc.), the locus of the spiritual life is shifted to the ordinary.
Thus, for instance, not a separate priesthood, but a priesthood of all believers. The
idea of Vocation', associated in the Roman Catholic tradition with priesthood or
109
monasticism is, for the Protestant, something that can be acted out within even the
humblest of employments (Fraser, Giles 2002: 134).
As Taylor puts it: "The highest in life can no longer be defined by an exulted
kind of activity; it all turns on the spirit in which one lives whatever one lives, even
the most mundane existence" (Taylor 1989a: 224). But as Mark Redhead (2002: 184)
points out, "Taylor finds himself on the same side of the fence as Nietzsche," whose
"affirmation of 'aristocratic values' is, on one level, associated with his rejection of
claustrophobic domesticity and antipathy towards 'ordinary life'" (Fraser, Giles 2002:
134-135). Taylor is, hence, caught in a paradox. The idea of self-responsibility can
infer full culpability for what one becomes, as in Descartes's 'disengaged subject',
which Taylor rejects, and which advocates the possibility of complete freedom from
one's material and social worlds. These ideas step outside of human boundaries, so
that one can make one's self with complete detachment from the external world.
Taylor criticizes these ideas in Overcoming Epistemology (1987a [I 995a]).
Taylor's response to his Nietzschean dilemma side-steps the cruel choice of
self-negation or the will to power. As modem subjects, we live inescapably in its
horizon, and its constellations of values are integral to who we are as persons (Taylor
1989a: 520). Its constitutive and life goods define who we are. "Moreover, since the
life goods of this horizon are ones we cannot escape, they must necessarily be
appealed to in some form by any set of shared values and common goods that might
hold a deeply diverse state together" (Redhead 2002: 190).
Taylor's thought owes much to the traditions he taps into, but his articulation of
these sources cuts across philosophies and ideologies, and he refuses to build a system
of his own. His thought is an "armamentarium of interlocking ideas" (Kitchen 1999:
33) with an "intractable unity" that makes it hard to compartmentalize (Baker 2003:
141). His questions are profoundly ontological, and impatient with any knee-jerk
submission or service given to schools ofthought for their own sake (Kerr 2004: 85).
His interrogation of modern identity cuts to the bone of human experience, remaining
all the while keenly aware of the place of history, tradition and horizons in the
constitution of selves and identities. Even so, persons are no mere emanation of
underlying structures. They are "self-interpreting animals", as he famously declares,
and they engage so in practices of moral and practical reasoning by ways of which
selves - never fixed - are perpetually becoming (Taylor 1985a: 45ft). In this respect
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an essential and defining tension exists between persons and the communities in
which they subsist, reflecting in Taylor's politics, at the micro level, a similar balance
between individual rights and social goods (Saurette 2004: 724-725).
Taylor's philosophical anthropology
What do we mean by a person? Certainly an agent, with purposes, desires, aversions,
and so forth. But obviously more than this because many animals can be considered
agents in this sense, but we don't consider them persons. So generally philosophers
consider that to be a person in the full sense you have to be an agent with a sense of
yourself as an agent, a being which can thus make plans for your life, one who also
holds values in virtue of which different such plans seem better or worse, and who is
capable of choosing between them (Taylor 1985c: 257).
A basic principle ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology is that it is a non-
contingent fact that human beings are oriented against some background framework
that confers moral significance on personal identity. Identity is never fixed, and
Taylor argues that changes in identity, once articulated in a narrative form, constitute
an "epistemic gain". A human being is "a being for whom certain questions of
categoric value have arisen" on which it has "received at least partial answers"
(Taylor 1985a: 3). In other words, his strong hermeneutics proposes limits to the
contingency of self as a condition of its intelligibility.
This is what makes the identity of a person - a self-identity dependent on self-
interpretations - different to the identity of other kinds ofbeing.40 "For while the
identity of other kinds of being might be fixed by a set of physical properties which
uniquely individuates an object through processes of change, explanations of the
actions of persons must take into account interpretations of what matters to the
person" (Smith 1997: 29). Rather than being a set of neutrally describable
individuating facts, identity is what interpretations disclose as mattering. "We are
selves," Taylor writes, "only in that certain issues matter for us" (Taylor 1989a: 34).
40 In Taylor's view, we need to have a 'portrait of the modern identity' in place before we can diagnose
its ills. This is just what Taylor sets out to do in Sources ofthe Self, though he does not consider
himself to have completed the task in that work (Smith 2002: 200).
III
As a theorist of (ontological, post-Heideggarian) hermeneutics,41 taking as his
central thesis that human beings are "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor 1985a: 45ft),
Taylor's first principle of philosophical anthropology is the Heideggerian notion that
human beings are the kind of being for whom their own being is open to question
(Taylor 1992: 328).42 For Heidegger, "human existence is constituted by the meanings
things have for it, meanings determined more or less explicitly by self-interpretations"
(Smith 2004: 31). As a theorist of strong hermeneutics (see below), Taylor adds a
second principle, the core claim of his philosophical anthropology: that the question
of one's being is answered by reference to non-contingent moral identity (Smith 1997:
36). In other words, a person is a being for whom things matter.
Mattering, Taylor informs us, is only intelligible as a background of qualitative
discrimination; if everything mattered the same, if anything mattered, nothing would.
What matters makes a difference, its articulation requires qualitative distinctions
between the worthwhile and the worthless, the significant and the trivial, the fulfilling
and the vacuous. For Taylor, the identity of a person is intelligible in virtue of the
capacity to make such distinctions, and a person's being matters, is good life rather
than 'mere' life, to the degree to which it can be interpreted as actually or potentially
worthwhile, significant or fulfilling (Smith 1997: 37).
The distinction between weak and strong hermeneutics comes from Nicholas
Smith (1994, 1997: 15-25), and these terms add an explanatory dimension to Taylor's
distinction between weak and strong evaluation (Taylor 1976a; 1985a: 14ft).43 Taylor
41 Taylor rejects the interpretivist view "that hermeneutics is an art or technique of understanding, the
purpose of which is to construct a methodological foundation for the human sciences" (Grondin 1994:
109. Emphasis added). Instead, philosophical hermeneutics presents understanding as the very
condition of being human, rather than it being merely a procedure-governed or rule-governed
undertaking. In short, understanding is interpretation; which provides the sense in which Taylor defines
humans as "self-interpreting animals" who engage in processes of moral and practical reasoning
(Taylor 1985a: 45-76).Taylor's self-interpretive view of human agents "essentially resists reduction of
experience to a merely subjective view on reality, or an epiphenomenon, or a muddled description"
(Taylor 1985a: 47).
42 Dasein (being-in-the-world), the Being of human beings, is distinctive in that its Being is an issue
for it, Heidegger says. Its life, unlike the life of animals (or other entities such as chairs for that matter)
is something with which it must concern itself. Heidegger's first tentative, yet affirmative outline of the
subject of Being and Time (1962: par 17): "Dasein is in such a way as to be something which
understands something like Being ... it does so with time as its standpoint."
4J Taylor introduces his concept of strong evaluation in the context of Harry Frankfurt's theory of
second-order desires, as a further refinement of Frankfurt's (1971) theory of reflective self-evaluation.
"In Frankfurt's view, it is second-order volitions, not second-order desires, which are criterial for
personhood. Second-order volitions are a (major) subclass of second-order desires. In exceptional cases
we may want to have a certain desire and yet not want the desire to be effective. Frankfurt gives the
example of someone wanting to know what a compulsive desire to have drugs feels like, so as to be
better able to understand addicts whom he wants to help. But he does not want the desire to be
satisfied; he does not want to take drugs, but just to have the desire. Such a case is one of second-order
desire, but not of second order volition. Second-order volition is a desire for a certain desire to be one's
effective desire, one that leads to action. Frankfurt calls one's effective desire one's will" (Laitinen
2003: 21).
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presents strong evaluation as the defining capacity of persons to examine critically
their desires and to determine whether they want (at a 'second order' level) to have
those desires. Strong evaluators take an active stance toward those desires - either
condemning them or endorsing them. To engage in strong evaluation, then is to
grapple with the question of whether one wants to be the sort of person who is moved
in the way one finds oneself being moved (Anderson 1996: 18).
According to a basic insight ofTaylor's hermeneutics, the good is a matter of the kind
of interpretation he calls 'strong evaluation'. Self-interpretations cannot be
qualitatively neutral, since interpretive disclosure always takes place by way of
articulating a contrast (Smith 1997: 38).
To explain the difference between strong and weak hermeneutics in light of
different evaluations, I shall stay close to my sources in Smith (1994; 1997; 2002).
Weak hermeneutics corresponds to a Nietzschean-inspired perspectivism (Smith 1997:
16-17), that "all knowledge is interpretation: interpretations are always value-laden;
values are ultimately non-cognitive; therefore truth-claims are ultimately expressions
of a non-cognitive faculty or event" (Smith 1994: 20). It is the idea that "knowledge is
either relative to the point of view of the knower, or reducible to the pre-discursive
forces and mechanisms that constitute that point of view" (Smith 1994: 20).
Compared, strong hermeneutics is realist in orientation. "[A]ccording to strong
hermeneutics, the competent, articulate interpreter honours the ontological
commitments entailed by the best available account over and above any more general
epistemological or metaphysical considerations" (Smith 1994: 21).
When we find a certain experience intelligible, what we are attending to, explicitly
and expressly, is this experience. The context stands as the unexplicated horizon
within which ... this can be understood (Taylor 1995a: 68).
Strong hermeneutics draws out the implications of the non-contingency of
things mattering for human beings. "It inquires into the sources of significance which
shape the identity of such beings, the conditions under which such sources are opened
up or closed off, and most concretely, it explores the structural conditions of
satisfaction of presumably core human needs" (Smith 1997: 38). And we see from
Taylor's argument in Overcoming Epistemology (I 987a), that the modern
philosophical tradition's refusal to address such questions on the basis of a naturalistic
bias evident in the "epistemological construal" of mechanistic methods and concepts
of (empiricist) science onto models of human self-understanding (Taylor 1995a: 4),
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that the kind of metaphysical critique found in what Smith calls strong hermeneutics
amounts to a critical imperative.
[Strong hermeneutics] takes its point of departure not from the epistemological
fragility of foundational truth-claims, but from the conditions of possibility of actual
interpretative practices. The conditions include the historical embeddedness and
linguistic mediation of the interpreting subject upon which weak hermeneutics insists,
but language is recognised as able to disclose independently subsisting realities.
Reality is what is disclosed by the better of competing interpretations, and the
property which interpretations compete over is truth. This moves the epistemological
emphasis from foundations to transitions: disclosure, unlike correspondence, can only
ever occur in relationship to a concealer and something concealed, hence truth
becomes intelligible in terms of a movement from one interpretation to another (Smith
1994: 20-21).
The agenda of strong hermeneutics is set by the agenda of philosophical
anthropology, to determine the most suitable means to comprehend the nature of
beings whose own being is a matter of self-interpretation. But, to this end, Taylor
rejects a foundationalist epistemology; a move that has "radical ... implications for
the status of the human sciences" (Smith 1994: 21 ).44 It is here that his association
with Gadamer's hermeneutics is more pronounced. More amorphous than
MacIntyre's (1984) conception of tradition, Gadamer's conception of horizon can
incorporate different, competing horizons to achieve a fusion of horizons to adopt
more inclusive viewpoints (Gadamer 1976: 15-17). "[A]t first distinct ... the 'fusion'
comes about when one or both undergo a shift; the horizon is extended so as to make
room for the object that before did not fit within it" (Taylor 2002b: 287).
While Taylor regards the commitment to one's "horizons of significance" as a
necessary pre-condition and ultimate standard of relevance of self-evaluation, he also
recognizes the limits ofhermeneutic evaluation. In so far as these limits refer to one's
cultural background, it is crucial to see that horizons are also socially produced and
reproduced (Kitchen 1999: 46; Taylor 1989a: 27-29; 2004b: 2, 24-25). As language
constitutes various ways of being human, so too do cultural frameworks (Tay lor
1989a: 18). And as these change, so too do our ways of being human. Taylor's "Best
Account" principle (Taylor 1989a: 69) "takes the values constituting self identity as
the ultimate point of reference and subscribes to the hermeneutic tradition's
recognition of the inherent circularity of such forms ofjudgment" (Tate 1998: 21).
44 "For the fact that human beings are self-interpreting animals, combined with the fact that they are
intrinsically capable of conceptual and linguistic innovation, means that there is something inherently
unpredictable about the subject-matter of the social sciences - the life activity of human beings" (Smith
2002: 124).
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Since in practical matters the best accounts are articulated in concepts invested with
significance, and the investment of significance imparts evaluative force, the ontology
incumbent upon the interpreter in this domain will also be evaluatively laden -- it will
be, that is to say, a moral ontology. Conversely, if truth is understood as a matter of
disclosure between contrasting interpretations, and the favoured interpretation is
articulated in a vocabulary of evaluative significance, then truth will also be
describable in evaluatively significant terms. For strong hermeneutics, such moral
relativism is unavoidable (Smith 1994: 21).
That which makes the life of a person worthwhile and fulfilling is the evaluative
framework that defines the good life for that individual (or group of individuals). An
evaluative framework incorporates a plurality of goods to which we are committed
(Taylor 1989a: 20, 66). Choices are made on the basis of what one happens to desire,
and at stake in a weak evaluation is the choice of satisfying that desire by choosing
between two more or less equal goods. A choice, for example, between a ham
sandwich and a turkey roll would not matter unless I was Jewish or Muslim; but ifI
were either, the choice would matter according to a standard independent of my
personal fancies, and would entail a strong evaluation: a qualitative distinction
concerning the worth of alternative desires. The stand the strong evaluator takes tells
us something about what matters to the person, and the background conception ofthe
evaluation. The measure of evaluation becomes more than mere preference, but stands
out as an independent standard of worth against which the value of my choices may
be questioned.
Strong evaluation is a core concept in Taylor's philosophical anthropology, in
which he holds as a first principle "the conviction that human reality is structured, and
in some sense constituted, by layers of meaning" (Smith 2002: 18; see Laitinen 2003:
67-71). Taylor's anthropology extensively draws its "engaged view" from Merleau-
Ponty's existential phenomenology; from which Taylor is able to fashion a view such
that, in Arto Laitinen's (2003: 64) description, "one's grasp of the [lifeworld] is
practical, emotional, and evaluative rather than purely cognitive or descriptive." But
the matter goes further. There is a further conceptual linkage between strong
evaluation and identity (Taylor 1989a: 27-29). Allegiance to the background horizon
provides the' identity', and contributes towards one's conception of 'self.
It is this sense of 'identity' and 'self that is conceptually tied to strong evaluations.
As a person is a being for whom things matter, so a particular person's identity is
what particularly matters for that person, and in both senses of 'particularly'. In the
first sense, I am specifically this person rather than that, according to Taylor's view,
because I take this kind of life to be fulfilling and that kind oflife to be empty, or
because I interpret this course of action as right and that action wrong, or because I
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find this species of motivation admirable but that species contemptible. In the second
sense, what I find fu'lfilling or empty, right or wrong, admirable or contemptible, is no
small matter, but is of particular or fundamental significance to me as a person. In
answering the question of identity, I am forced to take a stand (Smith 1997: 38).
"A self-identity that is constituted against a background framework of strong
evaluations is in an important sense non-contingent, since matter of fact desires stand
accountable to an independent source of worth" (Taylor 1989a: 39). Among the goods
there are what Taylor calls 'hypergoods', which are of central importance for us
(Levy 2000: 50; Baker 2003: l41; Redhead 2001: 85). Hypergoods are "goods which
not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from
which these must be weighed, judged, decided about" (Taylor 1989a: 63).These goods
are backed up with ontological background beliefs which form another central part of
the framework (Taylor 1989a: 4-9, 70-71, 105). For Taylor, "doing without
frameworks is utterly impossible for us ... that the horizons within which we live our
lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative
distinctions" (Taylor 1989a: 27).
Taylor identifies three different strata to the good life - meaningfulness, dignity
and obligation - that correspond to three axioms of moral intuition (Taylor 1989a: 14-
19). A good life will be meaningful, without which a life lacking can be considered
'wasted'. Secondly, a course of life can possess dignity, without which it lacks
goodness. Thirdly, forms of individual or collective life have obligations and duty
towards others. But here Taylor is not separating a Kantian "categorical imperative".
He rejects Kant's distinction between the right and the good, and the neo-Kantian
differentiation of the moral and the ethical domains. "For Taylor, the 'moral' domain
of rights and obligations represents one dimension of the culturally specific
conception of the good to have emerged in Western modernity, not a normative
sphere whose autonomy (as the realm of the universalizable) modems 'have come to
see'" (Smith 1997: 37-38).
From this point of view, the categorical imperative of respecting the other as an end in
itself is worth following only in so far as it is anchored in an understanding of what it
is to be a fully human agent. [n each of the three strata, Taylor contends, the good
must be defined contrastively, and definitions of goods taken together make up a
framework that furnishes human beings with an orientation for acting for the best, or
living to their full potential (Smith 1997: 38).
Our identity is defined by the commitments and identifications that are provided
by the framework within which we determine what is good or not. To be without a
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horizon of strong evaluative distinctions, or evaluative framework, would amount to a
"identity crisis" (Taylor 1989a: 27) where the very intelligibility of a meaningful life
is threatened or negated. Taylor explains this condition with reference to a
phenomenological account of embodiment and orientation. We do not know who we
are since we do not know where we are. Taylor describes the experience as one of an
"acute form of disorientation" which presupposes the absence of a stand from which
to take one's orientation, (Taylor 1989a: 30). Since, as Taylor puts it, "the condition
of there being such a thing as an identity crisis is precisely that our identities define
the space of qualitative distinctions within which we live and choose," it follows that
these distinctions themselves are not something we can choose on the basis of matter
of fact desires and preferences (Taylor I989a: 30). For Taylor, to know who I am is to
be oriented in moral space. This space can be mapped by strong evaluations (Taylor
1989a: 27-29).
Conclusion
These influences are found extended in Taylor critique of the Cartesian basis of
naturalism in social science. From the combination of these discussions I aim to show
how Windschuttle's rejection of cultural studies tout court, as a basis within which to
study journalism, is founded upon an obverse reflection of the theory he rejects. That
is, while Windschuttle rejects the relativistic and arguably' idealist' notions he
ascribes to cultural studies as unsuited to taking into account the types of practices
and ontologies he sees as journalism's foundation, the naturalistic framework that he
uses to launch his attack (which he seems to prescribe as one suited to journalism's
self-understanding) is equally incapable of taking into account the interpretive work
all people Uournalists included) do in making sense of and coping with their everyday
life situations.
The objective is to argue what may admittedly be seen to be a 'third way'
between Windschuttle and his reductionist conception of cultural studies. My
intention, however, is more ambitious than simply to provide an alternative, of which
there must surely be a number of significant contenders. I argue that Taylor offers a
critique of modernity that at one and the same time makes a claim on the project of
cultural studies, and in so doing undermines Windschuttle's claims against the field.
But there is one proviso here: Windschuttle's impression of cultural studies is clearly
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reductive (Turner 2000), taking its most vulnerable relativist and idealist theoretical
aspects as if they were doxological. The field's own internal dissent is thus ignored
(Grossberg 1993: 30_32).45 Likewise, I cannot pretend that the phenomenological and
henneneutic 'comportment' ofTaylor's theory should represent the field in its
entirety. But the more ambitious claim that I am making is that the Romantic-
expressivist 'positioning' of the sources ofTaylor's thought at least shares, ifnot
entirely resembles, the field's general opposition to empiricist, rationalist and
Enlightenment sources of modernity.
The philosophical and methodological (as opposed to 'method') ground of this
study draws extensively from the positions Taylor takes towards social science, the
human person, and language in his philosophical anthropology. It is not uncommon,
in trying to understand a philosopher, to seek out a master category into which to
situate his or her thought. For example, a thinker might be labeled a liberal,
communitarian, interpretivist, pragmatist, Tocquevillian, Hegelian and other
categories can be used. Each distinguishes the kind of thinking characteristic of that
philosopher. Each label immediately affords a handle or index by which to make
sense of the overall corpus ofthat person's writing and outlook. It also becomes
possible to measure the degree to which that thinker corresponds to the 'normative'
the class of all others belonging to that category.
In the case ofTaylor, however, each of the above categories has been, and
continues to be, applied to him by his critics and collaborators. But this variety of
epithets amounts in no way to Taylor being a kind of intellectual chameleon. His
project is quite definite, and can be understood as a culturalist philosophical
anthropology written around the organizing idea of there being various layers of
meaning and nonnativity inherent in human being-in-the-world. The following
chapter provides a general view ofTaylor as an intellectual whose engagement with
the exigencies of the modern world has shaped his outlook.
45 There is no shortage of books and papers that attempt to trace the genealogy of cultural studies, done
mainly to clarify the identity and purpose of the field. Notable papers obviously include Stuart Hall's
Two Paradigms (1980). In my view, Lawrence Grossberg's paper, The Formations o/Cultural Studies
(1993), and his book, Bringing it All Back Home (1997), offer among the most thought-provoking and
genuinely reflexive accounts ofthe field.
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Chapter Four
Taylor and the New Left
Charles Taylor edifies. It in 110t his fault that most practitioners in the human sciences
remain relatively unaware of the devastation the tradition of German speculative
philosophy from Kant through Heidegger has wrought on the epistemological conceits
within which they operate (Shapiro 1986: 311).
Thus fan Shapiro introduces his review of the two volumes of Charles Taylor's
Philosophical Papers (1985a; 1985b), taking a side-swipe at disciplines in the human
and social sciences that remain enthralled by models of human agency adopted from
natural science.' Taylor has engaged successively in debates to repudiate
behaviourism in psychology (Taylor 1964; 1967a; 1967c), logical positivism
(repudiated in turn) (Taylor 1971a; I976a; 1977), and continues to cognitivist
reactions to critiques of empiricism in the social sciences (Taylor 1982c; 1987a,
2000a).
These 'anti-science' debates can be identified as formed by a dislocation out of
which the "Third Culture" (Zizek 2000) emerged, coinciding with interventions from
scholars such as Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Peter Winch (1958) who, respectively,
addressed the real interests of natural science and human science which had
collectively become entangled with the decidedly 'anti-interpretive' ideology that
'third culture' thinking represents, and which empiricism legitimates. That is, Kuhn
maintained that his reading of Max Web and Ernst Cassirer offered a way to explain
interpretively how scientists actually worked, even though the literature from which
he derived these insights loudly proclaimed the utter difference between the natural
and social sciences. "What then followed [in that literature] was a relatively standard,
quasi-positivist, empiricist account of natural science, just the image f had hoped to
set aside" (Kuhn 1991: 17). Kuhn explains that his earlier insights were reinforced by
reading Taylor's essay, Interpretation and the Sciences ofMan (Taylor 197Ia). "For
I Hilary Kornblith (1999), a defender of naturalism in social science, has this to say about it:
"Naturalism in philosophy has a long and distinguished heritage. This is no less true in epistemology
than it is in other areas of phi losophy. At the same time, epistemology in the English speaking world in
the first half of the twentieth century was dominated by an approach quite hostile to naturalism. Now,
at the close of the twentieth century, naturalism is resurgent" (Kornblith 1999: 158).
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me it's a special favourite: I've read it often, learnt a great deal from it, and used it
regularly in my teaching" (Kuhn 1991: 18).
Winch, on the other hand, faced a different set of difficulties. A kind of non-
return value seemed to exist between the natural and human sciences, where
methodological influence legitimately flowed from the natural to the human, but was
prevented from flowing in the opposite direction. Under these conditions, Winch
objected to (analytic) philosophy having been harnessed as an "underlabourer" of
science, where its sole purpose was to guard science against any errors of language
(Winch 1958: 3-10).
These debates that both conditioned Taylor's overall approach then, and to
which he contributed significantly, continue to inform his more recent writing. And
while these scholars - Kuhn, Winch and Taylor - addressed different audiences, they
drew from the same general pool of opposition to positivism in social science.
Taylor's own work in this regard was articulated in his first book, The Explanation of
Behaviour (1964). And although it is tempting to plot Explanation along a lineage
beginning with Winch (1958) and Kuhn (1962), the realization that Taylor (1964) was
using Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Elizabeth Anscombe as his guides tends to skew
that illusion, and to broaden the scope of those debates. Even the title of TayIor's
book tends to give this away; alluding to Merleau-Ponty's The Structure ofBehaviour
(1963).2 Perhaps it is safer to conclude that all these scholars were part of a general
movement in the philosophy of social science, and to add that it is perfectly possible
that (in some sense) they were each looking over the shoulders oftheir collaborators.
Taylor's sources straddle analytic philosophy and hermeneutics in the
existential tradition of continental philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein's intervention in
Philosophical Investigations (1953 [2001 D, which remained particularly influential
until the late 1970s (Wright 1972; 1974), retains a strong influence on Taylor's work
in analytic philosophy; but the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions in
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer remain stronger influences. The
strongest influence, however, remains Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
2 The Sfructure ofBehaviour (1963) was translated the year before Taylor's book. But being fluent in
French and German, Taylor will no doubt have read Merleau-Ponty in the 'vernacular'; Le Structure du
Comportement (1942).
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Taylor's central role in instigating debate on the matter of human behaviour
remains perhaps his most significant achievement; though, by no means does it
eclipse the range of his other inteHectual achievements, notably in political
philosophy and ethics. The thrust of his attacks on behaviourism support a
teleological3 model against causal, mechanistic models proffered by natural science.
His teleological analysis in Explanation (1964) "represents a big step in the right
direction .... [and] offers us something much further removed from the details of an
underlying mechanism than any of those that went before it" (Wright 1972: 206).
Taylor's argument provides a defence of "final causation, anthropomorphism and
teleological explanation not reducible to an underlying, deterministic causal
mechanism" (Wright 1972: 207).
The concluding four words of the above quote could well fit within a sentence
on classical Marxism; and it is in response to that problematic that Taylor, together
with Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams and other Marxist intellectuals in Britain in the
late 1950s forwarded a critique that contributed significantly to the development of
post-Marxism (see Archer et al. 1989; Eagleton and Wicker 1968). Taylor's
'Marxism', in the tradition of MerIeau-Ponty and Georg Lukacs, amounts to a
rejection of economism in the base/superstructure metaphor and an affirmation of the
humanistic Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts. Together with Hall, Williams and many
others, Taylor was a founding member of the New Left - the topic of this chapter-
and hence contributed towards the formation of British Cultural Studies, even if he
was never part of it formally. In short, as a multi-faceted intellectual, Ian Shapiro can
say ofTaylor:
Alongside Charles Taylor the critic of empiricism stands Charles Taylor the
hermeneutically oriented political philosopher, and hovering in the background,
directing these two, is Charles Taylor the moralist, advocating communitarianism over
social atomism and the integrity of the human subject against what he sees as
immoralist, Nietzsche-inspired views of a fragmented subject (Shapiro 1986: 312).
It is entirely fortuitous that as a Rhodes Scholar Taylor was to find himself at
Oxford in the 1950s. Together with fellow Rhodes Scholar Stuart Hall, Taylor
engaged in what may be seen as the philosophical questions of the century as they
were posed at that time. Having emerged from those debates with convictions tied to
3 An action is teleological or goal-directed in when it "occurs because it is the type of event that brings
about this end" (Taylor 1964: 9); that it, it occursfor the sake of some end. Taylor's position is
etiological in that it concerns what brings about behaviour (see Rescher 1967; Wright 1974: 350-352).
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continental philosophy, it is to be expected that his adversaries would come to draw
mainly from the naturalistic interests found in the Anglo-American analytic tradition
so framed in that time and space. From that tradition would come some of his harshest
critics (see Ringen 1976).
Chapter outline
The previous chapter presents Taylor in the wide scope of his philosophical
anthropology. From here onwards the scope is narrowed by providing a survey of
Taylor's activism in the New Left movement from 1956 to about 1961, when he
returned to Canada. During this time Taylor, through Merleau-Ponty's existential
phenomenology, came to reject orthodox Marxism due to both its economism and its
debilitating effects on those living under its rule, yet endorsed Marx's earlier
humanistic writing.
This aspect ofTaylor's work gets hardly more than a mention in the large
corpus of commentaries on his philosophy. Among both the 'knockers' and the
'boosters' of his work,4 scholars generally agree that it is in the traditions of analytical
and continental philosophy that the anti-epistemological core of his hermeneutic
thinking is situated (Abbey 2000; Dreyfus 2004; Smith 2002), yet few (Fraser 2007;
Smith 2002) consider his earlier activism as having had any role to play in that
development. His involvement in the formative debates of the New Left is treated as
though it is of mere biographical interest and something which he 'grew out of' once
he returned to Canada. While scholars readily cite Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Hegel,
Kant, Herder and Wittgenstein as Taylor's sources, they curiously air-brush Marx out
of the picture (see Abbey 2004; Redhead 2002; Smith 1997).
This chapter discusses that amnesia about Taylor, but rather than enquire into
any 'genetic' links between work for which Taylor is better known and his earlier
Marxist enquiries (see Fraser 2004; 2007), it investigates the historical record, and
notes certain intimations and disjunctures to do with yet another aspect of Tay Ior's
early work: his contribution to the formative debates that led to the founding of
4 In Sources of/he Self (1989a), Taylor chastises both the optimistic 'boosters' of modernity and the
denigrating 'knockers', such as Alasdair Maclntyre. Both 'get it wrong'. The context of his discussion
is the moral value of "ordinary life," which "has become one of the most powerful ideas in modern
civilization" (Taylor 1989a: 14), yet one that is increasingly difficult to 'get right' against critics for
and against (Elshtain 1994: 67).
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British Cultural Studies. Despite his having been centrally involved in the New Left
movement that was centred in and around Oxford from 1956 onwards, Taylor is
acknowledged little beyond his having launched and edited the Universities and Left
Review with Stuart Hall, Gabriel Pearson and Ralph Samuel (Davies 193: 118). The
journal's policy was to confront both the Stalinist persuasion of British Marxism and
the welfarist policies of the Labour Party (Dworkin 1997: 62; Hall 1989: 20).
Beyond lan Fraser's (2007) extensive discussion on Taylor's dependence on
Marx, and Nicholas Smith's (2002) brief discussion of Tay Ior's writing on the politics
of that period in the late 1950s, the record on Taylor's contribution to Marxist
scholarship runs dry. Even these two authors fail to sufficiently connect Taylor's
work to one development that flowed from the New Left: the critical practice of
British Cultural Studies that has been popularly ascribed as the accomplishment of
Hall, Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson - an icon status that Hall vehemently
rejects, not least on grounds that "cultural studies is not one thing [and] has never
been one thing" (Hall 1990: 11). On the other hand, Hall says, "when pressed to say
what cultural studies is and what it isn't, something in me stops short. I have a stake,
and cultural studies isn't every damn thing" (Hall 1992: 292).
Certainly Taylor was never materially part of the group of extramural Engl ish
teachers in adult education who migrated to Birmingham after Richard Hoggart was
offered a professorship there and decided to continue his work begun in The Uses of
Literacy (see Hall 1990: 12). Nor does Taylor seem to have had any connection to
cultural studies in its American migration. While Taylor's work on multiculturalism
has drawn attention from many in the business of mediating in cultural tensions (no
less in Quebec itself), it would be far-fetched indeed to label him on these grounds as
a 'cultural studies scholar'. But while this much may be 'materially' true ofTaylor,
his earlier involvement in the debates from 1956 onwards that led to the formation of
the field, and the direction his thinking has taken since then, indicates that the failure
to consider these connections may be more myopic than strategically justified. As
Hall (1990) notes, cultural studies did not start with Birmingham, but with debates
almost a decade before the formation of the Centre there.
The attempt to describe and understand how British society was changing was at the
centre of the political debate in the 1950s, and cultural studies was at this time
identified with the first New Left. The first New Left, dated not 1968 but 1956 (Hall
1990: 12).
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Before moving on to a discussion ofTaylor's contributions to post-Marxism, I
shall provide a picture of him as a pubIic intellectual; to round off an image that
studies on his extensive scholarship can misrepresent. In this sense I am alluding to
the statement Slajov Zizek (2002: 20-21) makes about the decline of the public
intellectuals since the 1950s, and hence to say something those scholars who formed
cultural studies then.
A monomaniac hedgehog
Literary scholar Terry Eagleton found reason recently to compare academics to
intellectuals. Academics, he wrote in the Irish Times (10 February, 2007), "are usually
specialists in a single subject, whereas the classical intellectual has a more ambitious
range .... [W]hile academics are largely confined to industrial production units known
as universities, intellectuals seek to occupy a more public sphere, as journalists,
political commentators and opinion shapers." Eagleton refines his point:
[A]cademics are usually conservative or middle-of-the-road, while intellectuals tend
to be politically dissident. Since they have less investment in power than politicians
and entrepreneurs, they can occasionally speak the truth to it.
Taylor is ambivalent about whether he is better understood as an academic or an
intellectual.s He does call himself a "monomaniac" (Taylor 1985a: 1) in addition to
adopting his former Oxford professor, Isaiah Berlin's (1953) notion of the hedgehog-
referring to an intellectual who views the world through the lens of a single 'big idea'.
A fox, on the other hand, is in Berlin's description one who accumulates an outlook
constituted out of many different and even contradictory experiences and ideas.6
5 Eagleton cites Taylor approvingly; possibly not least by mistaking him for a "lapsed Catholic" like
himself (Eagleton 1996: 82, 124), though I suspect he projects himself onto Taylor, given Mark
Redhead's (2002: 10-17) description of the place ofTaylor's reflexive Catholic faith on both his
politics and his philosophy. Nonetheless, Eagleton's wish to identifY with Taylor (if that is what he
intends) may signal a confluence of concerns, if not unqualified approval itself.
6 Berlin's distinction, drawn and developed from the Greek poet Archilochus (Berlin) 953: 6), and by
which he introduces his study on Tolstoy's view of history (whom he describes as a/ox who wished he
was a hedgehog), is generally instructive, but is more so given that Taylor adopts the distinction as a
self-description. As Berlin writes:
For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central
vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and
feel- a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has
significance -- and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even
contradictory, connected, ifat all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or
physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle; these last lead lives, perform acts,
and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal, their thought is scattered or diffused,
moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for
what they are in themselves, without, consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or
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Taylor's self-description as a 'monomaniac hedgehog' may on first impressions
be surprising given his wide-ranging contributions to contemporary philosophy. Ruth
Abbey Iists these contributions as being in "moral theory, theories of subjectivity ...
epistemology, hermeneutics, philosophy of mind ... [and] philosophy oflanguage"
(Abbey 2004: 1). In an earlier book Abbey (2000: 2) considers interests in "the topics
of moral theory, selfhood, political philosophy and epistemology" to represent the
range ofTaylor's thought. But there is a whole into which these fit, which resembles
less the unity of a single idea than a "tightly related agenda" (Taylor 1985a: 1). That
agenda Taylor understands as "philosophical anthropology", but what that term
entails, and its precise content, requires judicious teasing out.
Other writers have found Berlin's model cause for self-reflection, and one
overlays a more familiar set of concepts. lerome Bruner (1983) plays with this motif
in querying his own thinking, wondering why he is "a fox rather than a hedgehog,
preferring to know many things rather than one big thing?" (Bruner ]983: 8). Bruner,
who in a discussion on narrative identity elsewhere cites Taylor approvingly (Bruner
1991), briefly reviews his own intellectual journey before deciding that "being a fox
[entails] ... having a syntagmatic rather than a paradigmatic mind" (Bruner 1983: 9.
Emphasis added). Berlin's description of his former student appears to agree with
Bruner's distinction. In a short introduction to lames Tully's Philosophy in an Age of
Pluralism (1994), Berlin describes Taylor's views on social and political matters as
"imaginative, generously receptive, deeply humane and formed by the truth as he sees
it, and not as it ought to be in accordance with dogmatically held premises or
overmastering ideology" (Berl in 1995: I). He continues,
This gives his work an authenticity, a concreteness, and a sense of reality which some
of his less open-minded, proselytising, not to say formula- and ideology-ridden allies
and disciples do not always show. He is vastly superior to them all, and, as I can
testify from my own experience, a genuine source of continuous inspiration even to
those who hold views very different to his own (Berlin 1995: I).
Berlin does admit to significantly disagree with Taylor - though sharing a
mutual interest in Herder - but adds that it is regrettable that Marx's influence on his
exclude them from, anyone unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and
incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision. The first kind of intellectual and artistic
personality belongs to the hedgehogs, the second to the foxes; and without insisting on a rigid
classification, we may, without too much fear of contradiction, say that, in this sense, Dante belongs
to the first category, Shakespeare to the second; Plato, Lucretius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky,
Nietzsche, Ibsen, Proust are, in varying degrees, hedgehogs; Herodotus, Aristotle, Montaigne,
Erasmus, Moliere, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, Joyce are foxes" (Berlin 1953: 1-2).
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former student has been generally neglected (Berlin 1995: 1-2). But Taylor's Marx
digs deeper: into Hegel. Mark Redhead (2002: 83) notes Comel West's view of
Taylor as being "deeply grounded in the Hegelian tradition without being a
HegeJian." Redhead agrees with West's summation, but adds that "it would be quite
unfair to label Taylor simply a Hegelian, as there are a host of other influences, such
as Tocqueville, Aristotle, Herder, and Heidegger, at work in his thought" (Redhead
2002: 83). Another is Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Reiser 2000: Marks 2005). Yet another
is Saint Augustine "who saw the road to God as passing through our own self-
awareness" (Taylor 1994a: 29). In Sources (1989a: 127), Taylor remarks that "[o]n
the way from Plato to Descartes stands Augustine" (see a[so Taylor 1992b: 103-104),
thus noting the important role Augustine plays as a Iynchpin between the ancients and
the modems. As Michael Hanby (2003) writes:
Augustine is important to Taylor's story because of his contribution to the "moral
sources" constitutive of modern identity and because this contribution anticipates
Descartes. Foremost among these contributions is radical reflexivity or a profound
sense of "inwardness". This reflexive self will later combine a Protestant affirmation
of everyday life with deistic and romantic conceptions of nature to produce a self that
grounds both a liberal agreement on moral standards and a general agnosticism over
the sources of these standards (Hanby 2003: 8).
As a critic of modernity - though not rejecting it as Alasdair MacIntyre does-
Taylor's is a project of 'modern rehabilitation' that rests significantly on an
understanding of the inwardness that typifies modern life (Taylor 1992a). 7 There are
two aspects here that attract Taylor's attention. One concerns "the fact that Augustine
found a crucial use for the first-person perspective" (Taylor 1992b: 104) that made
7 My reasons for using Augustine instead of, say, Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic understanding
of experience as negation, building on Wilhelm Dilthy's distinction between experience in the natural
and human sciences (see Warnke 1987: 26-27), is firstly to illustrate-in-use an element in the tradition
of Christianity that led significantly to the Cartesian conception of the cogito (Hanby 2003: 8, 166-
178). As Michael Hanby writes:
Descartes' Cogito is an idea, but its birth is more than an event in the history of ideas. The
Augustinian self who is its alleged precursor helps us both to understand this event in theological
terms, and to see in more profound depth just what was dying as this creature was born. Although
Descartes is often credited with rigidifying an Augustinian dualism between mind and body, his res
cogitans is symptomatic of an altogether different caesura already well underway by the seventeenth
century. Now the individual will- distinct and separated from the love of beauty, the longing for
God, or the praise of Christ - becomes a will to power, and it is set over against God's body, which
must be placed under house arrest. One need only consider the attempts to police the Church by the
early modern political philosophy at the root of our own political arrangements to bear out this view
(Hanby 2003: 178).
While it is my intention to collapse the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy in a concept ofpractice that
draws significantly from Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, my goal is to use the
philosophical anthropology of Canadian philosopher Charles Tay tor, who himself draws from both
thinkers but regards the interiority typical of modern identities as a necessary feature of modern moral
horizons (Smith 2002: 219-220).
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possible, in modernity, narrative identities through an articulation of narrative,
experience and temporality. 8 Attention to Augustine helps us to see how a certain kind
of modern identity arose; how a culture's 'strong values', conceptions of the good,
and its self-definitions came to summon the allegiance of modem subjects.
In Taylor's view, we need to have a 'portrait of the modern identity' in place before
we can diagnose its ills. This is just what Taylor sets out to do in Sources ofthe Self,
though he does not consider himself to have completed the task in that work (Smith
2002: 200).
To this point I have provided an array of sources that purportedly form as a
constellation around a single idea. That idea, as I have argued, began with Merleau-
Ponty. But it was also derived from Taylor's reading ofMarx (Fraser 2007; Taylor
1957a; Taylor 1985a: 243-244), though he downplays this influence with reference to
what Marxism has wrought in Bolshevism (Taylor 1995b),9 repeating aspects of an
argument he published in 1957 in response to E. P. Thompson's critique of Stalinism
(Taylor 1957a). Certainly Taylor's Marx is that of the 1844 Manuscripts (and not the
old Marx), as I shall explain in this and the following two chapters. To what degree
Taylor's Marx is filtered through secondary sources is difficult to say; though the
influence of Merleau-Ponty cannot be doubted.
Taylor found in Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology an approach
through which he "sketched an approach to the theory of human subjectivity, or
philosophical anthropology, that would go on to serve him throughout his writings"
(Smith 2002: 26). Here Taylor's dual English and French background was not going
8 In the tenth and eleventh books of his Confessions, Augustine offers us an early reflection on memory
and time. Consciousness, he writes, "anticipates and attends and remembers, so that what it anticipates
passes through what it attends into what it remembers" (XI: xxviii). Here Augustine posits how a
future, which could not yet be existent, passes into a past -- a no longer existing present -- through a
present that without a sequential including past and future would remain no more than a meaningless
metaphysical modality. That much seems to be entirely uncontroversial, but were it not for objections
certain scholars (Strawson 2004) make against conceptions of a 'narrative self; positing instead that
personal identities can be modeled along lines of a sequential present tense.
9 In their introduction to Taylor's (I 989b) essay, Robin Archer et al. (1989) define him as an
instrumental and pivotal mover in the New Left:
Rejecting as impoverished the two prevailing left doctrines of the I950s, Stalinist communism and
social democracy, the New Left sought to reconsider the basic moral and intellectual tenets of
socialism. The ensuing attempts to spell out a 'socialist humanism' represent not so much a unitary
theory as a shared set of concerns .... Charles Tay tor, one of the original contributors to this debate in
the I950s, reassess his position on the extent to which Marxism itself can be seen to give rise to
fundamentally anti-humanist forms of social organization. He reaches the provocative conclusion
that socialists should abandon the Marxist paradigm altogether and search for an alternative
theoretical framework in other strands of social and pol itical theory (Archer et al. 1989:60).
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to be left as unexplored ground. Taylor describes in a recent interview10 how growing
up in his family meant having a "complete love affair with France," and having a
grandfather for whom
Paris was the centre of the universe. This was an axiom of my childhood. I thought
everyone believed this. Even now, I'm surprised when others disagree.
Taylor's first interest in going to Oxford was to earn a PPE to prepare him for a
political career upon his return to Canada. His regu1lar visits to France left him with a
taste for francophone thinkers. On the continent he was to discover a ferment of
intellectual activity involving names such as Merleau-Ponty, Claude Levi-Strauss, and
Jean-Paul Sartre (Redhead 2002). Following his 1961 doctorate on a critique of
behavioural psychology (supervised by Herderian scholar Berlin), Taylor was to draw
further on Merleau-Ponty in the publication of his first book, The Explanation of
Behaviour (1964). This way the dye had been set; and all ofTaylor's future work was
to straddle the continental and analytic traditions (Smith 2004: 32).
Taylor describes himself nowadays as a social democrat; J J but perhaps he
always was one. After returning to Canada in the 1960s he ran four times
(unsuccessfully) for parliament as a candidate for the centre-left New Democratic
Party. In 1965 he famously contested in the Quebec constituency of Molint Royal
against his friend and fellow intellectual, Pierre Trudeau, who was to effectively
define Canada as prime minister. Taylor returned to Oxford in 1976 to become
Chichele professor of social and political theory - a position once held by Berlin.
Taylor came with the reputation of being a Marxist philosopher (see Taylor 1978b),
though his time there was spent reintroducing Hegel to analytic philosophy. Taylor
admits that Hegel's metaphysics may be dead, particularly in its teleological view of
nature as an expression ofspiritllal power; but he argues that Hegel's analysis of the
tensions between scientific instrumentalism and Romantic expressivism still offers a
better way of understanding the malaise of modernity that continues to infect Western
societies, cultures and philosophy today (Taylor 1985a: 77-78).12
In interviews Taylor appears more self-deprecating than views offered by his
commentators, as Mark Redhead found out. In a far more recent interview, published
10 Rogers, Ben (2008). Charles Taylor interviewed. Prospect Magazine, 143, February.
I1 Rogers, Ben (2008). Charles Taylor interviewed. Prospect Magazine, 143, February.
12 Jean Grondin (2000) characterizes continental philosophy as a self-defining invention of British
analytical philosophy, formed in the 1930s as "a welcome antidote to British idealism inspired by
Hegel's Logic" (Grondin 2000: 75).
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in Prospect Magazine (February 2008), interviewer Ben Rogers asks: "Did you come
from a family of intellectuals?"
Taylor replies: "My family was very involved in politics but there was nobody
who would have thought of themselves as an intellectual." Rogers' previous question
was: "What drew you to philosophy?"
J guess I just got angry. I studied history at McGill University, in Montreal, and then I
came to Balliol, Oxford, to do PPE and I thought it was going to be mainly politics.
But it was the fag end of a kind of post-positivist era in which -- unluckily for me --
there were two very tired dons who were fed up with the subject, and who gave
lectures sub-sub-sub-Hume in a bored tone of voice. I thought: this can't be what it's
all about, so I began to move around and get into other reading. I read Merleau-Ponty,
and I took offfrom there. It was kind of reactive.
On the neglect of the topic of Taylor's Marxism
In commentaries on Taylor it is extremely uncommon to find his core idea
traced to his early experiences and reflections in the New Left movement. Two
recently published books (Abbey 2004; Redhead 2002) give no more than a passing
mention to Taylor's early interest in Marx. Smith (2002: 180-183) pays some
attention to this aspect of Taylor, and situates it with illustrative effect in the context
ofTaylor's overall activism. Fraser (2007) thinks little of Smith's brief section, and
notes instead that apart from an observation Isaiah Berlin makes in lames Tully's
(1994) edition of essays, "there has been little written about Taylor's relationship to
Marx, Marxism and the notion ofthe self' (Fraser 2007: 2. Emphasis added). Fraser's
qualification is correct, and he does treat Taylor's ambiguous relation to Marx at book
length, though treating Taylor's work somewhat more hermeneutically than the
historical treatment I am attempting here. Paul Saurette (2004) neglects to mention
Marx at all in his review of books on Taylor (Abbey 2004; Redhead 2002; Smith
2002), despite opening his article with an observation that "Taylor shares Marx's
appreciation of the importance of questions" (2004: 723). Beyond this opening
gambit, Saurette makes no mention of Marx again. But perhaps this neglect is
intended to reflect the similar one common mainly to Mark Redhead's (2002) and
Ruth Abbey's (2004) collections of essays.
Fraser therefore notes quite correctly that "Taylor's engagement with Marx and
the Marxist tradition has been relatively neglected in the literature on his work." He
goes on to say: "Such an omission is strange, because Taylor has a long history of
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sympathy, albeit critical, with the more humanist side of Marx's and Marxists'
writings" over a thirty-year period (Fraser 2003a: 759). Fraser sets out in both his
book (2007) and his article (2003a) to correct the record; and in both publications his
treatment of 'Taylor's Marxism' remains the most exhaustive to date. Smith's (2002)
account is short on detail, but usefully divides Taylor's political career into three
stages.
The first corresponds to his involvement with the British New Left in the J950s; the
second to his activism within the Canadian New Democratic Party in the J960s; and
the third to his contribution to the debates surrounding Canada's constitutional crisis
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The chief task of TayJor's earliest political works is
to elucidate the meaning of socialism, the nature ofa socialist society, and the role of
the intellectual in achieving it (Smith 2002: J73).13
Smith does avoid stating that Taylor's thought or theory can be grouped by
these phases, but he does not actually proscribe even an implication that this might be
so. He ought to have done, as very definite strands extend over these three periods.
Smith identifies "a key element of[Taylor's] social theory: the idea that a truly
democratic socialist society arises not by way of a self-determining, unified and
homogeneous 'will of the people', but from the self-management of spontaneously
associated, heterogeneous groups" (Smith 2002: 173). Taylor explains his view in an
address to a reunion of the New Left, by pointing out how Marx's (and Marxism's)
adoption of Rousseau's model of freedom in the 'general will' made Stalinism and
other atrocities possible (Taylor 1989b: 63, 65).
The civic-humanist model derived from Tocqueville "makes us look at society
as a participatory community in which the common institutions, the common rules
and laws that give structure to the form ofthis participatory life, are seen as the
common repository of the human dignity of all the participants" (Taylor J989b: 64).
The communitarian inflection here, as I have said earlier, needs to be articulated with
the important understanding of' self-making'; an understanding he attributed directly
to Marx's in his important break with Hegel (Taylor 1968a: 155). That is:
In seeing man's nature as made, Marx is breaking with Hegel. The subject of the
Hegelian dialectic is not man, generic man, but the world spirit, that is, the spirit of
not just man, but also the universe which surrounds him. This spirit comes to
consciousness in man, and nowhere else ... but is still the spirit of more than man ....
13 There is continuity between Taylor's first and second stages of his political career. "The second
concern, which occupies Taylor throughout the 1960s, is the prospect for democracy, again understood
along socialist lines, especially in Canada" (Smith 2002: 173).
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Marx's split with Hegel here is what gives his theory its radicalism (Taylor 1968a:
155, 156).
At first sight it can seem peculiar that Fraser links Taylor's understanding of
Marx with his "the notion of the self' (Fraser 2007: 2). Fraser's book expands on an
article (Fraser 2003a) in which he considers Taylor's approach by way of key themes:
the self, the affirmation of ordinary life, democracy, ecology, and religion. But Fraser
is quite correct here, as indicated in the above quote from Taylor, and as I shaH
indicate towards the close of the next chapter, in a discussion on Taylor's reading of
Feuerbach. Fraser notes that "[o]ne ofTaylor's major criticisms of Marxism is that, if
it is to be a more relevant theory, it must say something extra about the 'personal
level' of the individual" (Fraser 2003a: 761).
Thus far I have indicated that Taylor cannot be read without keeping an eye out
for the influences of Marx, but that his most dedicated commentators have found little
or no reason to adopt this view. I want to turn towards a related neglect, where
scholars deal with subject matter to which Taylor obviously has made an authoritative
contribution. I'll discuss just one ofthese topics: the Hegelian Marx, and focus on one
scholar who inexplicably refuses to acknowledge Taylor.
Perhaps there are good reasons why scholars such as Tom Rockmore (2002) -
currently exploring much of the Hegelian territory Taylor (1975a) 14 had mapped out
decades earlier - should neglect to mention Taylor's earlier initiative in recovering
(the Hegelian) Marx from the bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism. There may be
similarly valid reasons why Rockmore fails to acknowledge any lineage between his
present aim to recover the Hegelian Marx from the post-Perestroika wreckage of
Marxism, and Taylor's earlier work in recovering Marx's humanism in a largely
Hegelian framework. IS
14 [n a review of Paul Redding's book, Hege/'s Hermeneutics (1996), Paul Franks (200 I) notes that the
book "is one ofthe most ambitious and suggestive book-length interpretations of Hegel's system since
Charles Taylor's Hegel .... Many accept Taylor's view of Hegel as a pre·Kantian metaphysician who
invokes Spirit as a divine subject actualizing itself in a history that culminates with Hegel's own
God's-eye viewpoint .... But Redding challenges Taylor's view, offering a non-metaphysical or post-
Kantian interpretation of Spirit that also moderates Hegel's apparent hubris. In particular, Redding
places distinctive emphasis on the intersubjective concept of reciprocal recognition" (Franks 200 I:
817).
15 Whether or not Fraser (2007) noticed this gap and seized it as an opportunity is hard to say; he makes
no mention of Rockmore's neglect (or resistance); nor shall 1 mention it any further. But there is one
gap that Fraser does not explore: the influence that Taylor may (or may not) have had on the nascent
field of British Cultural Studies, which started as a critique of economism in British Marxism. That is
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Nonetheless, in the introduction of his book, Rockmore presents his project as if
it were original (Rockmore 2002: x-xvii). But the absence of any substantial reference
to Taylor's work is stranger still given Rockmore's interest in Heidegger and the
German philosophical tradition. That he does mention in a begrudging endnote that
Taylor's Hegel (1975a) offers a "good account" of Romantic expressivism, and leaves
it at that, simply beggars belief (Rockmore 1980: 177). Certainly Taylor draws a
portrait of Hegel's Phenomenology using a dualism comprising 'expressivism' from
Herder, Vico and the Romantics, and 'rational autonomy' that corresponds to Kant
and the Enlightenment. It is a dualism he imports into Sources ofthe Self(l989) (see
Solomon 1985: 56, 112). But that Rockmore makes this limited gesture to Taylor in a
book on Marx, bearing chapters on the "Marxian theory of man" and "Man as an
active being", and without mentioning Taylor's earlier arguments, defies explanation.
The dismay is hard to hold back given that in Rockmore's second book, Heidegger
and French Philosophy (1995), he makes no mention ofTaylor scholarship at all,
despite their mutually impressive commitment to Heidegger and 'German philosophy'
in the continental tradition. This is the same Heidegger who, as Rockmore states more
recently, "insists on the importance of coming to grips with Hegel" (Rockmore 2001:
339).
In the previous chapter I drew attention to Redhead's comment that Taylor is no
adamant Hegelian (Redhead 2002: 83). However, I neglected there (though for good
reason), to explain how Taylor could be considered a Hegelian. This can be explained
by way of three responses that together can also provide a coherent frame through
which to read Taylor's work. I shall provide merely an outline of each. Writers readily
draw attention to Taylor's Hegelian inflections, as they do to the central influence of
Merleau-Ponty (Hewitt 2000; Pinkard 2004), but the caution they adopt to extending
that influence to Marx may reflect the greater salience afforded to the materialist
Marx of Engels and Lenin than to the Hegelian Marxism we more readily associate
with Georg Lukacs (Corredor 1997: 116; Cristi 2005: 30).16 Nonetheless, this absence
contradicts Taylor's sense of the diachronicity essential to understanding any
the topic of this chapter. Another inexplicable neglect in Fraser's book is any consideration of how
Merleau-Ponty's Marxism must have influenced Taylor.
16 Lukacs may have posed difficulties for Taylor. Eva Corredor (1997: 6) points out that he too had
published an acclaimed work on Hegel, The Young Hegel (1934), but also that "[i]n 1948 Lukacs
personaHy confronts Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and subsequently publishes a severe critique of the
French existentialists' efforts to combine Marxism and existentialism" (Corredor 1997: 6).
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philosopher's work (Taylor 1984) - an idea he says he gained from Merleau-Ponty.
"For him you could not philosophize without doing the history of philosophy and vice
versa," Taylor says in an interview (Taylor 1998: 105).17 Elsewhere he attributes this
view as "strongly articulated by Hegel" (Taylor 1984a: 17). One can take Taylor's
view as a simple didactic commentary, but it also harbours a more illuminating self-
reflective element operating at a meta-level. That is, it is entirely plausible that
Taylor's attraction to Merleau-Ponty's work lies in their mutual appropriations of
Hegel.
At the conclusion of a section of Sources (Taylor 1989a), Taylor provides a
chapter titled Digression on Historical Method, in which he discusses the "idealist
account" by which 'vulgar Marxists' have been among the most vociferous opponents
of Hegel and post-Kantian philosophy. But as if 'striking back', the kernel ofTaylor's
argument hinges on a criticism of a diachronic-causal explanation limited to "[0]ver-
simple and reductive variants of Marxism" (Taylor 1989a: 202) that provide
materialist explanations of, for instance, the industrial revolution and the rise of
capitalism. Elsewhere he describes the materialist schema as a "mechanistic
explanation" that can be traced back to seventeenth century science; and which is "at
home basically in the dualist outlook common both to Cartesian and empiricist
philosophy" (Taylor 1993a: 72).
For Hegel, who like Aristotle before and Marx after him, sees an indissoluble link
between economics and ethics, political economy concerns the fulfillment of human
needs. Hegel, who is a political realist, is under no illusions about the effect of modem
society on individuals. Although he has little tolerance for the modem failure to
remedy endemic poverty and other similar difficulties, he is not mainly concerned
with providing an accurate formulation of the foundations of political economy
(Rockmore 2002: 27).
An alternative, interpretive and anti-dualistic explanation might be considered
"idealist", he explains "ifthe underlying thesis were that somehow an interpretive
study of idees-forces was sufficient to answer the diachronic-causal question" (Taylor
1989a 204). Such a position, were it to exist, could be called "vulgar Hegelianism".
But the Hegelian explanation Taylor accepts as the authentic one reaches back to
Aristotle's refusal to separate form from matter. Hegel's position emerges in a climate
in which qualitative conceptions were in the ascendency against Cartesian and
empiricist views. However, Hegel's philosophy was not a simple opposition to
17 See Merleau-Ponty (I 962: xvi) and Taylor (1959a: 103).
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Cartesianism, but entailed a recovery of the subject and a rehabilitation of the
Aristotelian inseparability doctrine (Taylor 1993a: 73). This was an extremely
important discovery for Taylor, and he applies it to good effect in his critique of
epistemology. For example, Taylor uses the distinction such that the 'mechanistic'
explains behaviour, and that the Hegelian conception 'explains' action (Taylor 1964;
1993a).
The confusion arises because reductive Marxism seems to want to allow no causal
role at all to idees-forces, which is the equal and opposite absurdity to "idealism"; and
worse, this kind of Marxism has trouble recognizing that there is a third possibility
between these extremes. But in this middle ground lies all adequate historical
explanation. One has to understand people's self-interpretations and their visions of
the good, if one is to explain how they arise; but the second task cannot be collapsed
into the first, even as the first cannot be elided in favour of the second (Taylor 1989a
204).
The second response directly concerns a query about popular interpretations of
Marx and his apparent rejection of HegeJ. The commonly-held belief is that Marx
turned Hegel 'on his head' - an interpretation based upon a famous remark Marx
makes in the German edition of Capitat 8 (see Cristi 2005: 152; Fine 200 I: 62, 69,
80). I do not wish to dispute this remark, but to briefly point out an observation Tom
Rockmore (2002: 15-16) makes about the controversial relation of Marx to Hegel; and
then just as briefly to indicate how Taylor's conception of ' social imaginaries' -
which are not sets of ideas, but "what enables, through making sense of, the practices
of society" (Taylor 2004: 2) - draws principally from his reading of Hegel.
Furthermore, we can come to see how Taylor's philosophical anthropology is
grounded in a 'Hegelian Marx' .)9
18 "My own dialectical method is not only fundamentally different from the Hegelian, but is its direct
opposite. For Hegel the thought process, which he even transforms into an independent subject under
the name of "idea", is the demiurge of the actual; the actual forms only its outer appearance. For me, on
the contrary, the ideal is only the material when it is transposed and translated inside the human
head .... In Hegel, the dialectic is standing on its head. One must turn it the right way up (umsliilpen) in
order to disclose the rational kernel in the mystical covering" (Das Kapilal, Preface to 2nd edition of
1872 (Paul and Paul, 1930, vol. 11, p. 873».
19 Philosophical anthropology can be defmed an "an area of thought about the nature of man and the
nature of knowing" about man (Holbrook 1987: 13). The central point of this interrogation deals with
the embracing question about the particular being of human beings. lts purpose "is to render an account
and clarifY human existence as we objectively observe it and as we subjectively experience it in our
own life-world" (Vergote 1996: 25). The field has strong roots in German idealism, most strongly
articulated more recently in the philosophy of Max Scheler and contemporary Thomists (Copelston
1963: 435), but extends back to the left wing of the Young Hegelians, to which Ludwig Feuerbach,
Karl Marx, Bmno Bauer and others who made a virtue out of setting Hegel on his feet (Copelston
1963: 294-95).
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Rockmore (2002: 15) draws a distinction between the 'idealist' Marx of the
young Hegelians, and the 'materialist' Marx as interpreted through the lens of
Frederick Engels (and later, Lenin). Rockmore points out Engels's own ambivalence
as to whether Marx effected a 'break' with Hegel, or remained a Hegelian though
embracing the mechanistic-causal explanations of seventeenth century science which
Hegel included only as an element in his dialectic (the term made current by Johann
Fichte - a founding figure of German idealism - but Hege1 using the term Aujhebung,
that is, "sublimation" or "overcoming" (Solomon 1985: 311, 589). The difference can
be crudely put as a Hegelian Marx formerly accepting an 'idea-materialist' dialectic,
and after his 'break' with Hegel positing a historical materialist dialectic. But
Rockmore shows the difficulty of separating Engels from Marx in this later formation,
and that Marxist scholars (following Lenin's earlier rejection of Hegel, but ignoring
his later more nuanced position)
... tend to follow Engels's more schematic, negative view of the great idealist
philosopher as someone needing to be overcome .... Since Engels, generations of
Marxists have approached Marx's position as the inversion of Hegel's. Anglo-
American analytic philosophy, which arose out of the revolt against British idealism,
and has traditionally been skeptical about Hegel, usually approaches Marx without
consideration, or without adequate consideration, of Hegel. Even Lukacs, whose very
nuanced treatment of Hegel is the main source of what is called Hegelian Marxism,
continues to insist on a difference in kind between Marxism and Hegel (Rockmore
2002: 15-16).
Taylor's New Left activism
I have ended the above section with a somewhat more synchronic description20
ofTaylor's humanist approach to Marx, but in order to appreciate it correctly, it is
necessary to explore what motivated Taylor to move in this direction, and even to
consider whether any personal values, prior knowledge, or contingencies of his
context ameliorated or inhibited his motivation. We need to begin with Taylor's
postgraduate student career at Oxford in 1956. To get the chronology right, Taylor
had completed an undergraduate degree in history at McGill in Montreal in 1952, then
went to Oxford (at Balli01 College) on a Rhodes Scholarship. He completed a
Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy, politics and economics in 1955; went on to do
20 I have neglected to provide a similar discussion of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, but do so at the
beginning of the next chapter for reasons that should become clear then. There I introduce the
philosopher by way of a discussion about how French structuralism may have been introduced to
British Cultural Studies. But to reach there, I need to start with a question of why Taylor got involved
in Left politics in the first place.
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research for a Master of Arts degree, which he completed in 1960. He received a
doctorate the following year, and returned to McGill in Canada.
Taylor could not have gone to the famous university town at a more momentous
time. He began his postgraduate studies in 1956, the annas horribilis of communist
parties in Europe, ifnot worldwide. Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev had delivered his
'secret speech' indicting Stalin's personality cult. Workers in Hungary began
organizing, leading to the Soviets crushing the rebellion with a symbolic effect that
caused Communists abroad to abandon party structures to weaker-minded members
with neither the intellect nor the good sense to understand what had happened. During
the spring days of Budapest, and before the Soviet invasion, Egypt's Gamal Nasser
saw an opportunity to nationalise the Suez Canal to settle long-standing tensions with
Britain, prompting an ill-conceived Anglo-French attack to secure the canal. The
Egyptians were quickJy overwhelmed; but without United States support, the
humiliating Anglo-French withdrawal "signaled the end of any residual [British]
capacity to act independently of Washington" (Milner 2002: 51). Such was the
context against which, and the motive forces by Which, the British New Left was
formed: "by the collision and fusion of the two world-wide shock waves of Suez and
Hungary" (Widgery 1976: 25)?1
The New Left was formed as a response to the deepening crisis facing socialists,
communists and other leftwing activists. When Khruschev addressed the twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, he spoke of the
Stalinist purges that had been an integral feature of communist rule. The shock was
profound, though for many communists it did not come as a surprise. The system,
which had appeared to offer Eastern Europeans a radical alternative to Capitalism, had
instead been an instrument of repression and terror (Davis 2004: 8).
Such is an aspect of the background to the beginning ofTaylor's postgraduate
period at Oxford. It was the same year Stuart Hall says Taylor "went off [in the
summer of 1956] to Paris to work with Merleau-Ponty" (in Inglis 1993: 154). But
there are few clues why Taylor should have been attracted to the politics of the Left,
and not opted instead for the quieter sedentary life of a student. Taylor does give a
clue in an interview cited earlier: he "just got angry" with the post-positivist academic
21 Hellen Davis (2004: 7-8) describes these events as having a profound effect on Stuart Hall. It gave
new urgency to debates around imperialism and Stalinism. "The enormity of the situation could not go
unacknowledged. It now became imperative for Hall and his peers to fmd a way of mounting an
oppositional stance" (Davis 2004: 7).
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fare on offer, he says, "so I began to move around and get into other reading.,,22 But
simply 'getting angry' seems to be an implausible reason to read Marx.
Taylor had gone to Oxford with the express intention of reading politics and
entering into a political career in Canada. But he was at Oxford from the mid-1950s;
and this fact is significant. Taylor says little about his time there, though one further
comment does reveal something about the quality of his 'moving around'. In 1957
(two years after completing his PPE, and before completing his MA in 1960)
phi losopher of language John L. Austin - famous for his speech act theory and
president of the Aristotelian Society to which Taylor belonged - asked Taylor to
explain Merleau-Ponty at a seminar:
Austin had broader views, French philosophy interested him. I remember his
fascination with Merleau-Ponty at the Royaumont conference in 1957. On his return
to Oxford, he invited me to present Merleau-Ponty's philosophy at his seminar. I
began to expound on the Phenomenology ofPerception but he stopped me at the first
sentence with 'What does it mean'? He was not prepared to enter into a different
philosophical style (Tay[or 1998: 104).
Austin's work veered closely to Wittgenstein's; though he denied Wittgenstein
had influenced his work. Taylor had a different attitude. He says he "was very
fortunate to be a pupil of[Wittgensteinian scholar] Elizabeth Anscombe, who was at
Oxford at the time" (Taylor 1998: 104-105). It is worth quoting at length what Taylor
says next because it connects a number of pieces I consider here and in the next few
chapters:
Oxford's good side was the freedom and liveliness of the discussions in the seminars
of these great individuals. At the time, Anscombe was developing her book on
intentionality, Intention, and this philosophy of practical rationality, inspired by
Aristotle and Wittgenstein, taught me a lot. Two paths thus opened up for me to
escape from the empiricist yoke, and I tried to combine them by elaborating my
problematic of philosophical anthropology. My first book was influenced as much by
Wittgenstein as by Merleau-Ponty. There was actually an important convergence
between Wittgenstein and certain themes of the Phenomenology ofPerception. When
Anscombe said about intentionality that 'we have a terribly abstract view of these
questions', she was criticizing empiricist anthropology (Taylor 1998: 105).
As Taylor says, that was Oxford "at the time". But universities also have
institutional memory; and perhaps Oxford has more than most. Part of the institutional
memory there was the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, which captured the
imagination of intellectuals who were idealistically drawn to the heroism of taking up
arms in defense of the conflict between a democratically-elected Republican
22 Rogers, Ben (2008). Charles Taylor interviewed. Prospect Magazine, 143, February.
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government against the Fascist insurgency led by General Francisco Franco.23 Many
British communists, anarchists and others in the British Left joined the International
Brigades to support the Republic; and a high proportion ofthem died there (see
Samuel 1989: 45-46; Dworkin 1997: 11-13; Graves and Hodges 1940: Ch. 20).24
Spain was one memory the New Left would have been unable to avoid, given
that their meeting premises was the moribund Socialist Club, which had not seen
much activity since the late 1930s (Hall 1989: 20).25 But the disillusionment of Spain
put no end to student Marxism. Dennis Dworkin notes that Oxford and Cambridge
students of the 1930s were instrumental during the immediate post-war period in
promoting Marxist historical scholarship (Dworkin 1997: 10-11, 15-25). As an
undergraduate history major at McGill, Taylor (1966a: 227-231) would
understandably have taken note of this legacy. He also indicates in Marxism and
Empiricism (Taylor I966a) his having considered Neal Wood's book, Communism
and British Intellectuals (1959). What he found in its pages may have led him to see
himself at Balliol as an heir to that radical tradition (Wood 1959: 76, 85)?6
Nonetheless, he also noticed that Oxford's Marxist tradition was an island in the
empiricist sea of British intellectuallife.27 As Wood writes:
23 Poets such as WH Auden, Stephen Spender and, most famously, writers like George Orwell and
Ernest Hemingway wrote hopefully of the fighting and the brave determination of the ordinary people
involved. This literary legacy has ensured a continuing fascination with the civil war, which took place
between 1936 and 1939.
24 Somewhat fewer than 50 000 foreigners fought in Spain, including over 40 000 in the International
Brigade, which never consisted, however, of more than 15 000 at anyone time. British volunteers in
Spain totaled 2762. Their casualties were exceptionally high: 1762 wounded and 543 killed. About
one-half of those killed were members of the Communist Party of Great Britain or the Young
Communist League. It is difficult to estimate the number of British intellectuals who participated in the
fighting, drove ambUlances, or otherwise assisted at the front._The most widely known communist
intellectuals were John Cornford, son of Francis MacDonald Cornford, the Cambridge classicist, and
Frances Cornford, the poet; David Guest, son of the future Labour peer, Lord Haden-Guest;
Christopher Caudwell, a brilliant young Marxist critic and poet; and Ralph Fox, the novelist and critic.
All four died on the battlefield. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the non-communists in Spain was the
death of the young poet Juli'an Bell, son of Clive and Vanessa Bell. Those who survived included
Auden; the novelist, Ralph Bates; the journalist, Claude Cockburn; George Orwell; Wogan Philipps,
the painter; and Esmond and Giles Romilly, nephews of Sir Winston Churchill. Spain was the first and
last crusade of the British left-wing intellectual. Never again was such enthusiasm mobilized, nor did
there exist such a firm conviction in the rightness of a cause. Disillusion had not yet sapped the
idealism of the young (Wood 1959: 56-57).
2S Stuart Hall's (1958c: 14-15) brief discussion of working class literature includes references to
George OrweWs Homage 10 Cale/onia and the related work on the Spanish Civil War, which may
indicate the salience of the conflagration to their circle.
26 Neil Wood was an American who read for his Ph.D. at Cambridge University from 1955 to 1957.
The book is derived from his thesis.
27 "Not only has Marxism been a minority phenomenon in working class movements, and even in
working class socialist movements, but Marxism as an intellectual tradition has had very little
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The radical movement was concentrated almost entirely in London, Oxford and
Cambridge - where the children of the leisure-classes were educated. The majority of
the left-wing activities were to be found among the students of the arts and certain of
the sciences, particularly biology and physics. Very few ofthose studying for the
professions of law, medicine, and engineering seemed to be inclined in this direction.
FinaUy, only a small proportion of the radical activists were members of the
Communist Party; perhaps no more than one thousand at anyone time. Most of these
probably drifted out of the Communist Party after a very short period. Student
communism, in addition to being fashionable, served the useful purpose of arousing
the political and social sensibilities of numerous alert and intelligent youths (Wood
1959: 53).
It may be safe to say that, for Taylor as a young Rhodes scholar, Oxford's
legacies would have informed his sense of 'being there'. Taylor does draw links
between Spain and the decline of Marxism in Britain, and it is a question he considers
particularly in relation to his opposition to empiricism (Taylor 1966a: 228-229).28
Here he links 'anti-Marxism' with the empiricist and post-positivist analytical
tradition that 'got him angry', and which he saw as emanating from the seventeenth
century scientific revolution of the Enlightenment (Taylor 1966a: 234). But whether
or not Taylor actually embraced Marxist pra;r:is as an end in itself, or simply used it as
a vehicle against empiricism, his essay Marxism and Empiricism (1966), published
only a few years after his return to Canada, gives no clear indication. But one man's
quest against empiricist and post-positivist social science would hardly provide the
impetus for an entire movement; even if it coloured Taylor's approach to Marx. Stuart
Hall (1989) ponders why the movement should have started at Oxford, and not
elsewhere (Neil Wood (1959: 77) describes the movement as not actually having
started there as much as been resuscitated). Nevertheless:
How and why did this happen then - and why, of all places, partly in Oxford? In the
1950s universities were not, as they later became, centres of revolutionary activity. A
minority of privileged left-wing students, debating consumer capitalism and the
embourgeoisement of working class culture amidst the 'dreaming spires', may seem,
in retrospect, a pretty marginal political phenomenon. Nevertheless, the debate was
joined with a fierce intensity, self-consciously counterposed to the brittle, casual self-
confidence of Oxford's dominant tone (Hall 1989: 18).
Hall provides a partial answer as to why the movement began there and not
elsewhere. Balliol already had various shades of 'leftists', and he starts with "the great
importance on the British Scene. This is all the more true if one restricts one's purview to the academic
scene" (Tay lor 1966a: 227).
28 There seem to be no good reasons to discount Taylor's interest in (British) Marxism as merely
emanating from an impulse to engage with fashionable issues and debates of the day. But while there is
no mistaking Taylor's impatience with the (albeit worried) apologetic genuflections those on the Left
made towards all-things"Soviet, it would be mistaken to think Taylor's inspiration came from equally
doctrinaire sources.
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body of' Labour Club' supporters, the majority firmly attached to Fabian, Labourist
and reformist positions, and a few with their eyes fixed unswervingly on their coming
parliamentary careers" (Hall 1989: 19). But although Taylor too had similar
parliamentary ambitions, Hall does not include him in this group - possibly because
they represented most of what the New Left opposed. "The Oxford left was very
diverse," he writes, naming a few members of the "small number ofCP members ...
mainly in Balliol, where Christopher Hi 1129 was the tutor in modern history" (Hall
1989: 19). Another group whom Hall calls the "Balliol Reds" were embattled by early
Cold War suspicions, and propounded their views at a time "when Communists were
forbidden to take part in any Labour Party activity" (Hall 1989: 19).
Finally there were a small number of 'independents', including some serious Labour
people, intellectually aligned with neither of those two camps, who shuttled somewhat
uneasily between them. The latter group attracted more than its fair share of exiles and
migrants, which reinforced its cosmopolitanism (Hall 1989: 19).
Hall then names a few prominent foreigners. He recalls meeting "Chuck
Taylor" as "a French-Canadian Rhodes scholar (as well as that even more perplexing
phenomenon, a sort of Catholic Marxist)" (Hall 1989: 19). Taylor was no stranger to
Hall; and we can surmise from Fred Inglis's description that the two had conversed at
a high level. The Jamaican Rhodes Scholar had come to Oxford in 1951, having read
Marx's Capital (Chen 1996: 487), but his socialist education was not to end there.
Like Taylor, Hall's entrance into British leftist politics began when he received a
second scholarship and decided to stay on at Oxford. It was at this time that he met
Taylor, who taught him about Hegel and the humanist side of Marx (lnglis 1993:
I 54)?O In an interview with Kuan-Hsing Chan, Hall (1 996a: 497) recalls (after
considering the 'older generation of Raymond Williams) Taylor's influence on him:
29 Christopher Hill (1958) was the first to review the English translation of Antonio Gramsci's, The
Modern Prince and Other Writings (1957). As Taylor had read history at McGill before going to
Oxford, it is entirely likely that he would have found much reason to engage in conversation with the
famous Oxford historian. An editor note in the first edition of Universities and Left Review has the
following:
"CHARLES TAYLOR, 27, Canadian Rhodes Scholar, graduated with Firsts in History (McGill
University) and Politics, Philosophy and Economics (Balliol College, Oxford); John Locke Prize in
philosophy, Oxford 1956; completed a thesis on the theory of alienation, from Hegel to the
Existentialists; Elected Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, 1956."
30 Fred 1nglis (1993) writes: "At the same moment, four exceedingly bright young leftists linked up at
Oxford, and set themselves to found a rather different kind of political mag. Stuart Hall ... joined AI
Alvarez' and Graham Martin's Critical Society, the first group ever to invite Leavis to Oxford, and he
was taught by Bateson. He palled up with a Scotsman reading Classical Greats from Keele, another
Hall called Alan, as well as with an enormously tall, craggy, friendly, antic kind of Canadian Christian-
Marxist called Charles Taylor who always repudiated the more concrete-headed Marxists, and taught
140
Then there was the younger generation, Charles Taylor, myself, Raphael Samuel.
Raphael was the dynamo and inspiration, absolutely indispensable, full of ideas.... By
1958 ... Charles TayJor had already gone to Paris to study with Merleau-Ponty.
Charles was very important to me, personally. ] remember the first discussions of
Marx's 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which he brought back from
Paris, and the discussions about alienation, humanism and class (Hall 1996a: 497).
Hall suggests that this 'learning' took place in the context of a wider forum of
political activism when he says elsewhere that the "locus of our debate was the
Socialist Club, a moribund organization left more or less abandoned since its thirties
'Popular Front' days, which we resuscitated" (Hall 1989: 20). However, it does seem
that discussion between the two was not limited to the anonymous mediations of a
crowd. The new grouping launched its journal, Universities and Left Review (ULR),
whose first editors included Hall and Taylor (Hall 1989: 20). Hall recounts the events
then, which Fred Inglis (1993: 154) quotes at length:
We appointed ourselves keepers of the Left conscience. There was Chuck Taylor;
Raphael, Graham Martin and Gabriel Pearson then still CP, Alan and me. To begin
with, Alan and I resurrected the SociaJ,ist Society in Oxford, which had been going
strong in the 1930s. We found it still had a bank account with a decent credit; some of
the Old Left had kept their subscriptions going!
At the end of the summer of 1956 Chuck went off to Paris to work with Merleau-
Ponty and I went to London to teach English in a Secondary Modern school near the
Oval, as well as some extra-mural classes down at Bexleyheath. We had set up
Universities and Left Review just before then. [The grandly stylish title indicated the
University origin of its editors and their hoped-for link with the pre-war Left Review]
(sic.) We had no money for U and LR, but the first issue sold 8,000 [three times as
many as New Reasoner] (sic.). There was obviously something on the move out there.
We first met in Chuck's room in All Souls. We were full of barmy schemes; Ralph
and I were raising money to fly Sartre to England at the height of the Algerian crisis.
It would have been quite easy.
Positions taken in the New Left movement were expressively accomplished as
much in conversation as they were through debate in their articles in the forum
constituted by their journals. ULR co-editor Ralph (Raphael) Samuel3 ! (1989)
describes the "new frontiers" they were exploring. "We championed sociology as a
new learning which would introduce the breath of life into the universities and make
traditional subjects more 'relevant'" (Samuel 1989: 42). The sociological attraction
Stuart Hall the humanist side of the prophet, and about Hegel. They heard Christopher Hill lecture on
the class-revolutionary meaning of the English Civil War, where they were joined by a nomad from the
London School of Economics, Raphael -- known as Ralph - Samuel, child of an ardently Jewish-
communist family" (IngJis 1993: 154).
31 In the list of editors found in the first edition ofULR, Samuel's first name is given as Ralph. But in
Qut ofApathy (1989) it is given as Raphael.
141
may well have come from reading C. Wright Mills; but reading the following as (at
least partly) Taylor's (1958a) lead ,is hard to dismiss:
In philosophy we argued for a more phenomenological understanding of reality,
contrasting the urgencies of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre with the frivolities of Oxford
philosophy .... A later discovery, which can be dated fairly precisely to the summer of
1957, was alienation theory and the young Marx. It gave us a 'humanist' Marx - the
Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 - to counterpose to the
'determinist' Marx of later years. This early Marx was in some sense, so far as Britain
was concerned, our very own, since the Manuscripts were not translated into English
until 1960 .... 'If there is one word which the Labour Party lacks,' wrote Perry
Anderson - anticipating, as an undergraduate, one of the themes he was later to
develop as editor of New Left Review - 'it is alienation.' (Samuel 1989: 42, 43).
The year after Samuel says the Manuscripts - translated by Taylor (Dworkin
1997: 62i2 - were made avai lable to their group, Taylor and Michael Kullman33
published an article in The Review ofMetaphysics explaining Merleau-Ponty's
concept of the "pre-objective world" (Kullman and Taylor 1958). Two years later,
Taylor published an article with the rationalist philosopher Alfred Jules Ayer,
Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis (1959) - the same year Taylor published
Ontology (1959).34
Samuel notes that the "ULR had presented itselffrom the first as a movement of
young people and offered itself as a forum where 'the generation of the thirties' and
the 'generation of the fifties' could meet" (Samuel 1989: 45). Helen Davis (2004: 8)
describes the journal as "energetic and eclectic, pulling together both new and
established writers and commentators," though its intention to "adopt and adapt new
and existing models in order to explore socialism's relation to contemporary culture"
earned the suspicion of Edward Thompson, whose rival journal, The New Reasoner,
32 Stuart Hall (I958d: 27) refers to "Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and the German
Ideology," from which he quotes, then provides a reference to Timothy Bottomore and Maximilian
Rube!. A closer inspection finds that this translation was first published in 1956, thus calling both
Dworkins's and Samuel's claim about Taylor's having translated the Manuscripts into question.
33 As far as I have been able to ascertain, Michael Kullman's interest was architecture or art history. A
note in ULR says he was 26 years old in 1958, and "graduated with a first in PPE at Balliol College.
Now researching at St. Anthony's College, Oxford." There was a Micbael Kullman in charge of
General Studies at the Royal College of Art from about 1959 onwards.
34 The Ayer article was not co-authored as such, but presented a paper by Taylor, followed by another
respond,ing to Taylor. 1I mention these additional articles not so as to announce their explanation. This I
shall attempt in the next chapter. Here I intend only to indicate that discussions of Merleau-Ponty were
integral to ULR debate. Taylor's culturalist motives seem less than opaque: he would take on board
Merleau-Ponty's intentionality thesis to draw on its attempt to capture the essential structure of lived
experience. He would find benefit also in Merleau-Ponty's proposition to correct the classical accounts
of perception found in empiricism and Kantianism. Against empiricism, Taylor would settle accounts
with positivism, and thereby build his approach to social science. His score with Kantianism would
prove more difficult. Nonetheless, it is ,in Merleau-Ponty that he manages to combine these, as I show
at the end of the next chapter.
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founded by Edward and Dorothy Thompson and John Saville in April 1957 after both
had resigned from the Communist Party?5 New Reasoner "was the product of a
humanist, oppositional tradition in the Communist Party of Great Britain" (Davies
1993: 118), and sought to make the existing historical materialist model 'more
ethical' (Davis 2004: 8-9; Wood 1959: 200-201). The journal had Alasdair
MacIntyre36 and Raymond Williams on its editorial board. The VLR was established
the year before, in 1956, but its first edition coincided with New Reasoner 'so While it
was a shared stage upon which these journals played, their respective casts were of
different generations: one of the thirties and the other of the fifties (Samuels 1989:
45). It was not uncommon, however, for members of one generation to publish in the
journal of the other.
For various reasons (mostly financial), the two journals merged at the end of
1959 to become New Left Review (Hall 1989: 22-24). But until then, Taylor
committed himself to writing and editing VLR, and in his first article he quotes with
qualified approval Thompson's criticism of ('organic') intellectuals in the Communist
Party for their acquiescence in the Stalinist show trials. He then goes on to place a
premium on the morality of intellectual leadership. Whether or not this quality was a
reflexive one - Hall refers to the student left's '''moral seriousness', as contrasted
with "Oxford's willed triviality" (Hall 1989: 18-19) - one cannot say.
Taylor and his colleagues certainly did make their voices heard in relation to
their more experienced partners. And although the incisive quality ofTaylor's
intervention in debate is surprising for its erudition and clarity, it would be wrong to
assume the he worked out his position' all on his own'. The context in which he and
35 "Its editorial board included the novelists Doris Lessing and Mervyn Jones, the anthropologist Peter
Worsley, the tough South African revolutionary John Rex, Randall Swingler, a well-known journalist
and a dashing kind of nomadic chieftain of the Left in a mode now largely disappeared from British
life; its intellectual orientation was towards the sort of economic history advocated by the doughty
Communist Historians Group, Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Victor Kiernan, Rodney Hilton" (Inglis
1993: 153).
36 Maclntyre confronted Stalinists and humanists alike in a two-part essay written for The New
Reasoner in 1958, entitled Notesfrom the Moral Wilderness. He criticised humanists for advocating
the autonomy of moral principle - a position he later came to condemn as 'emotivism' (Maclntyre
1984), which Taylor describes as seeing "value statements as expressions of our emotional reactions to
certain objects" (Taylor 2003: 305). Maclntyre's 1958 argument was that by cutting moral judgement
offfrom the domains of history, anthropology and so on, the critic has no grounds but unintelligible,
arbitrary choice upon which to base his judgements (Maclntyre 1958: 124). Hence, the humanist strips
criticism of its authority. The Stalinist critic dismisses morality as merely epiphenomenal. The result is
the same.
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his fellow activist-intellectuals worked was both collegial and dialogical.37 The centre
of their collegiality was the New Left Clubs - membership of which "was academic-
students and teachers, for sure, and pretty few workers" (Inglis 1998: 166).38 But
more significantly, it was in the two journals that dialogue was made actual.
Davis (2004: 9-18) describes the life of the new movement around the clubs
once they had shifted to London, and to which Hall gave his energies. The shift
towards the imperative of culture seems entirely logical, given the new environs;
though it did create tensions within the New Left. "Hall [was] looking directly at post-
war culture and situating his analysis on the edge of contemporary Marxist theory ...
looking to a revision and reconstruction of a contemporary social ism fit for the
present, rather than trying to resurrect a more benign version of communism" (Davis
2004: 16). British working class culture was, as the title of Hall's 1958 article in VLR
suggests, in the throws of "a sense of c1asslessness." The Labour Party in particular,
and the Left in general, was in crisis. Labour's welfarism amounted to an
endorsement of new consumer culture.
It was also not long before Hall and his colleagues turned their attention to the
political role of the mass media (Dav1is 2004: 17-18). In the fifth issue of VLR, Taylor
and his fellow co-editors in 1958 express their good fortune in having contributions
from both Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams: "two people who have
influenced our ideas [on the mass media] most deeply." The writers provide substance
to that influence, indicating traces of the 'mass society' debate:
This controversy, however, has taken shape through discussions which we have had,
both at ULR Club meetings and in the group which worked at the exhibition for the
Labour Party Conference on The Mass Persuaders. What concerns us here is not the
more blatant vices of the new media, but their deeper and more subtle effects upon
attitudes and values. We are concerned about the persuasive and manipulative effects
of these new forms of communication, about the whole idea of a "mass society" itself
- and about the many ways in which people are encouraged to see themselves as "the
masses," and sometimes accept and participate in their own exploitation39
37 I am making this claim on the basis of the first editorial of Universities and Left Review; when in
1957, editors Taylor, Hall, Gabriel Pearson and Ralph Samuel wrote for the benefit of their audience:
"We hope that these people will become our regular readers, contributors, and financial supporters, that
if in the London Area, they will try to take part in the Left Review Club, and that they will give us that
active support and assistance without which every part-time journal must collapse."
38 The role of the Left Clubs is a topic I have not considered sufficiently. For thorough and amusing
discussions, see Hall (1989) and loan Davies (1993).
39 Universities and Left Review, issue 5, Autumn 1958, page 3. In the same edition appear three articles
on the 'mass media'. R,ichard Hoggart's paper, BBC and ITV After Three Years, and Raymond
Williams's The Press the People Want, are preceded by Stuart Hall's paper, A Sense ofClasslessness,
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On Taylor's rejection of orthodox Marxism
While members of the New Left were 'interested' in Marxism - Pearson and
Samuel and came from staunchly Jewish Marxist fami lies (Chen 1996: 492; Davies
1993: 118) - they kept their distance from the 'Old Left' represented by both the
Communist Party and the Labour Party; the first for its Stalinism and ambiguous
response to the Hungarian crisis (Wood 1959: 200), and the second for its reformist
welfarist policies (Davies 1993: 117. The ULR "therefore played at the edge of
Marxist theory, releasing it from the "reductionism and economism of the base-
superstructure metaphor" (Hall 1989: 25).
So far I have indicated though given little substance to Taylor contributions
towards debate in the New Left. In all, and possibly at the risk of putting it too
simplistically, Taylor generally accepts Marx's critique of capitalism but rejects
(orthodox) Marxism as an explanatory and political framework. In the second issue of
New Reasoner, for instance, Taylor offers qualified support for Thompson's criticism
of Stalinism as a deviation from Marx; that is, "as an incomplete, partisan, distorted
view of reality" (Taylor 1957d: 92).
In the search for a new definition of humanism, Edward Thompson takes his stand as
a Marxist Communist, and, by exposing the full humanist context of this tradition,
gives a definite answer to the facile view which would assimilate Marxist values to
the more hideous aspects of Soviet practice of the last decades .... But the question of
Socialist Humanism is of too great importance for us to leave any facet of the problem
unexamined. And there is one major question that seems to arise from Thompson's
article, where I can't help finding myself in disagreement with him. The question can
be put in the following way: If the practice known as Stalinism is not in the true
Marxist tradition, and if therefore the assimilation Communism-Stalinism is false, can
we go to the other extreme and brand Stalinism as a pure deviation from Communist
practice? (Taylor 1957d: 92).
Taylor's opinion, given at the close of his article, is that "Marxist communism is
at best an incomplete humanism," and that "humanism without the contribution of
Marx is abstract and cannot come to grips with the modern world" (Taylor I957d:
98). This is a view Taylor has held without alteration. In an interview with Taylor
in which he presents a class analysis of an increasingly affluent British working class. He ends his
paper with direct reference to Hoggart's and Williams's papers. "[T]he sense of classlessness, which
can only be engendered by a persuasive formula, must exist before people will accept their own
cultural and economic exploitation. They have to be made accessories after the fact. This is the context
in which we should understand the discussion about 'the mass media', about advertising and culture.
Every form of communication which is concerned with altering attitudes, which changes or confirms
opinions, which instils new images of the self, is playing its part. They are not peripheral to the
'economic base: they are part of it" (Hall 1958a: 31).
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(1978) soon after he returned to Oxford in 1976 as Chichele professor of politics,
Bryan Magee opens the discussion with a description of orthodox Marxism's
contribution to modem philosophy.4o "It's absolutely right, as far as it goes," Taylor
says of Magee's introduction. "It gives a good picture of Marxism as an explanatory
theory" (Taylor 1978b: 45). Then Taylor turns to an aspect of Marx unfamiliar to
those accustomed to the Marxist tradition in Britain:
But there's also another dimension: Marxism as a theory of liberation, which I think
accounts for the immense importance and excitement that this theory has generated in
the last century. You can start an account of that from the same point. It is that human
beings are what they are because of the way they produce the means to live, and they
produce the means to live as a society, not individually. So in a way we can look at
man just as another gregarious animal, like ants or bees. But what differentiates men
from ants and bees, Marx holds, is that human beings have the capacity to reflect on,
and change, the way they work on Nature to produce the means to life (Taylor 1978b:
45).
His call is to take account ofthe "inadequacies of Marxism" as it had evolved as
a political programme, and to peel away those layers so as to reach Marx the critic of
modernity. In this respect Taylor would have approved of Tom Rockmore's (2002)
recent call to distinguish "between Marx and Marxism," had it been published then; as
he certainly would of Rockmore's argument that in order to 'recover' Marx it is
necessary to do so through Hegel (Rockmore 2002: 15-21). When Taylor returned to
Oxford he had already published Hegel (l995a), and turned his efforts to
reintroducing to philosophy in Britian one who was largely ignored, particularly since
empiricism had taken hold there in the early twentieth century. Taylor's project was
an interest he had voiced a decade earlier:
In the 1930s and 1940s [Hegelianism] was entirely swept aside by the loose-knit trend
of thought known as linguistic analysis. This represented a return to an indigenous
philosophical tradition, and a return which was also a reaction against Hegelianism.
Bri,tish philosophy since has tended not just to be non-Hegelian but to be anti-
Hegel,ian. The form of its though is such that it tends to find the whole language of
Hegelianism meaningless, and therefore to find meaningless the language of Marxism
as well. In this reaction against Hegelianism ... we can find the obstacles to an easy
acceptance of Marxism on to British intellectual soil (Taylor 1966a: 230-231).
In general, Taylor and his colleagues identified Marxism as fettered by the
infrastructure-superstructure model upon which the philosophy was built; but more
specifically, they brought to the question a humanist socialism that orthodox Marxism
had long dismissed as 'idealist' and 'Hegelian'. There is strong evidence that Taylor
40 Taylor did, after all, return to his alma mater with an enormous reputation of being a 'Marxist
philosopher'; as the tone of Magee's introduction reveals.
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was instrumental in at least assisting his colleagues in this Hegelian direction. I say
'assisting' because, although Taylor did produce the translation of Marx's Paris
Manuscripts for the benefit of his circle, there is also a sense that a parallel Hegelian
influence came through reading Lukacs. Raymond Williams makes mention of how,
in the "mid-fifties", he "found also, and crucially, Marxist thinking that was different,
in some respects radically different, from what I and most people knew as Marxism
(Williams 1977: 2, 3).
Taylor's writings between 1957 and 1960 aimed "to contribute towards a
retrieval and renewal of socialist politics" (Smith 2002: 173). Like other contributors
to VLR and The New Reasoner, Taylor rejected the alternatives on offer: Labour Party
welfarism and Communist Party Marxist economism. The orthodox interpretation of
the model ascribed to the economic infrastructure a mechanistic determination that
made agency and human behaviour, located in the superstructure, difficult to imagine
beyond tenets of passive determinations. These difficulties in imagination were
compounded by a situation where the 'party line' was one frozen in a perpetual
genuflection towards Moscow. 'Marxism' was significantly determined by that
orientation; but was distinguished from what Edward Thompson considered to be
truer to communism than what Stalinism had engendered.41
It would be wrong to think Taylor to have been aloof to labour politics in
Britain; or to have satisfied himself merely with theoretical issues in Marxism. His
contributions to the issue that generally goes under the label 'welfarism' indicates
otherwise. Here he engages with Thompson in the "Clause 4 debate" in the 1960s
(Taylor 1960b: 3), which boiled down to whether the Labour Party's commitment to
common ownership was a conflation of a particular, historically contingent set of
means with convenient ends (reformism), or whether its commitment abided by core
values of equality and liberty (Desai 1994: 76, 104, 110-112). In what seems in the
mid-1950s to have been a precursor to the Thatcherist attack on the trade unions,
during this period the unions had been relegated to industrial welfare organizations
41 As Ben Agger writes: "Of course, the issue of fidelity to Marx is ambiguous .... There are passages
galore where he seems to endorse a positivist conception of social theorizing, including an objectivist
theory of representation that reduces the constitutional role of both theory and practice. These passages
can be balanced against the places, especially in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1961),
where Marx endorses a more dialectical model of the interaction between social and economic
structures, on the one hand, and subjective and intersubjective agency, on the other" (Agger 1992: 42).
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(Taylor ] 960a: 8). Taylor's viewpoint is well-summarised in the following piece, and
shows the teleological moral lynchpin of his approach:
Of course, the rise of the Labour Movement has forced more civilised and humane
standards on to management. Many firms now 'take care' of part or all of their
employees with everything from superannuation schemes to cheap housing, and more
firms will certainly do so in the future. But there is a great danger in exaggerating this
change, welcome as it is, into a supposed 'reform' of the system. For these schemes
do not begin to solve the problem of providing a decent standard of welfare services
for the whole community. They serve, on the contrary, to accentuate the double
standards in welfare which are more and more in evidence in our society, a system in
which workers in the less profitable industries, and non-profit making nationalised
industries, not to speak of the submerged fifth, wil'l go to the wall- and moreover
where their distress remains unnoticed amid the general rejoicing over 'progressive'
management. If the Labour Movement ever decided, on the plea that capitalism was
'reformed', to confine itself to a struggle within the system to make management
more progressive, it would be in danger of renouncing one of the finest parts of its
tradition, the struggle to establish a responsibility by the whole community for all its
members for the provision of vital human needs (Taylor 1960a: 8-9)
Welfarism accepted 'capitalism with a human face', and interpreted the growing
affluence of the average British working class member as socialist achievements
(Smith 2002: 174). But Taylor rejected welfarism on grounds that the appearance of a
capitalist diffusion of power was masked by the rise of the multinationals; and that
consumption provided the means by which these organizations profited. The
substantive economic changes people perceived provided the illusion that power had
been distributed more equitably, but class power remained essentially unchanged
(Smith 2002: ]75). Taylor also rejects welfarism on grounds "that it has an
emasculated conception of the good ... lacking moral imagination," and, by
naturalizing popular responses to consumerism as a normative condition, "for having
an ideologically foreshortened conception of human potentialities" (Smith 202: 176).
[T]he social critic must also rectify welfarism's failure to question the coherence and
worth of the conception of the good that does happen to prevail in contemporary
capitalist societies .... [C]onsumption for pleasure is not a 'viable' purpose for living'
because it is not amenable to growth or development. ... Taylor rebukes the welfarists
for taking the diversity of life practices I capitalist society at face value. For diversity
exists only at a superficial level, that is, within the paradigm of consumption ....
Taylor therefore flatly rejects the welfarist model of socialism. But like other
representatives of the New Left, he was even more hostile to Stalinism (Smith 2002:
177).
Perhaps the most significant influence on the development ofTaylor's thinking
is the temporal background against which he considered Marx: the condition of
Marxism in Britain during the Stalinist era on the 1950s to which he reacted. Unlike
many during that period who rejected Marx tout court because of the revealed sins of
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Marxism, particularly after Soviet excesses in Hungary in 1956, Taylor's response
was to reject Marxism for having 'got Marx fundamentally wrong'. It was the
humanist Marx to which Taylor appealed in his earliest critique ofreductionist
'political' Marxism in Britain, where Party members wavered on how to respond to
Stalinism. The Communist Party "was characterized by a somewhat uncritical attitude
towards the actions of the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites" (Smith 2002:
175). In an article titled Socialism and the intellectuals (1957b), Taylor writes:
For years Communist intellectuals were silent where they should have spoken because
they did not wish to damage the party. Communism then seemed to be an admirable
synthesis, a system without fissure. One had to accept it all or reject it utterly. Hence
if one was on balance in favour, it was best to remain silent. Now the yawning gap is
there: the concept of Stalinism has been brought forward and the capture of the party
by a bureaucratic leadership who hold onto power at all costs, even at the expense of
jettisoning one by one the ideals of Communism. Now that this contradictory element
has been abstracted from the main body of Communism, considered as the philosophy
ofpractice, it can again be thought of as a single unified system claiming our
unqualified adherence (Taylor 1957b: 19. Italics added).42
It is easy to mistake Taylor's position as a kind of liberal humanist that
MacIntyre dismisses in articles published in The New Reasoner. Instead, his recourse
is to the humanist Marx wherein there is, he tells Bryan Magee, "almost a vision of
man, social man, as a kind of artist, expressing himself in a society which has
overcome alienation .... [and] all the capacities humans have to control their lives are
put to the service of their expressive drives and aspirations" (Taylor 1978b: 48, 49). In
the second issue of Reasoner, Taylor (1957) criticizes again the isolation of
intellectuals from the labour movement, but having turned their loyalties instead to
the Party.
The isolation of the intellectual from the political life of the workers, from the
preoccupations of the Labour movement, which in Britain at least, most emphatically
do not include ideas, is the context in which much of the behaviour, both of the
intellectual and Lucky Jim, is to be understood. The former seeks to close the gap via
the supposed vanguard of the working class, while the latter has a sneaking and
sometimes vocal contempt for both
[ .... ]
It is not necessary to dwell on the really tragic predicament of many intellectuals in
the c.P. It is however necessary to try to draw the moral. It is clear that by refusing
their vocation as intellectuals to speak the truth in the name of political necessity, they
42ft may be that Taylor's reference to Communism as "the philosophy of practice" indicates a reading
of Antonio Gramsci's use of the circumlocution, which he used to refer to Communism. Christopher
Hill (1958: 107-113) points this out in an article on Gramsci's The Modern Prince and other writings,
published in English translation in 1957. Hill was a tutor in Ballio!.
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have not succeeded at all in bridging the gap between themselves and the workers
(Taylor 1957b: 18).
However, Taylor refers to "what the workers of Poland called the 'dead
language' - a self-enclosed system of lies which had lost consciousness of itself even
as a deception" (Taylor 1957b: 18).
The workers are not, at least in the long run, grateful to the intellectual who prostitutes
his thought in order to serve as somebody's propaganda mouthpiece. The "dead
language" is, sooner or later, recognized for what it is. It can receive ultimately only
the engineered applause ofa c.P. gathering. The Socialist intellectual who "helps to
publicize every foible of his industrial brethren" is not respected and perhaps least of
all by the "industrial brethren" concerned .... [T]he labour movement's comparative
lack of interest in ideas does not spring entirely from Stalinist abuses. The prevailing
anti-intellectualism in many Left Circles stems also from the widespread belief that
ideas are of no importance. The question to end all questions is indeed "What are you
going to do?" And in this context it is clear that thinking is not counted as "doing"
anything. This question is a clear invitation to the intellectual to abdicate altogether
(Taylor 1957b: 18).
Three decades later, Taylor underscores his views, showing the problem that
underlies his political thought. In The Diversity ofGoods (Taylor 1985b) he writes
that in order to deal with problems like political fragmentation "[o]ur political
thinking needs to free itself both from the dead hand of the [Cartesian]
epistemological tradition, and the utopian monism of radical thought, in order to
account for the real diversity of goods that we recognize" (Taylor 1985b: 247). From
'intellectual leadership' to 'anti-epistemology', the die had been cast in this article
(Taylor 1957b), which he reiterates in his review of the New Left in which he rejects
Marxism on 'humanist' grounds that the ideology suffers from "an inadequate and
overly-optimistic humanism" derived from "a very deep flaw in Marx's theory of
human sociality, his theory of human beings and human social existence" (Taylor
1989b: 62, 63).
By this time Taylor has added to his critique an objection to morality (distinct
from ethics as practical reason); an idea he attends to more recently in his critique of
religious fundamentalism (Taylor 2007). But the seed of this recent critique is sown
earlier in so far as scientific Marxism sees (humanist) moral ideas as an illusion to be
explained away as superstructural reflections while at the same time hiding a morality
of its own. Drawing on Nietzsche, Taylor sees instead that any Marxism "function[s]
with a very strong sense of moral indignation against the existing order of things"; but
he warns that an unbridled morality can be "motivated by ... hatred and contempt for
all those who are identified as being part of' that capitalist order (Taylor 1989b: 61).
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I think that one lesson from the long history of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism in
particular is the degree to which this kind of hatred and contempt can become a major
factor driving the people who are most active and take leadership positions in this
movement, and the kinds of destruction to which this can lead .... That is what leads
me to say ... that a conception of human potentiality is an absolutely essential part of
the spiritual background or basis of any left movement (Taylor 1989b: 62).
Here we find the kernel of Taylor's ambiguous approach to Marxism, which
includes his affirmation of Marx's conception of alienation. "In sum, Taylor rejects
Marxism for the flaws in its conception of democratic freedom, for its reductive
model of oppression, for its lack of appreciation of the confl ict between goods, and
for its overly subjectivist interpretation of the good" (Smith 2002: 181). But I want to
propose that Smith's summation veers very closely to (if not expressing) the
culturalist position taken by Raymond Williams, who generally rejects orthodox
Marxism for reasons of its anti-humanism, yet retains the Romantic impulse of
Marx's own humanism.
A fuller comparative examination ofTaylor's 'humanist Marxism' and
Williams's cultural materialism would require a dedicated study of its own, which I
clearly do not have the space for here. But there is one thread that I want to explore:
an anti-empiricist stance that bears a close resemblance to a similar position Taylor
draws from Merleau-Ponty. Both Taylor's and Williams's critical regard for Marxism
rests significantly on that rejection; both of which draw towards an affirmation ofthe
humanist Marx (Williams 1977: 161).
Fred Inglis describes Taylor as one "who always repudiated the more concrete-
headed Marxists" (lnglis 1993: 154), but he was not a 'pure theoretician' above
dealing with concrete issues. In fact, if he were otherwise, he would stand askance to
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in which concepts such as embodiment and practice
play a central part. It is clear in his essay, What's Wrong With Capitalism? (Taylor
1960a), that Taylor assumes structural elements to be salient features of social
reproduction.43 But his precise understanding of 'structure' appears to be more
43 "The sense that the present priorities are inevitable is increased by the fact of advertising. It is not
simply that advertising ensures an expansion in the demand for consumer goods. It is not even that
advertising has had the effect of creating a certain image of prosperity, and even sometimes of the
Good Life. It is because the bombardment of the public consciousness with a certain kind of product
inculcates an unspoken belief about what the progress of our civilisation has made possible, and what
we just simply have to put up with as the best of a bad job. The latest gadgets for automatic cups of
early morning coffee fall in the first category: the miserable state of our hospitals falls in the second.
We are rarely, ifever, told that we could have a decent education, modern hospitals, or clean and
beautiful cities.
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expressive than, what he refers to in Political Theory and Practice (Taylor 1983) as
"economic-model theory ... [which] reconstruct(s) political behaviour according to
some narrowly defined conception of rationality" (Taylor 1983: 76). He compares two
types of structuralism, one with an understanding of structure drawn from linguistics
positing structure as
constantly renewed and changed in action, and hence is not resistant to changes in
self-understanding .... This type of structure is then confused with the unchanging
resistant type, whose model is the laws of natural science, or else (in the case of
Althusser) Marx's theory of political economy (Taylor J983: 77).
It is unlikely, for at least two reasons, that in Capitalism (Taylor I 960a) Taylor
indexes naturalistic structuralism (Taylor 1983a: 77). Firstly, he was already engaged
in studying Herder's expressivist theory of language (Smith 2002: 19-26). Secondly,
he was already developing from Merleau-Ponty the basis of a critique of naturalism in
social science (Kullman and Taylor 1958; Taylor and Ayer 1959). It would seem
more plausible that Taylor's understanding follows Merleau-Ponty's anti-behaviourist
usage in the holistic tradition of German Gestalt psychology, in which "structure or
form was an irreducible part ofthe experience of anything," and constitutes the
background against which "we always experience things" (Moran 2000: 393).44
Taylor would have been keenly conscious of Merleau-Ponty's attraction to
structuralism, though with the understanding that language is grounded in human
perception and is not an anonymous system as natural science would have it (Moran
2000: 405).
"In fact, we are led to believe exactly the opposite. The public and welfare sectors are continuously
associated with what is drab and uninteresting and distant. But here is the vicious circle. The drabness
of the Labour Exchange, the hospital out-patients and the railway waiting room is due to the
misordering of priorities, and the inevitable tendency of capitalism always to skimp on this kind of
'unnecessary' expenditure. To accept these conditions is to accept the society and its priorities as given.
"The only way that we can really get our priorities right is to do away with the dominating influence of
the profit system, and to put in its place a system primarily based on common ownership" (Taylor
1960a: 11).
44 At the same time we should not take Merleau-Ponty as denying close link between linguistic and
economic structures. He accepted language and symbols as constituting the human social world.
Indeed, this focus on the nature of language and social institutions as expressing a deep structure
brought Merleau-Ponty into close contact with structuralism" (Moran 2000: 405). He welcomed
structuralism, and agreed with Heidegger that 'language speaks man', though with the addition that
language is grounded in perception and is not an anonymous system (Moran 2000: 405). "During the
late 1940s, Merleau-Ponty even became a qualified supporter of structuralism, acknowledging that
there must be close links between the linguistic, economic, and social structures we inhabit .... In 1949
Merleau-Ponty began to lecture on Saussure and was genera'lly attracted to structuralist forms of
explanation, particularly to the manner in which structuralist explanation bypassed the boundaries
between sociological, economic, and psychological explanation to see the deep common structures
underlying these different human levels" (Moran 2000: 400).
152
Following Merleau-Ponty, Taylor would reject a naturalistic notion of structure,
and espouse instead an expressivist one that allows for a constitutive element derived
from human agency. Furthermore, a teleological aspect - oriented towards the human
good - could not be occluded if one is to accept Taylor's fuller argument. As such,
when Taylor takes the stance that the "false priorities" or "maladjustments" of
capitalism are structural and not marginal- marginal in so far as they will pass in
time given the necessary reforms (Taylor 1960a: 7) - he would also be drawing upon
the expressivist Marx rather than any dogmas of scientific Marxism. That is, when
Taylor rejects the reformist hope on the grounds that "if these faults are structural
faults in our system, it is difficult to see where the internal reform within capitalism is
going to come from" (Taylor 1960a: 8), his rejection is not based on anything
resembling historical materialism. But, at the same time, he makes no case for a
thorough-going idealism.
The human good, he argues, is erroneously measured as a "growth of prosperity
... measured almost entirely in terms of the rise in the Gross National Product and the
number ofTY sets, washing machines, cars and so on" (Taylor 1960a: 5). Beneath the
veneer of a working class never having 'had it so good', Taylor argues in New Left
Review, is a system of cultural and social reproduction that serves a market economy
shorn of public investment.
Take education. We cannot bring ourselves to spend enough public money to reduce
the size of the classes to 30 - presumably because we cannot impose any greater
burden of taxation. Yet we give relief to those individuals who pay for their children's
public school fees, and to the private corporations which pour tax-exempt funds into
the public schools. And why, in this day and age, have the corporations come to bail
out the public schools? This is not just a question of class solidarity. It is also because
the public schools provide the cadres for business, the essential managerial elites: and
since the priorities - even in education - are established by the needs of the private
sector rather than by the needs of the community in general, a new ICI science block
at Eton gets priority over the reduction of the size of classes in the Wandsworth
Secondary Modern (Taylor 1960a: 5-6).
Taylor's view is reflected in Stuart Hall's (1959c) defense of a claim made in a
previous article of his (Hall 1958d), "about the sense which many people have that
they live in a more 'open' society, in which class consciousness tended to play a
lesser role than it had done previously" (Hall 1959c: 50). E.P. Thompson and Ralph
Samuel accused Hall of ' revisionism', with Thompson (1959) laying the charge far
more thickly than Samuel (1959), in whose view Hall argues that "the traditional
working-class community is being disintegrated: in the new society, by the pressures
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of geographical and social mobility, and by the impact of the Mass Media and status
differentiation" (Samuel 1959: 45). Thompson's more robust response accuses the
entire Universities and Left Review of 'romanticising' the working class, among other
matters.
These VLR types ... are passionate advocates of commitment in the arts, but they
evade commitment on the central issues of class power and political allegiance. They
are angrier about ugly architecture than they are about the ugly poverty of old-age
pensioners, angrier about the "materialism" of the Labour Movement than about the
rapacity of financiers. They wear upon their sleeves a tender sensibility; but probe that
tenderness, and one finds a complex of responses which the veteran recognises as
"anti-working-class." They are more at ease discussing alienation than exploitation. If
they mention Marx, it is the Marx of the 1844 [Manuscripts], not the Marx of Capital
or the Eighteenth Brumaire; they are interested in the diagnostician but not in the
revolutionary surgeon of the human condition (Thompson 1959: 50).
In response, Hall begins by reiterating a number of uncontentious views; among
them, "that 'consumption' in a capitalist and class society is a relationship based on
exploitation" (Hall 1959c: 51), and that class interests were not negated by labour
having changed in accordance with social conditions that favoured higher levels of
consumer commodity consumption. But all the while he moves stealthily towards the
economist dogma he aims to undermine. "Of course the 'class' interests of the
secondary modem teacher and the shop steward at Morris Motors are the same ....
And the point of consciousness seems to me more easily discovered if we would
recognize that the class struggle for the secondary modern teacher lies in the fight for
the Comprehensive School and the social principles behind that" (Hall 1959c: 51).
Hall's "ideological point," as he puts it, is that,
[T]he superstructure of ideas (in this case, false ideas, false consciousness) is going to
affect directly the course of events. And if the admission of this fact makes us
reconsider some of the more primitive notions - still current - of how to interpret
Marx's dictum that' It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness,' I, for one,
can only say, 'Long Live the Revisionists' (Hall 1959c: 51).
In the short extract above, Hall indicates, in addition to placing distance
between himself and determinist modes of Marxism, that he is aware of the dangers of
fleeing headlong into an opposite voluntarism.45 Hall thus signals a beginning of the
45 Jim McGuigan points out that "[aJt one time it seemed as though structuralism had superseded
cultural ism, but Hall insists ... that there are strengths and weaknesses in both, seen from the
perspectives of hegemony theory" (McGuigan 1992: 29). Gramsci corrects the ahistorical, highly
abstract level at which structuralist theories tend to operate. To accede to the cultural pole amounts to
voluntarism that dissolves power into fluid intentions; and to move in the determinist direction reduces
meaning to established positions. Yet it is not beyond reproach to argue that most who engage(d) in the
field resembled either voluntarists or determinists. Gramsci bridges the gap, but it is also to Levi-
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structuralist paradigm which, within a decade, was to counterpose in British Cultural
Studies the culturalist problematic of resistance and history. Not that I am suggesting
Thompson was defending determinism in orthodox Marxism. As a culturalist and
historicist author in the cause of working class resistance he could not be.
Nonetheless, the stronger culturalist sense of the power of human agency against the
determinations of history and ideology (in structuralism) prefigures in this brief
exchange the tenor of what was to become a 'hallmark' of British Cultural studies.
Hall gives no definite indication of the authority by which he restores to a
transcendent and metaphysical superstructure powers which, in orthodox Marxism,
belong to the physical-like mechanisms of the infrastructure. It would seem that he
had Gramsci in mind here.46 In the absence of any firmer indication of the sources by
which Hall began rethinking Marxism - although he probably does follow Williams
and Thompson - it is tempting to consider, in light ofTaylor's interest in Merleau-
Ponty, that it was at least partly through Taylor's influence that Hall eventually turned
to French structuralism; and by that route, eventually to Althusserian Marxism.47
Conclusion
This chapter poses the question of why and how Taylor engaged in a Marxist
problematic, and concludes that he both responded to the radical tenor of his Oxford
environment and reacted to the positivist outlook of analytical philosophy by seeking
an alternative view in continental philosophy. The chapter also situates Taylor in the
web of interlocutions that constituted the nascent New Left movement. At most, the
chapter focuses upon Taylor's writing while he was engagement in the New Left
debates on orthodox Marxism and welfarism; and there are good reasons to surmise
that those debates framed the founding agenda of British Cultural Studies (Taylor
Strauss's combination of semiotics and psychoanalysis that Hall finds voluntarism and determinism
most satisfactorily bridged.
46 Helen Davis erroneously states that Gramsci's "work was not published in English until the late
19605" (Davis 2004: 46). In fact, The Modern Prince was published in English in 1957, Christopher
Hill appears to have written the first review of it (Hill 1958), and the text must certainly have formed
part of discussion in the New Left clubs. Were Davis's claim true, it would have been too early - if the
genealogy of cultural studies per se is to go on - to consider Hall to have been articulating a Gramscian
position explored in Birmingham from the late 1960s onwards; which came about partly, though
significantly, from Hall's "great frustration at what he [saw] as the paucity of Marxist scholarship
available to English readers" (Davis 2004: 73). But Hall's knowledge of Marx begins a decade or so
earlier.
47 Not that Taylor will have needed to translate Claude Levi-Strauss's Anthropologie Structurale
(1958), as this was done in 1963. Amhropologie Structurale (Structural Anthropology) was translated
by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grunfest Schoepf, and published in 1963.
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1960a; 1960b).48 While Taylor's contributions offered much to inform the New Left
as a political movement, it must be acknowledged that it was principally an
intellectual movement; though not to be understood in terms of any academic
connotations, but instead in terms of leadership. The Hegelian understanding is
evident, even as the movement took issue with the very concrete status of intellectuals
in the Communist Party and labour movement (see Taylor 1957b; 1966a: 227-229).
There were many others who traveled a similar journey to Taylor's, and they
too influenced the direction of the New Left as much as Stuart Hall implies they did
for the emergence of cultural studies (see Hall 1989: 20-21). But publications of two
conferences suggest that Taylor's influence may have been significantly greater than
these other contributions. Ironically, his presentations at both conferences present a
figure considerably more critical of Marxism than one would have expected for those
occasions. But, then again, unlike his mentor Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Taylor had
never held any illusions about Marxism as a political ideology. Taylor's presentation
at the 1967 Slant symposium - "that strange amalgam of Catholics and socialists,
gathered together by Terry Eagleton and Brian Wicker" (Higgins 1999: 110)-
organized by Terry Eagleton and Brian Wicker, shows Taylor trying to put some
distance between himself and Marxism as a political philosophy. Other presenters
were Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton and Stuart Hall. John Higgins (1999) refers
in a footnote to Taylor's (1989b)49 presentation and suggests that it would be worth
comparing Taylor's and Williams's similar approaches to Marx and Marxism
(Higgins 1999: 193, n.15).
Williams's interpretation ofMarx was ... always an interpretation. His major claim to
offer a return to a lost emphasis on the 'indissoluble unity' of the 'whole social
process' is an interpretation of Marx's work which offers a correction to extremes of
economistic or 'mechanical' Marxism .... If the unity of the social process is in reality
'indissoluble', then no causal analysis of it is possible, the flow of social process can
never be grasped or articulated (Higgins 1999: 123).
48 Taylor's having co-edited the Universities and Left Review with Stuart Hall and others no doubt
concentrated his attention on the questions that occupied and constituted the movement. Among his
significant interlocutors were Edward Thompson, Alasdair Maclntyre and Christopher Hill, who were
associated with the related journal, The New Reasoner. Raymond Williams was also a 'prime mover' in
the movement, though his direction appeared more disparate than other of the 'thirties generation'.
Precisely how Taylor connects with the paradigmatic comportment ofWilliams's work is hard to say
with any certainty; although the evidence is strong that both engaged variously with the writing of
Georg Lukacs.
49 Higgins's footnote suggests that Tay10r is already introduced in the paragraph to which it refers; but
there is no trace to be found there. I can only surmise that previous versions ofthe paragraph(s) had
included Higgins's questions about Taylor's relation to Williams, and that the Taylorian aspect had
been edited out for much the same reasons that the question remains a puzzle for me.
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The paragraph to which Higgins's footnote refers concerns one whom Taylor
calls "the brilliant Christopher Caudwell" (Taylor 1966a: 227).50 Taylor's phrasing
resembles that in Neal Wood's book, Communism and British Intellectuals (1959:
57), though it is no less likely that he used Williams's (1961) more extended
treatment of the Marxist literary scholar. Higgins describes, with remarkable
sleuthing, Williams's ambiguous regard for CaudwelI's 'Marxist literary criticism';
but it is the passage from Williams (preceding the paragraph to which the footnote
refers) that is particularly pertinent for my purposes for the way it reflects Taylor's
opposition to naturalism, together with views that can be directly attributed to
Merleau-Ponty - without referring to either. Williams (in Higgins 1999: 108) points
out that "all human experience is an interpretation of the non-human reality," and that
this "is not the duality of subject and object.. .. We have to think, rather, of human
experience as both objective and subjective, in one inseparable process." Higgins
states that WilIiams is here challenging naturalism in orthodox Marxism, "a
perspective from which all disciplines, including those in the human sciences,
wrongly seek to emulate the methods and methodologies of the natural sciences, often
with crippling conceptual consequences" (Higgins 1999: 108).
Even more remarkably, as Higgins points out, CaudwelI's posthumously
published book, Illusion and Reality (1937), posed a direct challenge to behaviourist
psychology (or what Caudwell calls 'bourgeois psychology'). Taylor does something
similar in The Explanation ofHuman Behaviour (1964), though admitting that it was
Merleau-Ponty, whose own book bears a similar title,S] who had provided the motive
idea (see Taylor 1998: 105). It does seem unlikely, however, that Taylor would have
been unaware ofCaudwell's book; and ifso, it is difficult to explain why he makes no
mention of it in Explanation (1964). But then again, Taylor acknowledges Merleau-
Ponty in a mere three footnotes (Taylor 1964: 68-69, 95), and does not mention
Wittgenstein at all. I am not (necessarily) implying an inappropriate use of sources. In
so Christopher CaudweIl is the pseudonym of the Marxist literary scholar and poet Christopher St. John
Sprigg, He was a former journalist of the Yorkshire Observer, having followed the example of his
father who was once literary editor of the Daily Express. Caudwell was killed in action in Spain during
the opening engagement of the battle of Jarama Valley on 12 February 1937.
SI Maurice MerJeau-Ponty's The Structure ofBehaviour (1963) was translated the year before Taylor's
book. But being fluent in French and German, Taylor will no doubt have read MerJeau-Ponty in the
'vernacular': Le Structure du Comportement (1942).
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the history of ideas (and philosophy) it is exceptionally rare that any thinker might
. .. fi h 52arrive at a posItIOn rom now ere.
The other conference was organized by the Oxford University Socialist
Discussion Group in 1987, and drew together, thirty years on, various figures who
were formatively part of the original New Left. Taylor's presentation is published
under the title, Marxism and Socialist Humanism (Taylor 1989).53 Standing out from
that small party - if the structure ofa book presenting papers and presentation from
the conference is anything to go by - were Taylor and Hall.54 Hall's paper describes
the beginning of the movement with illuminating detail. Taylor's presentation -
building on themes touched on in his earlier paper - explains why Marxism could not
deliver on its promises. Again, it was a claim he had argued in his very first articles
on the topic (Taylor 1957b; 1957d).
Taylor's earlier Slant Symposium paper, From Marxism to the Dialogue Society
(Taylor I968a), ends with a call to find "a new house of theory; in the old marxist
[sic] mansion, the winds break in and the roof leaks in summer. We have to move"
(Taylor 1968a: 181). Taylor had probably never taken up residence in that abode; but
of Marx himself, his opinion was quite different. IfTaylor has truly 'abandoned the
old Marxist mansion',55 there would seem to be little point in pursuing the argument I
am following. If, on the other hand, Taylor's 'core idea' is rooted in his reading of
Marx, then one needs to inquire further into Taylor's anti-epistemology. This leads us
to consider Taylor's subscription to MerJeau-Ponty a little more deeply.
52 Similarities between these two titles (and a number of others) indicate a fertile period of intertextual
dialogue. See Peter Winch's and Thomas Kuhn's books, which I refer to in the next chapter.
5) Taylor's article is published in a book titled, DUI ofApathy: Voices ofthe New Left Thirty Years On,
co-edited by Robin Archer and six others. Nicholas Smith (2002) provides an explanation for the title,
though without referring to the actual book. "Taylor and the New Left saw apathy as one of the main
obstacles to the realization of socialist purposes - indeed the movement became closely associated with
the slogan 'out of apathy'" (Smith 2002: )79). Oh, the enthusiasm of youth!
54 Raymond Williams was not present at this conference, and died the following year.
ss lan Fraser (2007: 3) notes a definite shift in Taylor's allegiance to Marx and Marxism. The
auspicious year in 1989, when in the same year Sources ofthe Self( I989a) was published, "Taylor was
about to settle his account with Marx and Marxism" with Marxism and Socialist Humanism () 989b).
But I think Fraser reads too much into Taylor's retrospective essay on the origins of the New Left
movement. Certainly, Taylor declares the Catholic religion as his preferred framework, but that does
not entail - as Fraser claims - a rejection of Marx as an important philosopher of the Romantic
tradition and critic of modernity. Taylor's distinction of Marx from Marxism is not recent, though,
interestingly, Marxism and Socialist Humanism (I989b) coincided with the eFld of the Cold War. This
ought to be taken into account. Nonetheless, Fraser's observations do not deter him from taking




The previous chapters argue that Charles Taylor was materially involved in the
debates that formed the New Left Movement, and which provided the initial impetus
for the formation of British Cultural Studies (Hall 1992: 16-17).' But when one
considers that it was cultural Marxism that the movement first embraced, following
the key (culturalist) texts of Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams and Edward
Thompson (Hall 1981: 19-21), and that this moment was interrupted by Stuart Hall's
introduction of main ly Althussarian structural-Marxism in the late 1960s (Hall 1981:
27), the impression can be gained that the movement comprised entirely of a French
import sitting uncomfortably opposite the cultural Marxist thinking that had a firmer
claim on the title of British cultural studies.
While the 'turn to Gramsci' eventually articulated the culturalist and
structuralist paradigms, the strong impression is that these two paradigms provided
the infrastructure of cultural studies (Hall 1981), whereas the ethnographic, symbolic
interactionist, anthropological and other elements (see Grimshaw et al.: 73-75; Hall
1980: 40) occupied the field's superstructure. The opening pages of Paul Willis's
(1980: 88-90) essay arguing for a reflexive ethnography that embraces both
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, "but which is without rationalist natural-
science-like pretense" and which "remove[s] the hidden tendency [in traditional
sociology] towards positivism" (Willis 1980: 91, 95), indicates that the field was not
wholly determined by the culturalist-structuralist 'forces' at play. Scholars exploring
what I am referring to as 'superstructural' elements in the Birmingham Centre were
I Given Stuart Hall's (1990) description of the Centre's beginnings, the field should be understood as
'British culture' studies, rather than having a generic 'cultural studies' modified by the prefix of
'British'. But by 'British culture' the Centre did not intend anything along lines of 'defence of the
British realm', but working class experiences of existing in tension with class reproductive practices
that ensured the continuation of that realm's power. Following this delimitation, Richard Hoggart's
project in Uses ofLiteracy can be seen as having set the initial terms of the Centre.
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relatively autonomous, even if the 'foundational' forces were determinant (pace
A lthusser) in the final instance.
While these superstructural elements can be seen as theoretical epiphenomena
of the duo-paradigmatic foundation of cultural studies, other elements mentioned
(Hall 1980; see Davies 1993) as having briefly held the attention of the scholar-
activists occupying their Birmingham Quonset hut appear as having had little more
than a temporary hold on discussions. But to hold such a view amounts to denying
that the culturalist and structuralist foundations were porous enough to sustain and to
learn from critique. In Cultural Studies and the Centre (Hall 1980: 20-21), Hall notes
that debate in the Centre's mid-1960's pre-structuralist period turned away from the
structural-functionalist sociological enquiry through which they had hoped to conduct
their analysis, and took interest instead in the ethnomethodological emergence that
followed from a phenomenological critique ofEmile Durkheim (Hall 1980: 23). The
roots of this critique, Hall notes, belonged to the German idealist tradition "identified
with the Verstehen or 'interpretive' hermeneutic stress which characterized early
historical sociology and the Geistwissenschift approach in general" (Hall 1980: 23).
To dismiss Hall's note as referring to matters of passing interest would amount to
rejecting his insistence that cultural studies is not "one thing" (Hall 1990: 11) nor
"every damn thing" (Hall 1992: 292), and thus to narrow its terrain to unsustainable
proportions.
Imagining the relative saliencies of structuralist-culturalist versus 'other(ed)'
theory in terms of a centre-periphery model also amounts to misreading Jim
McGuigan's (1992) sense of the messier exigencies of the Centre's history as a series
of 'mistakes' on the way towards its final destination. McGuigan notes that the
Centre's genealogy (and that of cultural studies) developed by way of"false starts,
dead ends, the difference between actually doing concrete research and theorising it,
in a collective endeavour, sometimes harmoniously, sometimes antagonistically, built
around workshops rather than academic individualism" (McGuigan 1992: 31). Each
"false start", as it ought to be held, provided a locus of creative intervention, and
opened out towards further interventions that may (without guarantees) have been
impossible or very different without them.
[A]s well as registering the dizzying 'impact of the structural isms', Hall registers the
'impact of the feminisms' - that is, a political rather than principally intellectual
movement, in the 1970s. This leads us back to considering the relationship between
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cultural studies, institution and history and, in particular, the political radicalism of the
post-'68 research student generation before the Thatcherite backlash was to transform
the rules of the game so dramatically in the 1980s (McGuigan 1992: 31).
Jim McGuigan points out that "[a]t one time it seemed as though structuralism
had superseded culturalism, but Hall insists ... that there are strengths and weaknesses
in both, seen from the perspectives of hegemony theory" (McGuigan 1992: 29).
Gramsci corrected the ahistorical, highly abstract level at which structuralist theories
tend to operate. But from then on, to accede to the culturalist pole would amount to a
voluntarism that would dissolve power into fluid intentions; and to move in the
determinist direction would reduce meaning to established positions. Yet it is not
beyond reproach to argue that most who engage(d) in the field resembled either
voluntarists or determinists. Bridging that gap was possibly Hall's chosen quest,
without adopting a view from nowhere. Gramsci was one solution adopted, I imagine,
from Christopher Hill's work during Hall's student days (Hill 1958); but it was
principally in Levi-Strauss's combination of semiology and psychoanalysis that Hall
found voluntarism and determinism most satisfactorily bridged.2
[By] way of the Freudian concepts of the unconscious and the Lacanian concepts of
how subjects are constituted in language ... Levi-Strauss restores the decentered
subject, the contradictory subject, as a set of positions in language and knowledge,
from which culture can appear to be enunciated (Hall 1994: 536).
But cultural studies was never intended as a purely academic enterprise, though
certainly an (organic) intellectual one. Thus it was to Gramsci that Hall and his
colleagues turned to understand their roles as organic intellectuals called "to engage
with some real problem out there in the dirty world, and to use the enormous
advantage given to a tiny handful of us in the British educational system who had the
opportunity to go to universities and reflect on those problems, to spend that time
usefully to try to understand how the world worked" (Hall 1990: 17). As an
2 Richard Kearney (1994: 395-396) provides this eye-raising note: "[Philosophy professor at the EcoJe
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris] Louis Marin (1931-92) used to comment that when he
was a young man in the early 1950s, he and his wife Fran90ise were invited to the apartment ofM. and
Mme Maurice Merleau-Ponty for what was then described as a 'diner intime'. When he and his wife
arrived, he discovered that it was indeed a small dinner party: M. and Mme Merleau-Ponty, M. and
Mme Levi-Strauss, and M. and Mme Lacan. That these three were all friends indicates a certain
collaboration and dialogue that was highly charged in the early period in which structuralism was
gaining hold. Although Merleau-Ponty is known for his groundbreaking work as a phenomenologist of
perception (Merleu-Ponty 1945), only a year later he was lecturing on de Saussure at the Ecole
Normale Superieure in Paris. Merleau-Ponty's turn to semiology as a topic of interest began to blend
with his commitment to the achievements of Gestalt psychology, but even more with those of
phenomenology which he saw as superior even to the Gestalt theories of Kohler and Koffka, Gelb and
Goldstein. Yet with his growing interest in language, Merleau-Ponty found real value in the Saussurian
theory of the sign."
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educational project, cultural studies was first and foremost an extension of the
workers' Educational Association, university extra-mural departments, and the Left
Book Club (Davies 1993: 145, n.4). "Some of us - me, especially - had always
planned never to return to the university, indeed, never to darken its doors again,"
says Hall (1990: 12). But perhaps a more telling indication that Taylor may have
played some role in the formation of the field can be found in Hall's (1990) situating
the beginnings of the field at a particularly crucial point in the post-war period:
For me, cultural studies really begins with the debate about the nature of social and
cultural change in postwar Britain. An attempt to address the manifest break-up of
traditional culture, especially traditional class cultures, it set about registering the
impact of the new forms of affluence and consumer society on the very hierarchical
and pyramidal structure of British society ....
The attempt to describe and understand how British society was changing was at the
centre of the political debate in the 1950s, and cultural studies was at this time
identified with the first New Left. The first New Left dated not 1968 but 1956 (Hall
1990: 12).
Orthodox Marxism in Britain was moribund at the time the New Left began to
take shape, and its condition was made so not least by its economism. It was therefore
not unreasonable for Taylor and his companions to look across the Channel for fresh
thinking. It was in the existentialist branch of continental philosophy that Tay101'
found in French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty a schema that directed his
opposition to behaviourism, empiricism and Cartesian epistemology - that is, contra
the claim that all knowledge about the world is related to sensory experience or
observation (Smith 2004: 31-34). Merleau-Ponty, in Taylor's view, offered what he
had found lacking in analytical philosophy as it was taught at Oxford in his day.3
This chapter teases out the extent and implications of Merleau-Ponty's influence
on Taylor. While this chapter focuses on Taylor's 'Marxism', and the following
chapter turns the attention to his rejection of Cartesian epistemology, it remains
important to bear in mind that the two strands are deeply intertwined. Taylor's
rejection of behaviourism, Cartesian epistemology and naturalism in the social
sciences derives significantly from Merleau-Ponty, who derived his own position
against Cartesianisrn from within his humanist and Husserlian phenomenological
3 Ironically, Dermot Moran (2000) writes: "As a student, Merleau-Ponty reacted against the rather arid
academic philosophy taught in France in the I920s, rejecting both neo-Kantianism and various forms
of idealism. Instead he was drawn to the philosophy of the concrete, living experience as emphasised
by Henri Bergson (1859- J94 J) and by the Christian existentialist Gabriel Marcel (1889- J973)" (Moran
2000: 406).
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interpretation of Marx; drawn heavily on Georg Lukacs who also read HusserI. At the
same time, however, both Lukacs and Merleau-Ponty relied significantly on Max
Weber. As Taylor, in turn, drew on MerIeau-Ponty for his core idea, it is not unlikely
that he mode led his interpretation of Marx's thinking along lines influenced by his
mentor. In short, the two connected influences are MerIeau-Ponty's rejection of
Cartesianism and his 'Weberian Marxism,.4 Taylor's rejection of the Cartesian
epistemological construal begins from both. But even in his acknowledgement of
MerIeau-Ponty as having provided him with his 'core idea', Taylor's use of these
sources remain in the service of his own questions.
A 'close reading' of Taylor's writing: 1957-1959
A number of key events in Taylor's student life coincided in 1956. Stuart Hall
mentions that "the end of the summer of 1956" (Inglis 1993: 154) - possibly in
August - Taylor went to Paris to work with MerIeau-Ponty. The Hungarian revolt
broke out towards two months later. A note in Universities and Left Review states that
"from November 1956 to April 1957 Charles Taylor was World University Service
representative with Hungarian student refugees in Austria" (Taylor 1957c: 75).
Upon Taylor's return from France and Austria, the first edition ofULR was
published - about a year after Stuart Hall says it was established (Inglis 1993: 154).
For purposes of getting a sense of his overall concerns during this period, I shall
provide a short description of each of the eight articles Taylor published from the
spring of 1957 to 1959. His first article, Can Political Philosophy be Neutral
(1957ai, takes aim at linguistic analysis in analytical philosophy and the fact/value
distinction. He picks out its Cartesian character for special mention; as he does any
sociology that excludes the agency of moral subjects. Many ofthe themes Taylor's
later work is best known for appear more than merely 'prefigured' in this article. For
example, in the following extract we see a semblance of a concept Taylor draws from
Harry Frankfurt's essay, Freedom ofthe Will and the Concept ofa Person (Frankfurt
1988) - being Taylor's concept of moral agents as "strong evaluators".6 In addition,
4 Michael Lowy (1996: 431) begins his paper on "Weberian Marxism" with the observation that
Merleau-Ponty invented the term to define "the Western Marxist thinkers who systematically used
certain key ideas of Max Weber - in particular Georg Lukacs and some of his followers."
5 Universities and Left Review, Spring 1957, Volume I, Number I.
6 The main targets of TayIor's concept of 'strong evaluation' (Taylor 1985a: 15-44) are the
sociobiological, utilitarian and emotivist attempts to reduce morality to mere desires. Taylor
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Taylor indexes Marx's philosophical anthropology in the Romantic, as opposed to the
empiricist, tradition; and so aligns linguistic philosophy with the philosophical
background to empiricism:
But how about those who believe that our moral and political views are the merest
caprice if they are not grounded in some objective reality? Is it really possible, e.g. for
a Marxist or a Christian to squeeze his morality into this framework, and admit simply
that he holds the views he does in fundamentally the same way as his preference for
stout over bitter?7 One of the principal claims of Marxism is that the political action it
endorses is, in its general lines, established by a study of man in society - in particular
of Capital or men as they are in the economic and social relations of capitalist society.
The linguistic analysis cannot be applied to this theory without destroying it.
Similarly: "This is God's will" is meant as a factual statement, but it can hardly be
said to be devoid of moral implications. It is "neutral" only to non-believers. To
believers it is even decisive (Taylor 1957a: 69).
In Socialism and the Intellectuals (Taylor 1957b), Taylor applies an
understanding of the 'organic' philosopher, wh,ich he appears to derive from Merleau-
Ponty, to a critique of the anti-intellectualism he found in the British Communist
Party. It is not unreasonable to consider that Taylor links this understanding of the
intellectual as a 'Party underlabourer' to the same sources by which Peter Winch
(1958: 3-5) rejected philosophy's "underlabourer" status in relation to science. These
sources extend to John Locke, and had AJ. Ayer as one among a number of
proponents in the 1950s.
The Politics ofEmigration (Taylor 1957c) concerns Taylor's experiences with
Hungarian refugees in Austria; and it is this article that he expresses the antipathy of
Marxism with human well-being. This is followed by Marxism and Humanism
(Taylor 1957a), where he generally agrees with Edward Thompson's distinction of
Marx from Marxism, that "vulgar Marxist amoral ism or moral relativism is not
inconsistent with Marxism" (Taylor 1957a: 96). Taylor goes on prefigure an
explanation he was to put forward later, where he explains the Rouseauian roots
whereby Marx had made Stalinism an expected outcome (Taylor 1966a: 242-243).
But the Marx to whom Taylor appeals is one whom Georg Lukacs and Merleau-Ponty
accepted as the centre of their respective 'Marxisms'.
makes a distinction between strong and weak evaluations, which is a further development of
Harry Frankfurt's (1988: 10-11) distinction between first- and second-order desires. The
strong evaluations concern the moral worth of the first-order desires, whereas the weak
evaluations are morally neutral orderings of desires (Taylor 1985a: 16). Taylor reaches this
revision of Frankfurt's concepts by joining it to Elizabeth Anscombe's notion of "desirability-
characterization" (Taylor 1985a: 16).
7 See footnote n.6 above.
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I agree with Thompson that the most fruitful way in which to consider Stalinism is an
ideology, i.e. as an incomplete, partisan, distorted view of reality. But on a theoretical
level, I don't think that this ideology is adequately characterized as a kind of
"economic automatism." Granted, theories of this kind, quite incompatible with the
early writings of Marx were produced by Stalin and his cohorts, as Thompson clearly
shows, but it seems to me that the nub of the question lies elsewhere (Taylor 1957a:
92).
Taylor argues that Stalinism "elaborated something like a Marxist conception of
historical responsibility," and in the expression of this concept in the infamous show
trials "put forward some important truths in Marxism, but in a strangely twisted
fashion" (Taylor 1957a: 92). That is, Stalinism denied individuals any historical
responsibility with respect to their intentions and conceptions. The Party subverted
Marx's understanding of ordinary man as both conditioned and creative; as the centre
of objective limits and the ability to transcend those limits - man's historical role.
The practice of Stalinism has shown the "limits of the concept of class morality, not
just in its mechanistic form, but in its true form as the postulate of a new moral life,
borne forward by a class, in virtue of its historical role" (Taylor 1957a: 97). Stalinism
effected out of Marx's articulation of objective limitation and subjective creativity a
radical dualism that afforded limitation to ordinary living conditions and prospects,
and to the Party bureaucracy the 'privileges' of unbridled creativity. That is, the Party
bureaucracy lived in unbridled voluntarism. The mass of humanity lived under
conditions of extreme economic determinism. "The extreme economic determinism
and the unbridled voluntarism which are the two components of the Stalinist dialectic
are equally foreign to Marxism" (Taylor 1957a: 93).
The creative intelligent response of man to his social conditions was concentrated in
the party bureaucracy, while the rest of humanity struggled within the objective limits
of this condition, conceived as very narrow ones .... The subjective, creative side of
man was gradually located in the Communist Party, in the Central Committee, and
finally in Stalin himself. Building the human society was conceived as engineering ....
Since the greatness and humanity of man, for Marx, 1ies in his abil ity to remake his
world and his own nature into a human world and nature, humanity became almost the
preserve of the party bureaucrat (Taylor 1957a: 92, 94).
Taylor does not repudiate 'class morality', but sees it as essential to Marxist
Communism. "Marx sees Communist society as the return of man to himself, his
appropriation of alienated labour, and thus the unfettering of the creative powers and
potentialities stored in the human nature by human labour" (Taylor 1957a: 97). Taylor
sees the 'collective' as needing to be "completed by the assertion that man is of value
as man, irrespective of the part he plays or fails to play in the development of human
potentialities," and cites Marx's dictum of the proletariat being unable to "free itself
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without freeing all members of society" (Taylor 1957a: 97). These two developments
were inseparable: a return to self entailing also a return to community. But the
historical context of Marxism admittedly favoured a bias towards the collective, hence
negating the individual; "to build the new human nature by social labour, even if it
involves trampling underfoot for a time the brotherhood of man" (Taylor 1957a: 98).
Taylor absolves Marx himself for this outcome, as it was not a problem to which he
had to attend; but for the Bolsheviks it was a very real challenge. "The conflict
between the value of Promethean man, whose creative forces must be liberated for the
domination of things, and social man in need of fellowship was decided in favour of
the former" (Taylor 1957a: 98). The humanism of Marx was the cost for a scientific
Marxism that alienated man as the means towards social ends.
Marxist Communism is at best an incomplete humanism. This is not to say that it has
nothing to teach us - the opposite is patently true. A humanism without the
contribution of Marx is abstract and cannot come to grips with the conditions of the
modern world. But socialist Humanism cannot be based on Marxist Communism
alone (Taylor 1957a: 98).
In Alienation and Community (Taylor 1958a) Taylor returns to the question of
"one of the main features of Stalinist ideology" as evident in the objectivist logic
behind the Moscow show trials (l958a: 93). After explaining alienation in Marx's
1844 Manuscripts, Taylor goes on to apply the theory to an analysis of the ideology of
consumerism; taking into his sweep the utilitarian ethic by which he finds alienation
most effectively induced. Important elements of Taylor's later writingS are prefigured
here: his attribution of atom ism, alienation and anomie as outcomes of utilitarian
modern social imaginaries, and the ways in which these are indexed historically.
Ralph Samuel's (1989: 42) note about the New Left championing "sociology as a new
learning" is amplified in Taylor's article. But, published between Marxism (1957a)
and Alienation (l958a), Taylor's withering attack on Karl Popper, The Poverty ofthe
Poverty ofHistoricism (Taylor 1958b) - the "Poverty of Historicism" referring to the
title of Popper's book (Popper 1957) rejecting historicism. Taylor notes that Popper's
method is first to erect a 'historicist' straw man before annihilating it in the final two
chapters. But "nothing like a single coherent doctrine emerges" (Taylor 1958b: 77).
On page 45, however, we are brought to the "very heart of the body of argument"
which is to be ca1led historicism: "Social science is nothing but history: this is the
thesis." The whole mountain of moral and philosophical error is thus to be built on a
8 For example, Taylor's Ethics ofAuthenticity (1991 a) is a sustained critique of utilitarian moralities, as
is his later Modern Sociallmaginaries (2004b).
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methodological mistake, on an incorrect view of the nature of scientific method and
the logical relation between the proportions of science (Taylor 1958b: 77)
It is in this article that we find the first clear expression ofTaylor's approach to
the philosophy of social science; and, in many respects, the similarities between his
approach and Winch's (1958) critique of 'neutral social science' seem evident. But
unlike Winch's use of Wittgensten in analytical philosophy, Taylor's critique has very
clear Hegelian traces ofMerleau-Ponty's phenomenology.9 But the Marxist sources in
Taylor's attack are also clearly evident:
"Historicism" thus emerges from Professor Popper's book as a vaguely
mischaracterized straw-man, a compendium of simple logical errors and complex
impermissible desires. This is not to say that the issues in the book are unreal. On the
contrary. Popper is giving a statement of a widely held political view, or rather of the
methodology which presupposes this view. It is the view of liberal noo-
interventionism, the apology for an utterly negative view of freedom. It is important
that this view can appear to so many as being objective, neutral, as though a plea for
neutrality on the issues that seem vital to others, puts one somehow above the struggle
(Taylor 1958b: 78)
Also in 1958, Taylor co-authored a paper with Michael Kullman, The Pre-
Objective World (Kullman and Taylor 1958), in which they explore Merleau-Ponty's
Phenomenologie de la Perception (1945).10 The paper makes no specific argument as
per any contending position on any topic, but does pointedly present an outline of the
gist of Merleau-Ponty's book to an audience groomed on the type of analytic
philosophy Taylor objects to. The first critical response to the article came four years
later, from Hubert Dreyfus and Samuel Todes (Dreyfus and Todes 1962)."
In Taylor's (and Oxford linguistic philosopher AJ. Ayer's) following paper,
Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis (1959),12 he makes the point more strongly;
and suggests a reason for the generality of the previous paper: "the obvious reason
9 I shall be discussing this matter in the next chapter, and so shall not add any more than to point out
that although Taylor's and Winch's work attacks the same target in naturalistic social science, their
lines of attack are quite different.
IQ The English edition, Phenomenology ofPerception, was first published in 1962, although the imprint
lists 1958 as the translation. The authors, however, refer to the original 1945 edition.
11 From a note on the cover of Samuel Tode's Body and World (200 I), we are told that it was published
from his 1963 Harvard doctoral dissertation, The Human Body as Material Subject ofthe World. On
page xxviii of the introduction, philosopher Piotr Hoffman writes: "Had [Todes' dissertation] been
published at the time it was written, it would have been recognized as one of the most valuable
contributions to philosophy in the postwar period and as the most significant contribution to the field of
existential phenomenology since the work of Merleau-Ponty." Dreyfus has remained one ofTaylor's
supportive commentators; and I shall return to his discussion of Tay Ior's rejection of Cartesian
epistemology in the next chapter.
12 The paper is not strict co-authored, but is written as a seventeen-page essay by TayJor, followed by a
thirteen-page response from A.J. Ayer. This co-operation may indicate the prestige Taylor may
possibly have acquired as an exponent of French philosophy.
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[phenomenology] is less familiar [in Britain]" (Taylor and Ayer 1959: 93). Taylor
argues that phenomenology and linguistic philosophy are compatible, and that
difficulties between Husserlian idealism and the empiricist analytical thesis "arise
from mistakes about language" (Taylor 1959a: 109).13
Finally, the third section ofTaylor's Phenomenology (Taylor and Ayer 1959:
104-108), he takes up at length in his paper, Ontology (Taylor 1959), where he brings
to bear arguments offered in Gilbert Ryle's The Concept ofMind (1959) as to
distinctions between 'inner' and 'outer' actions - or the inner/outer sorting inherent in
Cartesian thought (see Taylor 1987a; 2002a) - that attends to "classical empiricist
account(s) of perception ... fitted into the categories of contemporary natural science
or reasonable facsimile(s) thereof' (Taylor 1959: 103).14 However, Taylor is not
above criticizing Ryle's "crass" understanding of Cartesianism, for it is evident that
Descartes never actually claimed as a dogma that mind was in fact separate from the
body.
Descartes said certainly that a person had both a body and a mind, but this was
certainly an incidental error. The original error is to be found in the thesis that the
body is to be spoken of as a kind of machine. Once this is accepted, the soul has to be
invented to avoid absurdity (Taylor 1959: 135).
Characteristically, Taylor is not one for simple rejections; and although he
remains opposed to Cartesianism, he is equally opposed to getting Descartes wrong.
A summary of TayIor's stance towards linguistic philosophy ofthe British empiricist
tradition may also serve to indicate that he does not reject the empiricist tradition tout
court. That tradition divided human enquiry into empirical and conceptual branches,
where the former branch concerns' matters of fact' , and the conceptual branch
concerning the meanings that thoughts and sentences must have in order to be able to
convey facts at all (Smith 2002: 18-19). J.L. Austin, whom Taylor cites quite
sympathetically, represented that empirical branch. In that vein, logical positivists
held that all propositions had to be empirically verifiable or else they were
nonsensical (see Smith 1997: 10-12). By revealing the complexity of ordinary
13 Again, the resemblance to Winch's (1958) argument is quite noticeable; but the difference is that
Taylor refers to Merleau-Ponty, whereas Winch's source is Wittgenstein. Taylor's fullest exploration
of his argument, his first book, The Explanation ofBehaviour (1964), also draws from Wittgenstein.
14 The primary goal of Ryle's The Concept ofMind (1949) - one of the classic texts of the linguistic
movement - was to dispel a long-standing philosophical myth about the nature of the mind by showing
how it arises from confusion over the function of mental concepts. The myth in question was mind-
body dualism: the idea that the mind is an entity, distinct from the body, which somehow resides
invisibly within the body like a 'ghost in a machine'. According to Ryle, the myth was one of the main
legacies of Descartes; hence 'Cartesian dualism'.
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language, the linguistic philosophers helped to uncover deep problems facing
reductionist theories of meaning, such as the one advanced by logical positivism. This
"approach took a feature of one type of discourse - in this case natural science - and
generalized it into a theory of meaning that rode roughshod over the particularities of
ordinary language use" (Smith 2002: 20).
Taylor emphatically concurs with Ryle that the Cartesian theory of the mind is
an implausible philosophical theory gone wrong. That is, the 'ghost in a machine
model' is popular yet implausible, and the way to tackle it is to expose, through a kind
of therapeutic reflection, the source of the error that makes us vulnerable to it (Smith
2002: 23). Taylor has at best a sanguine view of what the linguistic method alone
could achieve. Taylor observed that if linguistic analysis were to deliver a genuine
alternative to metaphysics, it would have to proceed in a manner that was free from
metaphysical presuppositions itself. It might meet this requirement in one of two
ways: either by being neutral with respect to substantive conceptions of the world, or
by justifying - and not just leaving to dogma - the view of the world it does favour. It
was clear to Taylor that linguistic analysis was 110t free from metaphysics in the
former sense, as Ryle's account of the mind demonstrated.
Common sense is not a repository of neutral or 'natural' beliefs and practices. It is a
historically contingent way of interpreting and dealing with the world. The fact that it
is a contingent product of history does not of course make it false. But it does make it
metaphysically partial. Taylor concluded that the linguistic method was not free of
presuppositions as the Oxford philosophers claimed (Smith 2002: 23).
The linguistic method was thus hardly suited for Taylor's project. First, it made
the questions of human subjectivity accessible only indirectly through what we are
entitled to say about it in ordinary language. It therefore imposed arbitrary limits on
how the constitution of human subjectivity could be explored. Second, it failed to
think historically. This flaw is evident in the naturalization of common sense. Third,
its model of argumentation was insufficiently precise.
On Merleau-Ponty's influence on Taylor
While commentators readily acknowledge the phenomenological and
philosophical hermeneutic dimensions of Taylor's philosophical anthropology
(Abbey 2004: 2-5; Redhead 2003: 8-10; Smith 1997: 36-39; 2002: 120), and
unproblematically attribute these dimensions to influences in Merleau-Ponty, there
remains by and large a surprising reticence to explore parallel influences in Taylor,
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particularly his interest in Marx's philosophical legacy. But there is an added
complexity here. That is, Merleau-Ponty's own sources in Marx may not have become
an irrelevant and repudiated past from which he himselfhad 'moved on', but may
have played a part in influencing his later work as well as the uses Tay/or came to
make of Marx.
As I point out in the previous chapter, the Marxist aspects ofTaylor's thought
are seldom considered more than of autobiographical interest; thus treating Taylor in a
manner similar to what orthodox Marxist scholarship has done to Marx - separating
the 'young Taylor' (the New Left 'Marxist') from the 'mature Taylor' (the 'civic
democrat').15 Compared, Marx could be read more perspicuously as straddling the
decline of (Hegelian) German idealism and the resurgence of empiricism when, in
collaboration with Engels, the scientific turn was to be produced; and to become
authoritative. What became hidden from view was Marx's earlier studies of ancient
Greek philosophy, particularly that of Aristotle. 16 One effect was to subvert
philosophy to the exigencies of a political movement as happened with Bolshevism.
Taylor makes clear that the practical human cost of such a reduction puts the entire
'socialist ideology' into question as a theory (Taylor 1974: 45-47; 1983a: 64-65).
Here he might as well take sides with Merleau-Ponty completely - and he probably
15 As Marx is purported to have rejected his Hegelian roots, so too the silence on Taylor's earlier work
leaves the impression that his New Left background was a mere nursery for his doctoral studies, and
that in returning to Canada he had left his 'Marxist youth' behind. It is for this reason mainly that
recovering the 'Marxist' Taylor has become lan Fraser's (2004, 2007) work, as recovering the 'young
(Hegelian) Marx' from the debris of collapsed Marxism has become the focus of Tom Rockmore's
work. But Rockmore follows in a tradition of Hegelian scholarship that has Georg Lukacs, Merleau-
Ponty and Taylor (among others) as its recent proponents. Not that their achievements were necessarily
a 'done thing' like a work of art. The questions and contexts that framed their research were quite
different - Leninism for Lukacs, pre-war France for Merleau-Ponty, and post-Stalinist Britain for
Taylor. The post-Marxist period elicits its own questions. However, common to these three thinkers
was a view of Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts that sat quite at variance to the principles of orthodox
Marxism. The Manuscripts were released by researchers in the Soviet Union in 1932 (Poster 1975: 42,
44-45, 49-51).
16 Studies of Marx's academic quest are extensive enough, though they appear to have become
ascendant in the intellectual Perestroika that has allowed scholars to inquire beyond the Leninist
boundary without risking the academic semblance ofa 'show trial'. One may consider the current
period post-Althussarian in so far as Althusser's position towards Marx was one driven "irresistibly to
the radical abandonment of every shade of Hegelian influence" (Althusser 1977: 90). But in an
atmosphere within which Hegel's rehabilitation could be effected, a sample of scholars such as Tony
Burns (2000), Sean Sayers and Tom Rockmore may be seen to write no longer in the provinces, but in
the very metropo)e of Marxist scholarship. Evidence of this sea change is found not least in Robert
lessop's recent migration towards questions that were once considered outrageous and heretical, ifnot
unimaginable. Burns sets out to "explain why Marx took such a great interest in Aristotle's De Anima
both during and shortly after doing the preparatory work for his doctoral dissertation - the subject
matter of which, of course, is precisely the materialist philosophy of the ancient Greek atomists
Democritus and Epicurus" (Burns 2000: 3-4).
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does - in so far as Merleau-Ponty accused Sartre of "attributing importance only to
objective history, while showing no genuine concern for man's freedom" (Hyppolite
1955: 101). The issue of freedom was uppermost in Taylor's mind when, following an
observation he made in 1956 while assisting Hungarian student refugees in Vienna, he
wrote in Universities and Left Review: "As for Marxism, they are neither for or
against it. A series of formulae they disliked having to learn, but as a body of
doctrine, it's dead for them" (Taylor 1957c: 75). He repeated this view about thirty
years later, when he noted, with admitted exaggeration, "the fact that between the
Elbe and the Mekong Delta, Marxism is utterly spiritually dead .... [and] somehow
manages to live only where Marxist regimes do not" (Taylor 1989b: 67).
There is a whole range of exploration going on in modem cultme of the most
important, fascinating and humanly meaningful kind, but it cannot survive in an
atmosphere in which this whole dimension is negated by the wrong model of freedom.
That is what I think you find in strictly orthodox Marxism, which is confident and
dismissive of this dimension and therefore sterile. What I describe here as orthodox
Marxism has really nothing to say about death, finitude, our relation to nature, and
only shallow things to say about human distance or sin or moral transformation. That
is why, as I said, from the Elbe to the Mekong Delta it is dead behind the eyes (Taylor
1989b: 70).
The distinction Taylor makes between Marx the philosopher of modernity and
the political ideology wrought in his name, accords with how Merleau-Ponty ended
his decade-long association with Marxism in collaboration with Jean-Paul Sartre.
That does not mean Merleau-Ponty rejected Marx the thinker; but like Taylor,
formative strands of Marx's thought continued to inform his phenomenology, not
least his view that "[t]rue philosophy consists in relearning to look at the world, and in
this sense a historical account can give meaning to the world quite as 'deeply' as a
philosophical treatise" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xxiii). Certainly he would have drawn
this insight significantly from Edmund Husserl's writings. However, at around the
time he was read ing Husserl, Merleau-Ponty had begun reading the 1844
Manuscripts; soon after their 1937 translation into French. He then came to the
conclusion that "Hegel and the young Marx were phenomenologists of concrete social
life, not purveyors of closed and arid intellectual systems" (Moran 2000: 393). In
Phenomenology ofPerception (1962), Merleau-Ponty writes:
The phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit expression of a pre-
existing being, but the laying down of being. Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-
existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing, truth into being. One may well ask how
this creation is possible, and if it does not recapture in things a pre-existing Reason.
The answer is that the only pre-existent Logos is the world itself, and that the
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philosophy which brings it into visible existence does not begin by being possible; it
is actual or real like the world of which it is a part, and no explanatory hypothesis is
clearer than the act whereby we take up this unfinished world in an effort to complete
and conceive it (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xxi-xxii).
Dermot Moran's (2000) comment on a fragment of this quote is instructive;
about Merleau-Ponty's scholarship on art, where he notes the Heideggerian
impression of Merleau-Ponty's view. "Though its sounds like Heidegger's views on
art and truth, it is more likely that Merleau-Ponty is here thinking of Marx and
Feuerbach's view of the role of philosophy to bring about the new world rather than
merely to understand it" (Moran 2000: 406). Taylor would adapt Merleau-Ponty's
view to a similarly expressivist one drawn from Herder (Taylor 1995: 79f). But it is
Marx's debt to Feuerbach that Taylor appreciates also l7 - thus indicating his sense
that it is not Marx per se that is as important as the background tradition to which he
belongs.
I want to return to Feuerbach a little later in this chapter; but here to take a
slightly less obvious approach to what I have been describing as Taylor's
identification of Marxism's 'weak link' in empiricism. Taylor (1989b) makes no
secret of his having discovered and extracted his anti-epistemological 'core idea' from
Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology, a set of procedures aimed at reaching an
undistorted description of experience. Taylor found in Merleau-Ponty's work an
approach through which he "sketched an approach to the theory of human
subjectivity, or philosophical anthropology, that would go on to serve him throughout
his writings" (Smith 2002: 26). I have suggested that Taylor's interest in Marx
preceded his' later' phenomenological interest in Merleau-Ponty; but his paper,
Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis (1959), clearly indicates that he was reading
phenomenology and Marx during the same period, and that he turned both against the
empiricist tradition. For that reason there are good grounds, though by no means
conclusive ones, to argue that Taylor's use of Marx was guided by similar uses found
in Merleau-Ponty.
17 It seems very likely that Taylor gained this insight from his doctoral supervisor, Sir Isaiah Berlin. for
whom Giambattista Vico, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Johann Georg Hamann (Berlin 2000) all
appear in a tradition that anticipates Marx, Hegel and Feuerbach. Taylor (1974) recognizes this link,
though, as I have posed earlier, appears to little recognise the place of Vico in this lineage.
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Organic intellectuals
Both Taylor and Merleau-Ponty had a particularly heightened idea of what it
entailed to be a philosopher; and it is plausible that Taylor drew his own notions of
the intellectual's political role from that mutual understanding. That is, the
understanding of the intellectual "as a situated philosopher" (Goehr 2005: 327) speaks
of them both. 18 It is the philosopher's duty, Merleau-Ponty argues in Humanism and
Terror, to explore the myth ofa totalitarian identification of "the peoples' thought
with party dictates, made possible through a false promise by the party to the people
that their thought is divergent and free" (in Goehr 2005: 327). In summarising
Merleau-Ponty's ideas on this matter, lydia Goehr (2005) writes:
[T]he philosopher works with the ambiguity and reflective doubt that constitutes the
core of humanistic Marxism deliberately to counter the insupportable Stalinist
reification or objectification that enables the party to impose its rule on society in a
totalitarian or ideological manner .... It is the philosopher's duty to expose the
contradiction, to dissipate the myth. This is the sort of action or engagement that
genuine revolutionary consciousness requires of the engaged philosopher. It is then up
to the heroes (among the people) to show how true revolutionary consciousness works
itself out in practice (Goehr 2005: 327).
Taylor was integrally part of the intellectual movement that began at Oxford
soon after institutional Marxism's 1956 annas horribilis, and from which the New
Left emerged. He considered the role ofthe intellectual seriously, and appeared to
follow Merleau-Ponty's example as a modus of his activism. After Merleau-Ponty's
"religious crisis l9 which led him in the 1930s in the direction of Marxism" (Moran
2000: 393), and after his readings of Husserl and Marx, and even after the war, he,
together with Sartre, helped found the left-wing journal Les Temps modernes.
Merleau-Ponty was "spurred by the conviction that philosophy had to become
engaged in the real world" (Moran 2000: 397)?O Questions concerning theoretical
18 It is important to distinguish here between the 'intellectualism' that Merleau-Ponty rejected, and a
position he derives from Max Scheler whereby any cognitive knowledge 'of the world' is dependent on
one's experience of embodiment. Basically, this advocates a philosophy of engagement as opposed to
the Cartesian models Merleau-Ponty attacks in Primacy ofPerception (see Mirvish 1983).
19 This crisis had far more to do with matters of the institutional Church's affiliations in global politics
than to do with matters of faith per se. Until 1935, Merleau-Ponty's outlook was Christian socialist.
"He was associated with left-wing Catholic intellectual journals such as Sept and Esprit, edited by the
Christian philosopher EmmanueJ Mounier. His first publications were reviews, in the French journal La
Vie lntellectuelle, of books by two philosophers who combined existentialism with Catholicism: the
French translation of Max Scheler's Ressentiment in del' Moral and Gabriel Marcel's Etre et avoir"
(Moran 2000: 392-393).
20 Merleau-Ponty resigned from the editorial board of Les Temps modernes over a disagreement "with
Sartre over the latter's uncritical support of the Soviet Union's role in the Korean War" (Dermot 2000:
398).
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problems of orthodox Marxism that occupied the movement were not new; but that
year thrust the philosophy into the light ofa crisis, and brought to those questions
added saliency. As Edward Thompson put it in Universities and Left Review:
The conflicts which matured within world Communism in 1956 are surely sufficient
to have shattered the old simplified picture. It is no longer any good whatsoever to
lump together all the contradictory phenomena of Communist-led societies as a Good
Thing or a Bad Thing. But it seems to me that intellectuals in this country have been
slow to grasp the inner significance of these events (Thompson 1957a: 31).
Thompson's article deals with the question of the purposes and ostensive
functions of unappreciated intellectuals in parties of the left. The period saw the
crushing of the worker revolt in Hungary, and the arrest of Lukacs. Yet, "in a period
of such significance for socialist theory as this, [intellectuals] can no longer waste
time and energy in the toi Is of a bureaucracy which demands everything from them,
from stamp licking to Daily Worker selling, except honest ,intellectual work"
(Thompson 1957a: 34). Taylor's explanation for the anti-intellectual malaise was "the
widespread belief that ideas are of no importance" (Taylor 1957b: 18), and the
concomitant attitude that intellectuals ought to abdicate to the expediencies of direct
action. But Taylor and his companions were going to have none of it.
Marxist versus Marxism
There appears from discussion so far that the core ofTaylor's project began
from within his critique of British Marxism during his days in the emergent New Left
movement. That is, Taylor did not appear to argue his position from within a Marxist
framework in a manner resembling the way in which a dyed-in-the-wool Party
member might do. He offered a critique of Marxism in Britain from a position that
drew from the Manuscripts Marx's concept of alienation (Taylor 1957a). It was a
move that influenced Taylor from then on, even ifthat source was to become
increasingly opaque in its many subsequent rearticulations. But it would be entirely
mistaken to think that Taylor's motivation was drawn from a parochial stage. Taylor
was no less attuned to developments in France, and he seems to have approached the
British condition from the (French) existentialist viewpoint in particular, and from
continental philosophy in general.
It is worth adding some substance to the claim I am making here, for there may
be a misconception that Merleau-Ponty was peripheral to French philosophy in
general, and even to the existentialist movement. Jean Hyppolite's (1955) brief
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"chronology of French existentialism" serves well to illustrate the point. He
distinguishes between four periods of French existentialism: (I) the years preceding
1939, (2) the period immediately following the war, (3) "Existentialism's period of
decadence [which] began a few years ago and is now, I believe, nearing its end"
(Hyppolite 1955: 101), and (4) a fourth period he thought the movement was entering
in 1955. Hyppolite identifies Merleau-Ponty as a leading figure in all but the first
period. Taylor enters the picture the year after Hypolite's article was published. The
period marks Merleau-Ponty's break with Sartre over his continuing accommodation
of "ultra-Bolshevism", and towards questions of the relations between history and
philosophy (Hyppolite 1955: 101). In addition to Hyppolite's schema, the areas in
philosophy surrounding existentialism's emergence must include analytic philosophy,
which, as the dominant tendency in English-speaking countries, emerged not least as a
struggle against British idealism. Hence we find Taylor (1959: 95-96; 1964: 47, 52)
drawing from Merleau-Ponty's method21 in Phenomenology ofPerception (1962) his
anti-dualistic attack on both empiricism and idealism entailed a 'return to history'.
History is the hinge around which Merleau-Ponty's critique of Marxism and
empiricism articulate. As Moran (2000) argues:
Following Hegel, Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, who all emphasise the
temporality and historicality of human existence, MerJeau-Ponty's commitment to the
phenomenology of concrete lived experience and embodiment also require him to
rethink the meaning of human historicality and temporality .... History can never be
understood as a single stream of meanings; there is no perspective from which we can
view the course of history from the outside, anymore than we can achieve a perceptual
view of a house as 'seen from nowhere' .... All thought, like all perception, is situated
and perspectival. This insight led Merleau-Ponty to develop a critique both of Hegel's
conception of absolute knowledge and also, in political terms, of the Marxist and
French communist approach to history, which tended to explain the living course of
history in static and a priori terms (Moran 2000: 404-405).
Taking a more conventional understanding of history, and to return to Taylor's
Oxford and the New Left movement that emerged there. We can be certain that
Taylor, traveling to Paris where he met with Merleau-Ponty, and returning to Oxford
and the economist condition of orthodox Marxist in Britain of the 1950s, must have
had difficulty in squaring the two 'Marxisms'. Given Mark Poster's (1975)
21 The chapter, 'The Phenomenological Field' in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology (1962) presents the
methodology he uses to evoke an alliance between science and perception, or between empiricism and
idealism (or intellectualism), thus collapsing the polarisation of the subject-object dichotomy. Both, he
argues, "assume a world in itself to which consciousness has to be accommodated" (Macann 1993:
168).
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description of post-war Marxism in France, the British Communist Party must surely
have cut a curiously anachronistic figure in Taylor's imagination:
After World War 11, the Communist Party of France was shaken by a threat it could
not have anticipated. The CPF had dealt, in its fashion, with numerous enemies in its
short history: Trotskyists, Socialists, liberals, fascists, conservatives, Catholics,
monarchists, all sorts of intellectuals, academics, and journalists who derived fame or
pleasure from polemicizing against Marx .... But now, after 1945, something more
sinister was happening: intellectuals of every conceivable stripe were proclaiming
allegiance to Marx's thought, or, at the very least, paying homage to the power and
fertility of his ideas. To the same extent that the French reading public was fascinated
by existentialism, Marx's ideas triumphantly paraded through Paris to enthusiastic
approval. To the chagrin of CP theorists, petty bourgeois intellectuals had successfully
advertised Marxism as a philosophy of alienation. France was astir with chatter about
alienation, bandying the name of Kart Marx in a manner entirely unsatisfactory to the
official Marxists of the CP (Poster 1975: 49-50).
This much shows Taylor to have been far less unconventional than he may have
appeared to have been to his New Left colleagues. He was French-speaking, after all;
and Paris had loomed large in his worldview since childhood. With his base in
Oxford, he was afforded the opportunity to mediate between debates in French
Marxism and the agenda pursued by the British New Left. Perhaps reassured by
Merleau-Ponty's similar experience, Taylor was able to critique the different ways in
which people came to distinguish Marx from Marxism. He found E.P. Thompson's
(1957a; 1957b) acceptance of Marxism and rejection of Stalinism flawed, though
understandable. Lukacs too had tried unsuccessfully to recover the Hegelian Marx and
to remain at the same time loyal to the communist movement (Anchor 1980: 280;
Resnick and Wolff 1982: 42).22
If the practice known as Stalinism is not in the true Marxist tradition, and if therefore
the assimilation Communism-Stalinism is false, can we go to the other extreme and
brand Stalinism as a pure deviation from Communist practice? Can Communists
repudiate Stalinism without also repudiating something of Communism? The answer
may not be simply the unqualified "yes" of Edward Thompson or the unqualified "no"
of classical anticommunists. There may be a more nuanced solution which will bring
us closer to the truth (Taylor 1957a: 92).
Taylor's position differs from both Thompson and Lukacs; although he is closer
to Lukacs (via Merleau-Ponty) for acknowledging the Hegelian and Romantic roots of
22 Tom Rockmore (2000: 99) succinctly sums up Lukacs's dilemma and eventual failure in trying to be
faithful to both Marx and Marxism. "Lukacs's impossible effort to be true both to Marx and to
Marxism creates an insuperable difficulty, which affects, weakens, constantly undermines and finally
defeats him throughout the long Marxist phase of his even longer intellectual career. Like so many
before and after him, he was unable to serve two masters. If his writings now seem dated to us, it is not
because he was a deeply informed, brilliant Marxist theoretician; rather it is because he was also deeply
interested in and cognizant about Marx that he tried, but finally failed, to be faithful both to Marx and
Marxism."
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Marx's earlier work. While Taylor was unequivocally critical of the orthodox
Marxism that he and many of his New Left contemporaries found in Britain, his view
was that "it is possible to reject Marxism as a global explanation, to have less than the
degree of faith in it which an orthodox communist has, and yet to appreciate the
importance and validity of its approach" (Taylor 1966a: 230). What Taylor sought, he
found in a recovery of the Hegelian Marx built around the concept of alienation. The
durability of this view in Taylor's philosophy is evident in his Ethics ofAuthenticity
(TayJor 1991 a).
The simple binary of Marx and Marxism can be misleading when considering
Taylor's approach. Certainly he rejected the economism of classical Marxism, and
certainly he found convincing the humanism of Marx's earlier work.23 At the same
time, he found Hegelian historicism24 more plausible that the reductive materialism
for which Marx is generally known. These are generalizations that serve to situate
TayJor in debates at that time, but only go so far. One of the more glaring
generalizations concerns the concept of materialism. Taylor separates from this term
its constituent empiricist and holist ingredients (Taylor 1966a: 237), together which
hinge upon a deeper articulation found in Aristotle (see Taylor 2002b: 284). Taylor's
objection, therefore, was certainly not the assertion of economic causality per se,
according to overtly materialist attributions to (or descriptions of) Marx's work. His
objections lie primarily in the ways in which Marx's work had been calibrated in
accordance with the epistemological requirements of seventeenth century science
(Taylor 1974: 51). That is, while the (Hegelian) holist ingredient asserts man as a
social being, and draws much from the Romantic tradition for this sense, the
empiricist ingredient draws upon a tradition that asserts an atomistic individualism
(Taylor 1966a: 238-239; 1974: 46). A deep contradiction, therefore, lies at the
philosophical base of Marxism in so far as there lies a rejection of the Romantic-
holistic root in favour of the empiricist-materialist (hence a 'deterministic') one.
Taylor explains:
The nub of the concept for our purposes here is perhaps this: since the seventeenth
century men - first in 'Atlantic' countries, then elsewhere - have tended more and
23 See Tony Burns's (2000) discussion on the central place of ancient Greek philosophy to Marx's
understanding of materiality.
24 In The Poverty ofthe Poverty ofHistoricism (Taylor 1958b), Taylor takes issue with Karl Popper's
attack on historicism. Taylor returns to the basis of his objection in Marxism and Empiricism (Taylor
1966a: 235-242), which I shall discuss shortly.
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more to define themselves as agents who derive their purposes from themselves.
Philosophically speaking, most earlier notions of man defined his 'normal' or optimal
condition at least partly in terms of his relation to a larger cosmic order, with which he
had to be in tune. The 'modern' view sees him rather as an agent who optimally
would use the surrounding world as a set of instruments and enabling conditions with
which to effect the purposes which he either found within himself (as 'drives' or
desires) or chose freely .... The best minds of the Romantic period recognized that one
could not go back, and should not want to. What they protested against was the
atomistic, manipulative bent of the Enlightenment (Taylor 1974: 49).
There are equally good grounds to argue that what Taylor found and rejected in
British Marxism derived from Engels's interpretation of Marx (Taylor 1974: 51),
which constituted a scientific or 'materialist Marxism' (Rockmore 1980: 29-30); and
that what he accepted was the humanist Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts, from which
he extracted Marx's theory of alienation.25 As Taylor points out, Marxism tries to
combine the rationalist, Enlightenment concern for the unhindered development of the
autonomous individual with the Romantic yearning for the discovery of meaning in
communion with all humanity, nature, and the cosmos (Taylor 1974: 49-51).
The evolution of Marx, on one interpretation at any rate, and certainly the evolution of
Marxism under the impetus of Engels, illustrates the tension and ambivalence in the
socialist tradition which is implicit in its attitude to modernization from the beginning.
On the one hand many socialists have found profound sympathy with the Romantic
experience of modern society as a desert in which everything has been levelled, and
all beauty has been stamped out to create a mundane, serviceable world of use-
objects. On the other, socialists have been among the most uncompromising
modernizers, tearing asunder traditional societies, institutions, customs with a savage
dedication unmatched by the great nineteenth-century utilitarians (Taylor 1974: 51).
A position similar to Taylor's - though more specifically directed at divorcing
Engels from Marx - is found in Tom Rockmore's range of work hammering out the
anti-Engelsian line. He argues that Engels assumed that by expunging all semblances
of Hegel, he was ridding Marx of (German) idealism (Rockmore 2002: 15-21). The
impression thus gained from the tradition derived from Engels was that Hegel was an
unremitting idealist (Rockmore 2000: 103; 2001: 340-341). Rockmore elsewhere
wastes no time in describing Engels - "who has clearly anti-idealist, positivist
leanings" (Rockmore 2000: 97) - as rejecting Hegel for being "pre-scientific", and
promoting materialism as scientific (Rockmore 2002: 15); hence making Marx at least
a 'proto-positivist' convinced that philosophy had been entirely superseded by
2S Taylor writes: "I do not believe anyone can doubt the debt of Marx, certainly the young Marx, to
Romanticism in general, and what I have called expressivism in particular. The picture which one finds
in the young Marx of liberated man, who has made himself over by labour, and whose work ceases to
be a travail and becomes free creativity, this surely is a quintessentially expressivist picture. And even
those who hold the most hard-nosed interpretation of the evolution of the mature Marx can hardly
believe that this quite disappeared from the purview of the author of Capital" (Taylor 1974: 51).
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science. As we see above, Taylor (1974: 51) does not accept that 'Engelsian' position
- thus 'unintentionally' prefiguring Rockmore's work - and does not accept the
corresponding notion that Marx was as assiduously a materialist; a view that, as
Rockmore (2000) points out in an historical note,26 derives primarily from a tradition
traveling through Engels and Lenin.
While both Hegel and Marx are considerably more nuanced than the
reductionist descriptions ascribed to each, it is significantly to Lukacs that Merleau-
Ponty looked for having, so soon after the Russian Revolution, set about recovering
Marx's Hegelian roots. The efforts of Lukacs (and Lucien Goldmann after him) to
free Marxism from an economistic straitjacket both constituted a major upheaval
within orthodox Marxism as it responded to the crisis it possibly thereby exacerbated.
In the previous chapter I mentioned Lukacs as having had an influence on Raymond
Williams (1977), but this came in the seventies after Williams met Goldmann on a
visit to Cambridge; and what Williams had discovered was the remarkable
congruence between his thinking and that of Lukacs and Goldmann (Higgins 1999:
111-112).
Space does not allow for a discussion on this aspect ofWilliams's work; nor on
how Lukacs's 'cultural Marxism' prefigures his own. The simplest and barest point
must do: that both attempted to win for culture a realm of theoretical and political
autonomy denied it by 'economizing' Marx; and that Lukacs set about recovering
Hegel so as to understand Marx in a way that ran counter to the economistic (and
positivistic) Marxism that proceeded through the pragmatic interpretations of Engels
and Lenin. Furthermore, his move was to separate Marx from the Leninist
configuration of Marxism, nonetheless attempting to retain Marx together with a
revised form of 'Marxism'. In this, Lukacs's 'cultural turn' anticipated debates that
were to follow in Britain and on the continent in the 1950s.
26 "Marx died in 1883 in a moment when the future of the movement based on his theories was far from
clear. When Engels died a mere dozen years later in 1895, the political movement that was to lead to
the Russian Revolution was already beginning to take shape. The group of men who carried out the
revolution were certainly more interested in practical politics than in careful scrutiny of Marx's
writings. It is not surprising that Lenin, who decisively influenced Marxism during the Bolshevik
period, mainly relied on Engels, not on Marx, in his authoritative writings. For the most part, Soviet
Marxists, including politicians like Stal,in, and representatives of 'official' Soviet philosophy ...
developed and elaborated, but did not substantially deviate from, the official Marxist line based on
Lenin's interpretation and adaptation of Engels to the Russian situation" (Rockmore 2000: 96-97).
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Merleau-Ponty's Marx
The fact that Taylor's overall philosophy shows a certain ambivalence towards
Marx ought not to be surprising given that TayJor subscribes as closely as he does to
Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology. lames Miller (1976) describes "the
French philosopher [as cutting] a curiously contradictory figure, tom between
phenomenology and a neo-Hegelian account of the meaning of history" (Miller 1976:
J09). But this contradiction is an advantage in so far as it allowed Merleau-Ponty to
explore the problematic area of human subjectivity in orthodox Marxist theory up
until the time Taylor was completing his doctoral studies (Edie 1971: 299; 1964: 57-
59; Miller 1976: 109). Merleau-Ponty died suddenly in 1961.
In the 1930s Merleau-Ponty began to deepen his study of Marx, especially the
writings of the young Marx as exemplified in the Manuscripts (Miller 1976: 109-
110). In 1935 he attended Alexander Kojeve's lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit. The year the world war broke out was particularly momentous for Merleau-
Ponty. Firstly, he was the first to visit the Husserl Archive after it had been taken to
Louvain in Belgium for safekeeping. "These brief encounters undoubtedly had a
decisive influence on the way in which Merleau-Ponty appropriated the later thought
of Husserl and incorporated it into the heart of his own philosophy" (Keamey 1994:
107). Secondly, it was in 1939 that he finally decided against joining the French
Communist Party, motivated by news in 1939 of the Moscow show trials and Nicholai
Bukharin's execution (Goehr 2005: 329-330; Kearney 1994: 106). Nevertheless,
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the significance of the trials wavered between
'explanation', on the one hand, and a declining estimation of Marxism as a
philosophy and as a movement (Miller 1976: 122). Merleau-Ponty attempted in the
immediate postwar period "to accommodate Marxism to his own thought, in the
process producing several rather disingenuous restatements on orthodoxy's
deterministic prejudices" (Miller 1976: 125), hence blurring his critique of
determinism in the social sciences.
Whereas in 1947 [Merleau-Ponty] had advocated a kind of critical adhesion to the
Communist Party, in 1955 Merleau-Ponty denounced the obsolescence of Communist
practice. The apparent cause of this new-found skepticism lay in the Korean War. But
Merleau-Ponty's turnabout had significant implications for his broader understanding
of Marxism. Increasingly, he refuses to take Marxist philosophical categories at face
value (Miller 1976: 122).
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The tendency, following Lukacs, to distinguish Marx from (Leninist) Marxism
was gaining ground. But by 1955, Merleau-Ponty took this further by exploring in
Marx's earlier theory an equivocation between a 'materialist' determination and a
dialectic that steered "clear of abstract alternatives such as 'idealism' and
'materialism'" (Miller 1976: 125). This equivocation is crystallized in Marx's concept
of society as second nature, 27 "the unreflective arena of habit, custom, convention,
and style" (Miller 1976: 131), which accounts for "Marx's original understanding of
social and historical laws" (Miller 1976: 132). Mark Poster (1975) notes that,
As Lubics said, the economy, a system of tools, was a "second nature." The economy
was indeed a second nature because it reproduced the unconsciousness of nature itself
within the creations of man, the economy would not become human until it was shorn
of its naturalness and reflected human desire (Poster 1975: 219).
Merleau-Ponty felt that this equivocation justified social relations being treated
through technical domination as if it were first nature - the objective natural world
per se. It is this equivocation Taylor noted, that allowed for the essentialist notion of
the proletariat that "Stalinism has built much on" (Taylor 1957a: 97). In Adventures of
the Dialectic, Merleau-Ponty argued that "[t]echnical action would replace
meaningful comprehension; in Marxist practice, the professional revolutionary would
displace the self-conscious proletariat, and guiding historical development would
become the prerogative of a party elite" (Merleau-Ponty in Miller 1976: 125).
Orthodox Marxism had already reduced the proletariat to a tool-object in forces of
production (Dallmayr 1976: 73).
It has created a kind of metaphysical gap between those who are "of the proletariat,"
and those who are not, so that at the limit, the latter are barely part of mankind at all.
The practice ofStaJinism has shown the limits of the concept of class morality, not
just in its mechanistic form, but in its true form as the postulate of a new moral life,
borne forward by a class, in virtue of its historical role. This concept is essential to
Marxist Communism (Taylor 1957a: 97).
It is here that Taylor eventually declares that "Marxist Communism is at best an
incomplete humanism" on the basis that the practice of the party in "trampling
underfoot for a time the brotherhood of man ... in creating the new society .... [was]
at least a possible reading of Marx" (Taylor 1957a: 98). Taylor's position draws, so it
27 In the Ninth Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx uses this concept. Cyril Smith (2005) represents the view in
a paragraph: "When society no longer appears as an alien "second nature," whose laws seem to be
immutable, we shall get to grips with the problems of living as part of "first nature," that is, of nature.
Natural necessity would remain, of course, to be studied by natural science, to be the collaborator with
technology in satisfying human needs. But historical necessity would gradually be overcome and
transformed. If this is "materialism," it is certainly not the "old materialism," whose standpoint was
that of "single individuals and of 'civil society'" (Smith 2005: 21).
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appears, quite directly from Merleau-Ponty. Events in the post-war period led
Merleau-Ponty to abandon the essentialist conception of the proletariat. He rejected
the Marxist 'assumption of rationality in human action, and its program for a
deterministic 'science' of society" (Miller 1976: I 10). "It was the proletariat that
unified subject and object, theory and practice, the ideal and real; it was the proletariat
that embodied a universal meaning of history in potential" (Miller 1976: 122).
Not until the Frankfurt School did Left theory develop a sufficiently
independent theory of culture that, in its own right, reconnected with political
economy to forge a powerful new analytical apparatus for analyzing emerging
monopoly-capitalist contradictions; and for those who made use of his work, Lukacs
became instrumental in their achievements. Taylor was one of many indebted to
Lukacs (Fraser 2007: 26, 28), though perhaps only indirectly through Merleau-Ponty,
who "elaborated a form of Marxism derived from Lukacs, Hegel, and the young Marx
- the Marx who ... portrayed the proletariat as a material force for 'the total
redemption of humanity'" (Miller 1976: 109-110).28
From Lukacs, [Merleau-Ponty] added an understanding of the proletariat as history's
(potentially) unified subject-object, the demiurge of Absolute Knowledge appearing
within human pre-history and transcending the fractured conditions of capitalism
toward the future of communism; while from Hegel, he borrowed the dialectic of
mutual recognition, and placed its resolution at the end of history. When wed to
Marx's original depiction of the proletariat as the heart of human emancipation, these
convergent strands in Merleau-Ponty's thought encouraged him to identify the
proletariat with man's alienated essence, and to seek in proletarian politics a virtually
apocalyptic class consciousness aiming at a more humane society, where men might
treat each other as ends rather than means (Miller 1976: 110).
The heavily Hegelian subscription is clearly evident from Miller's description;
but he also shows Merleau-Ponty as having found himself suspended between a
Hegelian portrayal of the "proletariat as the potential vessel of an absolute human
meaning" and a phenomenology in which the proletariat took the form of "an inchoate
yet coherent conjunction of individuals" (Miller 1976: Ill). Elsewhere Miller
28 The operative concept in Taylor's use of Marx was centrally his conception of alienation, drawn
from the Paris Manuscripts (Taylor 1958a) Given to whom Taylor refers in his essay, Alienation and
Community (Taylor 1958), it is unlikely that he derives his ideas from Lukacs. His references to the
humanist psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (Taylor 1958: 12, 14, 15) may indicate Taylor's interest in the
Frankfurt School; though it may as well indicate his a formative influence leading to his critical work
against behaviourist psychology (Taylor 1964). On the other hand, his references to Richard Hoggart's
Uses ofLiteracy (Taylor 1958: 14), discussed within an overall rejection of utilitarianism, suggests an
on-going dialogue with Hoggart and Williams on the matter of the cultural practices of media use.
Short of an incisive exegesis, finding Lukacs in Taylor's early work remains speculative. An exegesis
may reveal little more. However, there are no grounds to indicate any antipathy between Taylor and
Lukacs.
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describes Merleau-Ponty's Marxism as an "idiosyncratic fusion ofLukacs's 1923
view of class with Husserl' s later notion of history's telos" (Miller 1976: 128), thus
indicating an intention perhaps less idiosyncratic than an attempt to link both at their
respective Hegelian cores. To this view we can add Taylor's. While his understanding
is that the core of Marx is HegeJian, hence his at once critical approach to
Enlightenment thinking, and his attempt to laud its achievements (Taylor 1968a: 150-
151), Merleau-Ponty tries to connect the Hegelian-Marx thread (proceeding from
Lukacs) to a further (phenomenological) Hegelian thread that arrives from Edmund
Husserl (Kullman and Taylor 1958: 108, 110-112; Priest 1998: 13-35; Taylor 1967b:
114-116). The purpose for this combination, as Kullman and Taylor (1958: 112)
argue, is both to critique the empiricist theories of perception found in orthodox
Marxism in a way that recovers the historical dimension of human experience, and to
do so through a "genetic phenomenology" (Kullman and Taylor 1958: 113; see Priest
1998: 23).
The goal of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is therefore to take us back to the
beginning, to reveal the path we have taken. This sets the direction of his subsequent
philosophical work after 1945. What had to be done was to give a plausible account of
the higher forms, and first of that most essential of all higher forms for man-
language (Taylor 1967b: 116).
In the Phenomenology ofPerception (1962) we see Merleau-Ponty describing
man as 'condemned to meaning': "Because we are in the world, we are condemned to
meaning, and we cannot do or say anything without its acquiring a name in history"
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: xxii). By that he means, among other things, that the world
man inhabits is one that is meaningfully formed not only by perception and behaviour,
but also by language and symbols (Priest 1998: 206). But Merleau-Ponty here does
not have a representationalist symbolic theory in mind. As Taylor continues from the
above quote, "The crucial problem became that of accounting for expression, for the -
seemingly miraculous - creation of a new form ofthought or way of behaving or way
of knowing or treating the world through the evolution of (in the broadest sense of the
word) a new language" (Taylor 1967: 116). Stephen Priest (1998: 171) cites Merleau-
Ponty's refuting that 'to express' means 'to represent' in interpretation. "[T]he reason
he gives is that thought in its expression 'in' speech 'does not expressly posit objects
or relations' (Priest 1998: 171).
Merleau-Ponty used this image of man, in large part derived from Heidegger, to
criticize rationalist accounts of consciousness as "constituting". More than a
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perpetually renewed constitutive act, the "me" of personhood has to be viewed as a
relatively durable institution, "the field afmy becoming" with a history of its own
(Miller 1976: 113).
We can now refer back to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the proletarian as a
vehicle of history; and how he seeks to preserve within Marxism the intersection of
history within the personal. For Merleau-Ponty the subject of history is not simply a
factor in production, "but the whole man, man engaged in symbolic activities as well
as manual labour" (Miller 1976: 113). "What makes me a proletarian is not the
economic system or society considered as systems of impersonal forces, but these
institutions as I carry them within me and experience them; nor is it an intellectual
operation devoid of motive, but my way of being in the world within this institutional
framework" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 515). When an individual finds himself 'a worker',
this is a decision already "prepared by some molecular process, it matures in co-
existence before bursting forth into words and being related to objective ends"
(Merleau-Ponty ]962: 518). You find yourself having become a worker. To be a
worker is not only to be aware of being one. More crucially,
it is to identify oneself as worker or bourgeois through an implicit or existential
project which merges into our way of patterning the world and co-existing with other
people. My decision draws together a spontaneous meaning of my life which it may
confirm or repudiate, but not annul. Both idealism and objective thinking fail to pin
down the coming into being of class consciousness, the former because it deduces
actual existence from consciousness, the latter because it derives consciousness from
de facto existence, and both because they overlook the relationship of motivation
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 520).
In Sources ofthe Self(1989a: 464), Taylor takes up the issue of instrumentalism
and reification in capitalist society, to which he refers in earlier writing (Taylor 1966),
and positively cites Lukacs's work in this regard. Ian Fraser (2007) points out that in
aligning himself with Lukacs's linking of instrumental ism with alienation, he comes
closest to endorsing Marx's critique of capitalist society, "because [Marx] also
recognizes that there is a loss of meaning attached to instrumental understanding of
society," a loss which Taylor himself wants to win back (Fraser 2007: 26). Fraser
underscores Taylor's endorsement of "writers such as Lukacs, Adorno, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse in relation to their critiques of fetishism and alienation" (Fraser 2007:
28), and does so fittingly (for purpose I am leading to) in his chapter entitled "The
Self."
Since Marxist interpretations of Marx's relation to Hegel reaches its high point in
Lukacs, any effort to recover Marx must indicate the limitations of Lukacs's reading
of Marx's relation to Hegel .... [A]mong all the many talented Marxist writers,
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Lukacs stands out as perhaps the single most important Marxist philosopher. During
the long period of 'official' Marxism, there were many interesting Marxist writers ....
[Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao] very obviously [have] no real philosophical standing
when compared with someone like Lukacs .... It has been well said that Hegel was a
modem Aristotle. Like Hegel, although to a lesser degree, Lukacs was also a rare
polymath (Rockmore 2000: 97, 98).
Feuerbach
To this point I have argued that the resources ofTaylor's subscription to the
humanist and Hegelian Marx, as well as his critique of Marxist economism, derived
principally from Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, I have indicated that Taylor derives the
core of his agenda from Merleau-Ponty, who took over from Hegel and Marx the
understanding of our relation to the world as dialectical, but reworked that dialectic
according to an anthropology that was significantly more humanist than the orthodox
schema posited. In this respect, we can assume that Merleau-Ponty follows a path
closer to "Feuerbach who, as early as 1839, had begun to criticize Hegel's dialectic
from a humanist point of view" (Burns 2000: 26). For Marx, who followed Feuerbach
more directly then he did Hegel, he subscribed to the Aristotelian dialectic in that "the
relationship between mind and body within a particular human being might be
described as a dialectical one" (Burns 2000: 34) based on the principle of "identity in
difference" (Sayers 1980: 36).
The immediate source for the young Marx's idea that there is a need for a synthesis of
the German 'dialectical' philosophy of Hegel with the French 'materialism' of the
eighteenth century does appear to be the work of Feuerbach (Bums 2000: 34).
This is a view Taylor (1978a) takes when he argues that "Feuerbach is a
Hegelian, in the sense at least, that he has absorbed" Hegel's 'immanent critique' of
"the French materialists [who] start with a mechanistic conception of human nature
and human needs" (Taylor 197ba: 419, 418). Feuerbach did not return to an
Enlightenment human subject, but recognized "that an adequate account of the human
subject has to recognize that men form conceptions of themselves, and that they are
partly shaped by these conceptions" (Taylor 1978a: 419).
[Feuerbach] also sees that the subject who so understands himself cannot simply be
individual, that it is only in relation to others, in a community of speech, that we make
and develop these understandings by which we live. All this emerges in the rich and
still obscure Feuerbachian concept of the 'species being' .... one of the terms that
Marx took over from Feuerbach, using it extensively in his unpublished manuscripts
of 1844 (TayJor 1978a: 419).
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The paragraph following that from which I have extracted the above quote
contains a kernel ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology. That is, we can see one
source from which Taylor derives his notion of man as a "self-interpreting animal"
(Taylor 1985a: 27, 45-76).
Now we can think of animals as living this life with others unconsciously,
unreflectingly. But in the case of man, this common life is something of which we
have a notion, or at least a picture. We relate ourselves to some such notions or
images of what we are as men .... Feuerbach has, it would seem, incorporated an
understanding of man both as a self-interpreting being and an inescapably social
being. Marx took over both these dimensions when he borrowed the term (Taylor
1978a: 419).
For Feuerbach, "human self-understanding and therefore human development is
inescapably dialectical," thus presenting by way of "debunking Hegel's Spirit and
making man the centre of his" philosophy a humanism amenable to Marx (Taylor
1978a: 420, 419). Merleau-Ponty achieves a similar position in his own
phenomenology, though doing so through reading Lukacs's recovery of the humanist
Marx; to whose influence Merleau-Ponty added the Husserlian root that allowed him
to recover the humanist dimension of Hegel's phenomenology. In all, what we see is
Taylor tapping into a strand of Romanticism founded in the philosophical movement
of German idealism. It is here that we find (the humanist) Marx having begun. Marx's
'scientific' work takes shape in the later 1800s at a time when Enlightenment thinking
was returning to ascendancy in modern history as empiricism. Thus Marx
encompasses in the historical development of his thought both the Romantic and
empiricist strands of modernity.
By stating that Taylor 'derived' Hegel and Marx from Merleau-Ponty is not to
mean that he used Merleau-Ponty as a 'secondary source'. That much flies in the face
ofTaylor's own arguments (derived from Merleau-Ponty) concerning philosophy
being coterminous with its own history (Taylor 1984a). Merleau-Ponty does not stand
on his own feet, as it were, but on the shoulders of those giants arrayed in the
Romantic tradition of modernity; which extends to the antiquity of Greece.
Conclusion
To sum up, and to tie up some loose ends in this chapter, we can be reasonably
certain that Taylor's motives for studying the Manuscripts were bound up rather more
with an interest in Merleau-Ponty's Marxism than they had to do with sorting out
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problems of economism in British Marxism. In this respect we see that Taylor follows
in a line instituted by Lukacs who, together with Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt
School theorists, opposed the economistic view that Marx had "discovered the truth,
namely, that the economic aspect of social reality determined the non-economic"
(Resnick and Wolff )982: 32). Again, this opposition opened a way for a humanistic
Marxism built upon a critique of Marxist economism. But perhaps more significantly,
it recalibrated Marxism as a neo- Romantic rejection of the mechanistic picture
derived from seventeenth century science. Central here is a recovery of the historical
subject in the Hegelian problematic that Lukacs, and Merleau-Ponty after him, locate
in "the proletariat, the human essence in revolt against its radical negation," affirming
"the human essence;" a proletariat as "philosophy in deed and in political practice
philosophy itself" (Williams 2001: 61).
Taylor's interest did not amount to recovering Marx as ifhe were a revelation
hidden in the corruptions of successive interpretations. Instead, his interest lay in
"getting right" the fact that the historical matter is something upon which philosophy
converges without expecting to find there an essence. To consider Marx's philosophy
entails sensitivity to the 'genetic' structure Hegel bequeathed to Marx's own thought.
In the Manuscripts, therefore, what Taylor found was a convergence of 'getting right'
a world that in its experience remains quintessentially historical; and what Merleau-
Ponty offered him was a recent convergence upon its historical constitution.
Connecting history and philosophy this way accords with Taylor's (1984a) view that
allows him to see Merleau-Ponty not only as a successor in the Romantic tradition,
but also as an 'embodied' convergence of that tradition.
It should not be surprising to see the convergence with Hegel and Marx which is
evident in Merleau-Ponty's work. For the ambition to overcome the dualism of mind
and nature, the attempt to do this by a conception of mind which is inseparable from
its incarnation in matter, the resultant preoccupation with problems of genesis: these
are all Hegelian ideas; indeed, one might consider them the Hegelian bequest to
philosophy. This tends to be the view of Merleau-Ponty's generation of French
thinkers who were introduced to Hegel via Wahl and Kojeve (Taylor 1967b: 117).
While there is little doubt that Taylor's self-description as an intellectual takes
its measure from Merieau-Ponty, the question still remains whether Taylor can be
considered a Marxist thinker rather than as a critic ofMarxism. The question can be
put differently. Following the certainty that it is within the Romantic tradition of
continental philosophy that Taylor situates his philosophy, we can ask whether he
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takes his lead from the Hegelian-Marxist strand of that tradition, or whether his
appropriation of Marx follows from a broader subscription to the tradition in which
Marx is a part - that is, German Romanticism generally. We can surmise from
comparing Taylor's contention that Marxism was an "incomplete humanism" (Taylor
1957a), with his conviction that the Manuscripts expressed the humanist Marx, that
the 'young Marx' belonged to the Romantic tradition whereas the Marx of homo
economicus that informed orthodox Marxism was equally informed by the
Enlightenment tradition of modernity. This distinction establishes the framework of
Taylor's Sources ofthe Self(1989a); yet short of accepting one aspect of the
equivocation as 'good', and brand the other as its 'evil twin', and leaving it at that,
such provides insufficient reasons both for Taylor's prognosis of modernity and for
the value he accords to Marx. The anti-humanist impulse is not the sole possession of
positivistic Marxism, with all else given to alternative perspectives; empiricism
included.
By humanism I mean some kind of doctrine about human potentialities which can
command our moral admiration. The question is whether a socialist movement needs
such a doctrine at all. This issue is raised today in a way it was not thirty years ago, in
the writings of MicheI Foucault and by post-structuralists. There is a movement on the
left which thinks that humanist doctrines are an obstacle rather than a help, so the first
issue I have to come to terms with is whether this kind of view about human beings is
necessary at all or plays any role. 1very strongly think that it does (Taylor 1989b: 6\).
In Marxism and Empiricism (Taylor 1966a), Taylor addresses the question
"why Marxism and the Marxist tradition has had so little impact on Britain and British
philosophy" (1966a: 227). By referring to the philosophy as 'having little impact',
Taylor does not imply that Marxism was a neglected topic there, but that it was
considered from outside the empiricist paradigm as an intellectual curiosity. The
highest point in British Marxism had been in the 1930s, but the "post-war period has
seen a decline in the importance of Marxism, both intellectually and politically, to the
status quo ofthe 1920s". But "even at its apogee in the 1930s Marxism was not
important in the academic world" (Taylor 1966a: 228), with the exception of history,
"a discipline into which Marxist ideas and a Marxist approach have already penetrated
very deeply" (Taylor 1966a: 229).29 Despite the significant impact British neo-
29 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Taylor was academically predisposed towards historiography;
and not least for his association with Christopher Hill, it is hard to imagine Taylor not having brought
to their discussions the particular contributions Merleau-Ponty made towards connecting history with
identity. But this much is speculative rather more than it explains his overall view.
188
Marxists have had on social theory, not least in the institution of British Cultural
Studies, Taylor notes that
Many students of politiml thought have written on this subject. ... But the
characteristic of this writing is that it represents a study of Marxism from the
outside .... [A]t its best, it can only approach the sympathetic and detached study
normally accorded to Oriental religions. Marxism may be of burning interest for all
sorts of reasons, but never because it might be true (Taylor 1966a: 229).
Taylor thus implies a distinction between writing about Marx and Marxism and
writing within a Marxist framework; though that latter does not entail being a
committed Party member, or even a communist. Nor does the adoption of such a
framework demand one assume a forgiving stance towards 'mistakes' of the Soviet
and Leninist world. Taylor refers to Maclntyre30 as "the rare non-Communist Marxist
thinker," and adds "the work that recommends him to his colleagues is not
specifically Marxist" (Taylor 1966a: 228); but it would seem that in this accolade
Tay lor betrays a self-description in so far as he acknowledges the value of Marx, yet
calls for a rejection of Marxism as a political philosophy (Taylor 1968a: 180-181;
1989b: 69-70). Puzzling still is the negative response (Taylor 1995b) he gives to
Isaiah Berlin's description of his being a Marxist (Berlin 1995: 1-2). Taylor alludes to
his earlier arguments concerning the debilitating effects Leninism has had on human
well-being.
Even without Leninism, it would be very difficult to get some kind of decentralized
self-rule going in Russia again. Russia is a very difficult case because the catastrophe
of Leninism occurred in a history in which there was previously the catastrophe of
Ivan the Terrible, and it is probably not an accident that this history helped to lay the
basis for Russian Leninism. Maybe, therefore, things are worse in Russia than they
would be in the countries of Eastern Europe if this weight were lifted. Nevertheless, in
the long term, it has a catastrophic effect on self-rule. It is a great engine of despotism.
To sum up this second point against Marxism: in so far as this kind of humanism is
built on the Rousseauian model, as against the TocquevilJean model, it is disastrous in
the long run for democracy (Taylor 1989b: 67).
In distinguishing between the Rousseauian and Tocquevillean models, Taylor
means that the Marxist alignment with the former posited a model of human liberation
based on "a picture of human beings as having this tremendous potential to re-create
themselves from out of themselves" (Taylor 1989b: 68). The result is both a power to
destroy existing structures, but in its place provides a potentially empty kind of
freedom that Hegel rejected for not giving "a model for what human life would be
like to make it worthwhile" (Taylor 1989b: 68). This happens despite Marx's post-
30 Alasdair Maclntyre, alongside E.P. Thompson, abandoned the British Communist Party in 1956.
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Romantic conception of humans freed from productive labour given thereafter to
artistic creation. It is a conception in 1956 which, Taylor says, "was part of the
original New Left which made us look at the whole range of human culture in terms
of its political dimension" (Taylor 1989b: 68).
Now in the post-Romantic - I like to call it 'expressive' - age in which we have lived
since 1800, artistic creation and artistic expression have been conceived in two
different ways. There are conceptions of artistic creation as self-expression and all
sorts of people think of it in those terms .... It is that interpretation of artistic creation
that moves it towards the model of self-determining freedom. On the other hand, there
is a set of models in which what we are struggling to express is not ourselves, but
something beyond ourselves .... [a]n indication to go beyond subjectivism. My
critique of Marxism is that it once more slides towards the self-expressive model,
which I think is radically imperfect (Taylor 1989b: 68-69).
Taylor's interest in Marx is primarily philosophical in so far as Marx provides
both a source and an impression of the Romantic tradition ofmodemity. However,
there remains a deep ambiguity in both Marx and (especially) in Marxism that
accedes to the rival tradition stemming from the seventeenth century scientific
revolution. Taylor opposes this tradition for reasons mainly to do with the inadequate
and mechanistic image of the human person that is constituted within it. Taylor rejects
orthodox Marxism mainly for the way it institutes that image, to which its tragic
historical record attests. For this and similar reasons, Taylor finds in Marx's theory of
alienation a resource for his own agenda, and one in which his project must certainly
be indexed ifTaylor is to see himself as following in the Romantic tradition. His
opposing target indexes the Enlightenment, and it was in British analytical thought
and empiricism that he found its expression most firmly entrenched. That is, British




At the centre ofTaylor's argument lies a 'core' conception of human agency
that he is intent on restoring to the social sciences. In Taylor's way lies a Lockean
disengaged subject construed from a theory of mind imagined as an 'inner realm'
where ideas derive from sense impressions, or 'sensory data'. This 'knowing' subject
ideally given to philosophical-scientific reflection concurs with the Cartesian
intellectualist theory of mind, furnished with ideas rendered as discrete, self-
contained, representations. In the Cartesian-Lockean frame: from an 'inner' reflection
of an 'outer' world we derive experience ofthat world. Our knowledge is only
representational, and the motivation for the inner-outer sorting by which
representation is mediated is epistemological.
To this picture of reified 'ideas' Taylor brings the existential phenomenological
critique ofMaurice Merleau-Ponty, in whose theory perception is our primary access
to the world; that is, we perceive pre-objectively before we reflect objectively (Smith
2004: 33). Thus the epistemological model is reversed such that what it is to perceive
(primitive) is imposed on what it is to know, which becomes derivative. But
perception is not a mental faculty abstracted from embodiment. Perception is
inseparahle from coping and engagement with things in-the-world. The "content of
perception is non-contingently related to the world in which the perceiving, knowing
subject is embod ied. And since perception is our primary mode of access to the world,
the predicament of knowing subjects is never entirely free of its agent structure"
(Smith 2004: 33). A phenomenology must describe how things appear to the subject
prior to reflection; to attend to the perceptual, pre-objective world, which signifies in
a way that relates to the desires and purposes of the perceiver. Perceptual knowledge
is agent's knowledge (Kullman and Taylor 1958; TayJor 1995a: 10). "[T]he
hermeneutic attempt to rehabilitate meaning as an indispensable category for
understanding what it is to be human is to identify and dismantle the motivations for
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carving up the world" into an outer realm of physical facts and an inner realm of
mental ones. (Smith 2004: 32).
The argument of this chapter follows thisfoundational strand in Taylor's
philosophical anthropology, which he developed most poignantly in his first book,
The Explanation ofBehaviour (Taylor 1964), but which has continued to inform his
philosophy in the many directions in which it has been expressed. Taylor's essays,
Interpretation and the Sciences ofMan (Taylor 1971a) followed by Overcoming
Epistemology (1987a) are perhaps the best examples where his anti-epistemology is
explained. Taylor's magnum opus, Sources ofthe Self(1989a), is the most famous
and widest-ranging expression of all. The core he explains in Foundationalism and
the Inner-Outer Distinction (Taylor 2002), and Merleau-Ponty and the
Epistemological Picture (2005); and I shall end this chapter with a discussion
focusing on those two essays. The anti-Cartesian theme that I shall discuss, however,
is not exclusive to these texts, but stands out in all his work - his post-Marxism
included; and I shall return to the question of Feuerbach towards the end of this
chapter.
The theme of this chapter, in short, argues that epistemology, as a
foundationalist theory of knowledge - understood as a 'correct' representation (in
'mind') of an independent reality ('out there') - is outdated. The term representation,
for Taylor, includes the notion that reality is 'mind-independent', and by extension
assumes a punctual and disengaged self, together with an atomistic construal of
society. Descartes's formulation of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution fits
well with mechanistic science, and continues to inform computer-based models of
mind, but it misconstrues human life to which it is applied in naturalistic social
science.
Hermeneutics and the epistemological construal
Three themes emerge in Taylor's work: his affiliation to the humanist Marx, his
objection to Cartesian models of identity and agency, and the rejection of empiricist
assumptions in social science. While Taylor's philosophical anthropology is formed at
an intersection of these three concerns, it is important to note also that this
intersection represents his reading of Merleau-Ponty; not least Phenomenology of
Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962). But one difficulty that transpires from this
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recognition is that Phenomenology does not directly address problems of
epistemology, but tends to read instead as an idealist metaphysical exercise in
transcendental philosophy, I and hence appears to leave incomplete phenomenology's
aim to "overcome the idealism-realism antinomy," and does so possibly, as Gary
Madison argues, by harbouring an ambivalent relation towards Edmund Husserl's
idealism (See Madison 1981: 32,189,205,213-214).2
In the framework ofHusserl's notion of intentionality, being is being-for-a-subject.
Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty reacted against Husserl's idealism and his notion ofa
transcendental Ego as the constituting source of everything which appears to
consciousness. But he had not for all that - at the time of the Phenomenology - called
into question the notion of intentionality itself. He wanted in fact to hold on to this
Husserlian notion while rejecting its idealist implications. This may have been an
impossible project; it is in any event the source of alii the ambiguity in Merleau-
Ponty's work (Madison 2001: 32).
This much is evident in Merleau-Ponty's central conception of the situated
subject who, being embodied, is found nonetheless in-the-world it perceives. The
subject of perception in Husserl retains the subject/object ontology that Cartesian ism
introduced, and it is not least for this reason that Taylor departs here from Merleau-
Ponty (Dreyfus 2004: 52). Taylor finds, instead, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology
exemplified in Hegel, in whose philosophy of mind the 'mental' "is the inward
reflection of what was originally external activity" (Taylor 1985a: 85). That is, mental
life and self-perception do not consist of representations of something outside, but are
the fruit of an activity of formulating how things are with us, what we desire, think,
and so on. In this way, grasping what we desire or feel is something we can altogether
fail to do, or do in a distorting or partial or censored fashion. Ifwe think through the
consequences of this, I believe we see that it requires that we conceive self-
understanding as something that is brought off in a medium, through symbols or
concepts, and formulating things in this medium as one of our fundamental activities
(Taylor 1985a: 85).
Taylor traces Hegel's expressivism to Johan Gottfried Herder's philosophy of
language (Taylor 1995a: 79ff). "On the expressivist model ... human beings are
rational animals in the sense that they strive to realize goals and purposes which
provide a standard or measure for what it is to be a fully realized human being"
I Gary Madison (1981: 5, 16, 19, passim) makes this point extensively in various places of his book on
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. But opinions do differ. Remy Kwant (1963: 117-119)
2 Remy Kwant (1963: 118) describes this ambivalence in that, while Husserl argued that the ultimacy
of the phenomenal field corresponded to an equally ultimate subject to which everything appears-
"[t]his subject would be the thinking']' and this 'I' would determine the structure of the phenomenal
through the way in which it makes reality appear" - Merleau-Ponty argued instead that the phenomenal
field "does not reveal itself to a subject outside the field but encompasses also the subject, for this
subject is essentially a dialog(ue) with the other" (Kwant J963: J] 8)
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(Smith 2002: 65). Other influences on Taylor's philosophical anthropology include
the existentialists Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer in the continental
tradition, and in analytical philosophy, Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While
Taylor's thought comprises an articulation of those two traditions, they hinge on a
philosophical hermeneutic conception of the human person in so far as interpretation
is the very condition of being human. In this sense at least, Taylor challenges
Cartesian conceptions of persons imagined merely as 'objective' and uninvolved
observers. He hereby follows Gadamer (1970), for whom understanding is not
an isolated activity of human beings but a basic structure of our experience of life. We
are always taking something as something. That is the primordial givenness of our
world orientation, and we cannot reduce it to anything simpler or more immediate
(Gadamer 1970: 87).
This much is provided not to indicate that Taylor dismisses Merleau-Ponty; far
from it. Like Taylor, it can be argued that Merleau-Ponty straddles both the
continental and analytic traditions at least in so far as he claims that "language is the
entry point for a more profound understanding of human interrelationships" (Cullen
and Godin 1994: 114). Christopher Macann (1993) states that there are "the
beginnings of a revival of interest in Merleau-Ponty, especially among those
interested in phenomenology's answers to questions currently being posed in analytic
philosophy of mind" (Macann 1993: 433). Merleau-Ponty offers a key to unlocking
the core of the Cartesian problematic that drove Taylor's early thinking - what Hubert
Dreyfus (2004) calls Taylor's "anti-epistemology" - that emerged in an interface
between the continental and analytic traditions.) This consists principally in Taylor's
critique of empiricism, positivism and behaviourism in the social sciences, drawn
mainly (though not exclusively) from Merleau-Ponty. By means of the same source,
idealist and constructivist paradigms are rendered no less vulnerable. Both assume an
implaus.ible model of the self, as Merleau-Ponty's method of collapsing empiricism
and intellectualism attests (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 39-41,61).
Merleau-Ponty's method is the key to Taylor's anti-epistemology which, as I
have argued from the start, can be used to critique the representational and
mediational picture of agency and identity inherent in Windschuttle's empiricist
rejection of cultural studies. At the same time, however, in so far as Windschuttle's
3 Regarding the latter tradition, Taylor is generally credited (along with Alasdair Maclntyre, Richard
Bernstein, Richard Rorty, and others) with having made analytic philosophy interesting through a
rehabilitation ofHegelian thought (see Redding 2007: 13, 149).
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label of the field as a form of' linguistic idealism' fits Merleau-Ponty's description of
intellectualism (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 28-29), Windschuttle faces the situation of the
cap fitting him as perfectly as he sees it fitting his relativist opponents.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the details of his objections are
entirely without merit. What it does show, however, is that while many of the
structural ist conceptions, postmodern theories of identity, and even Iiterary sty les that
he criticizes are no less contentious for many scholars in the field, the empiricist
assumptions that he brings to his critique remain as problematic as the 'idealist' and
relativist conceptions to which he reduces cultural studies (see Turner 2000).
Furthermore, as I pointed out (at the start of the previous chapter) about Paul Willis's
(1980) paper, the resources upon which scholars in Birmingham drew in the process
of their debates ranged far more widely than can be assumed from reading papers on
outcomes of these debates.
In so far as it is possible to neatly separate the analytic from the continental
influences in Taylor's thought, the criticism of WindschuttJe's empiricism given in
this chapter applies principally to Taylor's analytic thought. But even here, however,
we find the anthropological implications of his arguments drawn from the continental
tradition are more than patently clear.
As Windschuttle does not declare his empiricist outlook quite so forthrightly
and provocatively as does David Stove (1982), whom he follows,4 his normally
uncontentious references to empirical practice might be easily overlooked (even by
constructivists) were it not for how he positions the term empirical in a binary relation
to the widest range of interpretive methodologies preferred by cultural studies
scholars (Windschuttle 1997a). That is, the sheer range of methodologies and
perspectives that he rejects (see Windschuttle 1997b: chs. 1, 7) indicates that by
'empirical' (that is, method) he means empiricist (as ontology and methodology). In
another respect it is not the case that Windschuttle's empiricism tends to prefer
quantitative research methods as opposed to qualitative ways of rendering reality.5 It
4 Windschuttle, in The Killing ofHistory (1996: 220-222, 232-233, 236-238), cites David Stove (1982)
as the "most incisive critic of the Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos-Feyerabend position" (Windschuttle 1996:
220). I do not wish to contest Windschuttle's acceptance of Stove's argument, except to point out here
that Stove addresses their collective relativist views as ostensibly confronting the philosophy of
science, but in fact drawing their views from a reading of the history of science (Windschuttle 1996:
221).
5 See Chapter Three, footnote n.4 on pages 54-55.
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appears doubtfu I that Windschuttle wou Id aver on the side of an exclusively Erkldren
(causal explanation) comportment of empiricism and logical-positivism as opposed to
the Verstehen (understanding) position given in the proceduralist mould of Wilhelm
Dilthey's hermeneutics (see Harrington 2000; 2001) of"objectified life" (Schatzki
2003: 302-305). "Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation," Windschuttle (1997b:
205) points out, after opening a section on the topic with:
There has been a distinction in the humanities and social sciences between studying
the actions of human beings and the meanings of human conduct. There have been
times when one side of the division has been favoured at the expense of the other ....
In the period between the Second World War and the late 1960s, action-based
perspectives were very much in vogue. This was the heyday of behaviourism in
psychology and sociology. Behaviourists argued that the meanings that people gave to
what they did could be vague, contradictory and often difficult to either interpret or
articulate. They thought it impossible to build a rigorous social science on such soggy
foundations. Human actions, however, could be counted, measured and tested with
precision and so appeared to provide the primary data from which a proper science of
society could emerge (Windschuttle 1997b: 204).
But before leaping to the conclusion that Windschuttle throws his Jot in with
social science of that period, he adds the criticism that "[i]t is clearly impossible to
portray the richness of society and the reality of life once meaning is set aside"
(Windschuttle 1997b: 205). He thus articulates Erkldren (action) and Verstehen
(meaning). But the pendulum did not stay there.
In recent years, however, the balance has not only swung away from the side of action
but has gone right over the edge in the opposite direction. For we now have cultural
and literary theorists insisting that it is only meaning that matters. Just like the
behaviourists of the 1950s and 1960s, they have produced an orthodoxy with its own
badges of identity and in-crowd terminology. One of the banners under which they are
marching is called hermeneutics (Windschuttle 1997b: 205).
Windschuttle does not reject hermeneutics in toto. The point where he does
begin to draw back from hermeneutics lies along a differential between a (Dilthian)
proceduralist hermeneutics and the substantive hermeneutics he attributes to Hans-
Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger (WindschuttJe 1997b: 205).6 Taylor (1985a: 3;
1989a: 168; 1994: 217) subscribes to the Gadamerian and Heiddegarian variety in so
far as their theory speaks of the structure of the subject being hermeneutic - hence
TayJor's thesis that human beings are self-interpreting animals, presupposing the
more fundamental "that human existence is constituted by the meanings things have
for it, meanings determined more or less explicitly by self-interpretations" (Smith
2004: 31).
6 Here I wish to underscore discussion on pages 67 to 69 in Chapter Three ofthis dissertation.
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This is a widely echoing theme of contemporary philosophy. It is central to a thesis
about the sciences of man, and what differentiates them from the sciences of nature,
which passes through Dilthey and is very strong in the late twentieth century. It is one
of the ideas basic to Heidegger's philosophy, early and late. Partly through his
influence, it has been made the starting point for a new skein of connected
conceptions of man, self-understanding and history, of which the most prominent
protagonist has been Gadamer (Taylor 1985a: 45).
But as the "henneneutic philosophy of social science demarcates the social
sciences from the natural sciences because of their interpretative procedure," and
since "it disclaims the kind of objectivity attained in the natural sciences,
hermeneutics is routinely associated with relativism in the social sciences" (Smith
2004: 29. Emphasis added). Windschuttle (l997b: 205) appears to misrepresent
Heideggarian henneneutics as fleeing to the side of 'meaning'. Instead, existential
hermeneutics underlines intentionality in the moniker of "meaning and being" (Smith
2004: 30. Emphasis added), thus emphasizing contextuality and embodiment of
interpretive activity. It is the embodiment of self-interpretation that Taylor derives
from Merleau-Ponty. For this reason Nicholas Smith says:
Merleau-Ponty is a key influence on Taylor - certainly more important than Dilthey
and probably more so than Gadamer (the names most often associated with
hermeneutics) - and it is important, when locating Taylor in the hermeneutic tradition,
to bear this in mind (Smith 2004: 31-32).
What I am claiming here is that, while Windschuttle certainly does not deny that
journalists interpret what they find in-the-world, his understanding of the human
person rests on certain assumptions belonging to natural science, and therefore his
anthropology is not so dissimilar to one found in the compunction of structuralism to
erase human agency from its social enquiry.? Nonetheless, if Windschuttle does pin to
his sleeve the colours he hoists agai nst cu ltural studies, he provides more than
circumstantial evidence that he favours the scientistic methodologies of causal
explanation as opposed to the preferred interpretive and Verstehen methodologies that
are largely shared between the contending paradigms in cultural studies. On the other
hand, what Merleau-Ponty refers to as "intellectualism" (see Macann 1993: 168),
together with its Cartesian subject, is evident in the representationalist thinking that is
dominant in much of cultural studies scholarship (see du Guy 1997), which becomes
7 lronically, Windschuttle's naturalism is not incompatible, or even far removed, from the
anthropological implications of structural ism.
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no less vulnerable to arguments leveled by Taylor's critique of Cartesian
epistemology than do Windschuttle's empiricist conceptions.8
Taylor (1980a) uses Merleau-Ponty (and Wittgenstein) to reject, on the one
hand, empiricist and Cartesian epistemology in the social sciences, and on the other
hand, the idealist paradigms that emerged as a residue of the empiricist and rationalist
absolute worldview that the seventeenth century scientific revolution extracted from
the Aristotelian holistic corpus (Smith 2002: 35-37). The absolute that science
requires eschews all subject-related properties on grounds that they are secondary to
those properties deemed independent of human perception, and to which logical-
empiricism and deductive-nomological models of knowledge attend (Taylor 1980a:
32).
The above sections serve to contextualize my claim that the intentionality (or
aboutness) ofTaylor's philosophy is the critique of epistemology. But the principal
problem for him is its misconstrual of human being. The point I am driving at is that
Taylor's critique of the epistemological construal that proceeds from the rational
Enlightenment is not a problem to which his philosophical anthropology is intended,
but instead, his anthropology derives from the direction of that critique. Consequently,
in so far as my claim is true, it would be incorrect to argue that Taylor actually
assumes any of the qualities about persons that are regularly ascribed to his views.
Instead, Taylor's assumptions lie in his critique of Cartesianism; and his philosophical
anthropology proceeds from these assumptions as an argued case. This clarification
makes the difference between averring to a relativistic comparison between, on the
one hand, rival conceptions of the self, and on the other hand, of establishing that one
conception acquires a measure of coherence or "epistemic gain" over rival claims
(Taylor 1989a: 72), if not a once-and-for-all certainty of its being true.9
The notion of"epistemic gain" in Taylor's usage provides a further example of
why he refuses to be a 'knocker' or a 'booster' of modernity (Smith 2002; and
8 A clear distinction must be made between representationalist models of the self, and theories of
representation. Taylor rejects the former but not the latter. Through Hegel, Taylor (1985a:78f) argues
that representation is an achievement that subjects work towards, rather than something transparently
given to the self in perception. This point is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
9 "Typical ways of achieving [epistemic gain] are through identifying and resolving a contradiction in
the original interpretation, pointing to a confusion that interpretation relied on, or by acknowledging
the importance of some factor which it screened out. The nerve of the rational proof, Taylor writes,
consists in showing that a particular transition is 'an error-reducing one. The argument turns on rival
interpretations of possible transitions'" (Smith 1997: 61-62. See Levy 2000).
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illustrates the case closer to the topic of this chapter - the question of epistemology in
relation to the stand-off between realists (or materialists and empiricists) and
relativists (or idealists and constructivists). That is, the issue behind the notion of
epistemic gain is one found typically between realist advocates of the inferential
supremacy of science, and "social constructivist arguments that scientific knowledge
has no privileged claim to truth and has thus placed all knowledges, in theory, on a
common epistemological footing" (Muller 2000: ]49). The relativist stance is made
up of a wide range of positions, 10 but share a family resemblance in claims that "there
is no reality beyond constructive description, that there is nothing 'outside the text'
(nothing that is not a product of representation) and therefore [that] science takes its
place as a human activity next to other activities" (Muller 2000: 151). Taylor tends
not to 'throw in his lot' with either camp, but steps back to take into view a broader
issue. The assertion of there being an 'epistemic gain' in advances of knowledge
rejects the neo-Nietzscheans who argue that the knowledge science produces is only
one kind equal to others on at least one basis, that 'the world' is only made and never
discovered. But the notion of 'epistemic gain' also' brings to earth', as it were,
scientific claims to absolute knowledge; hence drawing closer to positions found in
critical realism. I1
Merleau-Ponty contra Descartes
Popular notions of Descartes hold up a caricatured figure of a philosopher who
made a virtue out of skepticism by choosing to doubt all that his sense told him, even
suspecting that he was being deceived about what he thought he knew of himself and
the world. 12 Yet it is precisely at these intersections of philosophical doubt that
10 Johan Muller (2000: 15!) lists "constructionists, constructivists, deconstructionists, pragmatists,
postmodernists, epistemological relativists, subjectivists, sceptics, interpretivists, and reflexivists."
11 This is a topic all in itself: the appearance of a close correspondence between Tay lor and critical
realism: "an alternative to positivism that does not lead to the relativism and anti-realism characteristic
of post-positivism," and that cannot be "easily dismissed by critical realists: Kant, Hilary Putnam '"
Charles Taylor" (Groff2004: 22).
12 In the Second Meditation, Descartes concluded that he was a 'thinking thing', the indubitable
foundation of all knowledge from which he derived the only certainty of his existence (Descartes 1986:
12). But 'out there' beyond the perspective of the Cogito remained uncertain. While the unreliable
senses and imagination were "special modes of thinking," they could not exist "without an intellectual
substance to inhere in" (Descartes 1986: 54). Any knowledge we may have of 'the world' belongs to
mind alone, and "not to the combination of mind and body" (Descartes 1986: 57). Jn the Third
Meditation he perceives a piece of wax, a 'corporeal thing' that he touches, and of which he forms a
picture in his imagination. Descartes thus separates mind (intellect) and body. It is the intellect that
ultimately provides the means he has of knowing not just objects in the world, but also himself (Secada
2000: 41-42). Jorge Secada (2000) describes Descartes's logic:
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MerJeau-Ponty identifies not only the core of Descartes's philosophy, but also the
hinge of his own conception of embodiment. In sum, in Descartes there is a split
between subject and object, between the 'I' and things outside the 'I' that can have no
direct access to the 'outside' world. And since the intellect can only 'know' what is
'in the mind', it would be reasonable to remain skeptical of what is 'out there' as our
experience is only an epiphenomenon of our brain functions. The mind derives
representations of things in the world, and all we can know is whatever is contained
'in mind' existing as a ghost trapped in the machine of our bodies. So begins, in
Descartes modern scepticism about the existence of the external world; and that most
famous proposition in the history of philosophy, Cogito ergo sum, has echoed as the
master slogan of modernity (Scruton 1995: 40).
MerJeau-Ponty points out that even in the case of doubting, as Descartes
performs it, to doubt is to doubt something; the very experiencing of doubting brings
a certainty - the certainty of doubting. If Descartes tried to verify the reality of his
doubt, he would be launched into an infinite regress - what is doubted is the thought
about doubting, then the thought about that thought and so on. Descartes is not simply
thinking he is doubting, but is performing the act of doubting. "[H]ence it is not
because I think I am that I am certain of my existence ... my love, hatred and will are
not certain as mere thoughts about loving, hating and willing... I am quite sure
because I perform them" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 445). In this way, he says we
accomplish our own existence. He goes on to say,
[H]e who doubts cannot, while doubting, doubt that he doubts. Doubt ... is not an
abolition of my thought but a pseudo-nothingness, for I cannot extricate myself from
my being; my act of doubting creates the possibility of certainty ... it occupies me and
I am committed to it (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 465).
"Next Descartes shows that it is the pure intellect and not the senses which knows and recognizes
corporeal things. At the end of the Meditation he writes: 'I now know that even bodies are not
strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this
perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood
(AT, VII, 34). After the reflection on the wax, his readers will be ready to exercise, as he put it
later, the intellectual vision which nature gave them, in the pure form which it attains when freed
from the senses; for sensory appearances generally interfere with it and darken it to a very great
extent' (AT, VII, 163)" (Secada 2000: 143).
Descartes gives primacy to the intellect, recognising it as having no direct access to the world. In the
Sixth Meditation he faces his lingering doubts about corporeal objects, and concludes that material
things are at least capable of existing in that they are "the subject matter of pure mathematics"
(Descartes in Ariew and Watkins 1998: 50). As for his own body, it too is "simply an extended, non-
thinking thing." The mind is "simply a thinking, non-extended thing" and that "it is certain that I am
really distinct from my body and can exist without it" (Descartes in Ariew and Watkins 1998: 54).
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In the main, Descartes's view is popularly attributed to the mindset of the
reductionist mathematician (even ifonly because he was one) (Scruton 1995: 28, 43;
Tiles and Tiles 1999). Although the move he made (traceable to Augustine)13 is
generally acknowledged as having been foundational for the success of the
seventeenth century scientific revolution, it is less often acknowledged that his
intention was to protect the specifically human subject fi'om being contained under
the mechanistic rubric of the "new science" of the Enlightenment. It was the
Jansenist l4 movement in France, partly through its revival of Augustinian theology,
that made possible the split between subject and object, between the cogito and things
'outside' of it, that characterized his "new philosophy" of disengagement (Schmaltz
1999: 37-38).
Cartesianism demanded a very radical departure from existing methods of cognition
which it is difficult for us to understand fully, committed as we have been for the past
two hundred years to taking Descartes's assumptions about the role of philosophy for
granted. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, only when we have understood why
Descartes demanded that his readers spend an entire month considering the first
Meditation will we understand just how startling both Descartes's sceptical
methodology and mind/body dualism were to the seventeenth-century mind (Pagden
1988: 126).
Against Descartes' self-possessed Cogito standing against an outside world
which it represents' inside itself, any attempt to constitute the world as an object of
knowledge is always derived in relation to our primary access to the world that
Merleau-Ponty locates in the body. For Merleau-Ponty we know ourselves and the
world through perception. The principle of intentionality comes into play, thus calling
into question Descartes's contention that perception cannot be doubted, but the thing
perceived can. Here the principle of intentionality is at its strongest; the essence of
vision is our seeing something, and not something such as having an experience of an
abstract quality of something. "To see is to see something," thus it would make no
sense "to revert with Descartes from things to thought about things" (Merleau-Ponty
\962: 436,432). To doubt the presence of something seen entails uncertainty about
13 Rick Kennedy (J 990: 552) cites a statement from the young Janesenist priest Arnauld that St.
Augustine realized "that in order to arrive at the truth [of our existence] we cannot begin with anything
more certain than this proposition: I think, therefore, I am." MichaeI Hanby (2003: 166) points out,
however, that Descartes's contribution was indeed original, and that the similarities between his first
principle and Augustine's corpus was pointed out to him before he added the rider concerning God's
guarantee against the mind being given to error.
14 Jansensim was a "repressed minority movement within the French Roman Catholic Church," and its
members, centred around Paris in the seventeenth century, "believed they held to the true Roman
Catholicism ofSt. Augustine while the hierarchy of the church was being led astray by Jesuits and
sceptics advocating a lazy-thinking, human-centred Christianity.
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thought itself. To grasp a thought with certainty assumes the existence of the thing
intended. But the world is not an object, Merleau-Ponty counters, but the situation in
which we embodied beings find ourselves and towards which our efforts intend.
Explaining transcendence, he says "we do not possess [things]. .. I blindly exert their
bare existence" (MerJeau-Ponty ]962: 430). That we can doubt the presence of
something, yet trust our doubting is the untenable position he ascribes to Descartes'
doubting of his capacity to know things. Thus Descartes' doubting his capacity to
know things becomes untenable.
In contrast to Descartes, Merleau-Ponty gives primacy to perception as the way
to know ourselves and our world. "Perception is not a science of the world, it is not
even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the background from which all
acts stand out, and is presupposed by them" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xi). We must not
"wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say: the world is what
we perceive." Later he sums up by saying "[t]he world is not what I think, but what I
live through" (Merleau-Ponty ]962: xviii).
When Descartes tells us that the existence of visible things is doubtful, but that our
vision, when considered as a mere thought of seeing is not in doubt, he takes up an
untenable position. For thought about seeing can have two meanings. It can in the first
place be understood in the restricted sense of alleged vision, or 'the impression of
seeing', in which case it offers only the certainty of a possibility or a probability, and
the 'thought of seeing' implies that we have had, in certain cases, the experience of
genuine or actual vision to which the idea of seeing bears a resemblance and in which
the certainty of the thing was, on those occasions, involved. The certainty of a
possibility is no more than the possibility of a certainty, the thought of seeing is no
more than seeing mentally, and we could not have any such thought unless we had on
other occasions really seen (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 346-347).
For Merleau-Ponty it would make no sense to say that the perception could not
be doubted but the thing perceived can (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 432). Instead, "the
certainty of some external thing is involved in the very way in which the sensation is
articulated and unfolded before me. 1do not just have pain, but 1 have a pain in the
leg" (Merleau-Ponty ]962: 436-437). Likewise the body is not an object 'in mind',
but an original intentionality, a manner of relating to 'objects of knowledge'. We do
not have an idea about the body, but experience it and through it we experience the
world. "I have no means of knowing [my body] except by living it, losing myself in
it" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 231).
True knowledge for Descartes came 'through the mind alone'. But for Merleau-
Ponty, consciousness is neither a 'passive noting' of an event that leaves me in doubt
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of what I perceive nor a 'constituting power' that links up with the object without
leaving its inner world. On the contrary, I "reassure myself that I see by seeing this or
that" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 438). This is because, in essence, our existence is 'open to
the world' because we are embodied. For Merleau-Ponty there is no subject-object
divide, no mind body separation and there is no doubt but that we are beings-in-the-
world. For Merleau-Ponty, unlike for Descartes, truth does not inhabit the 'inner man'
for "man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself' (Merleau-
Ponty 1962: xii). The cogito "must reveal me in a situation". As sentient subjects,
things exist not in consciousness but/or consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 249).
Continuing his theme of certainty and doubt, Merleau-Ponty says that the very
foundations of certainty arise in intuitive thought. "[F]ormal relations are first
presented to us crystallized in some particular thing" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 448). The
thing exists for me in a space considered to be 'up' or 'down', 'right' or' left', and so
has meaning in so far as I place myself at a point and so on (see Taylor 1993a: 318;
1995a: 62). I am situated; experience is always a becoming, not a fixed 'having'. This
'uncertainty' is not necessarily a problem for Merleau-Ponty; we first and foremost
live our lives without reflection; the latter is, so to speak, added on. The object (a
triangle, in his discussion) is not then a collection of objective characteristics but
expresses a 'certain modality of my hold upon the world'. The triangle is not, as
Descartes asserts in the Fifth Meditation, "a form ... which is immutable and eternal
and not invented by me or dependent on my mind" (Descartes in Ariew and Watkins
1998: 45). It is through this kind of perceptual consciousness that we arrive at the
essence or eidos of things; the thing displays itself to me, and I perceive it through my
body and in projecting myself towards the thing. There is "a completed synthesis in
terms of which we have defined the thing" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 451).
For Merleau-Ponty we do not know the world and ourselves as empiricism
would have it through observation, nor as rationalism would have it from a priori
knowledge, but through "d irect contact with our existence. Self-consciousness is the
very being of mind in action" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 432). What the Cogito 'retrieves'
he says, is not a coordinated pulling together of the separate events of my experience,
but
the one single experience inseparable from myself... which is engaged in making itself
progressively explicit... The primary truth in indeed 'I think', but only provided that
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we understand thereby '1 belong to myself while belonging to the world (Merleau-
Ponty 1962: 474).
Merleau-Ponty's conception of embodiment is often misunderstood as about
'bodies-in-the-world' that are given due consideration. But when such 'embodiment'
is understood from an idealist and representationalist philosophy of mind, the dualism
from which the problem first emerged remains intact. Merleau-Ponty's conception of
embodiment is directed at Cartesian separations of body and mind, and so necessitates
a collapsing of other kinds of dual ism also: body and self, body and society, body and
symbolic order, and so on. One can think of, for instance, certain materialist
conceptions that prevail in cognitive science, "where one is left with a world of pure
physical determinations and no possibility of any thing resembling thought, meaning,
symbolism or social life" (Crossley 1995: 44).
On the other hand there are perspectives that aim exclusively at Descartes's
phi losophy of mind, but leave the body unaccounted for. These "have the potential to
dissociate and externalize the body and the social world, reifying both and, thereby,
constituting a dualism and reductionist approach to social analysis" (Crossley 1995:
43). The problem, therefore, is not one where embodiment or the' ideational mind' is
neglected in analysis, but where both are detached, as happened in seventeenth
century science. And while that revolution brought forth an age of scientific discovery
and invention, the reductionism that it inspired produced a mechanistic anthropology.
Merleau-Ponty challenges the mechanistic, Cartesian view of the body. He argues for
an understanding of the body as an effective agent and, thereby, as the very basis of
human subjectivity. Moreover, he understands embodied subjectivity to be
intersubjective and he understands intersubjectivity to be an institutional and historical
order. His 'body-subject' is always-already situated and decentred in relation to a
historical world (Crossley 1995: 45).
There is a stark contrast then between Descartes' 'thinking thing' (Cogito) and
Merleau-Ponty's 'embodied being', or phenomenal self, which is not just a 'thing' but
an ongoing process (see Zahavi and Parnas 1998). It is the difference between
understanding and engagement, between clear and distinct ideas and ideas that are
ambiguous and shifting, between the life of disembodied mind and the life ofthe
embodied mind, between 'I think' and 'I am', between doubt and certainty, between
what we know and what we experience, between immanence and transcendence: these
are some of the main issues that Merleau-Ponty points to and wrestles with in his
critique of Descartes's cogilO in his work, Phenomenology ofPerception.
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On self-interpreting animals
Considering that Taylor's critique of behaviourist psychology was published in
the I960s, it remains astonishing, as Jeff Sugarman (2005) points out in a paper on
Taylor's work, that despite "lavish ... attentions on the study of personality,
[psychologists] devote surprisingly little to the question of what is a person"
(Sugarman 2005: 793). Yet, reducing persons to an aspect such as personality accords
entirely with the abstracting impulse of scientific naturalism ordered toward studying
the nature of objects in the world. In natural ism, only those aspects of human being
that are ostensibly part of nature are recognized (Taylor 1964: 72ff).15 Subjectivity is
treated as incidental. Such is the Cartesian (and empiricist) view, dividing mind from
body, where the latter is identified as in the realm of external, objective reality,
whereas all else is internal and therefore subjective, incidental, and beyond research
(Taylor 1980a: 32; Thompson et al. 1986: 134-135). The implications for studying
persons are significant.
Ifwe try to study persons in the manner prescribed by naturalism, we shrink the
vocabulary and reach of psychological discourse in ways that exclude human values,
and the extent to which what we value is constitutive of what we are. Emptying
people of what matters to them is to reduce them in ways that render them distorted or
malformed, ifnot wholly alien (Sugarman 2005: 794).
MerIeau-Ponty puts it that we are "condemned to meaning" (Merleau-Ponty
1962: xxii). But our thoughts, motives, values, attitudes, and so on - beyond
naturalism's objectivist purview - are considered therefore to be subjective
projections cast onto a value-free world. Subject-related phenomena, therefore, are
discounted as real; and if they are explained at all, they are couched in a language that
makes no reference to human subjectivity and experience. From Merleau-Ponty,
TayJor discounts the Cartesian view that values are 'in our heads' and do not exist in-
the-world. 16
The great problem for naturalism, Taylor admits, is that it fails to reconcile
phenomenology and ontology. On one hand, many naturalists would agree that
IS Taylor writes in The Explana/ion ofBehaviour (1964: 73): "It is assumed that the data language must
contain only concepts which are part of that was called by Logical Empiricists the 'physical thing
language'. For it is held that terms involving consciousness, or psychological terms, as we might call
them, are such that propositions containing them are, without special interpretation, untestable. This is
believed to be virtually a self-evident truth by many thinkers."
16 To claim that values and meanings are 'in the head' amounts to saying that there is no music in the
world, but only sounds that are perceived through our brain functions representing 'out there' as
something 'in here'. Instead, "[m]usic is made and exists in the world, and it is only because of this that
we are able to have subjective experience of it" (Sugarman 2005: 795).
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imports and values are experienced, and that they may even be necessary for us to get
on with one another; but, on the other hand, they insist this is not what the objective
world is really like. According to Taylor, the naturalistic ideal that the world can be
experienced and explained in absolute terms is peculiar, and excludes all that is
crucially unique to human life. Human beings simply could not think, act and
experience in the ways they do if meanings, interests and values were not accepted as
part of the world (Sugarman 2005: 795-796).
Taylor examines specifically those features of human life that are accepted as
definitive of self-interpretation, by which natural science rejects as not being being
natural phenomena - given in absolute terms without human experience. Taylor thus
develops points initiated by Heidegger in Being and Time (1962), that is, the notions
that the world is imbued with (embodied) meanings, and that we care about the kind
of beings we are (see Taylor 1993a: 328; 1995a: 63-67, 100ff). Taylor's concept of
"self-interpreting animals" stands metonymically to his long-standing campaign to
polemisize "against disengaged views of human agency at play in mainstream social
science .... [A]gainst a form of thought predicated upon an atomistic understanding of
man as an entity that can be defined independently of (and thus disengaged from) its
social and cultural context" (Redhead 2002: 144).
With respect to Windschuttle's objections to cultural studies, we may
immediately jump to its defense by pointing out the field's article of faith that text is
necessarily and hermeneutically embedded in context. However, the
representationalist logic within which that dictum is dominantly read destabilizes it. 17
"[T]he dominant rationalist view ... has given us a model of ourselves as disengaged
thinkers .... [offering] us a picture of an agent who in perceiving the world takes in
'bits' of information from his or her surroundings and then 'processes' them in some
fashion, in order to emerge with the 'picture' ofthe world he or she has; who then acts
on the basis of this picture to fulfill his or her goals, through a 'calculus' of means and
ends" (Taylor 1992: 319). Taylor does not reject this view so much as to see it as a
reduction from a disarticulation wrought from the Aristotelian understanding. As I
have argued, Tay)or's concern reaches back to his earliest work on the question of
human behaviour, which focuses on the question of
whether all purposive behaviour can be explained on a more basic level
mechanistically, or whether on the other hand, different aspects of the stream of
behaviour must be seen as taking place at different levels, albeit not rigidly separated,
17 In the Cartesian intellectualist theory of mind, mind is furnished with ideas (building blocks of
knowledge). Knowledge has its basis in discrete representations, which are self-contained (Anton 1999;
Smith 2004: 32-34).
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from some of which the most basic explanation remains psychological and hence in
terms of purpose (Taylor 1970a: 75).
That is, Taylor seeks to collapse the Cartesian dualism wherein the 'self'
retreats to an inward realm safe from the reaches of science, and where interpretation
thereby becomes an entirely mentalistic exercise (Taylor 1995a: 10). Following
Wilhelm Dilthey (see Gadamer 1975: xiii), while interpreting a text is seen as a
judgment of what the background affords it, the Cartesian image of the perceiver
insists that the interpretation achieved can never be more than a 'mental' operation.
Meaning becomes an epiphenomenon of brain functions 'in the head', and nowhere
else. The idea of an identity becomes, concomitantly, something in which the bearer
has no responsibility other than to 'dig out' what is already there; that is, simply to
represent it. As Anthony Appiah (2005) puts it:
[N]either the picture in which there is just an authentic nugget of selfhood, the core
that is distinctively me, waiting to be dug out, nor the notion that I can simply make
up any self I choose, should tempt us .... [W]e make up selves from a tool kit of
options made available by our culture and society. We do make choices, but we don't,
individually, determine the options among which we choose. To neglect this fact is to
ignore Taylor's "webs of interlocution," to fail to recognize the dialogical
construction of the self, and thus to commit what Taylor calls the "monological"
fallacy (Appiah 2005: 107).
Taylor's central concept of persons being "self-interpreting animals" is thus
directly leveled at "monological consciousness" - the term drawn from Mikhail
Bakhtin, who sees it as opposed to the dialogical constitution ofself, and which
Taylor uses to refer to "the movement of interiorisation, which suppressed altogether
the sense that we are persons only as interlocutors" (Taylor 1985c: 278; 1991 b: 313)18
- of what Merleau-Ponty calls the 'intellectualist perspective'. The Cartesian
conception of the subject, and the tradition of inwardness that it founded (Hanby
2003: 8; Taylor 1992a), has been attacked for decades, yet, as Heideggarian scholar
Frederick Olafson (2001) writes, "it is sti 11 widely regarded as the only serious
alternative to the naturalistic reduction of human beings to the status of physical
systems" (Olafson 2001: 62). The difference between the one discredited and the one
18 From Wittgenstein, Taylor develops from the sense that there can be no 'private language' the
understanding that there can be no such thing as a monological self, but instead an expressivist self.
"Language originally comes to us from others, from a community .... Once I learn language can I just
continue to use it, even extend it, quite mono logically, talking and writing only for myself? Once again,
the designative view tends to make us see this as perfectly possible" (Taylor 1985a: 237). The
expressivist view accepts as part ofa whole what the monoJogical view reduces to it. Taylor refers to
Heidegger, for whom "[m]an behaves as ifhe were the creator and master of language, whereas on the
contrary, it is language which is and remains his sovereign" (Taylor 1985a: 238).
207
proposed, is the difference between 'mind' (from Descartes) and 'human being' (from
Heidegger).
Cartesian assumptions were problematic because, as a result of the very sharp contrast
between 'subject' and 'object', everything 'subjective' (and thus almost everything
distinctively human) was denied any real cognitive value for purposes other than those
of psychology. This meant that the quintessentially human was identified with the
inwardness of a private experience (Olafson 200 I: 60).
Together with Wittgenstein, Heidegger stands in relation to twentieth century
philosophy the way Kant stood in the nineteenth century. No one then could do
philosophy without reading Kant (Edwards 1989; Fultner 2005; Gu ignon 1990: 649;
Sheehan 1984). Taylor (1987) claims that Wittgenstein and Heidegger open the way
to a new type of inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of intentionality. In his
view, he writes in Overcoming Epistemology, what they offer is a "critique of
epistemology in which we discover something deeper and more valid about ourselves
[as agents] ... something of our deep or authentic nature as selves" (Taylor 1987: 482-
483).
The Structure of Behaviour
While Overcoming Epistemology (1987a) is among Taylor's most cited essays,
the groundwork was already completed in The Explanation ofBehaviour (Taylor
1964). Merleau-Ponty's similarly titled book, The Structure ofBehaviour (1942), may
lead one to suspect that Taylor's book is merely an English 'translation' of it; and in a
material sense that might not be too far offthe mark. 19 However, the success of any
philosophy is not measured by its originality rather than its capacity to address
questions of the age. For instance, Stuart Hall's introduction of Althussarian
structualist Marxism to British Cultural Studies was driven partly to remedy what Hall
saw "as the paucity of Marxist scholarship available to English readers" (Davis 2004:
73). But Hall was not merely trafficking in French philosophy, nor was it that he had
discovered a philosophical 'niche' to stake out. One reason for that "paucity", as
Taylor (1966) diagnoses it, was the long tradition of empiricism that, as a theory of
knowledge, was entrenched in Britain. Due to the hold of empiricism, Marxism was
incomprehensible to British philosophy, he argues, and partly explains why Cartesian
19 Taylor (I 970a: 76-77) refers to similarly titled books to which he was directing his argument: Plans
and the Structure ofBehaviour (1960), by George Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl Pribram; and
Donald Hebb's Organization ofBehaviour (1949). Taylor's (1964, 1970a) argument is more pointedly
directed at their shared mechanistic psychology.
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thought and its concomitantly 'punctual' conception of the self held sway there,
whereas phenomenology was seen to be more 'exotic'.
Empiricism was the Iynchpin keeping British philosophical edifice intact; and
striking it was tantamount to weakening the one impediment to introducing Marxist
thought (properly) to British philosophy. Whether or not this figured anywhere in
Hall's intention to adopt Althussarian structuralism is hard to say.20 He does regret
"the permanent oscillations between abstraction/anti-abstraction and the false
dichotomies of Theoreticial vs. Empiricism which have both marked and disfigured
the structuralism/culturalism encounter to date" (Hall 1981: 31). He discusses the
relative virtues of the field's constituent paradigms in such a way as to suggest a far
more phenomenological understanding than commentaries usually concede (Hall
1981: 32).
The observation that empiricism shares the mantle of British philosophy with
Hegelian-inspired British idealism is instructive given Merleau-Ponty's dismissal of
both on grounds that they both take the objective world for granted, and hence
perform a similar reduction of experience. That is, while both present themselves as
nominal adversaries of each other, Merleau-Ponty argues that both "assume a world in
itself to which consciousness has to be accommodated" (Macann 1993: 168). The
operation upon which both founder is perception; which is understood not along
Cartesian lines, but closer to the Heideggarian concept of being-in-the-world.
According to this [classical empiricist] theory the basis of human knowledge consists
in the impressions received on the human mind from the outside world. This particular
theory of knowledge was, of course, revived in this century with the return to the
empiricist tradition. It has lost its popularity today. But it is still useful to refer back to
it, because it is the cradle of a number of other views which have retained some
currency, even when people have ceased to discuss the philosophical problems of
perception in these terms (Taylor 1966a: 233).
20 In Cultural Studies and the Centre (Hall 1980a: 33), Hall concedes that'Althussarianism' never held
an entirely hegemonic position in the Centre; but nonetheless the rupture achieved with attempts "to
reduce the specificity of the 'ideological instance' to the simple effect of the economic base" (Hall
1980a: 34) was important in allowing for the cultural a relative autonomy denied by earlier orthodox
Marxisms. "Like the structuralists, Gramsci steadfastly resists any attempt neatly to align cultural and
ideological questions with class and economic ones. His work stands as a prolonged repudiation of any
form of reductionism-especially that of'economism': 'It is the problem of the relations between
structure and superstructure which must be accurately posed and resolved if the forces which are active
in the history of a particular period are to be correctly analysed and the relation between them
determined'" (Hall 1980a: 35). By the time Hall writes Signification, Representation, Ideology (Hall
1996), Althusser offers Hall a response to an entirely different problem in cultural studies: the
postmodern tendency to reduce problematics to single texts.
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It is here that I want to consider the implications ofWindschuttJe's subscription
to an empiricist understanding ofjournalism practice - empiricist, that is, in so far as
he derives the philosophical authority for his views from philosopher of science David
Stove (1982). Again, I do not wish to contest Stove's argument against the combined
thesis he constructs from Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and KarI
Popper. Nor do I wish to contest Windschuttle's (1997b) reading of Stove; at least,
not beyond the fact that he accepts his empiricist views uncritically. To recap,
Windschuttle rejects cultural studies as a basis for studying journalism principally on
grounds of what he asserts to be its (hyper)constructivist view of real ity. Windschuttle
points to various postmodem sources in his rejection of cultural studies - which,
again, I shall not discuss beyond the fact that he reduces cultural studies to the sum of
them.
Certainly even Stuart Hall objected more than once to the field having
undergone a metamorphosis from being a 'site of critical practice' to a disarticulated
'critical discourse', amounting to what he calls "theoreticism" (Hall 1980a: 25, 33,
42).21 Cultural Studies for Hall was always an empirical practice. Windschuttle does
not acknowledge this, but asserts (without saying as much) that natural scientific
method offers a framework that is more appropriate for the study ofjournalism than
the relativist framework that he rejects. Whether or not Windschuttle intends it so, by
counterposing an empiricist model of news gathering activities to an idealist - or an
intellectualist one, to use MerJeau-Ponty's (1962) term - construction of cultural
studies, he establishes a binary that denies all manner of interpretation in journalistic
practice as much as it posits its opposite as reducing all facticity to a figment ofthe
imagination.
Again, to bring the concept of truth into the discussion, it may be accurate
enough to describe Windschuttle's position as aligned rather more towards coherence
and correspondence theories (of truth) than it is towards pragmatist ones. But,
following Wittgenstein, the first two groups of theory apply correctly to science, and
ought to be accepted as legitimate there; but where they are applied to "all our
everyday (and professional) communicative activities" (Shotter 2006: 280), they
21 In a footnote (Hall 1980a: 287, n. 103) draws a conclusion similar to one I am making: "In the highly
charged sectarian atmosphere which has sometimes disfigured these debates critical distinctions were
frequently lost: for example, on one side the distinction between the 'empirical' moment in an analysis
and' Empiricism': on the other side that between the 'theoretical' and 'Theoreticism'. These have
turned out to be mirror-images of one another. But it has not always probed easy to get beyond them."
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would only make sense where a mechanistic picture of human being remains also in
attendance. But to reject such a picture does not entail a radical swing to the 'skeptic
camp', as it seems Windschuttle wou Id bel ieve. One does not need to assert a
coherence or correspondence theory of truth before one is able to accept the reality of
a concrete world that is plainly evident.
The reality of contact with the real world is the inescapable fact of human (or animal)
life and can only be imagined away by erroneous philosophical argument. ... It is in
virtue of this contact with a common world that we always have something to say to
each other, something to point to in disputes about reality. So the view of the agent as
being-in-the-world has room for a distinction every time we knowingly correct our
view of things (Taylor 2005: 40).
In cultural studies it is generally accepted that the field's opposition to the kind
of dualism that Taylor has in his sights is articulated in its insistence on grounding the
'representative text' in a 'constitutive context', and that this stems deliberately from a
critique of Cartesian ism. Hall's (1980) seminal encoding/decoding model of
representation saves traces of the Cogito even as it demolishes positivist sender-
receiver models of 'communication'. But in observing in one place how Hall explains
this as semiotic or discursive struggle (see Hall 1982), our attention is inevitably
drawn to the circularity of the model itself, leading to the suspicion that such
conversational maneuvers rest on a reality of what Hubert Dreyfus refers to as
"interpretation all the way down" (Dreyfus 1991: 25).
On Merleau-Ponty's method
By taking note of Windschuttle's (1997) subscription to the rationalist
conceptions ofDavid Stove, and considering Windschuttle's empiricist views in terms
of the well-known critique of naturalist social science by one ofTaylor's early
contemporaries, Peter Winch (1958),22 we can begin to suspect that Windschuttle's
joumalists are not thoroughly human at all. That is, while he says that "[j]oumalists
construct news bulletins but ... don't usually construct the events they write or
broadcast about" (Windschuttle 1998: 8), the strong impression is left that reporters
only represent things in a world but play no co-constitutive roles in their
22 Taylor must certainly have considered Peter Winch's book, The Idea ofa Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy (1958), in compiling his own not too dissimilar book (Taylor 1964). TayJor
(1998) admits that Wittgenstein, together with Merleau-Ponty, were the main influences in The
Explanation ofBehaviour (Taylor 1964). Peter Winch's (1958) book draws more transparently on
Wittgenstein. But Taylor's and Winch's books have as their object of critique naturalistic approaches to
social science.
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intersubjective and interpretive interactions with it. On the other hand, while
Windschuttle's rejection of strong internalist (idealist and constructivist) conceptions
ofjournalistic practice - whereby it becomes impossible to know the world except as
'text' - seems to advocate a realist ontology, its concomitant image of the human
becomes a malformed Cartesian subject. In other words, while the imaginaries of
natural science might go some way towards explaining journalistic 'regularities', its
methodologies becomes particularly blunt when confronted with the task of
understanding the interpretive work journalists actually do (AltschuJl 1995; Bensman
and Lilienfeld 1969: 107-108; Zelizer 1993a; 1993b).23 Windschuttle's empiricism
accedes to the same Cartesian reduction ism that he recognizes in his constructivist
adversaries. The subjects of both paradigms are reduced to agents of representation
who are denied any 'worlding' capacity (Olafson 2001: 60).24
[H]uman beings are not simply the spectators of a world process that is radically
independent of them. They are, instead, the beings that constitute the world as a
world. This is not to say that they create or produce it. What it means is that the self
and world - the latter has to be distinguished from nature - go together in a peculiarly
intimate way that cannot be rendered by any idea of the mind as a distinct substance
or of the brain as an organ inside our skulls. We are, in other words, beings that
cannot be conceived in isolation from the world in which we are, as being conceived
according to the Cartesian notion of the mind (Olafson 2001: 60).
Taylor analyses this conception shared by empiricist and relativist paradigms by
means of a methodology he draws from Merleau-Ponty, from whom he draws part of
the core of his philosophical anthropology. The other part - in which Taylor's anti-
epistemology finds its strongest support - he draws from Wittgenstein; that is, his
philosophy contra naturalistic claims that all knowledge about the world is related to
sensory experience or observation (Dreyfus 2004; Pinkard 2004; Taylor 2002a).
Wittgenstein's notion of ourselves being smitten by a dualistic 'picture' of mind
23 In common with each of these four sources is the idea that journalists form an interpretive group that
performs within a professional paradigm (Althschull 1995), belong to "interpretive communities"
(Zelizer 1993a), and are adept at taking an innovation and turning it into a public vogue (Bensmen and
Lilienfeld 1969: 107-108). That is, journalistic practice appears to operate from the Cartesian
assumption that reality is there to be discovered, but show a more than average capacity to constitute
significances that were not previously (self)evident in the material reported. A milder yet no less
pertinent version of the journalistic work I am referring to is found in the idea of "journalism as
transformative praxis" (Wasserman 2005).
24 Reminiscent of Marshal McLuhan's idea that we first create things and then they change us, Martin
Heidegger's (1962) concept of worlding holds that the world determines what we can do, and what we
do determines our world. A "double hermeneutic" is at play here in a way not dissimilar to the
conception coined by Anthony Giddens, who notes that such a double hermeneutic exchanges ideas
back and forth between "the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and the
metalanguages invented by social scientists" (Giddens 1984: 384).
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conceived in a Cartesian inner/outer sorting (Taylor 2002a: 106) resonates with
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological critique of the "mediational epistemology" that
was derived from empiricist post-Galilean science (Taylor 2002a: 108, Ill; 2005: 40-
4 I). The epistemological construal derived from Cartesianism is evident in both
empiricist and constructivist models ofthe self. In this respect, Taylor uses Merleau-
Ponty's (1962) methodolog/5 to evoke an alliance between science and perception,
or between empiricism and idealism (or intellectualism), thus collapsing the
polarisation of the subject-object dichotomy (Matthews 2002: 7). As Christopher
Macann puts it:
If in the case both of empiricism and intellectualism the objective world has already
been presupposed, then it becomes the primary task of a properly phenomenological
reflection to conduct us back into a pre-objective realm .... [I]t is the task of a
phenomenology of perception not so much to mediate between empiricism and
intellectualism but, on the ground of their mutual and reciprocal destruction, to
enforce a departure from that which both take for granted, namely, the objective world
(Macann 1993: 168).
While Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological project aims to reassert the necessity
of the "pre-objective world" prior to representations of that world, Taylor articulates
his own critique of Cartesian ism through an attack, instead, on the atomistic view of
the disengaged subject of scientism (see Taylor 1989a: Ch. 2). It is basically by
rearticulating representation with constitution as per the Aristotelian conception that
Taylor fashions a philosophical anthropology of engagement that addresses this
epistemological construal.
Our understanding of the world is holistic from the start. There is no such thing as the
single, independent percept. Something has this status only within a wider context
which is understood, taken for granted, but for the most part not focused on.
Moreover, it couldn't all be focused on, not just because it is very widely ramifying,
but because it doesn't consist of some definite number of pieces (Taylor 2002: 113).
The matter for Taylor, says to Fergus Kerr (2004), is that "[r]eductionist
accounts of human behaviour foster inhumane policies in society" seen as composed
of disconnected individuals, and whose sole function is to protect these bearers of
rights, while at the same time "denying premodern assumptions about the primacy of
our obligation as human beings to society" (Kerr 2004: 87, 88). These theories put
forward, Taylor writes in his essay Atomism (1985b), "a vision of society as in some
sense constituted by individuals for the fulfillment of ends which were primarily
2S Merleau-Ponty's methodology is described in the chapter, 'The Phenomenological Field', found in
The Phenomenology ofPerception (1962).
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individual" (Taylor 1985b: 187). 'Atomism' here refers to the Enlightenment doctrine
of the autonomous and self-sufficient individual (Taylor 1985b: 210). In Explanation
(1964: 11), Taylor argues that atomism is part of the background of the liberal-
empiricist tradition wherein the 'representational' construal is grounded in the
experience of the individual subject of consciousness (see Redhead 2002: 143ft).
These theories put forward, Taylor writes in his essay Atomism (1985b), "a
vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfillment of ends
which were primarily individual" (Taylor 1985b: 187). 'Atomism' here refers to the
Enlightenment doctrine of the autonomous and self-sufficient individual (Taylor
1985b: 210). Atomism, Taylor argues in Explanation (1964: 11), is part of the
background of the liberal-empiricist tradition. His understanding of
communitarianism, too, is indicated in his attack on atomistic views of society, seen
as composed of disconnected individuals, and whose sole function is to protect these
bearers of rights, whi le at the same time "denying premodern assumptions about the
primacy of our obligation as human beings to society" (Kerr 2004: 88). This
'representational' construal is grounded in the experience of the individual subject of
consciousness.
As his philosophical work unfolds, from the attack on nonteleological theories of
human behaviour in The Explanation ofBehaviour through the rejection of doctrines
that emphasise individual self-sufficiency (atomism) in social and political theory,
Taylor touches on ethics all the time; but it is above all in Sources ofthe Self that he
deals with the issue centrally and most extensively (Kerr 2004: 89).
Taylor's 'robust realism'
In Overcoming Epistemology (I 987a), Taylor argues that positivism and
constructivism are separations from within the Aristotelian view. What became
'positivism,26 emerged as the first extraction from the Aristotelian corpus via the
seventeenth century scientific revolution; though strictly it ought to be referred to as
empiricism. Constructivism emerged as a critical extraction from within positivism,
but belongs also to a Nietzschean outgrowth to the lineage extending from the
Kantian critique of Descartes. I shall not digress into a genealogy of either of these
'separations', except to indicate Tay)or's concern with the original Aristotelian
viewpoint. Taylor (1987a) points out that, within the Aristotelian view, 'mind' both
represents objects in the world as well as participates in the constitution of those
26 The term 'positivism' was strictly invented by constructionists to indicate their object of critique.
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objects. Hence empiricism, and later positivism, requires that the 'scientific gaze'
separates the representative and constitutive activities of mind; bracketing the latter
"in order to create an objective true representation of reality" (Muller 2000: 150).
Truth then is the degree of correspondence between the representation and the reality.
The degree of correspondence is measured by evidence, by which certainty about the
correspondence is generated. This operation depends in turn upon a certain self-
reflexivity, a certain self-transparency', enabling the scientist to interrogate the
representation methodically (Muller 2000: 150).
This 'scientific viewpoint' is one of disengagement; a requirement
corresponding to the notion of truth as representation, or the objective viewpoint of
the Lockean "punctual self' (Taylor 1989a: 49). Unlike constructivists, who reject
this view, Taylor accepts its validity but insists in line with the Aristotelian view, that
the objective perspective is not primary, but secondary to intuition and, by extension,
to experience (Taylor 1987a: 476). From Kant's critique ofHumean empiricism,
Taylor says "we couldn't have experience of the world at all if we had to start with a
swirl of un interpreted data" (Taylor 1987a: 475). The capacity for representation
depends therefore upon a pre-predicative (or pre-objective) being-in-the-world, "that
condition of our forming disengaged representations of reality is that we must be
already engaged in coping with our world, dealing with the things in it, at grips with
them" (Taylor 1987: 476). Towards the conclusion of Overcoming Epistemology
(1987), he writes:
Certainly the Nietzschean conception has brought important insights: no construal is
quite innocent, something is always suppressed; and what is more, some interlocutors
are always advantaged relative to others, for any language. But the issue is whether
this settles the matter of truth between construals. Does it mean that there can be no
talk of epistemic gain in passing from one construal to another? That there is such a
gain is the claim of those exploring the conditions of intentionality. This claim doesn't
stand and fall with a naive, angelic conception of philosophical construals as utterly
uninvolved with power. Where is the argument that will show the more radical
Nietzschean claim to be true and the thesis of critical reason untenable? (Taylor
1987a: 484).
The closing phrase refers to a fundamental split in social theory which, in Johan
Muller's (2000: 151) description ofTay Ior's terms, has become reorganized into neo-
Nietzscheans and "defenders of critical reason"; though, again, Taylor subscribes to
neither camp. Instead, what Taylor is about, as I have been arguing, concerns a more
fundamental recovery that follows Merleau-Ponty and "[t]he tremendous contribution
of Heidegger [who], Iike that of Kant, consists in having focuses the issue properly"
(Taylor 1987: 476). That issue, as Johan Muller (2000: 150) correctly puts it, is far
215
from controversial even to constructivists. "It only becomes controversial when the
conclusion is drawn that there can be no objectivity, truth, evidence or warrant simply
because, by not being able to step outside worldly implicatedness, all talk of truth is
for ever after fatally compromised" (Muller 2000: ISO. Italics added). The 'flip side'
of that position, held by positivists, but extended to social theory, Michael Shapiro
(1986: 311) refers to as having produced a naturalistic "conceit" within the human
and social sciences that renders within them an implausible model of human agency.
Articulating these two errors, Shapiro summarises what Taylor's project against
epistemology is about:
If, paraphrasing Heidegger, we note that Kant changed the question, "What is a thing"
into "Who is man," we can locate the origin of the epistemological concern Taylor has
adopted, the place of the human subject in the problem of knowledge. And we can
locate his Heideggerian, ontological concern with illuminating the background
conditions (what Heidegger called the "ground plan") within which knowing
functions. These concerns, when deployed on the human sciences, yield both a
thoroughgoing critique of naturalistic approaches to human conduct and the
systematic articulation of an expressivist/hermeneutic alternative. Within this
orientation, Taylor emphasizes not only how a grasp of the intersubjective and
common meanings within which human action takes place is necessary for the
recovery of the meaning of that action but also how it allows us to articulate
successfully the issues of rationality, human agency, and various political concepts
(Shapiro 1986: 311).
It does not seem far-fetched to see Taylor's intention as reflected in the way in
which he seeks to hermeneutically collapse the dualism characterized by the
empiricist and idealist strands of modernity (Taylor 2002). Here I wish to concur with
Gary Kitchen's (1999) observation that, although Taylor is inclined to reject the truth
claims of natural science as having exclusive or superior truth claims with respect to
human experience, "it seems clear from the consistency principle that theories about
the natural world which we hold to be true are extremely relevant to what we hold
true in human affairs" (Kitchen 1999: 45).
Human phenomenology does not make natural science wrong, merely reductive
insofar as it disparages the terms in which we live our Jives; but the answer to this is
not to think that the terms of our lives transcend science, for they must still be
ultimately consistent with it if we are genuinely to accept its claims as true (Kitchen
1999: 45).
But the direction in which Kitchen takes his argument gets mired in much of the
same inconsistencies "symptomatic of the difficulties facing [Taylor's] project"
(Kitchen 1999: 48). That is the direction in which Taylor's "moral realism" leans;
though the inconclusiveness of Kitchen's argument lies, I suspect, in his reliance on a
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contemporaneous (hence ahistorical) analytic frame. Taylor (l984a) remains highly
critical of tendencies (mainly among analytic philosophers) to treat sources as if they
were contemporaneous. I want to take a different route to that taken by Kitchen
(1999), and which I have outlined in the previous section, and instead to take
seriously Taylor's method in Sources (l989a) whereby he operationalizes his
Merleau-Pontean adjunct that to study philosophy amounts also to a genealogical
exercise of tracing sources. Doing so, we see, for instance, that in his recognition of
Weber, Merleau-Ponty's debt to Lukacs becomes more transparent. Extended to
Taylor, this genealogy of Merleau-Ponty's sociological slant is evidence in the way
Taylor appropriates Marx in The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Taylor 1991a). There he
refers to Marx and Weber as both converging upon a common social object of
explanation (Taylor 1991a: 6-9).
IfTaylor's sources in Marx are Hegelian, read through the lens of Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology, then the question of where Taylor lies along a materialist-
idealist continuum becomes pertinent given his objection to positivistic models of the
selfin the human and social sciences (see Taylor 199Ib). Certainly Taylor is a realist
- a 'robust realist', as Hubert Dreyfus (2002: 64) calls him - in so far as he "advances
a sort of real ism when it comes to scientific knowledge, believing that science can
lead us towards a true understanding of the way the natural world really is" (Abbey
2002: 7). This position does open Taylor to Richard Rorty's Nietzschean-inspired
charge - that our knowledge of the world is only 'knowledge for us' - that Taylor
becomes as ensnared in the very same Cartesian inner/outer sorting that he critiques
(Rorty 1998: 86, 93-94).
The belief that there is a difference between the world as it is and the world as it is for
us seems particularly problematic for Taylor given his whole phenomenological
insistence that we know the world through involved coping. This seems to privilege, if
not claim exclusivity for, knowledge about the world as it is for us.... Taylor,
however, subscribes to a more robust and traditional realism, believing that it is
possible to know the world as it is in itself, or at least to get closer to this sort of
knowledge. Modern science is the vehicle that makes this increasing proximity
possible. Its mechanisms make it possible for us to strive for a view from nowhere
that allows us to see an independent reality in a disengaged way (Abbey 2002: 7).
But Taylor avoids choosing between the world as a reality independent of our
coping, and its 'sense' as understood in the frames of our coping. When coping with
the world, we sense a deeper reality independent of the meanings we accord to it. But
this does not put Taylor in the empiricist camp, as he explains in his essay, Hegel's
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Philosophy ofMind (1985a). Even the causal view recognizes two kinds of
knowledge, being the agent's standpoint and the absolute standpoint (Taylor 1985a:
81). The latter, Taylor suggests, sets limits on the ways in which we cope with it.
When it comes to coping with the world, it is not a case that anything goes or thinking
makes it so. There are structural realities to which we accommodate ourselves, not
vice versa. And the more responsive to those real ities we are, the better able are we to
cope with the universe (Abbey 2002: 7).
I want to consider a possibility that Taylor indexes his anthropology (and anti-
epistemology) in an earlier source; one to which Marx is perhaps as much indebted as
he is to Hegel. That source is Ludwig Feuerbach, whom Taylor would have to
acknowledge if the implications of his Merleau-Pontian view that philosophy is
coterminous with its history are to be taken seriously (TayJor 1984a). However, I
want to trace this source on what might seem to be a 'queered pitch' made so by an
allusion to British idealism that many find more illuminating in understanding what
the social sciences do.
Feuerbach again, and the promise of Vico
To simply state and even to demonstrate Taylor's opposition to Cartesian
epistemology would say very little, as he is certainly not the first to have made that
move. Antirealists do as much in their flight into intellectualism. But while antirealists
draw on the modern 'strand' indexed in the Kantian critique of Humean empiricism
and Descartes - upon which positivistic science continues to draw - Taylor, as a
'robust realist', finds himself positioned not against the constructionists per se, but
intent on rearticulating the representational element in their social theory with a
conception of the constitutive drive in human agency. His intention is to restore an
Aristotelian philosophical anthropology in which Erklaren (causal explanation) is
grounded in Verstehen (understanding).
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was the first to offer a
sustained critique of Descartes, "the first to question the applicability of the Cartesian
mentality, which had been associated with the great scientific achievements of the
previous century" (Olafson 2001: 60), though he remained obscure in his day
(Dallmayr 1977: 60). Vico's "new science" made little headway against the
seventeenth century scientific revolution that was carried forward by Descartes's
"new philosophy" (Barnouw 1980: 609-610; Dallmayr 1977: 68; Levin 1991: 55, 57).
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Giogio Tagliacozzo (1982) describes Vico as "an oddity among the thinkers of his
century ... [which] explains why he has been neglected or misunderstood for so long
and why he is important in our time" (Tagliacozza 1982: 93).27 Robert Miner (1998)
notes that "Vico criticizes Cartesian method in terms that remind us of Aristotle, or at
least the Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics" (Miner 1998: 53). But it is perhaps his
thought on the embeddedness of reason in practical action that resonates with current
philosophical themes, not least those found in American pragmatism (see Shotter
1986: 203-204), but no less with themes found in Taylor and Merleau-Ponty.
The question remains, why Taylor appears not to acknowledge Vico, at least not
until very recently as "one of the leaders of the reaction against a shallowly rationalist
explanation of human action" (Taylor 2007: 335). Vico sought to collapse the mind-
body dualism that Cartesian thought accomplished to enable the epistemological
certainties required by emerging modern science. That is, in the Cartesian frame
science needed to know truth certainly. Vico did not object to this ambition, but
pointed out that our ability to know the objects of mathematics derives not from
properties discovered' in mathematics', but from properties our activities invented in
and as mathematics (Miner 1998: 59, 65-66). "[O]ur mind has a perfect grasp of its
objects because it has made them" (Tiles and Tiles 1998: 426). That is, what we
'discover' amounts to our own invention that has become, using a term from Viktor
Shklovsky, dejamiliarized.28 Vico hereby notices a degree of anthropomorphism in
Descartes's thinking, projecting mind onto the universe, and discovering 'there' the
operations of its own contingency, thus failing to see that human thinkers stand to
mathematics as God stands to creation. "[T]o know and to create become
synonymous, i.e., imaginative creation is the means by which man's consciousness of
the world unfolds" (Hutton 1972: 361).
Implicit in Vico's approach was an important limitation on human aspirations; our
efforts to understand the natural world will lead at best to an understanding of
principles which govern what we can do in the natural world, but not to any theory
that might claim to represent the natural world as it is in itself(or as God made it),
27 Taylor's subscription to the Romantic line represented by Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx, and his
ignoring Vico, does not rest entirely upon the Cartesian critique, but that the particular strand of that
critique proceeding from the German Romantic Johann Gottfried Herder. One can argue that as Herder
proceeds from Kant, his position was more accurately counter-Enlightenment, and therefore his
opposition to Cartesian ism was somewhat indirect. Nevertheless, Herder stands in that tradition of
thought. But allegiance to a tradition per se does not account for Taylor's adherence to Merleau-Ponty,
who in his Phenomenology ofPerception (1962) appears to critique Descartes more directly.
28 See Shklovski (1998).
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independently of human involvement in it. We can know the world only through our
active involvement with it (Tiles and Tiles 1998: 428).
Vico's influence on modem historiography is considerable, Taylor admits, as he
is to anthropology in so far as he "is one ofthe pioneers in developing a theory of the
origins of human cu Iture from a virtually pre-human, bestial stage .... [and] to bury
the picture of humanity as fixed from the beginning" (Taylor 2007: 333). Taylor later
compares Vico to the seventeenth century representationalist theories of language
typical of John Locke, which Taylor discusses in relation to Herder in Language and
Human Nature (Taylor 1985a: 226, 231). Taylor adds to his views expressed there a
rider that the effect of Vico explaining "how humans came to be language beings ...
[is] part of an overall theory of our becoming fully human" (Taylor 2007: 343).
So, why does Taylor ignore Vico? I do not believe Taylor simply neglects the
Italian idealist, but I do contend that he does so because he refuses the tradition to
which British idealism belongs, though recognizing nonetheless its important anti-
Cartesian comportment. Taylor subscribes instead to a strand in continental
philosophy, of which its most persistent feature is its questioning of foundations,
together with positions on meaning no longer attributed to metaphysical essences.
Meaning is gained intersubjectively, as are our identities. Taylor converges
significantly with Paul Ricoeur in this respect, as he does to Mikhail Bakhtin (Taylor
1991: 313-314).
In Interpretation and the Sciences ofMan (1985a), Taylor argues that our
meanings are not subjective (that is, residing in the heads of actors), but, rather,
intersubjective. "The meanings and norms implicit in these practices," Taylor
observes, "are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices
themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but
which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action" (Taylor 1985a: 36).
Continental philosophy thus finds itself renouncing the metaphysical quest for
absolute grounds, even if some of its proponents - Husserl in particular - found this
renunciation vexed and regrettable. Kant's claim to 'lay the foundation of
knowledge', Hegel's appeal to Absolute Spirit, Kierkegaard's recourse to a
Transcendent Deity, Marx's call for a Total Science, are largely superseded (albeit
often reinterpreted) by continental thinkers in the twentieth century (Kearney 1994:
2).
Vico may lie near the beginning of a train of thought that informs Taylor's 'core
idea', but Taylor's anti-epistemology has a critical realist slant that rejects idealist
reduction ism. Taylor's notion of our being "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor 1985a:
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45-76) does not entail any sense of our being able to constitute ourselves as
intellectualists (or 'constitutive idealist') may 'imagine'. Thus we find a clue as to
Taylor's caution with regard to Vico, and the continuing influence of the Marxist
ground ofTaylor's realist anthropology found in his paper on Ludwig Feuerbach:
"one of those figures who appears again and again in the footnotes and introductory
paragraphs of works on other philosophers, but [who] is rarely studied for himself'
(Taylor 1978: 417).
One cliched summation of Feuerbach (and Marx), Taylor points out, is that he
"debunked Hegel' s pretensions to a science of some super-human, cosmic entity
called' spirit', and showed that the real, unconscious subject of both metaphysics and
theory was man" (Taylor 1978a: 417-418). Taylor does not reject this view, but points
out that Feuerbach remained Hegelian at least in so far as he accepted Hegel's
contention (in his Phenomenology) that "the question of how or what we know has to
presuppose some conception of the knowing subject" (Taylor 1978a: 418). But it is
not Hegel's "Spirit". Debunking Hegel's central notion of Spirit required Feuerbach
to look elsewhere for a humanist materialist of the 'knowing subject'. As a Hegelian,
the simple and unproblematic notions found in the Enlightenment were obviously
inadequate29 to "a critically defensible doctrine of what it is to be a human subject"
(Taylor 1978a: 419). For Feuerbach people form conceptions of themselves in line
with the Hegelian view, and are partly shaped by those conceptions. "Part of what is
essential to being a human being, as against [being] an animal, is our relating
ourselves to a certain conception of ourselves" (Taylor 1978a: 419).
Feuerbach seems to recognize that an adequate account of the human subject has to
recognize that men form conceptions of themselves, and that they are partly shaped by
these conceptions. Part of what is essential to being a human being, as against an
animal, is our relating ourselves to a certain understanding of ourselves. He also sees
that the subject who so understands himself cannot simply be individual, that it is only
in relation to others, in a community of speech, that we make and develop these
understandings by which we live. All this emerges in the rich and still obscure
Feuerbachian concept of the 'species being' .... This is one of the terms that Marx
took over from Feuerbach, using it extensively in his unpublished manuscripts of
1844. Marx dropped the term later, but I do not believe that he sloughed off his debt
to the Feuerbachian notion (Taylor 1978: 419).
29 Taylor notes that "Feuerbach's humanist criticism of Hegelianism is very far from being a simple
return to earlier materialism; that in short, he did not just debunk Hegel, but tried to build a humanism
through a dialectical transformation of Hegel's thought. This humanism allows for self-transformation
in a sense undreamt of in the earlier forms, and in this provides some of the groundwork for Marx's
theory" (Taylor I978a: 420).
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Taylor goes on to argue that Feuerbach sees our 'species being' as related to
itself in ways that differ from other animals in that "we can think of animals as living
this Iife with others unconsciously, unreflectingly" (Taylor 1978a: 419). But with man
there is a "picture" of a life that is human. "We relate ourselves to some such notions
or images of what we are as men" (Taylora 1978a: 419).
In the notion of species being Feuerbach has, it would seem, incorporated
understanding of man both as a self-interpreting being and an inescapably social
being. Marx took over both these dimensions when he borrowed the term (Taylor
J978a: 419).
As tempting as it is to assume that Taylor derived his notion of humans as "self-
interpreting animals" directly from Feuerbach, it is more likely that he returns to
Marx's mentor a notion he derives from Merleau-Ponty. In any event, Taylor already
uses the concept in Interpretation (Taylor 1971 a). Already there, to our being
languaged beings given to self-interpretation, according to the Feuerbachian model,
he adds the moral dimension of which Nicholas Smith argues is Taylor's original
contribution (Smith 2004: 42-43). As Taylor puts his claim, "our self-understanding
essentially incorporates our seeing ourselves against a background of distinctions
between things which are recognized as of categoric or unconditioned or higher
importance or worth, and things which lack this or are of lesser value" (Taylor 1985a:
3).
Taylor counterpoises to the empiricist outlook the "Marxist view ... as implied
in the thesis that men can only come to solve certain perennial intellectual problems
through advances in praxis (Taylor 1966a: 234). And since Taylor identified the anti-
Hegelian bias in British empiricism, he does not choose to graft the Marxist or
Hegelian branch onto the British stock - "[f]or this conception of thought an action is
foreign to the rediscovered empiricist tradition" (Taylor 1966a: 233 - but took to
introducing his British audience to post-Heideggarian phenomenology by attacking
behaviourism which was thriving there at that time, in the 1960s, in psychology and
other human sciences.
I took on the challenge of reformulating Merleau-Ponty's ideas in the rigorous style
esteemed by Austin and others, not without good reason. It was not only the
empiricists who ignored phenomenology. Those influenced by St Thomas and
medieval philosophy ... likewise considered this tradition as an exotic and
uninteresting one. There were some marginal exceptions ... but on the whole, there
was no interest in Husserl and phenomenology. I believed from the outset that
philosophical anthropology passed through history while for analytical philosophers
philosophy is a wholly contemporary undertaking (Taylor 1998: 105).
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Conclusion: The inner/outer picture
Taylor's collaboration with Merleau-Ponty provided him with his anti-Cartesian
'core idea' (Taylor 1998), and the primary inspiration for the thesis of his first book,
The Explanation ofBehaviour (1964), in which he attacks the naturalistic foundations
of behavioural psychology. Taylor's thesis is informed by a conception of
embodiment found in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology ofPerception (1962),
combined with a critique of the inner/outer sorting informed by a range of
philosophers drawn from both the analytic and continental traditions. These include,
in addition to Merleau-Ponty, existentialists Heidegger and Gadamer in the
continental tradition, and in analytical philosophy, Ryle and Wittgenstein. Where
those sources combine is at a point where they expose the mechanistic picture of the
human subject that comes through empiricism that was expressed most emphaticallY
in behaviourism during the 1950s and 1960s, and before that in the positivism of
empiricist thought during the late nineteenth century.
Taylor (2002a: 106; 2005: 26) finds in Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations the notion of a 'picture' - "Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen" [A picture held
us captive]"3o - that resonates with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological critique of the
"mediational epistemology" that was derived from empiricist post-Galilean science
(Taylor 2002a: 108, Ill; 2005: 40-41). But while Taylor has given a particularly
sociological inflection to this condition in the idea of the "social imaginary" (Taylor
2002b), it remains fundamentally a theme he first considered at length in Explanation
(1964), and reaching poignant expression in Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer
Distinction (2002a) and Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture (2005).
Together, these two sources reiterate in the present the core of his philosophical
anthropology that he worked out at the start of his intellectual career, as it does in his
approach to the philosophy of social science in which his philosophical anthropology
is indexed.
The powerfully scientific Cartesian image of ,inner' mind representing an
'outer' reality that was most evident in social science in the fifties and sixties-
evident in the hegemony of positivism, behaviourism and the overall construal of
30 The original German text used the italics oppositely: "Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen." The text
following reads, in translation: ""And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (Wittgenstein [Anscombe] 200 J: 41, 4I e).
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science - has continued to the present day despite effusively confident theoretical
treatments of its symptoms (Gunnell 1997: 520-521). While "behaviourism is long
dead", Nicholas Smith (2002) writes:
the belief that the laws governing human behaviour must be mechanistic in form is
still very much alive. The very idea that teleological explanations might have a place
in the science of behaviour is no less anathema to many philosophers and
psychologists now than it was in the heyday of behaviourism. Taylor's defence of
teleology from a priori attack therefore retains contemporary relevance. Second,
Taylor's argument is as much about the relationship between scientific explanation
and conceptual analysis as it is about behaviourism narrowly defined. And this issue
remains of central interest to philosophy (Smith 2002: 43).31
We all know how easy it is to stop an academic in his or her tracks by invoking
adjectivals such as 'positivist', 'behaviourist' and 'empiricist', and so on. But
dispelling the condition cannot be done by these incantations, Taylor (2002a: 107)
says. Castigation might treat the symptoms, but the 'picture of mind' remains covertly
virulent. The Cartesian picture has held us modems prisoner with a conception of
mind conceived in a reductive representationaJist model of an inner/outer sorting.
According to representationalist theories in epistemology, "our epistemic practices are
judged by whether they adequately represent something said to be independent of
them all called Reality or Truth" (Phillips 1994: 35). While it "is now fashionable in
virtually all philosophical milieux to be extremely impatient with this way of
thinking, and to claim to have transcended or 'deconstructed' it .... the prisoners of
the dominant image have just moved to another cell" (Taylor 2002a: 107). In
Overcoming Epistemology (1987a), Taylor locates that entire 'cell block' in
foundational ism:
In some circles it seems to be rapidly becoming a new orthodoxy that the whole
enterprise from Descartes, through Locke and Kant, and pursued by various
nineteenth- and twentieth-century succession movements, was a mistake. Within this
new agreement, however, what is becoming less and less clear is what exactly it
means to overcome the epistemological standpoint or repudiate the enterprise. Just
what exactly is one trying to deny? .... The heart of the old epistemology was the
belief in afoundational enterprise. What the positive sciences needed to complete
them, on this view, was a rigorous discipline that could check the credentials of all
truth claims. An alleged science could only be valid if its findings met this test;
otherwise it rested on sand (Taylor 1987a: 465).
The seventeenth century scientific revolution accomplished its epistemological
construal by abstracting from the Aristotelian yoke its rationalist core. This real ization
provides much of the core ofTaylor's agenda: a recognition that the modern scientific
31 This is a fuller version ofa quote provided in Chapter One.
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framework abstracts from the holistic Aristotelian view an aspect that, since
Descartes, accounts for the mentalistic (or intellectualistic) essence of the
representative view. That aspect constructs the mediational logic such that an outer
'reality' is interpreted by an inner 'mind', thus accounting for Taylor's objection to
what he refers to as the inner/outer sorting (Abbey 2004: 7; Dreyfus 2004: 53-55, 57,
60, 64; Taylor 1987a; 2002a: 112). In other words, the Cartesian framework abstracts
from the Aristotelian whole its principle of representation, thus subverting the
formerly-primary constitutive element that Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger (and
Wittgenstein) reestablish through their dissolution of the epistemological picture
(Taylor 2002a: 106). Taylor summarises the object of his critique:
But there is a wider conception of the epistemological tradition, from whose
viewpoint this last would be a rather grotesque judgment. This is the interpretation
that focuses not so much on foundationalism as on the understanding of knowledge
that made it possible. If I had to sum up this understanding in a single formula, it
would be that knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent
reality. In its original form it saw knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality
(Taylor 1987a: 466).
At the core ofEpistemology (I 987a) is Taylor's contention that the seventeenth
century scientific revolution ushered in a threshold change in our self-understanding
and its relation to the good (Taylor 1987a: 466-467). This change was manifested in
the mind-body dualism which was Descartes's legacy intertwined with his conception
of mind as an 'inner entity' - which Ryle (1947) declares as a '''category mistake'
which has generated the Cartesian theory of mind as an extra entity somehow 'inside'
the visible human person" (Taylor and Ayer 1959: 104). Taylor emphatically concurs
with Ryle that the Cartesian theory of mind is an implausible philosophical theory
gone wrong (see Smith 2002: 22-23). In Ontology (1959b), Taylor draws heavily on
Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy to dispute the '''inner man' theory,"
which
breaks down because, the internal events being imperceptible to all but myself, I could
never be taught how to speak about them by others. I would have to invent a kind of
"private" language, a vocabulary of private terms, to speak about my own behaviour
(Taylor 1959b: 129).
Yet Taylor (2002a: 107-108) would point out in other fields bearing a similar
critique - having allegedly expunged residues of positivism and behaviourism from
their respective disciplines -the Cartesian subject remains nonetheless an effective
trace. His most sustained critique of various 'contemporary' Cartesian traditions is
made in his essay, Self-Interpreting Animals (Taylor 1985a: 45-76). But it is mainly
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elsewhere that he explains that the Cartesian tradition survives in the mediational
picture of an inner/outer sorting at the heart of representationalist models of
perception (Taylor 1987a; 2002a).
Within a representationalist frame, what is being interpreted is essentially
'outside', and being decoded' inside'. Experience becomes problematic within the
frame, which Taylor also calls a "mediational epistemology" (Taylor 2004a: 44).
What is missing - and which Taylor's hermeneutics supplies - is an understanding
that "human beings are 'interpretation all the way down', which means that social
existence and interpretation indeed become co-extensive" (Rosa 2004: 694). Barring
an explicitly constitutive element, Hall's model does not necessarily occlude the
important human interface where the Cartesian epistemological construal actually
operates. But in so far as it does, Taylor's project, in its 'core elements', exposes
where it is that Hall's model falls short - the human interface - and is pertinent to
Hall particularly as his is a model of meaning. As Nicholas Smith (2004) explains:
[T]he idea that there is something ontologically or metaphysically "queer" about
meaning comes naturally to a mode of thought that divides the world into an "outer
realm" of physical facts and an "inner realm" of mental ones. An important feature of
the hermeneutic attempt to rehabilitate meaning as an indispensable category for
understanding what it is to be human is to identifY and dismantle the motivations for
carving up the world this way. Along with other hermeneutic philosophers, Taylor
maintains that one of the most potent motivations is epistemological: The inner-outer




When the Media Wars broke out in Australian universities, it offered both sides
- journalism training and cultural studies scholarship - an opportunity not necessarily
to bridge the gap perceived to exist between them, but to reflect upon what it is that
they do; and also what forces brought them to blows in the first place. Certainly,
many took that opportunity; with journalism scholars engaging in introspection as
much as their counterparts in cultural theory (see Rooney 2007; Shepperson and
Tomaselli 2004; Skinner et al. 2001; Tomaselli and Shepperson 2000; Tomaselli
2001; Tomaselli and Caldwell 2002; Turner 2000; Wasserman 2005; Zelizer 2005).
But on the whole, the lines where the original battlements stood remain as the
contending positions now as they were a decade ago. Journalism education has
marched on, perhaps in search of a holy grail of theory; 1 or happier with a conviction
that practice has its own autochthonous theory (and be done with it). As for their
opponents, an observer can be forgiven for thinking that its captains had not stepped
back from whatever minimal breach they had made, and questioned whether Theory
was not obsolete (see Ferguson and Golding 1997).
The term Media Wars may perhaps be a misnomer for the "journalism versus
cultural studies" 'battle', as Keith Windschuttle (1998a) identifies it. However
impressive its scale appeared at the local level, it was always a peripheral skirmish in
the wider 'science wars', contested over the underlying epistemological logics of
modernity. Terry Flew and Jason Sternberg (1999) cite John Hartley (1995: 20; 1996:
33) as arguing in a "direct provocation to cultural studies academics" that journalism
was "the sense-making practice of modernity" (Flew and Sternberg 1999: 9). His
comment was far from pejorative, but aimed at cultural studies scholars "whose focus
has mostly been in areas such as literary, film and television studies" (Flew and
Sternberg 1999: 9), and calls on those same scholars to take journalism seriously as a
(modem) textual system, and not to downgrade it as 'mere journalism' lacking in
I Myles Breen notes in Jownalism: Theory and Practice (1998: 3) that "a discipline without a written body of
theory (literally, a 'literature') is unthinkable in a university culture." The book he edits is presented as a means to
plug that gap injoumalism's existence in the academy.
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literary niceties. Evidently, Hartley considers journalism's 'modernity' to be that
strand flowing from Enlightenment rationality, particularly in the empiricist paradigm
aligned to natural science. I have argued that Windschuttle defends a line of thinking
that appeals to that same modern paradigm.
The thesis (revisited)
This thesis has followed a transcendental argument around three propositions
declared in the introductory chapter. The first proposition concerns Keith
Windschuttle's contention that the constructivist and linguistic idealist outlook of
postmodern cultural studies contradicts the realist and empiricist self-understanding
ofjournalism practice. Windschuttle thereby places journalism and cultural studies at
opposite ends of a continuum between empiricism and intellectualism. The
proposition accepts Windschuttle's claim/or journalism, and accepts at face value his
related claim about the 'linguistic idealism' inherent in postmodern cultural studies.
Following Windschuttle's stand on the first proposition, the argument moves to
a second: arguing that British Cultural Studies was formed at a post-Marxist
dislocation between Enlightenment fundamentalism and sources derived from the
Romantic tradition. Here I bring into view a contention that Windschuttle reduces
cultural studies to its postmodern aspect. I have also intimated that this aspect is not
unproblematic within cultural studies. I shall clarify this point in the last section of
this chapter, where I address the question of agency in cultural studies - a field drawn
principally out ofpost-Marxist debate specifically in the 1960s, but drawing on debate
before that period.
I have argued that post-Marxism was a rejection of the empiricist thinking to
which classical Marxism was at least implicitly aligned, and that its mechanistic
teleology was a part of that thinking. If, as I argue, cultural studies was founded as a
post-Marxist critique of the economism of classical Marxism, perhaps its most
developed articulation in the New Left (apart from Raymond Williams and Edward
Thompson) came from Charles Taylor's Marxist-humanist interventions that
articulated a rejection of economism with a rejection of the mechanistic outlook of
empiricist social science. Economism and empiricism, I have argued, share a common
source in Enlightenment fundamentalism. This was not an esoteric concern, but
mattered in the realm of ordinary (human) experience. A significant part of that
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experience - at least so far as the New Left was concerned - was both to understand
and to motivate popular resistance to that experience. Understanding required a
conception of agency that was negated by economism. Such was the rationale for the
Left clubs that Taylor, Stuart Hall, Ralph Samuels and others set up.
From Taylor's use of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, he came to treat both economism
and empiricism as providing similarly inadequate accounts of human agency. That is,
the foundational anthropology in both empiricism and intellectualism was rooted in a
combination of Cartesian epistemology and the Lockean 'punctual self. Taylor (1964)
would go on to critique behaviourist psychology out of his reading of Merleau-
Ponty's phenomenology, which emerged partly from a critique of classical Marxism,
and from which Taylor drew his critique of the empiricist-intellectualist dualism as
collectively endorsing a Cartesian subject. Thus, Windschuttle's dualism suffers its
first setback: it negates the possibility of providing an adequate account of agency,
and, by implication a plausible account ofjournalism practice beyond the very same
Althussarian determinisms that he criticizes so caustically (Windschuttle 2000: 154).
Its second setback concerns the question of the correspondence between
Windschuttle's dualism and the rival Enlightenment and Romantic traditions of
modernity (Negus and Pickering 2004: 7-9; Taylor 2000b; 2002c). I have argued that
these together constitute modernity; from Enlightenment come the rationalist sources
that are conventionally taken to fashion modernity, and from the Romantic tradition
come the creative impulses that make modernity a paradox. From Merleau-Ponty,
neither empiricism (which accedes to the Enlightenment side of the paradox) nor
intellectualism (which veers in the opposite direction) will do.
The challenges of dealing with this paradox, presented as a condition of
modernity, is at the forefront of two ofStuart Hall's (1980a; 1980b [1981]) reviews of
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). While there was certainly an
intention in the Centre to conduct empirical research, they inherited the distrust
critical theorists had of the positivist empiricism that reproduced pre-existing
epistemological foundations in the Cartesian mould. While there is no doubt that the
Centre's cultural critique veered towards the Romantics, Hall and others were clear
about the dangers of not remaining within certain limits. The excesses of
intellectualism Hal1 refers to as theoreticism - a term he may have adopted from
Lenin. The reason why theoreticism was problematic for Hall was that it supplanted
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"Marx's own practice ... to move towards the constitution, the reproduction, of ' the
concrete in thought' as an effect of a certain kind ofthinking" (Hall 1980b: 68). Hall
continues, in Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms (1980b), to argue that Marx's method
is adequately represented in neither structuralism nor culturalism. "An adequate
working through of the consequences of this argument might begin to produce a
method which takes us outside the permanent oscillations between abstraction/anti-
abstraction and the false dichotomies of Theoreticism vs. Empiricism which have both
marked and disfigured the structuralism/culturalism encounter to date" (Hall 1980b:
68).
In Cultural Studies and the Centre (Ha11l980a), Hall discusses the chaUenge of
these oscillations as part of the challenge of constituting the "practice of intellectual
work" (Hall 1980a: 42). In an interview with Kuan-Hsing Chen (Hall 1996a: 499),
Hall explains that "when you talk about cultural studies theoretically, we actually
went around the houses to avoid reductionist marxism." How they did this, he
explains on the same page, was by reading Weber, German idealism, Lukacs,
ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, Hegelian idealism, all to find non-
reductionist alternatives to functionalism and positivism (Hall 1996a: 499). Certainly
this work would have occurred some years after Taylor had left England, but he had
certainly not abandoned the issues he discovered (in Merleau-Ponty) while he was
there. Hall mentions two dates, 1956 and 1958, when Taylor had gone to Paris to
work with Merleau-Ponty. There he discovered his one 'big idea' - Merleau-Ponty's
method - that hinged on a critique of the intellectualist-empiricist dualism. It is
unlikely that Taylor, who brought the 1844 Manuscripts to Oxford, who engaged in
spectacular debates about Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology, would not have shared
these insights as he did with those concerning Marx in "discussions about alienation,
humanism and class" (Hall 1996a: 497). "The issue of 'theoreticism' is not an
irrelevant one, certainly," he writes (Hall 1980a: 42); and in a footnote adds the
following:
In the highly charged sectarian atmosphere which has sometimes disfigured these
debates critical distinctions were frequently lost: for example, on one side the
distinction between the 'empirical' moment in an analysis and 'Empiricism': on the
other side that between the 'theoretical' and 'Theoreticism'. These have turned out to
be mirror-images of one another. But it has not always proved easy to get beyond
them (Hall 1980a: 287, n. 103).
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What I have argued is that a convincing link exists between Tay)or's rejection
of both empiricism in social science and economism in Marxism, and the similar
attempts in early cultural studies debates to navigate between theoretic ism
(intellectualism) and empiricism; and that this forms the central problematic of
cultural studies. All else (gender, class, race) more or less follows this problematic. In
other words, the dislocation between the empiricist and the intellectualist traditions of
modernity constitute(d) the 'blueprint' of cultural studies. I do not expect this
statement to be uncontentious; but I do not believe it (following this part of my
argument) to be false. Accepting this condition, however, leaves Windschuttle's
similar dualism in a precarious position;2 for surely he expressed a contradiction that
lies at the heart of cultural studies? If so, his entire problematic must fit within the
entire project of cultural studies.
So works a transcendental argument. And having accepted Taylor's viewpoint,
the antagonist has no choice but to accept the 'thicker edge of the wedge': the third
proposition, being Taylor's philosophical anthropology. The significance of this
proposition lies not in the fact that ifone accepts a few quills of the hedgehog one is
obliged to accept the rest of its body too. The ethical import ofTaylor's theory derives
significantly from his post-Marxist scholarship, and his rejection of empiricism in
social science derives from that scholarship. Their combined import is the recovery of
an adequate model of human subjectivity and agency that rejects the epistemological
construal at the centre of Cartesian ism; which in itself has wrought as implausible a
model of human agency as any found in poststructuralism. Taylor's Aristotelian
outlook, deployed since the late 1950s, also critiques representationalism in
epistemology and rejects foundationalist empiricist conceptions of human action. In
its place he has sought to promote an embodied and engaged understanding of the
human subject developed mainly from Merleau-Ponty's method.
I shall now address the three propositions as one might on a 'variation of a
theme'. That is, I want to consider next an aspect of Windschuttle's genuine concern
about journalism training, and to distinguish it from media education.3 On the second
proposition, I want to consider what I have called the 'blueprint' of cultural studies;
2 I am making this claim in relation to Windschuttle's empiricist assumptions. The practical question of
journalism training is another matter that I shall address in the next section.
3 This is a topic I have tried to keep at a distance so as not to add confusion to what my thesis is
actually about.
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that is, using a concept ofTaylor's (2000b), that cultural studies is a space of
'multiple modernities'. As Taylor addresses this concept specifically in a book
honouring Stuart Hall, it becomes more than likely that Taylor imagines cultural
studies along these lines. The third section elaborates on the third proposition:
Taylor's philosophical anthropology. Here I shall consider a few sources concerning
the ethics of cultural studies; and more specifically, to pay particular attention to the
only source (Freed 2001) I know of that actually brings Taylor to bear on cultural
studies. But as I said in the closing paragraph of the opening chapter, I think Mark
Freed (2001) misses the significance ofTaylor in this respect.
Raiders of the lost... or lost in philosophy
Cultural studies has always claimed as one of its practices the right to raid
neighbouring disciplines for whatever tools and resources it needs to accomplish its
work. Sociology, politics, anthropology, economics, history, literary studies and a
range of research methodologies have been found rich with resources ready-to-hand.
The gaze of cultural studies is necessarily interdisciplinary (Greenfield and Williams
)998: 96; Meadows 1999: 44), "assuming a mantle last worn by philosophy: not
content to survey its own patch with its own expertise, it roams across everybody
else's fields of knowledge-production too, from science to sociology" (Hartley 1999:
25). But there is an impression that, for cultural studies, stepping into philosophy is
like going over to the 'dark side'.
For a time it seemed that cultural studies was invincible in the academy, and on
its way to becoming a great and ever-conquering empire. But an empire does
eventually collapse under the great burden of having to maintain equilibrium between
its centre and its periphery. The provinces do not always behave. And there is the
debilitating cost of discovering that the empire does not extend forever, but that there
are boundaries, beyond which it may attempt to venture only at the crippling cost of
not having remained closer to home.
Jennifer Slack (2005) reviews the recent initiatives in the Philosophy of
Communication Interest Group (PHILCOM) - a group committed to "bringing
philosophical reflection to the practices of studying communication, revealing the
underlying philosophical assumptions of accounts of communication, and proactively
reshaping the study of communication by self-consciously utilizing rigorous
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philosophical assumptions that were in keeping with the changing cultural and
political landscape of the 1970s" (Slack 2005: 395). Larry Grossberg had encouraged
his cu Itural theory students "to participate ... to find common ground for undertaking
research" (Slack 2005: 394). While 'philosophy' for PHILCOM promisingly "meant
continental philosophy - primarily, in fact, critical theory ... hermeneutics, and
phenomenology" (Slack 2005: 395), the new members' insistence on political
reflection (as was their practice) evidently disrupted the group's more disciplinary
understanding of what it meant to 'do philosophy'. Slack describes her impressions of
the outcome of their venture:
Sometimes it felt like the cultural theorists were relegated to the sense of being
interlopers, poor cousins at the foot of the table eating the scraps of the big guys and
hoping nobody would notice that we weren't "really" doing phi losophy .... Philosophy
may well have entered into composition with us once, willingly; but they also resented
what some began to characterize as an intrusion into their midst, a "takeover," as it
were. I also sense that, given our growing popularity, we undermined their challenge
to mainstream communication studies. Perhaps our presence muddied the water in
their challenge to analytic philosophy and to their sense of the mission of promoting
explicitly philosophical- not political- reflection. But more likely, our presence-
presented as philosophy - tainted philosophy, thus echoing the challenge confronting
philosophy everywhere: suddenly everyone was doing philosophy. Continental
philosophy in a sense ushered in the demise of philosophy. In breaking down
distinctions between philosophy, theory, history, rhetoric, and sociology (and here in
the interest group, communication and cultural studies), claims to be doing philosophy
proliferated and detracted from the sense not just of "philosophy as king" but of
philosophy as a unique discipline. Whatever the precise mix, our presence contributed
to diminishing philosophy too (Slack 2005: 399).
Deja vu, lames Carey (2000: 16) might have said, mindful ofjournalism's own
unhappy incursion into the academy. "Good source for them," Windschuttle might
have crowed. But perhaps the lesson to be learned is to take seriously the balance that
Stuart Hall's urged between cultural studies not being 'one thing' and not being 'any
old thing' (Hall 1990: 11; 1992: 278). The difference is also between the wildly
permissive sense of what cultural studies wishes to do, and what it ought to do.
It does matter whether cultural studies is this or that. It can't be just any old thing
which chooses to march under a particular banner. It is a serious enterprise, or project,
and that is inscribed in what is sometimes called the "political" aspect of cultural
studies .... But there is something at stake in cultural studies, in a way that I think, and
hope, is not exactly true of many other very important intellectual and critical
practices (Hall 1992: 278).
While cultural studies has come of (postmodern and post-Marxist) age, there are
some in the field ofjournalism studies who feel that the way their subject matter has
been reshaped under the tutelage of cultural studies has far from improved the
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vocational aspects ofjournalism (Windschuttle 1997a; 1998b), that it has undermined
the confidence of reporters on the beat (Kieran 1997), and even become "the central
disorganising principle in journalism education" (Tomaselli 2001: 44). Starting on
these grounds at least, there may be a good case to be made for excluding certain
aspects ofjournalism from the purview of cultural studies; and it need not be an
entirely subjective matter in deciding where to draw those boundaries.
The claim that I am making is that the concept ofjournalism, not unlike
Raymond Williams's opinion of cultural studies itself, is "a vague and baggy
monster" (Williams 1989: 158). But drawing on his advice that cultural studies be
defined more closely "as media studies, community sociology, popular fiction and
popular music" in order to "create defensible disciplines" (Williams 1989: 158),
journalism as a field too can be defined into defensible aspects. A model to hand is
Robert Craig's (1999; 2001; 2003; 2005) conversational model of communication as a
field constituted by rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, socio-psychological and
critical (among other) traditions. The similarity between Craig's "communication
metamodel" and Zelizer's (2004b) depiction ofjournalism as constituted by
sociology, history, language studies, political science and "cultural analysis,,4 is
instructive.
Communication is afield; journalism is afield; cultural studies is afield. It
would seem quite impossible for any field to contain another field in any meaningful
way. However, it is not unimaginable that one field could encompass a "defensible
discipline" belonging to another field. But I want to make the matter clearer by
distinguishing between four terms -field, discipline, subject and topic - and to
suggest that 'journalism' as a field will differ from 'journalism' the discipline (ifit
exists), that it will qualitatively differ from 'journalism' the subject as it would from
journalism as a topic. In the latter case, journalism defined within the disciplines of
sociology, history, politics and cultural analysis will all differ remarkably. It is quite
conceivable that cultural studies could 'take journalism seriously' (pace Zelizer
2004b), but the subject and/or topic it would constitute would be a 'figment' of its
own methodologies conducive to its own site(s) of practice. In other words,
'journalism' would be something understood within its own language, and against its
4 Zelizer (2004b: 180- 193) makes a point of inserting cultural studies within the whole of cultural
analysis. At first 1 found this odd, but 1do now endorse this move for reasons that cultural studies is
about power and cultural practices, and not about cultural practices in toto.
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own horizons of meaning. Alternatively, was journalism to be taught in a newsroom-
as a newspaper cadet programme might do - the subject would be constituted by the
ontologies germane to that site of practice. The problem remains: what to do when
these converge in the academic 'site of practice'?
It would seem that 'journalism' as a term suffers much the same vagueness and
'bagginess' as culture, 'the media', mass communication, and so on. No one person
does journalism; as appears concomitant to the belief in English departments that if
students can learn to write properly, they can 'do journalism,.5 Perhaps so, but to 'do
journalism' requires learning to put content over form. Journalism is about reporting,
not about writing. If it is anyone thing, journalism is about research (Tomaselli and
Caldwell 2002).
Reporting is the cornerstone of journalism. Reporting is to journalism as research and
evidence-gathering is to scholarship.... Journalism schools do not make reporting
methods a formal object of inquiry. Although there are texts on the interview, for
example, there is little in print which examines the realities of requirements of
repotting in the light of the epistemological concerns of scholars. Nor is there much
which borrows from other professional disciplines. For example, academic lawyers
reflect on rules of evidence for their own purposes. Journalists have something to
learn from them (Adam 1989: 74).
It would be a mistake to reduce journalism to a range of effective techniques;
for while it is certainly about methods of surveying the paradoxes of the modern
world - the existence of which it is deeply implicated -journalism is intimately part of
the reproduction of its imaginaries. As such, it ought not to be reduced to a practice of
news production independent of the events of its consumption; though, to be fair, such
bifurcation is standard throughout media research, and eschews the holistic research
that David Deacon advocates (Deacon 2003). Stuart Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding
model, by which he largely ended the theoretical hegemony of technical sender-
receiver models of communication (Pillai 1992: 221-222), provides an apt framework
in which to imagine journalism as happening in the consumption ofnews.
5 This is not to pour scorn on what certain literary affectionados believe to be 'mere journalism'.
Journalism necessarily tends towards the popular, and its narratives ought to belong to the public
domain to which it is directed as an economy of news. The situations that make news ought always to
be a public mat/er. This description is not vulnerable to there being differentiated media products, and
the tendency for certain kinds of stories to appear in different media titles; ranging from the tabloids to
the quality press. It would seem, nonetheless, that to define journalism exclusively as a newsroom
activity amounts to reaching a definition of the practice that is too narrow as news production becomes
journalism at its point of consumption
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Hall's model appears to offer a more accurately holistic picture ofjournalism
than do conceptions that pay exclusive attention to news production. Journalism
'happens', or is constituted, in practices at the centre of which worlds are made,
identities are shaped, and the situations of everyday life are made to matter.
Journalism is about ever-recurring cycles of world-making, occurring at those
moments when different people read the same edition of a newspaper, or listen to the
same news bulletin. Each cycle ends with the conversations of that same audience
making sense of their world constituted in the stories signified in the images and
commentaries they entertain.
Hall's model was subjected to considerable critique at its inception (Morley
1980, 1981; Wren-Lewis 1983), but its continuing salience indicates that Hall was
effectively articulating a range of theoretical concerns extant at that time, rather than
Inventing a surprising framework ex nihilo. Whether theoretical surprises are truly
possible, however, is extremely doubtful as intellectual accomplishments are social
accomplishments. That is, theorizing takes place in afield of concerns, and have a
dialogical and conversational character.
As a 'field of concerns', cultural studies as concerned with the question of
modernity appears to have moved away from the conversational logic (Hall 1980a;
198jOb) to a monological practice where, following its poststructuralist turn, "the
eloquence-of post-structuralist critiques of teleology, un iversalism and essentialist
reasoning have often been obtained by simplifying a 'theoretical Other' into
caricatures written in capital letters: Reason: Enlightenment, Modernity, the West"
(Hansen 1996: 59). Yet, Foucault, towards the end of his life, began to repudiate these
excesses, and to see "a critical philosophical life" as entailing '''faith in
Enlightenment' as well as faith in the possibility of creating ourselves as autonomous
beings" (Hansen 1996: 60) - in short, a philosophy of limits within the bounds that
allow for human wellbeing. "One may argue that if western intellectual history is
marked by an emergent episteme bent on universalist reason, the same history is also
marked, and enriched, by the existence of another, though weaker, romanticist
episteme" (Hansen 1996: 60). All the more reason for cultural studies to take
journalism seriously. Certainly, as John Hartley (1995) contends, journalism makes
sense of that world constructed in universalist reason. It gives flesh to the rationality
of its empiricist slant, but its truer virtues come from the Romantic side of modernity.
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It is that side ofjournalism to which John Pilger draws our attention in an article on
the "histrionics of Obamaniania":
This was journalism as it had been before corporate journalism was invented, before
the first schools ofjournalism were set up and a mythology of liberal neutrality was
spun around those whose "professionalism" and "objectivity" carried an unspoken
obligation to ensure that news and opinion were in tune with an establishment
consensus, regardless of the truth. Journalists like Penn Jones, independent of vested
power, indefatigable and principled, often reflect ordinary American attitudes, which
have seldom conformed to the stereotypes promoted by the corporate media on both
sides of the Atlantic....
"True democracy," wrote Penn Jones Jr, the Texas truth-teller, "is constant vigilance:
not thinking the way you're meant to think and keeping your eyes wide open at all
times.,,6
Between empiricism and intellectualism
Modernity, as Taylor (2000b) argues, consists not in a single Enlightenment
family invested in Descartes, Locke and the behaviourist, cognitivist, mentalistic and
scientistic train that followed in their wake. A Romantic critique and reaction to
Enlightenment rationalism also constitutes modernity. Here we look towards
Giambattista Vico, Johan Gottfried Herder and Jacques Rousseau as its exemplars.
We look also to the humanistic Marx, and to Feuerbach. But most of all, we look to
Hegel to understand the articulation between Enlightenment and Romantic, empiricist
and idealist, and many of the dualisms that typify modernity.
Certainly Windschuttle's categories of realism and idealism present themselves
as a different dualism. We can move to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's method of
collapsing their inner tension by pointing out the similar Cartesian subject assumed in
both empiricism and intellectualism - generally synonymic with realism and idealism.
The impression can be easily gained that cultural studies was constituted under the
signs of culture and structure paired as a dualism - the "names of the game", as Stual1
Hall (l980b: 72) conceded, even given his insistence that neither "is, in its present
manifestation, adequate to the task of constructing the study of culture as a
conceptually clarified and theoretically informed domain of study" (Hall 1980b: 67).
But we can move further by pointing out that neither culturalism nor structuralism
correspond to either side of those dualisms (realism-idealism, empiricism-
intellectualism), but attempt - particularly in the move of Lacanian psychoanalysis to
6 Pilger, John (2008). Obama - we should dry our eyes quickly. Mail & Guardian, November 28, page
25.
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retain and to collapse (Freudian) dualism - to effect different forms of articulation
such as between text and context, agency and structure, and so on.
Similarly, Windschuttle's castigation of (postmodern) cultural studies as a fonn
of linguistic idealism, and his casting ofjournalism practice (and education) within
the language and logics of empiricism and realism, could have been identified as a
local expression of the underlying epistemological abstractions that sustain the
'science wars'. Thus the vulnerability of his charge could have been recognized and
neutralized by means ofthe challenge to the epistemological conceits that Michael
Shapiro (1986: 311) identifies as the prime target ofTaylor's project - and which he
began in his post-Marxist writing in the late 1950s.
It is not without significance that it was against scientific Marxism that the
proto-cultural studies group in Britain reacted in 1956. As Tom Rockmore (2001)
argues more forcefully than does Taylor, much of what is attributed to Marx in the
name of 'science' is the work of Frederic Engels. This is a contentious point, no
doubt; and as I have so far averred to question it seriously, I shall not make good that
debt here. Nonetheless, it is a view that colours Taylor's post-Marxist scholarship in
so far as he seeks to recover the "humanist side of Marx" (Fraser 2003a: 759) in line
with thinking derived from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's reading of Georg Lukacs. I shall
not review my arguments in previous chapters. What I do want to point out here,
however, is what this picture says about cultural studies as a site of(modern)
contestation.
In the opening chapter I suggested that British Cultural Studies was the
quintessential site ofpost-Marxist activism. Stuart Hall states emphatically that
cultural studies began with the first New Left in 1956 (Hall 1990: 12). In Cultural
Studies and its Theoretical Legacies (1992), Hall insists that cultural studies was from
the start a "Marxist critical practice" not least because the "New Left always regarded
Marxism as a problem, as trouble, as danger, not as solution" (Hall 1992: 279). In The
Problem ofIdeology - Marxism without Guarantees, he argues that "[p]ost-marxism
remains one of our largest and most flourishing contemporary theoretical schools"
(Hall 1986: 28), and distances the school from, on one side, the deconstructionist
"post-marxists" (or 'post-Marxists', as in my opening chapter) who "stand on the
shoulders of the very theories they have definitely destroyed" (Hall 1986: 28), and on
the other side, Perry Anderson, who regarded "problems relating to philosophy,
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epistemology, ideology and the superstructures ... as a deformation in the
development of Marxist thought" (Hall 198628).7
Significant proximities exist between Hall's (1986) post-Marxist argument for
the categories Anderson rejects, and Taylor's own recovery of the humanist Marx.
Hall's argument for the validity of Althusser's displacement of the base/superstructure
metaphor, both in response to theoretical problems that the economic determinacy of
classical Marxism presents to matters explaining and guiding cultural activism (Hall
1986: 32) he reiterates in large part in his later essay, Signification, Representation,
Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates (1996). Buried in both of
Hall's essays is a recognition of the vital place Hegel plays in any instructive reading
ofMarx (Hall 1986: 33; 1996: 16) - being a principle ofTaylor's post-Marxist
scholarship.
By inserting 'modem' in brackets, I am drawing attention to a problem of
whether and/or how postmodernity is an extension of modernity, and whether or not
the postmodern can be said to correspond with, or at least imbricates with, what I
discussed in the opening chapter as the post-Marxist period. In terms discussed there,
it is less problematic to identify postmodemity with the post-Marxist problematic
even though the 'postmodern condition' quite evidently preceded what could also be
called post-Communism. What I would prefer to settle with is to situate the post-
Marxist rupture at a point where modernity began to yield to the postmodem
condition, identified in one of its artifacts: the growing predominance of mass media
and popular culture. This point was evident in Britain in the late 1950s and early
1960s; the period corresponding to the formation of the New Left, leading to that of
cultural studies. It was the period in which Taylor's critique of empiricism in social
science began. But as he discusses in Sources (1989a), empiricism belongs to that
family of paradigms that include Enlightenment fundamentalism, coexisting with its
reactions in the Romantic movement expressed (particularly in hermeneutics and
phenomenology) eventuated in contemporary continental philosophy.
These two strands constitute the (post)modem condition, defined partly as a
(human) condition of radical choice and moral pluralism. As modem subjects, Taylor
says, we face an array of moral visions. Yet, as he writes in his essay, What is Human
7 See loan Davies's (1993: 123, 126) discussion on the debate between the culturalist E.P. Thompson
and the structuralist Perry Anderson.
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Agency? (l985a): "granted this is the moral predicament of man, it is more honest,
courageous, self-clairvoyant, hence a high mode of life, to choose in lucidity than it is
to hide one's choices behind the supposed structure of things, to flee from one's
responsibility at the expense of lying to oneself, of a deep self-duplicity" (Taylor
1985a: 33). Taylor here and elsewhere (Taylor 1989a; 2000b; 2002b) draws a close
correspondence between the 'modern condition' of what one could consider as a
dualism of contending modernities, and modern identities as being similarly
constituted.
I want to submit here that the 'modem condition' in which the Centre in
Birmingham found itself mirrored its own structure as a kind of 'intellectual
hothouse' of contending "multiple modernities" (Taylor 2000b: 367). That is, its
members engaged in contestation between contending sources ofmodernity such that
the Centre encapsulated what British Cultural Studies was about. The Centre was
situated in the dislocation between empiricism and intellectualism. Without
attempting to be neutral- Stuart Hall's dialogical ethics, for one, urged one to take
positions, and not merely to disavow them (Scott 2005: 1) - the Centre provided a
convergence between the contending sources of modernity that the post-Marxist
rupture afforded them, and the experiences by which mainly working class individuals
were inserted into social positions that were simultaneously interpellated and resisted.
That is, positioned within the Romantic tradition, and "[g]reatly influenced by
Marxist humanism, the early cultural theorists set out to 'rescue' that group of
individuals who had been disenfranchised and treated instrumentally in capitalist
modes of production and were therefore denied their intrinsic identity, worth, and
dignity" (Slack and Whitt 1992: 574). The situation that the (British) cultural studies
field contended was simultaneously political and ethical.
In sum, British Cultural Studies was constituted (first) as a reaction to the
economistic condition of classical ('scientific') Marxism, and to this end drew upon
the humanist Marx who, at that period of his thought, most evidently expressed his
Hegelian influence. From Tay1or's work in particular, we can see a correspondence
between the economism of classical Marxism and the backing of empiricism the
mechanistic outlook of Enl ightenment fundamental ism. "As conceived within the
Enlightenment fundamentalist's outlook, the demands of reason and nature are both
240
non-negotiable and empty as sources of orientation for the contingently acculturated,
purposeful subject" (Smith 1997: 4).
An adequate theory of the subject
To return to Windschuttle's contention against cultural studies, and bring into
view the counter-contention that he had misrepresented the field by reducing it to its
postmodern 'tendencies' in literary theory (Turner 2000), the point I have been raising
from Taylor's reading of Merleau-Ponty concerns the kind of subject that
Windschuttle imagines journalists to be. One point of contention that Windschuttle
raises is that cultural studies is unethical; implied in his claim that the field is
contemptuous towards media audiences: "In all the replies to my original paper, no
respondent disputed any of my claims about the contempt in which media audiences
are held by cultural studies academics" (Windschuttle 1999: 19).
The question of ethics and the subject is not entirely foreign to cultural studies
scholarship, evident in the fact that the driving force behind avoiding the excesses of
empiricism and intellectualism was the recovery of not only a plausible model of
agency, but also ofa subject of emancipation. That, too, is the purpose of Taylor's
philosophical anthropology. But I want to take up David Scott's (2005) argument that
Stuart Hall, too, pursued a project that was deeply ethical. He defines Hall's as a
"dialogical ethics" (Scott 2005: 2), and in so far as Scott's argument holds firm,
Hall's project bears a remarkable resemblance to Taylor's, particularly as given in his
essay, The Dialogical Seif(1991a).
By [Hall's dialogical ethics] I mean that his ethics are not rule-following of the
rationalist or Kantian sort in which what counts is mastery of the moral law.... Rather
[Hall's] ethics are founded in and shaped by responsiveness to alterity, to the opacities
of otherness, and to the unavoidable risks and ineluctable certainties haunting any
dialogical encounter, and any hope of belong-in-difference (Scott 2005: 2).
Furthermore, Hall's emancipated and critical subject, gauged by the model of
dialogical subjectivity that he promotes, allows for the constitution of a world more
thoroughly human than what Windschuttle's disengaged subject could possibly
accomplish. Granted, the literature on the ethics of cultural studies is sparse. Certainly
the agential subject has been inadequately conceptualized, swaying through theory
like a drunk - falling on one side into the 'ditch' of (modern) determinations; and
after being hauled to its feet, toppling over again to the side of ribald, carnivalesque
resistances celebrated in postmodernism - bearing a close resemblance to that
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humanist myth of "self-determined agency ... grounded in a mistaken belief of an
atomistic, autonomous self' (Freed 2001: 4).
Jennifer's and Laurie Whitt's (1992) essay was perhaps the first to address this
lacuna, and is driven partly by the situation where the "engagement with
postmodernism has brought to the surface questions that prompt debate over the
constitution of the subject and the problems and possibilities of politics" (Slack and
Whitt 1992: 571). A great silence followed their essay; to be punctured only recently
by Scott's (2005) essay on Hall's ethics and Mark Freed's (2001) essay on the eclipse
of agency in cultural studies. Without an adequate account of agency the very
possibility of ethical discourse is radically drawn into question" (Freed 200 I: 3).
Freed's (2005) paper is the only one I know of that brings Taylor into
discussion on subjectivity in cultural theory, but he does in an abstract fashion that
neglects to notice Taylor's deep connection to the post-Marxist foundations of the
kind of problematic that cultural studies faced. In this respect, Freed's discussion of
Taylor de-historicizes the problems of subjectivity that current debates in the field
engage in. By adding to a combined synopsis of Freed's (2001) and Scott's (2001)
papers a historicized account ofTaylor's philosophical anthropology (as I have been
pursuing throughout this thesis), a synthesis can be made of the transcendental
argument laid out in the Introduction of this thesis.
Stuart Hall, Scott writes, worries abollt "the solace of closure" (Scott 2005: I).
Hall "has cultivated an ethical voice responsive to the violations that grow our of
complacent satisfactions, secure doctrines, congealed orders, sedimented identities"
(Scott 2005: I). It is a worry that harks back to his questions on ideology and the
problems of determinacy inherited from the first post-Marxist dislocation that had
fused the New Left. "As with its interest in mechanisms of determination, cultural
studies'" general tendency to occlude the possibility of agency "is traceable to its
Marxist genealogy" (Freed 2001: 3).
Althusser did displace the base/superstructure metaphor upon which
determinacy was grounded (Freed 2001: 4; Hall 1986: 32), but conceded that
determinacy was economic in the final instance - "the last repository of the lost dream
or illusion of theoretical certainty," Scott (2005: 5) quotes Hall as saying. But in his
essay, Marxism without Guarantees (1986), Hall wants to establish an "open horizon
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of Marxist theory - determinacy without guaranteed closures ... determination of the
economic in the first instance" (Hall 1986: 43), thereby opening a space for
contingency that renders its subjects not sovereign, but exposed to conditions "over
which we may have no absolute control and to face the prospect of alternatives
between which it may be impossible to choose well" (Scott 2005: 7).
The idea that the present is contingently (over)determined does not imply that it is
simply constructed or invented by the sheer will of rational action, and therefore can
be reconstructed or reinvented by a fresh application of radical agency. Liberal as well
as postmodern subjects often perceive themselves as agents of pure choice, ironizing
agents who can stand back from themselves, so to speak, and revise and modify their
ends at will (Scort 2005: 7).
Further on, Scott describes Hall as saying that "there is something altogether
reductive and therefore morally about the picture of human selves and human
interaction that emerges from the one-sided Enlightenment admiration for a
sovereign, autonomous self legislating and single good for us all" (Scott 2005: 15).
He is describing the empirical self as opposed to the intellectualist self of
postmodernism; yet both types are impoverished; and therefore, from Merleau-Ponty,
are not true opposites (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 39).
While Scott provides a generalized account of Hall as an intellectual for whom
thinking "is a way of moving on ... of changing himself, [as] a way of preventing
himself from always being the same ... honouring the provisional in himself' (Scott
2005: 4) - before moving on to post-Marxist questions of ideology and the demands
of contingency - Mark Freed (2001) begins with these questions, then appl ies Tay lor
to them. Freed's discussion to this point concerns the record set by Raymond
Williams and Ernesto Laclau in the face of the poststructuralist development in
cultural theory. I shall not summarise Freed's treatment to this point, but start with the
problem of agency that Williams, LacLau and poststructuralism leave unsatisfactorily
theorized. However, the following contains the germ ofthe discussion:
In fact, the advent of poststructuralism itself has not made much advance in
recognizing a place of agency within its cultural analytic. Poststructural ism is largely
hampered - as post-MarXist cultural theory still is - by analytical emphasis on
determination. The ubiquity and importance of (structural) determination in
poststructuralism is perhaps best given in Derrida's dictum that there is nothing
outside textuality. It might reasonably be argued, in fact, that the inescapability of
structural determination of some kind is present in poststructuralism from the
beginning - that the recognition of the inescapability of linguistic determination in the
form of discourse marks the inauguration of poststructuralism itself (Freed 2001:6).
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Poststructuralism, therefore, fails as much as its structuralist predecessor to
allow for agency in a plausible way. Freed turns to Taylor after a brief discussion of a
'crippling incoherence' in poststructuralism, in which it is realized that any counter-
hegemonic initiative must arise apart from structuring pressures; yet at the same time
- having reduced human individuals to interpellated subject positions - denying this
possibility by the monolithic structuring principles of difference (Derrida) and
discourse (Foucault) (Freed 2001: 6-7). Ideological pressure make even the idea of a
possible self and impossibility.
Tay)or's conception of positive freedom - against liberalism's atomized
conception of 'negative freedom' (freedom from structuring principles) that accords
with Taylor's concept of 'weak evaluation' - derives significantly from his
conception of persons being hermeneutic, and regards social membership less as a
limitation than as an enabling condition of agency. Persons only shape their identities
in relation to others; in relation to alterity and the background that makes their agency
intelligible. Positive freedom amounts to the recognition that choices and
circumstances are negotiated.
In this condition, an atomized self could have no capacity to act, as both
background and circumstances are erased. The argument for positive freedom
"facilitates a simultaneous analysis of both determination and the possibility of
agency amid interpellative pressures (Freed 2001: 10), and is therefore "the very
move necessary to successfully underpin cultural studies as a mode of ethical
discourse. Most significantly, it is a move postmodern cultural studies has not yet
been willing or able to make" (Freed 2001: 8). Circumstances remain as crucial a part
of the background that makes agency both possible and intelligible. As such, Taylor's
concept of positive freedom - by articulating interpellative pressures and an "engaged
agency" that involves one's form of life and bodily existence (Taylor 1995a: 62) -
"presents a more adequate foundation on which to ground the aspirations of cultural
discourses to speak to ethical problems" (Freed 2001: 10).
Agents have to create the differences that produce agency, and they have to create
those differences in consciousness as a discursive product. Cultural studies can be the
discourse that objectifies these differences provided it take these conditions of agency
seriously and finds ways of articulating both circumstances and choices and the ways
they have been negotiated (Freed 2001: 11).
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Freed's advice might have been turned from discovering an answer to
theoretical problems that (postmodern) cultural studies still faces, to a suggestion that
scholars engage in a process of recovering from the field's history of "false starts" and
"dead ends" (McGuigan 1992: 31) in order to discover scholarship that was always a
part ofcultural studies' genealogy. In this respect, Freed's paper does not go far
enough as the value of Tay Ior's work lies not in its capacity to respond to the
inadequate conceptions of agency at large in much of cultural theory, but that his
conceptions were engendered as a participant in debates that are part of the field's
genealogy.
While Taylor (1968) makes no secret of his belief that an "unreconstructed
Marxism" would not serve socialist goals of achieving a socialist society - and that he
made this claim during the early period of British Cultural Studies - his successive
papers on Marx (Taylor 1974; 1978a; I 978b) show quite clearly that it was the
political programme and not Marx himself that he was rejecting (Taylor 1968 ISO-
181; 1 972b). He rejects Marxism for the same reasons that he rejects em piricism in
social science: each represents an implausible conception of agency, and with
palpable consequences for ethics. I have argued that Taylor presents the Romantic and
'expressivist' Marx against the empiricist Marxism that Tom Rockmore argues is the
'invention' of Engels. It is easy to line up objectors to this view. And whether or not
any of the "Marxisms" to which cultural studies has entertained would agree with
Taylor, only a further study could determine.
Perhaps the surest indication ofTaylor's connection to cultural studies, and
specifically to Hall's enormous contribution to the field, is Taylor's inclusion in
Without Guarantees: In Honour ofStuart Hall (Gilroy et al. 2000). Taylor's essay is
one I have referred to a number of times, and concerns the question of multiple
modernities against the Enlightenment and acultural conception of a single modernity
- acultural being the one to which modernization theories of development subscribe
(Taylor 2000b: 366-367) - whereas a cultural theory allows for difference and
differentiation across cultures, and allows for conceptions of modernity that are
ascribed differently from one culture to the next. The interstices between these and
their related 'multiple modernities' remain points of dislocation.
Taylor adds to his discussion the concept of the "social imaginary" (Taylor
2000b: 370-374). "I'm talking about the way ordinary people 'imagine' their social
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surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms: it is carried in
images, stories, legends, et cetera" (Taylor 2000b: 370). Social imaginaries are shared
at large, and possibly across an entire society (Taylor 2000a). It "is that common
understanding which makes possible common practices, and widely shared sense of
legitimacy" (Taylor 2000b: 371).
Humans operated with a social imaginary well before they ever got into the business
of theorizing about themselves (Taylor 2000a: 26).
The idea of a 'public sphere' is one imaginary - delivered to discourse by recent
theory, but having existed long before that. The idea of 'the people' is another.
(Perhaps these and other terms become public currency when they have already
expired.) Nonetheless, comparisons between Taylor's 'social imaginary' and Hall's
'ideology' suggest a striking like-mindedness. Taylor's option for the cultural against
the acultural suggests a similar affinity. The notion of 'multiple modernities' suggests
a way to understand linkages between society, culture, and difference. But in his
paper, Taylor is really speaking about the linkages between the representational and
expressive workings of language in modern societies - a theme to which many in
cultural studies could readily respond. This is instructive: Taylor is always one to
open spaces for discussion rather than to close down debate with dogmas ready to
hand. His way is dialogical, not monological. Thus he ends his paper:
[T]here is the entire phenomenon of development, that is, the evolution of societies
under the impress of others, more advanced, who borrow, adapt, create new and
hybrid forms. We are still looking for a language to understand this, to bridge
differences, make comparative studies.
I have been trying to suggest some directions in which we might look for the
languages we need. I hope they will prove fruitful (Taylor 2000b: 373-374).
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